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DEBRA HAMEL

ATHENIAN GENERALS

ATHENIAN GENERALS

MILITARY AUTHORITY IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD

BY

DEBRA HAMEL

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ABBREVIATIONS OF ANCIENT AUTHORS AND TEXTS

Ael.	Aelianus
VH	*Varia Historia*
Ael. Arist.	Aelius Aristides
Aeschin.	Aeschines
Andoc.	Andocides
Androt.	Androtion
App.	Appianus
BC	*Bella Civilia*
Ar.	Aristophanes
Ach.	*Acharnenses*
Av.	*Aves*
Nub.	*Nubes*
Plut.	*Plutus*
Ran.	*Ranae*
Thesm.	*Thesmophoriazusae*
Arist.	Aristoteles
Ath. Pol.	*Athenaion Politeia*
Oec.	*Oeconomica*
Pol.	*Politica*
Rh.	*Rhetorica*
Aristod.	Aristodemus
Ath.	Athenaeus
Cic.	Cicero
De Offic.	*De Officiis*
Clearch.	Clearchus
Dem.	Demosthenes
Ep.	*Epistulae*
Din.	Dinarchus
Diod.	Diodorus Siculus
Diog. Laert.	Diogenes Laertius
Dion. Hal.	Dionysius Halicarnassius
Din.	*De Dinarcho*
Lys.	*De Lysia*
Eph.	Ephorus
Eup.	Eupolis
Frontin.	Frontinus
Str.	*Strategemata*
Harp.	Harpocration
Hdt.	Herodotus
Hell. Oxy.	*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*
Hom.	Homerus
Od.	*Odyssea*
Hyp.	Hyperides
Is.	Isaeus
Isoc.	Isocrates
Just.	Justinus
Lex. Seg.	*Lexica Segueriana*
Luc.	Lucianus
Pr. Laps.	*Pro Lapsu*
Lycurg.	Lycurgus
Lys.	Lysias
Moer.	Moeris
Nep.	Cornelius Nepos
Alc.	*Alcibiades*

Arist.	*Aristides*
Chab.	*Chabrias*
Cim.	*Cimon*
Iph.	*Iphicrates*
Milt.	*Miltiades*
Phoc.	*Phocion*
Them.	*Themistocles*
Thras.	*Thrasybulus*
Tim.	*Timotheus*
P. Oxy.	Oxyrhynchus Papyri
Paus.	Pausanias
Philostr.	Philostratus
Her.	*Heroicus*
VS	*Vitae Sophistarum*
Pind.	Pindarus
I.	*Isthmian Odes*
Pl.	Plato
Apol.	*Apologia*
Chrm.	*Charmides*
Leg.	*Leges*
Menex.	*Menexenus*
Symp.	*Symposium*
Pl. Com.	Plato Comicus
Plut.	Plutarchus
Ages.	*Agesilaus*
Alc.	*Alcibiades*
Arat.	*Aratus*
Arist.	*Aristides*
Cat. Ma.	*Cato Maior*
Cim.	*Cimon*
Comp.	*Comparatio*
Dem.	*Demosthenes*
Fab.	*Fabius Maximus*
Luc.	*Lucullus*
Lys.	*Lysander*
Mor.	*Moralia*
Nic.	*Nicias*
Pel.	*Pelopidas*
Per.	*Pericles*
Phoc.	*Phocion*
Sert.	*Sertorius*
Them.	*Themistocles*
Thes.	*Theseus*
Tim.	*Timoleon*
Poll.	Pollux
Polyaen.	Polyaenus
schol.	scholiast or scholion
Strab.	Strabo
Sync.	Syncellus
Theopomp.	Theopompus
Thuc.	Thucydides
Vit. Aeschin.	*Vitae Aeschinis*
Vit. Thuc.	*Vita Thucydidis*
Xen.	Xenophon
Anab.	*Anabasis*
Ath.	*Atheniensium respublica*
Hell.	*Hellenica*
Mem.	*Memorabilia*
Oec.	*Oeconomicus*

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ABBREVIATIONS

Agora XVII	Bradeen, *The Athenian Agora XVII.*
AO	Develin, *Athenian Officials, 684-321 B.C.*
APF	Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C.*
ATL	Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists.*
CAH	Bury, Cook, and Adcock, *Cambridge Ancient History.*
Classen-Steup	*Thukydides.*
Eisangelia	Hansen, *Eisangelia: the Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century BC and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians.*
FGH	Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker.*
Fornara	*Translated Documents of Greece and Rome*, Vol. I: *Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War.*
GG	Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte.*
GHI	Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions.*
GSW	Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, Vols. II-V.
HCT	Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides.*
HW	How and Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus.*
I. Delos	Durrbach, Roussel, and Launey, *Inscriptions de Délos.*
IC	*Inscriptiones Creticae.*
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae.*
LSJ	Liddell, Scott, and Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon.* 9th ed.
ML	Meiggs and Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC.*
PA	Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica.*
Reinmuth	*The Ephebic Inscriptions of the Fourth Century B.C.*
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.*
SV	Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums.*

INTRODUCTION

Of fundamental importance to the study of Athens' history in the classical period is the identification of the locus, or loci, of authority in the Athenian polis. The question has received considerable attention in recent scholarship. There have been challenges to the traditional view which sees Athens' *ekklesia* as the sovereign body of the city. Hansen, for one, has argued that although the assembly may have been sovereign in the fifth century, its authority was subordinate to that of the *dikasteria* and *nomothetai* in the fourth.[1] Sealey suggests that Athens was not in fact a *demokratia* in the fifth and fourth centuries, but a "rule of law" in which decisions of the *ekklesia* were subordinate to *nomoi*.[2] The present study is likewise concerned with the question of sovereignty in Athens, though my focus is not the city's legal institutions but its most important *arche*, the *strategia*. Specifically, I attempt to define the limits of the authority which Athens' generals exercised in the military sphere with a view, principally, to illuminating the relationship which obtained between *strategoi* and the Athenian *demos*. It is my contention that the generals did not in fact exercise a significant degree of authority over their city's military operations. Rather, the *demos* controlled its generals both by means of its direct involvement in decision-making related to campaigns and by establishing in Athens a climate of fear which was very often sufficient to dissuade generals from acting in opposition to the Athenians' will. The sovereignty of the *demos*, embodied in the city's various institutions, was *not* attenuated as a result of powers granted to or assumed by the *strategia*.

Since we lack any contemporary description of the generals' powers in abstract terms, we cannot be certain, from the explicit testimony of our sources, of even the most basic of related issues, whether one of Athens' ten *strategoi* enjoyed greater authority than his fellows by virtue of constitutional perquisites. Denied the guidance of ancient *theoria*, we must look to praxis, the concrete history of the generals' *acta* and the reactions to those *acta*, to reconstruct the limits of the generals' influence over Athens' military operations.

The monograph is divided into four parts. In the first I consider the extent to which generals determined how a campaign was to be conducted and

[1] Hansen (1987), pp. 94-107.

[2] Sealey (1987) and (1981-82). For related discussion see Cohen (1995), pp. 34-57, Todd (1993), pp. 298-300, Ober (1989), esp. pp. 22 and 299-304, and Ostwald (1986), pp. 497-524.

concluded. Among the questions addressed are whether generals exercised effective control over the assembly's formulation of military policy, what role *strategoi* had in assembling an army once the decision to undertake a campaign was made, and whether generals themselves defined the terms according to which hostilities against defeated adversaries were concluded. In part two I consider the relationship of Athens' *strategoi* to their troops and subordinate officers. Special attention is given here to the influence which these strata of the military exercised over the behavior and decisions of generals in the field. Part three concerns the relationship which obtained between generals and their fellow commanders—the polemarch, their colleagues in the *strategia*, and the *hegemones* of other states with whom Athenian generals sometimes shared command. In part four I consider more explicitly the generals' relationship to the Athenian *demos*, with particular attention given to explicating the means, both direct and indirect, by which the Athenians exercised control over their most powerful—and potentially most dangerous—*archontes*.

Some of the questions that are addressed in this monograph are not as closely related as others to the principal issue here considered, the relationship of generals to the Athenian *demos*. But the inclusion of this information is, I think, highly desirable in light of the broader goals of the study: while intended as an investigation of the generals' authority over military operations, it is hoped that this monograph will at the same time serve more broadly as a description of the experience of Athens' generals in their capacity as military leaders. No such survey of the generals' fundamental task is currently available: over the past decades work on the Athenian *strategia* has focused more narrowly, for example, on the prosecution of generals, the circumstances of their election, and their constitutional position vis-à-vis one another, and numerous articles have treated the activities of individual *strategoi*. A comprehensive study seems overdue.

I have elected to transliterate the names of *strategoi* and most other personal names directly from the Greek, both because of my own aesthetic preference and in order to conform to the practice of Develin in his *Athenian Officials*, to which the reader may have frequent occasion to refer. I use the more familiar Latinate spellings, however, when referring to ancient authors and texts. The name of Thucydides the historian, who was, after all, a more successful author than general, is so spelled. In the case of geographical locations I have been inconsistent, transliterating less well-known names from the Greek but using Latinate forms when they are more familiar or when the transliterated alternative was to my mind repellent.

PART ONE

STRATEGOI AND THE CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER ONE

DELIBERATION AND PREPARATION FOR WAR

Nikias ascended the *bema* of the *ekklesia* in the spring of 415 and tried to dull the Athenians' passion for an expedition he thought wrong-headed. But his doubts about the need for the campaign and the specter he raised of renewed conflict with Sparta did not sway the ekklesiasts from their resolution of five days before. In the end one hundred ships were dispatched to Sicily and Nikias with them. He did not want to go.

We are better informed about the Sicilian expedition than about any other Athenian campaign. Thucydides' account of the undertaking is invaluable for its detail. Yet we may wonder how typical the expedition was of Athenian military actions. Was it customary for Athens' generals to influence Athenian military policy, or did they more regularly execute policy decisions formulated by others? Might Nikias have declined without reprisal his appointment to command in Sicily? These and similar questions are considered in the present chapter, whose subject is the contribution made by generals during the initial stages of an expedition, when war was discussed and prepared for at Athens.

1. *Deliberation*

The Athenian *demos* did not regularly delegate to its generals responsibility for determining Athenian military policy. The decision to undertake an expedition was rather made by the Athenians themselves,[1] deliberating in full assembly, who likewise considered questions related to the leadership, troop strength, and funding of proposed campaigns. But if the *ekklesia* exercised final control over Athens' military decision-making, we may yet wonder to what extent the resolutions of Athens' citizens, and indeed on occasion the fact of their being summoned to assembly, may be attributed to the influence of those who served as *strategoi*.

---

[1] Hornblower (1983), pp. 121-122 (cf. [1991], p. 500, and Andrewes [1966], p. 11), argues from Thuc. 4.90.1 that generals were able to call out troops "off their own bat." In this passage Thucydides does attribute to Hippokrates responsibility for levying the troops which were bound for Delion in 424. But nothing in Thucydides' account suggests that Hippokrates raised the troops on his own authority rather than in obedience to the Athenian *demos*: ὁ δὲ Ἱπποκράτης ἀναστήσας Ἀθηναίους πανδημεί, αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ ξένων ὅσοι παρῆσαν ὕστερος ἀφικνεῖται ἐπὶ τὸ Δήλιον....

1.1. *The Convening of* Ekklesiai

There is ample evidence that the *prytaneis* of the *boule* were invested in the late fifth and fourth centuries with the authority to convene the Athenian *ekklesia*. A number of decrees which have been preserved on stone[2] or are referred to by literary sources[3] number among their provisions the directive that the *prytaneis* summon one or more *ekklesiai*. Further evidence is provided by the author of the *Athenaion Politeia*, who includes the summoning of assemblies among the *prytaneis'* responsibilities (43.3). There is no suggestion in the latter's discussion that the *prytaneis* shared this responsibility with other Athenian officials. Nevertheless it appears that this was not always their exclusive prerogative. Our evidence indicates that generals too might sometimes have a hand in the convening of *ekklesiai*. The precise extent of their authority in this area, however, may be disputed.

Thucydides informs us that after the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, in 430, Perikles summoned an *ekklesia* with a view to encouraging the Athenians: ...ξύλλογον ποιήσας (ἔτι δὲ ἐστρατήγει) ἐβούλετο θαρσῦναι... (2.59.3; cf. 2.60.1: ἐκκλησίαν...ξυνήγαγον).[4] The implication of the passage is that Perikles convened the meeting on his own authority, acting in his capacity as *strategos*. This information is ostensibly at odds with that provided at *Ath. Pol.* 43.3, which suggests that the *prytaneis* alone summoned *ekklesiai*, but it may be that the responsibilities of generals had changed between 430 and the late fourth century, when the *Athenaion Politeia* was composed.[5] A different interpretation of Thuc. 2.59.3 is also possible, however. Thucydides may have neglected to describe in full the procedure by which Perikles initiated the meeting. The possibility that he "summoned" the *ekklesia* by requesting that the *prytaneis* do so, in other words, is not precluded by Thucydides' account.[6] The passage is therefore

---

[2] *IG* i^{3} 34.18-19 (448/7); *IG* i^{3} 93c.17 (415); cf. *IG* i^{3} 85.9-10 (418/17), where τὸς πρυτάνες has been restored.

[3] Thuc. 4.118.14; Aeschin. 2.53, 60, 61; 3.39, 67; cf. the forged decrees at Dem. 18.37, 21.8, 24.21 and 22, which are not, however, contemporary evidence (cf. ch. 1 n. 8).

[4] Plutarch (*Phoc.* 15.1) similarly attributes to Phokion the summoning of an assembly in 344/3 for the discussion of a Megarian request for help. (For doubts about the date of the campaign to Megara see Develin, *AO* p. 326). Cobet adds ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίησαν at Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.39 to produce the reading ἐκκλησίαν ἐποίησαν οἱ στρατηγοί. But Xenophon is here describing a meeting which took place in 403, immediately after the resolution of the civil war. If the generals did convene an *ekklesia* at this time, their doing so has little to tell us about the constitutional procedures which normally obtained in Athens.

[5] The decrees referred to in n. 2 above which attribute to fifth-century *prytaneis* the authority to convene assemblies cannot tell us whether generals ever shared in that task. They therefore do not provide evidence against the supposition that fifth-century generals could convene assemblies on their own authority.

[6] No explicit reference is made by contemporary sources to such a procedure, but a handful of second-century decrees refer to *ekklesiai* summoned by the *boule* at the behest of the generals (στρατηγῶν παραγγειλάντων): *IG* ii^{2} 911.5-7, *SEG* 24.134, *I. Delos* 1507.39-40; cf. *SEG* 21.440.3-4, *IG* ii^{2} 897.4-6, and 954.2-4 (with Agora inv. I 2105; see Tracy [1972], pp. 46-

not incompatible with the hypothesis, adopted by a number of scholars, that Athens' generals were obliged to act through the *prytaneis* in order to convoke *ekklesiai*.[7] Whatever the correct interpretation of 2.59.3, however, and this must remain in doubt, a second reference in Thucydides to *strategoi* and the convening of assemblies suggests that this characterization of the generals' participation in that task is inadequate.

In 423 the Athenians resolved to accept the terms that the Spartans had proposed for a year-long armistice. Thucydides records the provisions of an Athenian decree passed at this time, among which was the directive that the generals and *prytaneis* summon an assembly for discussion related to the embassies which the two states would exchange (4.118.14: ἐκκλησίαν δὲ ποιήσαντας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ τοὺς πρυτάνεις...).[8] That the *demos* on this occasion required that an assembly be convened by both the *strategoi* and *prytaneis* is difficult to explain if we assume, in accord with the model suggested above, that the generals' involvement in the summoning of assemblies was ordinarily limited to their communicating to the *prytaneis* their requests for *ekklesiai*. One may suppose that the generals' more

---

49). (These last three decrees contain the phrase βουλὴ ἐμ βουλευτηρίωι σύνκλητος στρατηγῶν παραγγειλάντων καὶ ἀπὸ βουλῆς ἐκκλησία.... It is possible that in these instances the generals requested only a meeting of the *boule*, and that the *ekklesia* which followed that meeting had been summoned in advance by the regular procedure [i.e., that σύνκλητος modifies βουλή and not ἐκκλησία]. For this suggestion see Harris [1986], p. 375, and cf. [1991], p. 330 n 16. Against this possibility see Hansen [1989c], pp. 188-190, and cf. [1983b], pp. 152-153.) In addition, ἐκκλησία στρατηγῶν παραγγειλάντων is restored at *SEG* 22.93 and *IG* ii^{2} 420. (The latter differs from the other decrees mentioned here in that it is dated to the late fourth century. This early date is among the reasons that the restoration [for which see Meritt (1964), p. 305] is doubted by Hansen [1983b], pp. 151-152 n. 14.) Finally, στρατηγῶν παραγγειλάντων is restored at Agora inv. I 6103.3-4 (Meritt [1967], p. 64). (See Tracy [1988], pp. 186-188, for suggested emendations of *IG* ii^{2} 911.5-7, Agora inv. I 6103.3-4, and *I. Delos* 1507.40.) These decrees provide one possible paradigm for the reconstruction of the constitutional practices alluded to at Thuc. 2.59.3: as suggested in the text above, it may be that fifth-century generals did not summon *ekklesiai* on their own authority, but rather convened meetings through the agency of the *prytaneis*. (An assumption of this reconstruction is that these two possibilities are mutually exclusive.) It is dangerous, however, to conclude anything about fifth-century practices from second-century evidence. Notwithstanding these decrees, therefore, the only compelling reason not to take Thucydides literally when he tells us Perikles summoned an *ekklesia* in 430 is that that information is not compatible with what we are told at *Ath. Pol.* 43.3.

[7] So Hansen (1987), pp. 24-25, and (1981a), p. 356 and n. 41; *HCT ad* 2.59.3; Hignett (1952), p. 246; Hauvette-Besnault (1885), p. 124.

[8] Other decrees preserved on stone or included in literary texts provide only dubious evidence for the participation of generals in the summoning of *ekklesiai*. (1) *IG* i^{2} 98.20-21 is restored to read that the *prytaneis* and *strategoi* are to summon an assembly (...*h*ο[ι δὲ πρυτάνες καὶ οἱ στρατεγοὶ τὲν ἐ]κκλεσίαν ποιόντον...). (The same restoration is not made at *IG* i^{3} 93c.20-21.) (2) The forged decrees in Demosthenes' *On the Crown* refer to *ekklesiai* summoned by the generals and *prytaneis* (18.37) and by the generals alone (18.73). These decrees are not contemporary evidence, however, and may reflect second-century rather than fourth-century constitutional practices (Hansen [1983b], p. 152 n. 14; cf. Schläpfer [1939], p. 207 and cf. pp. 28-29).

extensive participation on this occasion was extraordinary, demanded by the historical circumstances for reasons unknown to us. But it is difficult to imagine what would have made necessary, absent an emergency, the participation of the generals in an administrative task with which they normally were not involved. It is therefore preferable to assume that the generals' participation in this instance in the convening of an *ekklesia* was not extraordinary and that, therefore, their involvement with that task is not fully described by the model proposed above. We may rather suppose that under some circumstances generals of the late fifth century shared with the *prytaneis* the responsibility for summoning assemblies.[9] What those circumstances were, and what purpose the generals' participation in the task served, are not clear. But it is likely that Athens' generals no longer fulfilled the same function in the late fourth century: had the *prytaneis* shared with the *strategoi* at that time the responsibility for summoning *ekklesiai*, we would expect to be told as much at *Ath. Pol.* 43.3.

It remains to consider the earliest and most problematic reference in Thucydides to *strategoi* and the summoning of *ekklesiai*. As general in charge of the defense of Attica in 431 (see ch. 5 § 1.3), during the first Peloponnesian invasion of the war, Perikles adopted a relatively passive strategy which many Athenians came to criticize. Opposition to Perikles' conduct of the campaign, if not universal (2.21.3), was evidently strong enough that the Athenians would likely have resolved to adopt a more aggressive policy had they met in assembly while the Peloponnesians were in Attica. With a view to preventing the Athenians from doing so, we are told, Perikles ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν [the Athenians] οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα (2.22.1). Christensen and Hansen (1989) have argued persuasively that "*syllogos*", a generic term which can denote any type of public meeting, here refers in particular to military assemblies.[10] We need not be surprised that Perikles had the authority as *strategos* of the campaign in Attica to summon or not summon meetings of this type. The difficulty of the passage lies rather in ascertaining the extent to which Perikles exercised control over the convening of the *ekklesia* during the invasion.

Thucydides tells us that Perikles did not himself "summon" an *ekklesia* while the Peloponnesians were in Attica.[11] Taken by itself this information

[9] Rhodes (1972), p. 45, likewise concludes that "convening the ecclesia and arranging its agenda at this time may have been the joint prerogative of the prytanes...and the generals...."

[10] Bloedow (1987), pp. 12-17, argues against this interpretation and suggests that "*syllogos*" refers rather to a special or emergency meeting of the *ekklesia*. His objections are discussed by Christensen and Hansen in the addendum to their article ([1989], pp. 210-211). I agree with the latter that Thucydides is unlikely to have used "*syllogos*" to denote a particular type of *ekklesia*, since "*ekklesia*" alone would have sufficed to describe all types of assemblies of the *demos*.

[11] We are not explicitly told that *ekklesiai* were not convened for the duration of the invasion, but this is a likely inference from Thucydides' narrative. The next assembly to which

presents no difficulties beyond those which have already been addressed in connection with 2.59.3. We need only wonder, that is, whether Perikles could have summoned an assembly on his own authority rather than through the agency of the *prytaneis*.[12] The implication of 2.22.1, however, seems to be that the *ekklesia* was not convened during this time by *anyone*: neither the *prytaneis* nor Perikles' colleagues in the *strategia*, we are led to believe, took the initiative in summoning an assembly during the invasion. It is usually assumed, though it is not the only explanation possible, that Perikles was responsible for this moratorium on *ekklesiai*, an assumption which leads to the conclusion that Perikles had the authority, *de iure* or *de facto*, to prevent the Athenians from assembling. If so, he exercised for a time a stunning degree of control over the democratic machinery of Athens, and we must ask by virtue of what powers he succeeded in stifling, if only temporarily, ekklesiastic debate.

Several explanations for Perikles' ability to do so have been proposed. Bloedow maintains that Perikles prevented the Athenians from assembling by exercising the extraordinary powers he enjoyed due to his special status within the *strategia*—he was, Bloedow holds, "στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ in everything but the name."[13] Dover and others suggest that Perikles' *auctoritas*, rather than any constitutional authority he possessed, enabled him to prevail upon the *prytaneis* and his colleagues in the *strategia* to postpone the summoning of an *ekklesia* until the Peloponnesians left Attica.[14] Others

Thucydides alludes took place sometime after the Peloponnesians had withdrawn from Attica (2.24.1).

Rusten (1989), p. 129, argues that ἐκκλησίαν ποιεῖν "may emphasize public debate over a specific issue rather than the occurrence of an assembly itself," and he suggests as an explanation of 2.22.1 that "Pericles refused to debate περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι either in the assembly or elsewhere." But the appearance of ἐκκλησίαν and (some form of) the verb ποιεῖν in a number of fifth-century decrees (*IG* i^{3} 34.18-19, 85.9-10, 93c.17; Thuc. 4.118.14) suggests that this was the language regularly used in Thucydides' day to refer to the summoning of assemblies. As such it is unlikely that ἐκκλησίαν ποιεῖν at 2.22.1 would have been understood by fifth-century Athenians as anything other than a reference to the convening of an *ekklesia*. (The passages Rusten adduces in support of his interpretation of 2.22.1 [Ar. *Ach.* 169; cf. Ar. *Eq.* 746; Thuc. 1.139.3, 4.118.14] are not compelling evidence.) Furthermore, Perikles' refusal to discuss the issue would not have deterred others from doing so. Nor would it have prevented the Athenians from countermanding his decisions or, more alarmingly, removing him from the command in Attica. Perikles' silence would therefore not have been an effective means of preventing the Athenians from making an ill-considered decision, which was, we are told, the reason that ἐκκλησίαν οὐκ ἐποίει οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα. (For *that* strategy to be effective, of course, it was necessary that the *prytaneis* and the other *strategoi* follow Perikles' lead in not summoning an *ekklesia*.)

[12] References below to generals summoning *ekklesiai* should be understood to mean that the *strategoi* effected the convening of assemblies, whether on their own authority or by appeal to the *prytaneis*.

[13] Bloedow (1987), pp. 12, 17, 27. See also Schwahn (1935), col. 1079. On *strategoi autokratores* see appendix 13.

[14] Dover (1960), p. 75. See also Kagan (1974), p. 56; Hignett (1952), pp. 246-247; Kahrstedt (1936), p. 268. Cf. Ober (1989), p. 87; Brunt (1965), p. 265 n. 37.

suggest that Perikles was able to prevent the convening of an *ekklesia* because the generals' consent (or, we might rather say, because the consent of Perikles alone, as *strategos* of the campaign in Attica) was required before an assembly could be summoned in a military crisis of this sort, during which normal constitutional procedures did not apply.[15] Of these alternatives I would dismiss as unlikely only the first. I argue elsewhere (see ch. 5 § 1) against the contention that there was ever a commander-in-chief among Athens' generals, endowed by the Athenians with superior authority vis-à-vis his colleagues. As long as plausible alternative explanations of 2.22.1 are available, we ought not resort to explaining the passage by reference to the extraordinary powers Perikles is alleged to have possessed as *Oberstratege*.

The two explanations which remain are plausible enough, but I suggest an alternative: perhaps Perikles was not in fact responsible for the failure of the *prytaneis* and the other *strategoi* to summon an *ekklesia* during the invasion. It is normally assumed that the opposition to Perikles' policy which was being voiced κατὰ ξυστάσεις in Athens (2.21.3) in 431 would have led inevitably, in the absence of Perikles' machinations, to a formal assembly meeting at which those complaints might be lodged to better effect. But this need not have been the case. At 2.21.3 we are told that some Athenians wanted to take the field against the enemy. We are *not* told, however, that those who were opposed to Perikles' passive strategy were taking the formal steps necessary to effect a change in policy. There is no explicit indication in Thucydides' narrative, that is, that Perikles' critics were agitating for an assembly, or that any Athenian approached the appropriate officials with a view to having an *ekklesia* summoned.[16] It is therefore possible that no such appeals were made. The initiative for the convening of an assembly, however, if it did not come from the people, could yet have come from the *prytaneis* and *strategoi* themselves. But if the *prytaneis* were not legally *obliged* to summon an *ekklesia* during the invasion, as may have been the case,[17] and if they and the *strategoi* were not inclined as individuals to oppose the passive strategy which Perikles had adopted, we need not suppose that they would respond to the informally-voiced discontent of some of Athens' citizens by summoning on their own initiative a special meeting of the assembly. Those who were authorized to convene an *ekklesia*, that is, may have decided on their own that it was best to wait out the Peloponnesian invasion before giving a forum to Perikles' detractors.

We may wonder, if Perikles was just one of a number of officials who might have taken the initiative to summon an *ekklesia* in 431 but did not, why his failure to do so was significant enough to be recorded by Thucydides. I would suggest that although any of the *prytaneis* or *strategoi* might have convened the assembly, the Athenians would have expected Perikles himself, whose policy was under attack and who was therefore the most interested party, to respond to their discontent by initiating public discussion. This is precisely what did happen in the following year: after the second Peloponnesian invasion, when the Athenians' anger turned once again against their general, it was Perikles himself who called an assembly and sought to mollify them (2.59.3, 60.1). That he did not respond in this fashion in the previous year was, I suggest, noteworthy. It was not surprising, however, and therefore not worthy of mention by Thucydides, that Perikles' colleagues likewise failed to assemble the Athenians.

In conclusion, although Thuc. 2.22.1 can be interpreted to mean that Perikles had considerable authority, either *de facto* or *de iure*, over the convening of the *ekklesia* during the invasion of 431, my own interpretation of the passage ascribes to him no greater powers than are indicated also at 2.59.3. In his capacity as *strategos* in 431, that is, Perikles could have initiated the convening of an *ekklesia*, though in the event he elected not to.[18]

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[15] Sinclair (1988), p. 81; Brunt (1965), p. 265 n. 37. Cf. Harris (1986), pp. 373-374; Dover (1960), p. 75; *HCT ad* 2.22.1; Schwahn (1935), col. 1079. For related discussion see Hornblower (1983), pp. 120-121, and Ste. Croix (1956), p. 3 n. 12. See also appendix 1.

[16] Contrast 2.21.3 with 3.36.5, where we are told that in 428/7 the ambassadors from Mytilene and certain Athenians prevailed upon τοὺς ἐν τέλει (i.e., the *prytaneis* rather than, as Gomme suggested at *HCT ad* 3.36.5, the *strategoi*; cf. Hornblower [1991], p. 418, and *HCT ad* 5.27.2) to hold a second assembly for the purpose of discussing the fate of Mytilene.

[17] Christensen and Hansen (1989), pp. 198-199, point out that there may have been only one obligatory *ekklesia* per prytany in the fifth century (versus four in the latter half of the fourth century). If this was indeed the case, they argue, the interval between assemblies in the fifth century could have varied from a few days to as long as nearly two prytanies, or more than sixty days. The convening of the *ekklesia* could therefore have been delayed constitutionally for the duration of the first Peloponnesian invasion, which lasted fewer than forty days (Thuc. 2.57.2). Bloedow (1987), p. 17, objects to the authors' reasoning, but his own argument is not persuasive: "...in the circumstances a postponement of that duration would have been tantamount to a suspension. Would the Athenians, who were vigorously agitating for a pitched battle, and wanted either a regular meeting of the Assembly or an emergency meeting of the *demos* in order to secure a formal decision to this effect, have found acceptable a postponement of such meetings until after Archidamus had withdrawn?" As I argue above, however, there is no evidence that the Athenians were in fact agitating for an assembly.

[18] Among the questions for which a definitive answer is not possible is whether an *ekklesia* could have been convened at the behest of a single general, or if unanimity in the *strategia* or a majority decision were required. (The question is raised by Bloedow [1987], p. 18.) In either case, our understanding of 2.22.1 and 2.59.3 need not be changed dramatically: for "Perikles did not summon an *ekklesia*", that is, we might understand, "Perikles did not seek the support of his colleagues with a view to effecting the convening of an assembly." But I doubt that full or partial agreement among the generals was necessary. In many cases, because of the absence of generals from Athens, that requirement would have been impracticable. And as I suggest above, the potential for annoying the sovereign *demos* with arbitrary summonses to assembly will have acted as a disincentive to generals with a penchant for convening *ekklesiai*. Finally, if it was indeed the case that generals summoned assemblies through the *prytaneis*, the latter might themselves have served as arbiters of the generals' requests in the unlikely event that the *strategoi* disagreed about whether to put a matter before the *demos*. (Gomme at *HCT* 2.59.3 wonders whether the *prytaneis* were obliged to call assemblies at the generals' behest.)

Whether he or any general was able to convene the assembly on his own authority rather than through the agency of the *prytaneis* remains unclear, but the mechanics of the procedure in fact make little difference. Although the generals' ability to effect the convening of the *demos* constituted a measure of authority over the *ekklesia*, I would argue that that authority was not meaningful. Answerable as they were to their fellow citizens, whose hostility an arbitrary summons to assembly might rouse, generals would not likely have used their own powers or their influence with the *prytaneis* unless compelled to do so by extraordinary circumstances. Finally, that fifth-century generals sometimes shared with Athens' *prytaneis* the responsibility for convening *ekklesiai*, as Thuc. 4.118.14 suggests, likewise does not indicate that generals ever exercised a meaningful degree of authority over the summoning of assemblies.

1.2. *The Influence of Generals on the Formulation of Military Policy*

The ability of generals to effect the convening of *ekklesiai* did not necessarily translate into influence over the formulation of Athenian military policy. Political influence was exercised rather by those Athenians who elected to participate in assembly debate and who proved themselves persuasive in what must have been a difficult forum.[19] As was true of any Athenian citizen, it was necessary for generals who sought to affect military decision-making to persuade the *demos* to adopt their proposals. The influence generals might enjoy over ekklesiastic deliberation, that is, was not different in principle from that which any Athenian might exercise. But we may wonder whether the influence of generals over the formulation of Athens' military policy was not in fact considerably more extensive than that enjoyed by other citizens.

Our evidence suggests that throughout the classical period the men who were elected to Athens' *strategia* were by and large a politically active group. Generals account for roughly 15% of all the Athenians of the fifth and fourth centuries who are known to have delivered a speech before the *boule* or *ekklesia* or to have proposed *psephismata*.[20] We may safely assume that as politically active Athenians generals—both those currently serving in the *strategia* and those who had held the office or would do so in

[19] See Hansen (1987), pp. 69-72.

[20] See Hamel (1995), Table 3. We might imagine that service in the *strategia* conferred some measure of political influence on generals. The foreign policy and command experience which tenure of the generalship afforded *strategoi* is likely to have enhanced their credentials as advisors in the *ekklesia*—provided their year in office brought no disgrace. But as it is impossible to determine to what extent, if any, current and former *strategoi* owed their success in ekklesiastic debate to their military careers, I have chosen not even to speculate on the question here.

the future[21]—participated in assembly debates directly related to proposed or ongoing military campaigns at least as frequently as did non-generals. But did men who were currently in office participate *more* frequently than other politically active citizens in campaign-related deliberation? By way of answering this question I list in the excursus to this chapter the instances of involvement by generals in campaign-related debate that are explicitly attested in or suggested by our sources. There is credible evidence of more than twenty occasions throughout the fifth and fourth centuries in which generals currently in office participated in campaign-related deliberation. Against these, I know of only a handful of instances in which generals not currently serving as *strategoi* were involved in debates of this sort. The distribution of these attested occasions of political involvement in their careers suggests that generals were more likely to address the assembly in connection with military issues during the years they were serving as *strategoi* than at other times.[22] This suggests in turn that men currently serving in the *strategia* participated more frequently in—and were likely to enjoy a correspondingly greater influence over—military decision-making than did other politically active Athenians.[23]

That this should be the case is hardly surprising. It would be entirely natural that in the course of fulfilling their official functions Athens' gener-

[21] For the duration of this section I use the terms "general" and "*strategos*" to refer loosely to all those Athenians who are known to have served in the *strategia* at least once in their careers. When it is necessary to distinguish this larger group from generals currently serving in the *strategia*, I do so by a regrettably awkward periphrasis.

[22] One might also compare the involvement in campaign-related deliberation of men currently serving in the *strategia* with that of *all* Athenians not currently serving as generals. The advantages of confining the discussion to known generals, however, both those who were currently serving as *strategoi* and those who were not, are two-fold: (1) In doing so we can be reasonably certain that the only measurable difference between the groups to be compared is that the members of one group were currently in office. (2) Plutarch provides much of our evidence for the involvement of Athens' generals in assembly debate. But because he is interested in the activities of the subjects of his *Lives* largely to the exclusion of others' accomplishments, the author tends to record only his subjects' participation in ekklesiastic deliberation. Since many of Plutarch's subjects were generals, we probably hear from him of a disproportionately large number of instances of political involvement by generals. It is likely, that is, that Plutarch provides a picture of ekklesiastic participation which does not reflect the historical balance between speakers who were generals and those who were not. This imbalance would be a concern were we comparing the political participation of those who were currently serving in the *strategia* to all those who were not, but comparing the participation of men currently serving as *strategoi* to that of known generals not currently in office eliminates this difficulty.

[23] As a group generals were also politically active in the years they were not serving as *strategoi*. About two-thirds of the attested instances of participation by generals in ekklesiastic debate (related to both military and non-military issues) date to years in which the participants are not known to have served in the *strategia*. (I have gleaned this information from Index I of *AO*.) It is therefore not inappropriate, I think, to use generals not currently serving in the *strategia* as representatives of politically active Athenians as a whole, and to assume, as I have here, that their level of participation in campaign-related deliberation was comparable to that of all politically active Athenians.

als had occasion to address the *ekklesia* in connection with military issues far more frequently than had the average Athenian citizen.[24] Generals, for example, might sometimes receive information from foreign states which they were required to share with the Athenian *demos*.[25] Alternatively, they might address the *ekklesia* with a view to being given a particular command[26] or, perhaps exceptionally, of being released from a command to which they had been elected.[27]

Whatever the extent of the influence which generals currently serving in the *strategia* enjoyed over campaign-related deliberation, the Athenian *demos* will have retained final authority over the military decisions that were made in Athens' *ekklesia*. Nevertheless, it would be of interest to know whether the influence of generals was so extensive as to confer on them effective control over Athens' military policy. Unfortunately, our sources do not comment specifically on the degree of respect which the military advice of generals commanded in the *ekklesia*, but it is certainly the case that generals were sometimes opposed in their policies, both by their colleagues in the *strategia* and by others.[28] This and the Athenians' penchant for scrutinizing and disciplining their generals (cf. chapter 8) suggest that the *demos* did not blindly follow the advice of its elected officials. I suspect that the influence which Athens' generals enjoyed over the formulation of Athenian military policy, while more extensive than that of most politically active Athenians, fell rather far short of effective control.

2. *The Appointment of Generals to Commands*

For much if not all of the classical period the appointment of generals to particular commands was a separate procedure from their election to the *strategia*.[29] Generals were elected in the spring of each year (*Ath. Pol.*

[24] Cf. Sinclair (1988), p. 81, Jones (1957), p. 125, and Hignett (1952), pp. 245 and 249, on the frequency of the generals' consultation with the *boule*.

[25] See the excursus to this chapter: Demosthenes and Hippokrates in 424/3 (twice); Phokion in 344/3; and cf. Kimon in c. 476 and the Athenian reaction to the capture of Elateia in 339/8.

[26] Ch. 1 excursus: Miltiades in 490/89; Phokion, perhaps, in 340/39.

[27] Ch. 1 excursus: Nikias in 416/15.

[28] Ch. 1 excursus: Ephialtes vs. Kimon in 463/2; Perikles vs. Tolmides in 448/7; Kleon vs. Nikias in 425/4; Nikias vs. Alkibiades in 416/15; Phokion vs. Leosthenes (son of Leosthenes) in 323/2. I would note here also that non-generals could and did influence Athenian military policy. (So, for example, Kephalos in 379/8: Din. 1.39; Leptines in 369/8[?]: Arist. *Rh.* 1411a4-5; Kephisodotos in 358/7: Arist. *Rh.* 1411a9-11; Demosthenes in 340/39: Philochoros *FGH* 328 F 55, Dem. 18.80, Plut. *Dem.* 17.2; Demosthenes in 335/4: Diod. 17.8.6. Isocrates, who likewise never served in the *strategia*, attempted to influence Athens' military policy via political pamphlets [e.g., the *Plataicus* of 373-371].)

[29] *IG* ii^2 123.13-15 clearly refers to two stages of election: ...ἑλέσθαι στρ[α]τηγ[ὸν ἐ] | κ τῶγ κεχειροτονημένων, [τ]ὸ[ν δὲ α] | [ἱ]ρ[ε]θέντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι [Ἄνδρου]. Dover

44.4), some four months (i.e., prytanies) before entering office, and were appointed to command expeditions during the course of their year of service as the need arose.[30] This situation changed to an extent when the Athenians began to elect a number of their *strategoi* to annual positions with narrowly defined responsibilities. The appointment of generals to these positions presumably occurred on the occasion of their election to the *strategia*, but it is not known whether generals were elected directly to their posts or were assigned their positions by a separate vote.[31] Our earliest evidence for this departmentalization of the *strategia* is an inscription dated to 352/1.[32] In it

(1960), p. 72 n. 23, points out that Diodorus regularly confuses election to the *strategia* with appointment to commands: "...the effect of his phraseology, e.g., in 11.81.4, 85.1, is to suggest that a man only becomes a general when he was given such a command."

[30] Badian (1971), p. 26 n. 68, claims that Melanthios was chosen not from among previously elected generals but on an *ad hoc* basis to command the forces which Athens sent to Ionia early in the fifth century. The language of Herodotus, however, who alone refers to Melanthios' appointment (5.97.3), does not warrant this conclusion: Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν δὴ ἀναπεισθέντες ἐψηφίσαντο εἴκοσι νέας ἀποστεῖλαι βοηθοὺς Ἴωσι, στρατηγὸν ἀποδέξαντες αὐτῶν εἶναι Μελάνθιον, ἄνδρα τῶν ἀστῶν ἐόντα τὰ πάντα δόκιμον. ("The Athenians were persuaded and voted to dispatch twenty ships as aid to the Ionians. They appointed as general of the fleet Melanthios, a citizen who was distinguished in all respects.") Nothing in Herodotus' account implies that Melanthios was not an elected general prior to his appointment to the Ionian command.

Kleon was certainly not a general when appointed to the command in Pylos in 425/4 (Thuc. 4.27.5-29.1), but his appointment does not imply that he was admitted at the same time to the *strategia*. Although later sources refer to Kleon as a *strategos* ([Dem.] 40.25; Diod. 12.63.4; Plut. *Nic.* 7.5), Thucydides does not. See Fornara (1971), p. 59, and *HCT ad* 7.16.1.

Plutarch (*Phoc.* 16.4) may provide evidence of an *ad hoc* appointment in 338/7, however. We are told that after the Athenian defeat at Chaironeia the vocal revolutionaries of the city dragged Charidemos to the *bema* "thinking him worthy to be general" (...τῶν θορυβοποιῶν καὶ νεωτεριστῶν ἐν ἄστει τὸν Χαρίδημον ἑλκόντων ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα καὶ στρατηγεῖν ἀξιούντων...). In the end, after the intercession of the Areopagos Council, the Athenians gave control of the city to Phokion, but Charidemos is known to have served as a general in this year: he was given charge of the hoplites and sent to Salamis with Diotimos, son of Diopeithes (Dem. 18.116; cf. Dem. 18.114 and *IG* ii^2 1496.28-30; a generalship for Diotimos in this year is indicated at *IG* ii^2 1628.396-397, 1629.915-916, and 1631.10-11). The question is, was Charidemos elected to the *strategia* as a result of this incident, or was he already a general at the time? Gehrke (1976), p. 61 n. 52, argues that στρατηγεῖν does not imply that Charidemos was newly elected to the *strategia*; the Athenians were merely considering during the debate described by Plutarch to whom they would entrust the military command of the city. Tritle (1981), p. 128 n. 27 (cf. pp. 122 and 132), rejects this interpretation and argues that the backing of Charidemos by "revolutionary masses" implies that he was not a general at the time. Neither explanation is clearly preferable. Plutarch's language certainly is imprecise if (as Gehrke suggests) στρατηγεῖν is meant to refer to Charidemos' appointment to a position of exceptional authority within the *strategia* rather than to his election to the *strategia*. But Plutarch's reputation for precision is perhaps not strong enough to warrant excluding the possibility. (For related discussion see Tritle [1981], pp. 131-132, who argues [against Gehrke (1976), p. 63] that Phokion was already a general when given command of the city.)

[31] Cf. Rhodes (1981), pp. 678-679, on *Ath. Pol.* 61.1.

[32] For discussion of the date at which the annual posts were introduced, see Rhodes (1981), pp. 678-679, and Ferguson (1909), pp. 320-322. See also Hammond (1969), pp. 115-117 and 142, who dates the reform to soon after the Second Persian War, and Sarikakis (1953), pp. 257-261, who argues for a date shortly after the Athenian defeat at Chaironeia (cf. Sarikakis

reference is made to the *strategos epi ten choran*,[33] the general who was responsible throughout the year for protecting the Athenian countryside and waging war in Attica in case of invasion. Four more of Athens' ten generals held similar positions within the *strategia* by the 320's.[34] It is clear that after the introduction of these annual posts numerous expeditions under consideration in Athens will yet have fallen outside the purview of the specially appointed generals. Thus it remained necessary throughout the classical period for the Athenians to appoint generals to commands during the course of the year. The creation of special assignments within the *strategia* presumably affected the appointment procedure only by decreasing the frequency with which the Athenians were obliged to make such appointments, and by reducing the pool of unassigned generals who were available to assume commands in mid-year. It is my purpose in the present section to consider the criteria by which these appointments were made. Of particular concern is the influence which the generals themselves had on their own appointments and those of their colleagues.

We may imagine that in the debate which surrounded the appointment of generals to campaigns consideration was given to the military experience of the various candidates for the position.[35] It is unlikely, for example, that inexperienced generals were entrusted with the sole leadership of expeditions, particularly those of considerable importance. Other aspects of a general's background might likewise inform the Athenians' decisions. In a number of instances we find as commanders of expeditions generals who are known to have been familiar already with the territory in which they were campaigning or who were associated with influential citizens in the area. Hagnon, for example, campaigned in Chalkidike on two occasions (Thuc. 2.58.2, 2.95.3)

[1976], pp. 13-14). Fornara (1971), pp. 79-80, sees evidence for the introduction of special competencies in the late fifth century. Cf. appendix 11.

[33] *IG* ii[2] 204.19-20: ...τὸν στρατηγὸν τὸν ἐπὶ τὴ | [ν φυλ]ακὴ[ν τῆς χ]ώρας κεχειροτονημένον....

[34] The *strategos epi tous hoplitas* (or *epi ta hopla*) assumed command of Athens' hoplites when they were led out. Two *strategoi epi ton Peiraiea* were responsible for guarding the population of the Peiraieus. And the *strategos epi tas symmorias* had responsibilities related to the trierarchic symmories (*Ath. Pol.* 61.1).

[35] I know of no explicit testimony to this effect, but the Athenian ethos was not so unlike our own that they did not recognize experience as a desirable quality for military leaders. Their appreciation of experience in the military sphere is suggested by the differences between Athens' *strategoi* and other *archontes* (cf. [Xen.] *Ath.* 1.3): whereas most of Athens' some 1200 annual officials were amateurs, selected by lot and prohibited from holding any office more than once, *strategoi* were elected to their positions and could hold office repeatedly (*Ath. Pol.* 62.3). (There were about 700 officials in Athens [*Ath. Pol.* 24.3] in addition to the 500 *bouleutai*; on the number of *archai* see Hansen [1991], pp. 239-240, and [1980], pp. 166-167.) All of this is not to say that the Athenians were incapable of electing to the *strategia* men who lacked extensive military experience. See for example Xen. *Mem.* 3.4 on the qualifications of Antisthenes for the job. Whether the Athenians invested inexperienced generals with sole authority over difficult commands is another question.

after having founded Amphipolis in Thrace (4.102.3).[36] Thucydides, who likewise served in the North, possessed the right of working gold mines in Thrace and consequently enjoyed considerable influence in the area (4.105.1).[37] Phokion was sent out to help Athens' allies in the Hellespont in 340/39. His friendship with a leading citizen of Byzantium won for him and his army a hospitable welcome in that city (Plut. *Phoc.* 14.6-7), and it is very likely that that relationship and Phokion's reputation in the Hellespont had been important factors in the Athenian decision to appoint him to the command.[38]

It was also possible, if probably unusual, for foreign states to influence the appointment of generals to campaigns by asking that particular commanders be dispatched for service in their countries. The appointment of Phormion's son Asopios to his command in the West in 428/7 was prompted by such a request. In the spring or early summer of 428 the Akarnanians had sent an embassy to Athens asking that Phormion be sent out to them as general. The Akarnanians' interest in obtaining Phormion's services is not surprising: he was a familiar figure in the West at the time, having served in the Corinthian Gulf with considerable success in 430/29 and 429/8 (Thuc. 2.69.1, 80-82, 102-103). The Athenians were evidently prepared to comply with the Akarnanians' wishes (schol. Ar. *Pax* 347), but they were prevented from dispatching Phormion by circumstances that are unknown to us. In the end they agreed to the Akarnanians' second request, that a son or relative of Phormion be sent out in his stead.[39] A similar inci-

[36] It is possible, however, that Hagnon was not a general on the second occasion. Thucydides tells us he was in Thrace in 429/8 to act as *hegemon* on a Thracian expedition against Macedon and Chalkidike (2.95.3). Hagnon was apparently supposed to lead Athenian troops on the expedition once they arrived (ἔδει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους...παραγενέσθαι), but in the event they were never dispatched (2.101.1).

[37] Kimon likewise operated around Cyprus and Pamphylia in both 466/5 and 451/0 (Thuc. 1.100.1, 112.2; Plut. *Cim.* 12-13, 18). See also Connor (1971), p. 156 n. 45: "It is interesting to note that both Nicostratus and our Dieitrephes II commanded Thracians, Thucydides 4.129.1 and 7.29.1 [cf. 8.64.2]. The family may have had special interest or competence in this area."

[38] Phokion was appointed to the command in the wake of Chares' failed expedition in the area. The latter's campaign had been unsuccessful at least in part because Athens' allies, who distrusted Chares, had refused him access to their harbors. Phokion convinced the Athenians that Chares and his colleagues were responsible for the allies' hostility since they had failed to gain their trust (Plut. *Phoc.* 14.3-5). We are not told as much, but that the Athenians responded to Phokion's speech by appointing him to the command of a second expedition to the Hellespont suggests that Phokion had referred in his speech to his own reputation and personal connections in that region. For discussion of this incident see also Tritle (1988), p. 110.

[39] Thucydides (3.7.1) refers only to the Akarnanians' request for a relative of Phormion, but a fragment of Androtion (*FGH* 324 F 8 = schol. Ar. *Pax* 347) indicates that the Akarnanians were initially interested in obtaining Phormion's leadership (assuming, that is, that Thucydides and Androtion are referring to the same embassy; see Harding [1994], pp. 101-104, however, who does not identify the two embassies). At first, Phormion was prevented from serving as general by his *atimia*. Why he was not dispatched to the West after he regained his political rights is a mystery. For bibliography and further discussion see ch. 8 n. 42.

dent occurred in the late 350's. Kersobleptes, the Odrysian king of Thrace, sent an ambassador to Athens to advise the Athenians to elect as general Charidemos, who had long been associated with Kersobleptes and his father Kotys.[40] According to Demosthenes, Kersobleptes intended that Charidemos be sent north after his election, where he could support the King against his Thracian rivals and their Athenian supporters. In his speech before the Athenian assembly the Thracian ambassador may not have alluded to the services which Charidemos could render Kersobleptes, but he did announce that Charidemos alone would be able to recover Amphipolis for Athens (Dem. 23.10-15). It seems likely, therefore, that Kersobleptes' ambassador suggested not only that the Athenians elect Charidemos general, but that they appoint him to a command in the North as well. Kersobleptes' overture, however, was less successful than had been that of the Akarnanians some eighty years before. Although Charidemos was eventually elected to the *strategia*—he was sent north in 351/0 to counter Philip's actions on the coast of the Propontis (Dem. 3.5)—it is impossible to know whether Kersobleptes' suggestion was in any way responsible for his election. Certainly the Thracian campaign which Kersobleptes had envisioned never materialized.

The political considerations which influenced the Athenians' appointment of generals were by no means limited to concern for the preferences of Athenian allies. It has been suggested, for example, that Lakedaimonios was appointed to command in Corcyra in 433 because his pro-Spartan background was expected to make less likely the eruption of the Corcyraean affair into a major conflict.[41] Antiphilos was allegedly sent north during the Lamian War in preference to Phokion because some Athenians feared the latter would end the war against Macedon if given the chance.[42] In isolated instances such as these the politics behind particular appointments are alluded to by our sources or can reasonably be suspected from the evidence

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It is clear that the appointment of Asopios to his command in the West was the result of the Akarnanian embassy. Unfortunately, we cannot know whether his election to the *strategia* was likewise prompted by the Akarnanians' request. (That Asopios was an elected general is certain [Thuc. 3.7.1].) Among other things, we do not know whether the embassy arrived in Athens before or after the spring elections. If before, it is reasonable to believe that the Akarnanians were behind Asopios' election. If the embassy arrived after the elections, we must believe either that Asopios had been elected to the *strategia* prior to its arrival or that he was made general by special election as a result of the Akarnanians' request (cf. Fornara [1971], p. 56). That the Athenians had been prepared to relieve Phormion of his *atimia* and elect him general indicates, at any rate, that they were not opposed in principle to allowing foreign states to influence their elections.

40 For Charidemos' career see Parke (1933), pp. 125-132 and 146.

41 So Stadter (1989), p. 266, Wilson (1987), p. 53, Ste. Croix (1972), pp. 76-77, and Kagan (1969), p. 244.

42 Plut. *Phoc.* 24.1-2. Gehrke (1976), p. 152, doubts the historicity of the story which Plutarch reports.

available to us. For the most part, however, we must remain ignorant of the political considerations which influenced Athenian appointments and of the tribal, familial, and other loyalties which probably determined how large numbers of Athenians voted.

Given the numerous factors which might influence the Athenians' appointments, it is dangerous to assume that a general's command of a particular expedition signifies his agreement with the policy which prompted it.[43] Nikias' reluctance to lead Athens' forces to Sicily is ample warning against equating a general's views with the opinions of those whose orders he was following.[44] One ought also guard against a related assumption, that generals who were appointed as commanders of the same campaign necessarily shared political views or were otherwise associated with one another. The Sicilian expedition again offers evidence to the contrary: that Nikias and Alkibiades harbored animosity for one another is prominent in Thucydides' account of the expedition's prelude (6.12.2, 15.2).[45] Finally, one

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43 For the same view see Ste. Croix (1972), p. 316, and Gomme (1962), pp. 103-104. As an example of this assumption in historical scholarship see Tritle (1988), pp. 108-109: "Eubulus is usually identified as the architect of the Euboean campaign of 348 B.C., and the appearance of Hegesileus and Phocion is construed as evidence of this influence. It is unlikely, however, that Phocion was an associate of Eubulus; he was probably an established politician with his own group, and *his appearance argues that he had given his support to the undertaking*. Phocion's command of the expedition, to which Hegesileus may have succeeded, indicates an agreement on policy by two political groups rather than the ascendance of one" (emphasis added).

44 Nikias' reluctance: Thuc. 6.8.3-4, 34.6; Lys. 18.2-3; Plut. *Nic.* 12.4, 14.1; *Alc.* 18.1-2; cf. Thuc. 6.23.3, 7.15; Plut. *Nic.* 19.10.

45 I would suggest a second example. After the Athenian defeat at Embata in 356/5, Chares accused his colleagues Iphikrates and Timotheos of treason because they had refused to take part in the battle. As a result of Chares' accusations Iphikrates and Timotheos were recalled to Athens and tried (Nep. *Tim.* 3.4-5; Diod. 16.21.4; for discussion and additional references see the excursus to ch. 8, nos. 56-58, and Hansen, *Eisangelia* nos. 100-102). Differences of opinion regarding how a campaign should be conducted do not in themselves suggest that the generals concerned held opposing political views. But in this case the outcome of the disagreement was so serious that one suspects Chares had been neither his colleagues' personal friend nor their political ally prior to the dispute. (Cf. Roberts [1982], pp. 45-49, who suggests that while the immediate motivation for Chares' charges was his need to deflect blame for the defeat from himself, the opposition between the general and his colleagues was deeper and was related to their different approaches to foreign policy.) I should note that Chares, Iphikrates, and Timotheos did not assume command of the expedition in Ionia by the same vote: Chares was dispatched to Ionia first with Chabrias and was only later joined by Iphikrates and Timotheos (Diod. 16.7.3, 21.1).

Diodorus (13.36.3-4, cf. 13.34.3) reports that when the Four Hundred were in charge in Athens after the defeat in Sicily they prosecuted the war less competently than had the democracy: they sent out forty ships to Oropos under the command of two generals who were ill-disposed toward one another (...δύο στρατηγοὺς ἀλλοτρίως ἔχοντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους.... οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐστασίαζον). These generals subsequently lost 22 ships in a battle against the Peloponnesians. Diodorus' remark suggests that the democracy would not similarly have appointed to the same command generals who were at odds with one another, a view which is disproved by the democracy's appointment of Nikias and Alkibiades to the Sicilian command. That the hostility between the generals who were sent to Oropos

cannot assume that a general who is known to have supported the policy behind a particular expedition was necessarily appointed to its command. After Skione revolted from Athens in late 424/3 the Athenians passed a decree on the motion of Kleon to recapture the city and put its inhabitants to death (Thuc. 4.122.6). The expedition was prepared immediately and was launched before the end of the year. But command of Athens' forces was not given to Kleon (4.129.2), despite that he was a general in this year and had by this time been elected to the *strategia* for 423/2, and despite the fact that his involvement with the expedition would not have been precluded, so far as we know, by a previous appointment.[46]

I have suggested above that a general's appointment to a particular command was not contingent upon his agreement with the policy he would be called upon to execute. Conflicts between a general's views and the demands of the command to which the Athenians had assigned him might therefore be considerable. We may wonder whether it was possible under such circumstances—or under any circumstances—for a general to decline a command to which he had been appointed. What evidence we have suggests that he could not. In two instances our sources refer explicitly to the reluctance of generals to assume particular commands: Lakedaimonios was allegedly sent to Corcyra in 433/2 against his will (Plut. *Per.* 29.2), and Nikias was likewise displeased with his appointment to command in Sicily in 416/15 (cf. ch. 1 n. 44). Nothing is recorded of Lakedaimonios' reaction to his appointment, but we are told at length of Nikias' efforts to dissuade the Athenians from undertaking the expedition to Sicily (Thuc. 6.8.4-14, 19.2-24.1). His motives in doing so were to some extent altruistic: Nikias wanted to prevent the Athenians from implementing a policy he thought mistaken. But Thucydides' account suggests that Nikias was motivated as well by his desire to extricate himself from the command.[47] What is noteworthy is that the means by which he attempted to do so were indirect: despite his reluctance to sail to Sicily and his disagreement with Athenian policy, Nikias did not simply decline his appointment.[48] In the end both he

attracted the attention of Diodorus and his source suggests that it was unusually severe. Finally, Isocrates, in enumerating the advantages of monarchy in war, claims at 3.24 that the Athenians meet with misfortune when they dispatch many generals on a single expedition.

46 In 422, however, Kleon was appointed to command an expedition to Thrace which he had apparently urged the Athenians to undertake (Thuc. 5.2.1).

47 Thuc. 6.8.4: καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἀκούσιος μὲν ᾑρημένος ἄρχειν, νομίζων δὲ τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ὀρθῶς βεβουλεῦσθαι...παρελθὼν ἀποτρέψαι ἐβούλετο....

48 Nikias did offer to yield his command to anyone who disagreed with his thinking on the requirements of the expedition (Thuc. 6.23.3; and see Dover's comment on the passage in *HCT*). This was indeed a more direct attempt to rid himself of the command in Sicily than was the rest of what he said in his speeches, but Nikias' offer was not an outright rejection of the Athenians' appointment. Nor did anything come of it, although Nikias had met with success using the same ploy in 425/4.

and Lakedaimonios assumed their commands in obedience to the Athenian *demos*. Whether they could have acted otherwise cannot be determined with certainty, but that they did not is telling.[49]

A second incident in which Nikias was involved requires discussion in this context. In the course of an assembly meeting in 425/4, Nikias was criticized by Kleon for his failure to sail out and capture the Peloponnesians whom the Athenians had trapped on the island of Sphakteria. This, Kleon boasted, was what he would do were he in command. His comments prompted some of the Athenians who were in attendance to suggest that he make the expedition himself, and Nikias, taking his cue from their reaction, offered to surrender to Kleon his command in Pylos.[50] Although he was reluctant to make the expedition, Kleon was eventually compelled to accept Nikias' offer by the Athenians' continued insistence that he do so (Thuc. 4.27.5-28.3; cf. Plut. *Nic.* 7.3-5, *Alc.* 14.4). This episode does not, I think, contradict the conclusion suggested above, that generals were not entitled to decline their appointments. The part which Nikias played in transferring his assignment to Kleon was secondary. It was the Athenians who initially sug-

49 Plutarch (*Cim.* 18.5) suggests that Kimon could not get out of his campaign to Cyprus in 451/0 (...οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἀνάδυσις τῆς στρατείας...), but I am not convinced that he is making an historically accurate reference to Kimon's inability to decline his appointment. Plutarch may have inserted the remark as a means of explaining to his readers why Kimon sailed to Cyprus despite that his death on the expedition had been twice prophesied.

Plutarch (*Phoc.* 9.3) and Nepos (*Phoc.* 2.5 [which concerns an event that occurred in 317]) refer to occasions (or it may be the same occasion) on which Phokion was not willing to lead Athens' troops when the Athenians bid him do so. Without the substantiating report of some source more attentive to constitutional detail, however, I am not willing to accept their testimony as evidence that Athens' generals could refuse commands in the late fourth century. Perhaps a more reasonable interpretation of their evidence is that Phokion vehemently opposed the expedition(s) in the context of an assembly debate. Cf. ch. 1 excursus n. 21.

50 Gomme (*HCT ad* 4.28.3) doubts that Nikias had already been appointed to command an expedition against the men on Sphakteria, but it seems clear that he had been. Thucydides refers specifically to Nikias' *arche* in Pylos: ...ὁ Νικίας...ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς... (4.28.3; cf. Plut. *Nic.* 7.4: ὅ τε Νικίας ἀναστὰς ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλον στρατηγίας αὐτῷ...). (Against Gomme see also Kagan [1974], p. 243 and n. 86.) Kleon's criticisms, moreover, do not quite make sense unless we assume that the Athenians had already decided to send a fleet to Pylos and had appointed Nikias to its command. Kleon criticized Nikias and the other generals for not sailing to Pylos (4.27.5), but if the *demos* had not already authorized a campaign against Sphakteria on some previous occasion, the generals—since they could not undertake an expedition of their own accord—could fairly be criticized only for not having taken the initiative in proposing an expedition or for having argued against such a proposal. The implication of Kleon's rebuke is that the generals had the authority to sail to Pylos, which implies in turn that the *demos* had already decreed that an expedition be made. Kleon's criticism fell on all of the generals to an extent (εἰ ἄνδρες εἶεν οἱ στρατηγοί), but it was directed in particular against Nikias (καὶ ἐς Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἀπεσήμαινεν...). If we assume that Nikias had not been appointed to the command in Pylos we might suggest that Kleon was driven by his animosity for the general to single him out, unfairly, for censure. But the more obvious explanation for Kleon's targeting of Nikias is that he had indeed been given the command against Sphakteria. (Flower [1992], pp. 42-44, reaches the same conclusion; cf. also Hauvette-Besnault [1885], pp. 80-81.)

gested that Kleon make the expedition, and their heckling finally drove him to accept the appointment. Kleon's assumption of the command, moreover, was formalized in the end by an assembly vote. Without the approval of the Athenians Nikias could never have given his position to Kleon, and without their prompting he might never have presumed to do so.[51]

If generals could not decline their commands once appointments were made, they might nonetheless enjoy some influence over the appointment procedure itself. In the course of campaign-related deliberation generals were free to make proposals related to the command of expeditions under consideration. Thus Miltiades appears to have offered himself as general of the expedition he proposed the Athenians undertake in 490 or 489 (Hdt. 6.132, and see appendix 3).[52] In 407/6 Alkibiades reportedly requested that certain of his colleagues be dispatched with him to Asia Minor,[53] and in 373/2 Iphikrates asked the Athenians to appoint as his colleagues Kallistratos and Chabrias.[54] But however much consideration the recommendations of generals were given by the *demos*, final authority over appointment decisions rested with the Athenians themselves.[55] Late sources which attribute to Perikles authority over the appointments of his colleagues are either magnifying without foundation that general's role in Athenian politics, or they are referring imprecisely to proposals made by Perikles regarding the appointment of generals to commands.[56] Athenian generals could not of

51 Cf. Dover's discussion of the passage at (1960), p. 74. See also Bers (1985), p. 4.

52 The leadership of two expeditions undertaken in 424/3 may have been decided by similar means. The generals Demosthenes and Hippokrates were approached on two separate occasions in that year, first by Megarian democrats interested in surrendering Megara to Athens (Thuc. 4.66.3), and a second time by certain Boiotians who wanted to establish democracies in their cities (4.76.1-2). Each of these negotiations led to a campaign undertaken by the Athenians under the leadership of Demosthenes and Hippokrates. We may imagine that after meeting with their Megarian and Boiotian contacts the generals were obliged to address the Athenian assembly and urge its support for the expeditions they had in mind. Given the circumstances, it seems likely that there was little question during the ensuing deliberations that Demosthenes and Hippokrates would undertake the leadership of the proposed expeditions.

53 Nep. *Alc.* 7.1: ...*et ipse postulasset ut duo sibi collegae darentur, Thrasybulus et Adimantus, neque id negatum esset, classe in Asiam profectus*...; Diod. 13.69.3: εἵλαντο δὲ καὶ στρατηγοὺς ἑτέρους οὓς ἐκεῖνος ἤθελεν, Ἀδείμαντον καὶ Θρασύβουλον; Plut. *Alc.* 35.1: ...τά τ' ἄλλα ψηφισάμενοι καὶ συνάρχοντας οὓς ἐκεῖνος ἠθέλησεν. Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.21 pairs Adeimantos and Aristokrates with Alkibiades and does not refer to Alkibiades' role in their appointment.

54 Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.39: ...ἐπαινῶ, ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ προσελέσθαι κελεῦσαι ἑαυτῷ [Iphikrates] Καλλίστρατόν τε...καὶ Χαβρίαν.... On the passage see also Dover (1960), p. 74 and n. 28.

55 After his appointment to the command of the expedition to Pylos in 425/4, Kleon—who was probably not a *strategos* at the time (cf. ch. 1 n. 30)—chose Demosthenes as his colleague in the enterprise (Thuc. 4.29.1-2). We are not told as much, but Kleon's selection must have been approved by the Athenian *demos*. Cf. Dover (1960), p. 74.

56 Plutarch (*Per.* 29.1-2) credits Perikles with the appointment of Lakedaimonios to the Corcyra expedition in 433/2, but his evidence is not substantiated by Thucydides (1.45.2; cf. appendix 9 and Fornara [1971], p. 37 n. 32). Diodorus (12.42.7) likewise attributes to Perikles

their own accord place either themselves or their colleagues at the head of expeditions.[57]

3. *The Selection of Troops and Military Personnel for Particular Expeditions*

Prior to the dispatch of forces from Athens it was necessary that the fighting men and officers of the state's three, not entirely distinct military branches be called up for service. I discuss above the appointment of *strategoi* to specific commands. I am concerned here with the generals' role in conscripting Athenian troops and selecting officers for service on particular expeditions.

Procedural details are in many cases lost to us. It is not clear, for example, how Athens' taxiarchs, *lochagoi*,[58] cavalry officers,[59] and cavalrymen[60] were chosen for service on campaigns. To my knowledge, however, there is no evidence which suggests that the generals were responsible for their selection.[61] Trierarchs were ordinarily obliged to recruit rowers and naval of-

the appointment of Karkinos and certain other generals to the command of a *periplous* of the Peloponnese in 432/1 (cf. Thuc. 2.23.2). See appendix 7 for discussion of the alleged agreement between Perikles and Kimon according to which the latter was given command against Cyprus in 451/0.

57 A passage from Aristophanes' *Acharnians* may provide evidence to the contrary, however. We are told at l. 593 (cf. l. 598) that the character Lamachos is a *strategos*, but later in the comedy (ll. 1073-1079) he is dispatched by the generals to guard the mountain passes against invading Boiotians. One might argue that an assembly vote was not required for the dispatch of generals within Attica for home defense: the generals themselves may have been authorized to make decisions in cases of emergency. But it is perhaps inappropriate to take Aristophanes' information literally. Van Leeuwen, *ad loc.*, suggests that l. 593 is a parody of the *Telephus* (cf. Pritchett [1940], p. 473). Lamachos' criticism of generals at l. 1078 suggests, at any rate, that he does not at that moment conceive of himself as one of them. (For further discussion of the passage see Fornara [1971], p. 58; Lewis [1961], p. 120; and West [1924a], pp. 146-147.)

58 That taxiarchs and *lochagoi* were commanders of tribal units (*Ath. Pol.* 61.3) cannot explain how they were selected to serve on particular expeditions in every instance. When Athens was engaged in multiple campaigns, the servicemen of any one tribe can have been divided among numerous fronts. Taxiarchs therefore cannot always have commanded only the hoplites of their tribe. Indeed, the correlation of taxiarchs with their tribal regiments was eventually abandoned: the Athenians continued to elect ten taxiarchs despite the increased number of tribes (from ten to twelve) after 307/6 (*SEG* xiv 64; Rhodes [1981], p. 685). Note also that in the late fifth century two taxiarchs may have been elected from the same tribe (Leontis) in the same year (*Agora* XVII 23.111-114; the taxiarchs mentioned in the inscription may have served in consecutive years, however: Bradeen [1964], p. 51). For discussion of taxiarchs see also Dover at (1965), p. 97, and *HCT* IV, pp. 372 and 440-441.

59 We do know that taxiarchs, hipparchs, and phylarchs were elected to their positions each year by the *demos*. The taxiarchs in turn appointed *lochagoi* (*Ath. Pol.* 61.3-5).

60 On at least one occasion, however, in 348, cavalrymen drew lots for an expedition (Dem. 21.133). On the enrollment of new cavalrymen see *Ath. Pol.* 49.2 and Bugh (1988), pp. 53-55.

61 Thucydides tells us (2.22.2) that Perikles continually dispatched cavalry against the Spartan invaders in 431, but this does not imply that he determined which officers and men were sent out on each occasion.

ficers (*hyperesiai*), and while conscription of the former was possible,[62] there is no evidence that generals were involved in the procedure.[63] Marines (*epibatai*), on the other hand, were provided by the state,[64] and the generals may have had a hand in their enrollment (cf. ch. 1 n. 74), but our evidence for this is limited. I discuss below what we do know about the generals' role in assembling an army: during the fifth century and at least part of the fourth, Athens' generals were responsible for enrolling Athenian hoplites for service; and in the fourth century, and perhaps the fifth as well, they supervised the appointment of trierarchs.

3.1. *The Enrollment of Citizen Hoplites*

We have evidence for two different procedures by which Athenians were enrolled for service as hoplites during the classical period. First, from at least the mid-fifth until the mid-fourth century,[65] Athens' *strategoi*, working in conjunction with the taxiarchs, selected hoplites for service in particular campaigns and published lists (*katalogoi*) of named conscripts.[66] Troops enrolled in this manner are said to be "from the catalogue" (*ek katalogou*).[67] The number of hoplites to be enrolled by the generals and taxiarchs on each

62 See Gabrielsen (1994), pp. 105-110 and 120-124 (who lists references to conscription on pp. 107 and 248-249 n. 6), and Jordan (1975), pp. 102-103.

63 In 362, at least, the *bouleutai* and demarchs were instructed to draft oarsmen ([Dem.] 50.6). This may have been a departure from normal procedure (see Gabrielsen [1994], p. 107; Davies [1981], p. 144). We are told by Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.2.11-12) that in 373/2 Timotheos was unable to fully man his fleet of 60 ships at Athens and consequently sailed around the islands with a view to completing his crews. The passage might be taken as evidence that Timotheos was directly involved as general with the recruitment of rowers, but Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.14 suggests that that responsibility lay rather with the trierarchs: Timotheos was deposed by the Athenians and replaced with Iphikrates, who, unlike his predecessor, promptly manned his fleet and τοὺς τριηράρχους ἠνάγκαζε.

64 For discussion see Gabrielsen (1994), pp. 106-107.

65 Myronides (Diod. 11.81.4) and Tolmides (Diod. 11.84.4-5) enrolled troops by this procedure in the 450's. The latest reference to this system of enrollment is at Dem. 39.8, which is dated to 348. Hansen (1985), pp. 89 and 110 n. 248, notes that the passage presupposes that enrollment was by the publication of rosters of named citizens.

66 For the involvement of generals in enrollment see Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.34; Lys. 14.6; [Lys.] 9.15; Diod. 11.81.4, 11.84.4-5 (cf. Plut. *Per.* 18.2); Plut. *Phoc.* 10.3. On taxiarchs see Ar. *Pax* 1180-1181; Lys. 15.5; Poll. 8.115. Lys. 15.5 suggests what we might suspect anyway, that the generals had greater authority than the taxiarchs over the enrollment of troops.

67 E.g., Thuc. 6.43.1, 7.16.1, 7.20.2, 8.24.2. The mechanics of this enrollment procedure are not fully understood. It has been thought that those Athenians who were eligible to serve as hoplites were enrolled in a central register (*katalogos*) from which troops were chosen for particular military expeditions (so Andrewes [1981], p. 1; *HCT* IV, p. 264; Mitchel [1964], p. 102 n. 3; Jones [1957], p. 163). Our evidence does not imply that any such register existed, however (Hornblower [1991], p. 256; Hansen [1985], pp. 83-89). The *katalogoi* may instead have been based on the population registers of the demes (*lexiarchika grammateia*; cf. Bugh [1988], p. 55). In the phrase *ek katalogou*, then, the word *katalogos* may refer either to a central hoplite register, if such there was, or to the *katalogos* of a particular campaign.

occasion was determined as a rule by the assembly.[68] The authority of the *strategoi* over troop strength, that is, was limited to their ability to persuade the *demos* to adopt their proposals.[69] The generals' freedom to enroll troops of their choosing was likewise limited. In a speech dated to the first quarter of the fourth century, reference is made to an oath sworn by the generals to enroll for military expeditions those who had not served in the field ([Lys.] 9.15: ὀμόσαντες μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἀστρατεύτους καταλέξειν...). The passage suggests that Athenians who were eligible for service were supposed to serve in rotation. In practice this equitable procedure was not always followed. In the same speech we hear of a certain Polyainos who was enrolled for an expedition too soon (less than two months) after returning from a campaign and who met with abuse when making complaint to one of the generals ([Lys.] 9.4).[70] But occasional infractions do not imply that Athens' generals regularly disregarded their oath. We may believe that, at least from the early fourth century, generals were constrained to a considerable degree in their selection of troops by their need to consider the service records of those they were drafting.

We do not know when the oath referred to at [Lys.] 9.15 was adopted, nor whether generals were under a similar obligation to enroll hoplites for expeditions more or less fairly prior to its adoption. What can be said is that

68 Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.34; Diod. 11.84.4-5. Cf. Fornara (1971), p. 37 and n. 33. The generals of the Sicilian expedition were, however, given authority to determine the number of troops who would be required on the campaign (Thuc. 6.26.1; cf. appendix 13).

69 Tolmides, for example, reportedly asked the Athenians to authorize his enrollment of 1000 troops in 456/5 (Diod. 11.84.3-4).

70 The chorus of Aristophanes' *Peace* (1172-1183) likewise complains of taxiarchs who draw up muster lists unfairly (cf. *Eq.* 1369-1371). A passage in Aristotle's *Politics* may also be relevant here. At 1303a8-10 Aristotle remarks that there was a disproportionate number of casualties among the better classes (γνώριμοι) during the Peloponnesian War because troops were enrolled *ek katalogou* (διὰ τὸ ἐκ καταλόγου στρατεύεσθαι). Unless Aristotle means by γνώριμοι all of those classes which could supply hoplite soldiers—this would exclude only the lowest, thetic class (Thuc. 6.43.1; Harp. s.v. *thetes kai thetikon*)—his complaint suggests that the onus of military service was not evenly distributed among the non-thetic classes when enrollment was *ek katalogou.* A superficially similar idea is expressed at *Ath. Pol.* 26.1. The author, referring to the period after the death of Ephialtes, attributes the deaths of the ἐπιεικεῖς of both the lower and upper classes (...καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων) to the incompetence of Athens' generals and enrollment *ek katalogou*. But whereas γνώριμοι in the *Politics* is used to describe a social class, the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* is apparently using ἐπιεικεῖς as a moral term (so also Rhodes [1981], p. 328). The meaning of the passage is thus fundamentally different from that of *Pol.* 1303a8-10. Andrewes (1981), p. 3, who takes both passages to mean that there were at some time "differential casualties between the classes," suggests that the disparity was a result of the generals' attempts to enroll good troops: "To the extent that they succeeded in enrolling troops of good quality, they ensured that the wastage among these was disproportionately high...." But this explanation implies that the most qualified troops were to be sought in the higher classes, an assumption which may be untrue. Hansen (1985), p. 88, infers from the passages that thetes were liable for military service at the time Aristotle was writing. Casualties among the upper, non-thetic classes were consequently no longer disproportionately greater than those suffered by the thetes.

during the fifth century generals were sometimes able to enroll choice troops for their campaigns. According to Diodorus (11.84.4-5), the Athenian people, having stipulated that Tolmides enroll 1000 troops for his *periplous* of the Peloponnese in 456/5, imagined that he would draft those who were strong and in the prime of youth. Isocrates (16.29) reports that Phormion drafted the best hoplites for his campaign to Thrace in 432. We may wonder, moreover, how the best troops (τὸ δὲ πεζὸν καταλόγοις τε χρηστοῖς ἐκκριθέν)[71] can have been selected for service in the Sicilian expedition if the conscription of hoplites on that occasion was strictly mechanical (Thuc. 6.31.3). Evidently, service records were not the only criterion according to which troops were enrolled during the fifth century. The regulations which governed conscription at that time appear to have been sufficiently flexible to allow, at least occasionally, for the selection of large numbers of quality troops.[72] It should be noted, however, that Athenians could volunteer for service in the field and that generals might attempt to recruit volunteers in order to increase the number of quality troops they were to lead.[73]

At some time prior to 352 (Dem. 3.4)[74] the Athenians adopted a different procedure for enrolling hoplites. Athenian males who were between the

71 The meaning of καταλόγοις χρηστοῖς is, however, not entirely clear. See Andrewes (1981), p. 2, and Murray (1961), p. 37.

72 Cf. the similar discussion in Hauvette-Besnault (1885), p. 67.

73 Is. 9.15; Diod. 11.84.4-5, 13.2.2; Plut. *Per.* 18.2. Ar. *Av.* 1364-1369 likewise suggests that it was possible for Athenians to volunteer for service in the field. See Andrewes (1981), p. 2, and Westlake (1954), pp. 90-94.

74 I do not see that Aeschin. 2.168 implies that call-up by *eponymoi* was introduced before 362 (so Hansen [1985], p. 89). It is, however, remotely possible that call-up by age group began as early as the late fifth century. At 3.98.4 Thucydides says that the 120 marines (*epibatai*) who died in Aitolia in 427/6 were of the same ἡλικία: τοσοῦτοι μὲν τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἡλικία ἡ αὐτὴ οὗτοι βέλτιστοι δὴ ἄνδρες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε ἐκ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως διεφθάρησαν. In order for this passage to imply that hoplites were called up by *eponymoi* as early as 427/6, two conditions must be met. First, Thucydides must here be using ἡλικία in its technical sense of "age-group", which he does not do elsewhere in the *History*. Gomme (*HCT ad loc.*) believes that this is its meaning, but he suggests that Thucydides not be taken literally: the 120 men may have come from two or three contiguous age-groups. Others translate ἡλικία with more figurative expressions (Hornblower [1991], p. 514: "all in the flower of their youth"; Hobbes: "all of them able men"). Second, the procedure used for calling up *epibatai* must have been the same as that used for calling up hoplites. Apart from this passage, however, there is little evidence for the manner in which *epibatai* were enrolled for service. (1) In the Troizen decree, the generals are instructed to conscript (καταλέξαι) *epibatai* (ll. 23-24), a provision which may reflect fourth- rather than fifth-century practice. (2) At *IG* i^3 60.15-16, which dates to c. 430, reference is made to volunteer *epibatai* (but see Jordan [1975], pp. 201-202). And (3) Thuc. 6.43.1 indicates that the thetes serving as *epibatai* in the Sicilian expedition were not called up ἐκ καταλόγου. It also is not clear whether *epibatai* were regularly taken from the same census classes which supplied hoplites in the fifth century. (Although *epibatai* could be referred to as hoplites: at Thuc. 6.43.1 the 700 thetes who served as marines are numbered among the 5100 hoplites on the expedition.) Thuc. 6.43.1 and 8.24.2 suggest that thetes normally served as marines, but [Lys.] 6.46 and Arist. *Pol.* 1327b9 make this conclusion uncertain. (For discussion see *HCT ad* 6.43.1 and 8.24.2. Jordan [1975], pp. 195-200 and 223

ages of eighteen and fifty-nine and consequently eligible for military service were called up by age-group (ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις).[75] The author of the *Athenaion Politeia* (53.4, 7) describes the procedure. Each year the names of Athens' eighteen-year-old males were recorded together below that of the eponymous archon of the year. The name of one of 42 Attic heroes was likewise affixed to each successive group (*helikia*), the youngest adopting that name which had belonged to the previous year's senior age-group. When authorizing the call-up of soldiers by *helikiai*, the Athenians did not specify the number of men to be drafted, as when call-up was *ek katalogou* (e.g., Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.34). They rather identified by archon and hero those age-groups whose members were required to report for service (Aeschin. 2.133; Diod. 18.10.2).

After the adoption of this enrollment procedure it will of course have remained possible for generals, by participating in assembly debates, to influence the *demos* in its decisions regarding the number and identity of the *helikiai* to be called up for service on any given occasion. Nevertheless, although it is likely that Athens' generals retained some responsibilities related to the call-up of troops once this procedure replaced enrollment *ek katalogou*—whatever administrative details remained were presumably under the purview of the generals—their authority over the mobilization of troops seems necessarily to have been diminished by its adoption. When call-up was by *helikia*, generals can have had little or no freedom to enroll

n. 45, argues that *epibatai* were regularly taken from the *zeugitai*, but his argument is not entirely persuasive.) Given that "age-group" may not be the appropriate translation of ἡλικία at Thuc. 3.98.4, and given that the manner in which *epibatai* were enrolled during the fifth century may have been entirely different from that by which hoplites were enrolled, it seems best not to conclude from Thuc. 3.98.4 that hoplites were called up by *eponymoi* as early as 427/6.

75 When describing his military career Aeschines (2.168) refers to two different procedures for calling up troops, ἐν τοῖς ἐπωνύμοις and ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν. I am not convinced by Hansen (1985), p. 88, that the latter is to be equated with call-up *ek katalogou*. When serving ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν Aeschines was sent out with his age-mates (ἡλικιωτῶν). This would not have been the case had Aeschines and those with him been drafted *ek katalogou*. Nor is the suggestion of *LSJ*, s.v. στρατεία 3 (followed by Mitchel [1964], p. 102 n. 3), persuasive. Adams suggests in his note *ad loc.* that ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν describes the call-up of part of an age-group. This is an attractive solution, yet ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν does appear to refer to service in turn (Hansen [1985], p. 88; Andrewes [1981], p. 2; cf. the advice of Demosthenes at 2.31: ...πάντας ἐξιέναι κατὰ μέρος, ἕως ἂν ἅπαντες στρατεύσησθε...).

Aeschines also informs us that he served among the *epilektoi* at Tamynai in 349/8 (2.169; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 13.5). Tritle has suggested that the Athenians had a force of between 300 and 500 *epilektoi* ([1989], p. 57, and [1988], pp. 77-79), seasoned veterans who were selected for their bravery (cf. schol. Aeschin. 2.169). The corps was organized, Tritle further suggests ([1989], pp. 56-57, and [1988], p. 187 n. 19), as a result of the adoption of call-up by *eponymoi*: the existence of a force of elite troops would "insure the generals that they would have at least a core of high-quality men upon whom they could rely." Inscriptions dated to the late fourth century suggest that the *epilektoi* were organized by tribe and were under the authority of the taxiarchs (Tritle [1989], pp. 54-55). We have no evidence, however, for the procedure by which these troops were selected and called up for service. (On corps of elite troops known from other states see *GSW* II, pp. 221-224.)

for a campaign troops of their choosing, as was possible when only the number and not the ages of the troops to be called up was specified by the *demos*.

3.2. *The Appointment of Trierarchs*

The trierarchy underwent considerable change during the fourth century in several important respects. The number of Athenians who were called upon annually to perform the liturgy was increased from 400 to 1200 by the reform of Periandros in 358/7 ([Xen.] *Ath.* 3.4; Dem. 14.16, 21.155; [Dem.] 47.21). The financial obligations of the liturgy were divided among trierarchs more equitably as a result of this reform and another instituted by Demosthenes in 340 (Dem. 18.102-108). And the military obligations associated with the trierarchy, never of primary importance,[76] were eliminated altogether for the majority of those who performed the liturgy after 358/7.[77] Whatever the number and particular responsibilities of trierarchs in the late fifth and fourth centuries, however, the procedure by which they were appointed to the trierarchy remained substantially unchanged. A list of those potentially liable to perform the liturgy (either 400 or 1200 Athenians) was drawn up at the beginning of each year.[78] Some number of these potential trierarchs obtained exemptions on various grounds,[79] while those who did not became nominal trierarchs and awaited their appointment to active commands. After 358/7, nominal trierarchs were divided into 20 administrative units (*symmoriai*), whose members were collectively responsible for meeting the expenses incurred by those of their number who were appointed to commands.

There is good evidence that the appointment of trierarchs was overseen during the fourth century by Athens' generals, initially by all ten ([Dem.] 35.48), but late in the century[80] by one particular general, the *strategos epi tas symmorias* (*Ath. Pol.* 61.1). We are told by sources dating from the early and middle years of the century that the generals "appointed" trierarchs (the verb used is καθίστημι: Lys. 29.3; [Dem.] 35.48, 39.8). After the reform of

[76] Gabrielsen (1994), pp. 37-39.

[77] For discussion of reforms of the trierarchy see Gabrielsen (1994), pp. 173-217, and Jordan (1975), pp. 73-83.

[78] For discussion of the time of year when trierarchs were appointed see Gabrielsen (1994), pp. 74-77, and Jordan (1975), pp. 65-67.

[79] Perhaps 100 of the 400 ([Xen.] *Ath.* 3.4) earmarked for the trierarchy in the late fifth century obtained exemptions (Gabrielsen [1994], pp. 74-75). In the fourth century some 40% might successfully claim exemption. (Demosthenes at 14.16 imagines that 800 men would obtain exemptions from the trierarchy if 2000 were selected; but cf. Gabrielsen, p. 70, who understands the passage to mean that of the 1200 selected as potential trierarchs, 800 might be expected to claim or obtain exemptions.)

[80] The *strategos epi tas symmorias* apparently did not exist before 334/3: *IG* ii^2 1623.147-159; Rhodes (1981), p. 52 and n. 246.

358/7 the generals enrolled trierarchs in symmories (Dem. 39.8). And in the 320's the *strategos epi tas symmorias* enrolled those earmarked for the liturgy in lists of potential trierarchs (τριηράρχους καταλέγει),[81] carried out their exchanges (*antidoseis*), and introduced into court legal hearings concerning exemptions from the trierarchy.[82] These same tasks may have been performed by all of the generals earlier in the century. The rest is clear enough, but what is meant by the generals' "appointment" of trierarchs requires clarification.

Our sources may mean that the generals were responsible for selecting from the citizen body Athenians who were potentially liable to perform the trierarchy. There is some dubious evidence for this in our sources. In Aristophanes' *Knights* (912-918), Paphlagon, a stand-in for Kleon, threatens the sausage-seller: "I will make you a trierarch," he says, "spending your own money with an old ship that you'll never stop putting money into and repairing. I'll see to it that you get a useless sail."[83] The sense of the passage is not that Kleon was threatening a nominal trierarch with appointment to an active command, but that he intended to establish in the trierarchy a citizen not currently earmarked for the liturgy. That generals had the authority to do so was believed by a scholiast on the passage, but it is unlikely that he had independent evidence for his information.[84] Aristophanes' text probably implies nothing about the role of generals in the appointment of trierarchs. There is no indication in the passage that Kleon was speaking in his capacity as a *strategos* rather than as an influential private citizen.[85] It should be noted, moreover, that the threat with which Kleon continues his tirade is unrelated to the powers he would have enjoyed as *strategos*.[86] The

[81] I assume the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* is referring here to the enrollment of potential trierarchs in a preliminary list rather than to their enrollment in symmories or in a list of active trierarchs. The first alone would necessarily precede *antidoseis* and legal hearings, to which the author next refers.

[82] *Ath. Pol.* 61.1; *IG* ii^2 1629.204-213; Suda s.v. *hegemonia dikasteriou.* These hearings could be held both soon after the list of prospective trierarchs was drawn up and immediately prior to an expedition: Gabrielsen (1994), pp. 91-92.

[83] ἐγὼ σὲ ποίησω τριη/ραρχεῖν, ἀναλίσκοντα τῶν / σαυτοῦ, παλαιὰν ναῦν ἔχοντ', / εἰς ἣν ἀναλῶν οὐκ ἐφέ/ξεις οὐδὲ ναυπηγούμενος· / διαμηχανήσομαί θ' ὅπως / ἂν ἱστίον σαπρὸν λάβῃς.

[84] The scholiast's information appears to be derived from this passage alone (particularly his remark that if the generals *really* hated someone, they gave him an old ship): ἐπειδὴ οἱ στρατηγοί, εἴ τινα εἶχον ἐχθρόν, εἰς τριηραρχίαν ἐνέβαλλον, ὅπως ἂν αὐτῷ ὁ βίος ἀναλίσκοιτο. εἰ δέ τις ὑπερβαλλόντως ἀπεχθάνοιτο, παλαιὰς ναῦς αὐτῷ ἐδίδοχαν, ὅπως ἂν ὄικοθεν καινὰς ἀντ' αὐτῶν κατασκευάσῃ, καὶ πάντῃ ἄποροι ἐγίγνοντο.

[85] So Gabrielsen (1994), p. 74; Kolbe (1899), p. 532 n. 163; Hauvette-Besnault (1885), p. 69. Against this view see Jordan (1975), pp. 62-63 and 229 n. 63, and cf. Davies (1981), p. 24 n. 21.

[86] Kleon threatens to bring it about that the sausage-seller enroll himself among Athens' wealthy and so be obliged to pay the *eisphora* (ll. 923-926). This is probably a reference to Kleon's role in enforcing and perhaps initiating that tax in 428/7, in which year he may have served as a *bouleutes* (Ar. *Eq.* 773-776; for discussion see Sommerstein [1981], p. 193; Kagan

passage does not warrant the conclusion that Athens' generals were ever responsible for the selection of Athenian citizens as potential trierarchs.[87]

Two pieces of evidence suggest that what is meant by καθιστάναι τριηράρχους is rather the selection of trierarchs for particular expeditions, that is, the appointment of nominal trierarchs to active commands. First, although the references to the generals' appointment of trierarchs at Dem. 35.48 and 39.8 do not indicate what procedure was meant by the author, Lysias at 29.3-4 can only be taken to mean that the general Ergokles selected his associate Philokrates for active service as a trierarch under his command. There is room to doubt that Ergokles had in fact hand-picked Philokrates: the speaker of Lysias 29 may have exaggerated the trierarch's connection to Ergokles in his attempt to implicate Philokrates in that general's embezzlement. Nonetheless there is no reason to doubt that the scenario described by Lysias was possible. Second, in a decree of 325/4 authorizing the dispatch of forces to the Adriatic (*IG* ii[2] 1629.183-188), the trierarchs "who have been appointed" (το]ὺς δὲ τριηράρχους [τοὺς κα]θεστηκότας) are instructed to bring their ships to the pier before the tenth of Mounichion. It is reasonable to assume that the appointment procedure alluded to here is that by which nominal trierarchs were selected for active commands.[88] At least in the early and mid-fourth century, then, generals were responsible for selecting from the pool of nominal trierarchs those who would accompany them on campaigns. The evidence of Lysias (29.3-4) suggests that personal connections were among the reasons generals might choose particular trierarchs, but we do not have enough information to identify the other criteria by which their selections were made.

Neither can we know whether Athens' generals were likewise responsible for appointing nominal trierarchs to active commands during the fifth century. I have already discussed the first of two problematic pieces of evidence relevant to the question: Kleon's threat to impose a trierarchy on the sausage-seller in Aristophanes' *Knights* (912-918) does not imply anything about the responsibilities of fifth-century generals. Our only other information[89] comes from the Troizen Decree, in lines 18 to 23 of which appear provisions for the generals' appointment of two hundred trierarchs. The

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[1974], p. 145; *HCT* II, pp. 278-279; West [1924b], p. 139; Busolt [1904], pp. 998 n. 1 and 1017-1018).

87 See Gabrielsen (1994), pp. 72-73, for a brief description of the numerous ways men became eligible for the trierarchy.

88 So also Gabrielsen (1994), p. 76.

89 Jordan (1975), p. 63, however, cites Lys. fr. 342.7-9 T as tentative evidence for the generals' role in selecting trierarchs in the fifth century. We are told by Lysias that a certain Epigenes was compelled to undertake a trierarchy despite his ill health and limited funds: ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν Ἐπιγένης ἀσθενὴς τριηραρχεῖν ἠναγκάζετο, ἀνάργυρος ὢν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῶν πολεμίων κρατούντων. I see no reason for Jordan's assumption that Athens' generals did the compelling.

likelihood that the decree's text has, at the least, been perverted by fourth- or third-century copyists makes it perilous to accept its evidence without reservation (cf. appendix 4).[90] Yet the decree, even if a fourth-century forgery, does provide some evidence that fifth-century generals were responsible for the appointment of trierarchs: the author of the decree did not consider the authority of generals over trierarchic appointments in the fourth century to be a departure from fifth-century practice. This is meager evidence, to be sure, but the conclusion to which it points may well be correct: it would not be surprising if the responsibility of appointing men to the trierarchy—a burden both economic and military in character—fell early on Athens' generals.[91]

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90 For discussion of the decree's provisions for the trierarchy see Gabrielsen (1994), pp. 37-38; Jordan (1975), pp. 231-232; and Jameson (1963), p. 397.

91 A final note on the allocation of ships to trierarchs: Jordan (1975), pp. 68-70 and 229-230 n. 63, argues that during the fifth century ships were assigned to their trierarchs by Athens' generals. His argument is based primarily on Ar. *Eq.* 912-918 (Kleon's threat to saddle the sausage-seller with an old ship) and the scholiast's comment on that passage. Jordan notes as well, however, that the three surviving naval catalogues from the fifth century (*IG* i[3] 498-500) do not list ships as "unallotted" (*anepiklerotos*), a label which appears regularly in extant naval records from the 370's and 360's, when ships were certainly distributed to trierarchs by lot (see Gabrielsen [1994], pp. 80-84). The testimony of Aristophanes is in this case worthless, both because Kleon is not necessarily speaking as a *strategos* in the passage and because his reference to the old ship is too vague to imply anything about his ability to assign it to a trierarch (for the text see ch. 1 n. 83). Nor is the scholiast's opinion to be highly regarded (cf. n. 84 above). The silence of the extant fifth-century naval catalogues likewise implies nothing about the responsibilities of Athens' generals. Jordan (pp. 69-70) may be right, however, in suggesting that the generals were responsible for supervising the allotment of ships to trierarchs, at least in the fourth century: in the Troizen Decree they are instructed to allot ships to the 200 trierarchs they had appointed (ll. 22-23: ...ἐ] | πικλ[ηρῶσαι αὐτ]οῖ ς [τ]ὰς ναῦς...). If the decree is not genuine, this provision could nonetheless reflect fourth-century procedure.

EXCURSUS*

ATTESTED INSTANCES OF INVOLVEMENT BY GENERALS IN CAMPAIGN-RELATED DELIBERATION[1]

GENERALS CURRENTLY SERVING IN THE *STRATEGIA*

Evidence Credible

490/89	Miltiades: Paros: see appendix 3
480/79	Themistokles: 2nd Persian War (wooden wall oracle): see appendix 4
463/2	Kimon: Ithome: Plut. *Cim.* 16.8-10
451 or later	Perikles: Cyprus: see appendix 7, p. 186
448/7	Perikles: Boiotia[2]
440/39	Perikles: Samos: see appendix 8
433/2	Perikles: Corcyra: see appendix 9
432/1	Perikles: 2nd Peloponnesian War (first invasion): Thuc. 2.13
432/1 or 459	Perikles: Aegina[3]
427/6	Nikias: Minoa[4]
425/4	Nikias: Pylos: Thuc. 4.27.5-28.3 (cf. ch. 1 § 2)
424/3	Demosthenes, Hippokrates: Megara[5]
424/3	Demosthenes, Hippokrates: Boiotia[6]
424/3	Kleon: Skione[7]
423/2	Kleon: Thrace: Thuc. 5.2.1
416/15	Nikias, Alkibiades: Sicily: Thuc. 6.8-23; Plut. *Nic.* 12, *Alc.* 17-18.3
405/4	Adeimantos: Hellespont: Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.31-32
344/3	Phokion: Megara[8]
340/39	Phokion: Byzantium: Plut. *Phoc.* 14.3-6
339/8	Phokion: war with Philip: Plut. *Phoc.* 16.1-3
323/2	Phokion: regarding proposed revolt from Macedon: Plut. *Phoc.* 22.5-6
323/2	Phokion, Leosthenes (son of Leosthenes): Lamian War: Plut. *Phoc.* 23.1-3; cf. *Phoc.* 26.4, *Tim.* 6.5
323/2	Phokion: Boiotia: Plut. *Phoc.* 24.3-5, *Mor.* 791e-f, 819a; Polyaen. 3.12

* Notes to the Excursus begin on p. 34.

Evidence Dubious

490/89	Miltiades: Marathon: see appendix 2
490/89	Themistokles: 2nd Persian War (Troizen Decree): see appendix 4
c. 476	Kimon: Skyros: see appendix 5
456/5	Tolmides: *Periplous*: see appendix 6
451/0	Kimon, Perikles: Cyprus: see appendix 7
448/7	Perikles: Delphi (Sacred War)[9]
446/5	Demokleides: Brea[10]
440's	Perikles: annual patrols[11]
432/1	Perikles: *periplous*[12]
431/0	Perikles: *periplous*[13]
425/4	Hyperbolos: Carthage[14]
419/18	Alkibiades: Pylos[15]
395/4	Thrasyboulos (of Steiria): Thebes[16]
390/89	Thrasyboulos (of Steiria): eastern Aegean[17]
370/69	Iphikrates: Attica[18]
359-336?	Phokion: Macedon[19]
339/8	???: Athenian response to capture of Elateia[20]
317?	Phokion: Peiraieus?[21]

GENERALS NOT CURRENTLY SERVING IN THE *STRATEGIA*

Evidence Credible

463/2	Ephialtes: Ithome: Plut. *Cim.* 16.8-10
425/4	Kleon: Pylos: Thuc. 4.27.5-28.3
407/6	Thrasyboulos (of Kollytos): Asia Minor[22]
357/6	Timotheos: Euboia: Dem. 8.74-75[23]
337/6	Phokion: regarding support of Macedonian campaign: Plut. *Phoc.* 16.5-7
335/4	Phokion: Thebes: Plut. *Phoc.* 17.1; cf. Diod. 17.8.6

Evidence Dubious

366/5?	Phokion: Boiotia[24]
359-336?	Phokion: Macedon: see n. 19 below
333/2?	Phokion: regarding support of Macedonian campaign[25]

NOTES

[1] Under the rubric "campaign-related deliberation" I include (1) instances in which generals supported or opposed in the *ekklesia* the undertaking of a particular expedition and (2) those occasions in which generals took part in deliberations directly related to an ongoing or proposed campaign (of which Adeimantos' opposition to the amputation decree of 405/4 [Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.31-32] may serve as an example). But I have not included, for example, Kleon's participation in the Mytilenean Debate of 428/7 on the ground that discussion of the fate of the Mytilenean captives was no longer directly related to the prosecution of a military campaign *per se*. Nor have I included the participation of generals in political activity which, if not specifically related to particular campaigns, had as a consequence the outbreak of war. In this category I would place Perikles' refusal to rescind the Megarian Decree as well as Alkibiades' orchestration of an Athenian alliance with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis in 420/19 (and Nikias' participation in assembly discussions regarding that alliance). (On Perikles' involvement with the Megarian Decree see Thuc. 1.140-145; Diod. 12.38-40; Plut. *Per.* 29-32; Ar. *Ach.* 523-539 with schol. to 532, *Pax* 605-609 with schol. and 615-619; Harp. s.v. *Aspasia*; Ath. 589d [Clearch. F 35]; Aristod. *FGH* 104 F 16; Suda s.v. *Aspasia, Pheidias.* On the alliance of 420/19 see *IG* i³ 83; Thuc. 5.43-48; Plut. *Mor.* 351b, *Nic.* 10, *Alc.* 14-15.) It was desirable to thus circumscribe rather narrowly the ekklesiastic participation here considered in order to avoid difficulty in determining what political activity might be classed as more broadly concerned with military issues.

[2] We are told by Plutarch (*Per.* 18.2; cf. *Comp. Per. et Fab.* 3.3) that Perikles disapproved of the timing of Tolmides' Boiotian expedition of 448/7 (ὁρῶν δὲ Τολμίδην...σὺν οὐδενὶ καιρῷ παρασκευαζόμενον εἰς Βοιωτίαν...) and argued against the campaign in the assembly (ἐν τῷ δήμῳ). (Ste. Croix [1972], p. 316, suspects that Perikles' opposition to the campaign was not limited to its timing.) Busolt (1904), p. 421 n. 2, questions the historicity of Plutarch's story, but although no other source refers to Perikles' opposition to the expedition, I believe that Plutarch's information is credible. The author does not in this instance ignore the role of the Athenian *demos* in decision-making: he sets Perikles' opposition to the campaign in the context of an assembly meeting (contrast *Cim.* 18.2-3). Plutarch, moreover, quotes a memorable comment (τὸ μνημονευόμενον) made by Perikles on this occasion: Tolmides, he said, would "not err waiting for the wisest counselor, time" (...εἰ μὴ πείθοιτο Περικλεῖ, τὸν γε σοφώτατον οὐχ ἁμαρτήσεται σύμβουλον ἀναμείνας, χρόνον). We ought not doubt Plutarch's evidence for Perikles' opposition to the campaign. (So also Kagan [1969], pp. 122-123 and n. 8.)

[3] In 431 the Athenians expelled the Aeginetans from Aegina and soon afterward sent Athenian colonists to occupy the island (Thuc. 2.27.1). Plutarch (*Per.* 34.1-2) attributes both the campaign and the settlement of colonists to Perikles, but his evidence is worth little in the absence of substantiating information from other sources. Nonetheless it is likely that Perikles took part in assembly discussions related to the expedition. Aristotle and Plutarch record that on some occasion which they do not specify Perikles bid the Athenians to "remove Aegina, the eyesore of the Peiraieus" (Arist. *Rh.* 1411a15-16; Plut. *Per.* 8.7, *Mor.* 803a; [Plut.] Mor. 186c; cf. Plut. *Dem.* 1.2, Ath. 99d, Strab. 9.1.14). Perikles may have made this remark earlier in the century, when hostilities between Athens and Aegina had last erupted: in 459 the Aeginetans were defeated by the Athenians in a naval battle and were compelled after a siege to destroy their fortifications, surrender their fleet, and pay tribute to Athens. (Figueira [1991], p. 113, and Sinclair [1988], p. 37, place Perikles' remark in this context.) But Perikles' instruction to "remove" (ἀφελεῖν) Aegina is more suggestive of the fate which the Aeginetans endured in 431 than it is of the earlier settlement. (Stadter [1989], p. 108, dates the remark to 431.) This argument is admittedly weak, but for the present purpose the date of Perikles' remark is not particularly important. It is likely enough that the general participated in campaign-related deliberation in either 459 or 431 and delivered at that time his famous dictum.

[4] When discussing the Athenian expedition against the island of Minoa in 427/6, Thucydides (3.51.1-2) tells us what the objectives of its general were. Nikias' aims in making the expedition were threefold: he wanted (1) the Athenian blockading force to be based on the island, (2) to prevent the Peloponnesians from making expeditions from the island, and (3) to prevent ships from entering Megara's port. That Thucydides attributes these objectives to Nikias suggests that the general had presented his views regarding the campaign to the Athenian public in the course of deliberations at Athens.

[5] We are told by Thucydides (4.66.3; cf. Diod. 12.66.1-2) that in the summer of 424/3 the democratic leaders of Megara entered into negotiations with the generals Demosthenes and Hippokrates with a view to surrendering their city to the Athenians. As a result of these negotiations Demosthenes and Hippokrates led an attack on Megara and Nisaia. Presumably the generals were obliged to address the assembly in order to gain the Athenians' approval for the expedition they had in mind, but it may be that few details of the surprise attack were shared with the Athenian *demos*: Thucydides tells us (4.67.2) that during the night before the attack no one

knew what was happening except those for whom such information was necessary (καὶ ᾔσθετο οὐδεὶς εἰ μὴ οἱ ἄνδρες οἷς ἐπιμελὲς ἦν εἰδέναι τὴν νύκτα ταύτην).

[6] Thucydides explains that the Athenian expedition to Boiotia in 424/3 was prompted by certain Boiotians who were interested in establishing democracies in their cities and had intrigued with the generals Demosthenes and Hippokrates (4.76.1-2). Neither Thucydides nor Diodorus (12.69.1) refers to deliberation at Athens, but if the expedition was discussed by the Athenians—as it presumably was—we may imagine that the generals were compelled to address the Athenian people or *boule*: it was they who were most knowledgeable about the Boiotian situation.

[7] In 424/3 the Athenians passed a decree on the motion of Kleon to capture Skione and kill its inhabitants (Thuc. 4.122.6). Kleon was general when he made the proposal: see Ar. *Nub.* 581-587 and Fornara (1971), p. 61.

[8] Plutarch (*Phoc.* 15.1) describes the Athenians' reaction to a secret request for help received from Megara. Phokion responded to the appeal by calling a meeting of the assembly at which he explained the Megarians' communication to the Athenians. The latter voted to send help to Megara, and immediately after the assembly Phokion marched away with his men under arms. For discussion of the incident see Tritle (1988), p. 99 (cf. p. 109), and (1987), p. 9, who argues convincingly that Phokion himself moved the proposal to support the Megarians.

[9] Plutarch (*Per.* 21.2) attributes to Perikles the decision to send an expedition to Delphi to return that sanctuary to the Phokians. Plutarch's information is not corroborated by Thuc. 1.112.5, however, and is likely an example of his exaggeration of the influence of his subject. So also Stadter (1989), p. 224.

[10] A certain Demokleides is identified at *IG* i^{3} 46.12 as the founder of Brea. Demokleides is also the proposer of the decree (ll. 38-39), to which an amendment was added by Phantokles (who was not a general). The appearance of στρατιοτõν at l. 31 (l. 27 in *IG* i^{2} 45) of the decree suggested to Develin, *AO* p. 84, that Demokleides was serving as general when he founded the colony. Their appearance suggests as well that the colonizing expedition may have been military in character. Demokleides, finally, may be the same man as the Dem[okleides] who served as general in 439/8 (see *AO* p. 92).

[11] Plutarch reports at *Per.* 11.4 that during the *pentakontaetia* Perikles sent out sixty triremes annually for eight months at a time. There are difficulties with accepting that as many as sixty ships were regularly involved in patrols during this period, however, since the cost is likely to have been prohibitively expensive (see discussion and bibliography at Stadter [1989], pp. 137-138). Without substantiating information, moreover, we may doubt that Perikles was regularly responsible for the dispatch of a patrolling fleet.

[12] In 431 the Athenians sent one hundred ships around the Peloponnese under the command of the generals Karkinos, Proteas, and Sokrates. According to Diodorus (12.42.7), Perikles was responsible for sending the fleet out: πληρώσας οὖν ἑκατὸν τριήρεις καὶ δύναμιν ἀξιόλογον εἰς τὰς ναῦς ἐνθέμενος, καὶ στρατηγὸν ἐπιστήσας Καρκίνον καὶ ἑτέρους τινάς, ἐξέπεμψεν εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον. We ought not accept his testimony, however. Thucydides does not attribute responsibility for the expedition to Perikles. Diodorus, moreover, having immediately beforehand described Perikles' position in Athens as that of a monarch (12.42.6: ...Περικλῆς στρατηγὸς ὢν καὶ τὴν ὅλην ἡγεμονίαν ἔχων...), makes no reference to deliberation at Athens in his account of the expedition.

[13] Thucydides (2.56.1) tells us that during the Peloponnesians' second invasion of Attica Perikles prepared (παρεσκευάζετο) a fleet of 100 ships for an expedition which he would lead against the Peloponnese. In describing the same expedition Plutarch (*Per.* 35.1) explains Perikles' motivation for preparing the fleet: he wanted to relieve the city of the problems which had been caused by the confinement of the Athenians within the city's walls, and he wanted as well to harm the Peloponnesians. By ascribing these motives to Perikles, Plutarch is suggesting that the expedition was Perikles' brainchild, a conclusion which Thucydides' sparse account does not substantiate. Perikles may indeed have persuaded the Athenians in this instance, but Thucydides' account provides evidence only that he, as general of the expedition, prepared the fleet prior to its departure from Athens.

[14] In his *Knights* (1300-1304) Aristophanes represents Hyperbolos as asking (presumably in 425/4, the year in which the comedy was produced) that a fleet of 100 ships be sent against Carthage. Aristophanes may be referring in the passage to an actual proposal made by Hyperbolos, but there is a strong possibility that his request for ships is a comic invention. (For discussion of the proposal see Ste. Croix [1972], pp. 222-223, and Baldwin [1971], pp. 153-155.) That Hyperbolos was a general in 425/4 is, moreover, not certain. Scholiasts on Ar. *Ach.* 846 (ἦν δὲ στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων) and *Pax* 1319 (στρατηγὸς φιλοπόλεμος) refer to Hyperbolos as a general, but they do not specify the date of his service. Ar. *Eq.* 1313 suggests that Hyperbolos was general when he made the alleged proposal concerning Carthage. (ll. 1311-1313: ἦν δ' ἀρέσκῃ ταῦτ' Ἀθηναίοις, καθῆσθαί μοι δοκῶ / εἰς τὸ Θησεῖον πλεούσας ἢ 'πὶ τῶν σεμνῶν θεῶν. / οὐ γὰρ ἡμῶν γε στρατηγῶν ἐγχανεῖται τῇ πόλει.... ["I am resolved, if the Athenians accept his proposal, to sail to the temple of Theseus or of the Furies and lie at anchor. He will not, as our general, mock the city."]) But we know already of ten Athenians other than Hyperbolos who served as gener-

als in 425/4. (See the list of generals for that year in *AO* pp. 129-130.) The latter's appearance on the board in that year would consequently require explanation. (For discussion of the question of Hyperbolos' generalship see Camon [1963], pp. 46-48 and 58, and *AO* p. 130.)

[15] In the winter of 419/18 Alkibiades persuaded the Athenians to convey the helots they had settled at Kranioi to Pylos (Thuc. 5.35.7) in order that they might make raids in the Peloponnese (5.56.3). I place this among dubious instances of involvement by generals in campaign-related deliberation because the "campaign" which Alkibiades persuaded his fellows to undertake, while military in character, was not an Athenian expedition *per se*.

[16] In 395/4 a Theban embassy addressed the *ekklesia* and requested Athens' support against the Spartans, whose invasion of Theban territory was imminent. The Athenians voted to help the Thebans, and Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.5.16) tells us that Thrasyboulos gave the Thebans the Athenians' answer. Hansen (1989b), p. 48, attributes to Thrasyboulos the proposal to send aid (cf. Sealey [1976], p. 389; Hammond [1986], p. 462), but this is not what Xenophon tells us (as Develin, *AO* p. 208, points out).

[17] Lys. 28.4 suggests that Thrasyboulos may have proposed the expedition which he undertook to the eastern Aegean in 390/89: ...εἰ ὑμῖν Θρασύβουλος ἐπηγγέλλετο τριήρεις ἔχων ἐκπλεύσεσθαι καὶ ταύτας παλαιὰς ἀντὶ καινῶν παραδώσειν...οὐδένα ἂν ὑμῶν ἐπιτρέψαι τὰς ναῦς ἐκεῖνον ἔχοντα ἐκπλεῦσαι....

[18] Pausanias (9.14.7) and Polyaenus (3.9.20, 28) report that Iphikrates dissuaded the Athenians from going out to fight when the Thebans marched on Athens. It is not clear from their accounts, however, whether Iphikrates' persuasion of the Athenians took place in the context of an assembly meeting. Nor do Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.49-52) or Diodorus (15.63.2, 65.6) refer to the incident in their accounts of the Athenian campaign against Thebes in 370/69.

[19] Plutarch (*Phoc.* 9.9) reports that Phokion mocked Polyeuktos of Sphettos on some occasion when the orator was urging the Athenians to declare war on Philip. The passage suggests that Phokion spoke in opposition to a proposed expedition against Philip in the course of an assembly debate. There is no indication in Plutarch's account of the date of the incident, however, and it may be that Phokion was not serving as general at the time. (The incident is not listed among the attested instances of involvement in assembly debate by Phokion or Polyeuktos in either *AO* pp. 496 and 498 or Hansen [1989b], pp. 57-58 and 63.)

[20] According to Diodorus (16.84.3-4), Athens' generals were the first to hear from messengers that Philip had occupied Elateia and intended to march on Athens. The generals responded by ordering trumpeters to sound an alarm throughout the night. They also introduced the messenger to the Athenians at the next morning's assembly meeting. According to Demosthenes (18.169-170), however, the messenger reported first to the *prytaneis*, who subsequently summoned the *strategoi*. It was the *prytaneis* who gave the orders to the trumpeter and who made report to the assembly and introduced the messenger to the Athenians.

[21] According to Plutarch (*Phoc.* 9.3), the Athenians urged Phokion on some occasion to lead them against the enemy, but he was unwilling to do so (and presumably voiced his opposition in the context of an assembly meeting). Plutarch provides no information about the proposed expedition, neither the year in which it was considered nor the identity of the enemy. But the incident should perhaps be identified with Phokion's alleged refusal to lead the Athenians to regain the Peiraieus in 317 (Nep. *Phoc.* 2.5), a late expedition with which we need not be concerned here. Cf. ch. 1 n. 49.

[22] Thrasyboulos' denouncement of Alkibiades in the assembly led to the latter's departure from the *strategia* in 407/6 (Plut. *Alc.* 36.1-4). Cf. appendix 15.

[23] Cawkwell (1978), p. 45, assumes that Timotheos was general on this occasion, but this conclusion is not supported by the text. (So Develin, *AO* p. 278.)

[24] Plutarch (*Phoc.* 9.6-7) informs us that on some occasion Phokion advised the Athenians against fighting with Boiotia over a territorial dispute. He suggested they rather fight with words. Tritle (1988), p 104, has suggested, plausibly enough, that Phokion's remark was made soon after the Athenian loss of Oropos in 366, a year in which Phokion is not known to have served as *strategos*.

[25] Develin, *AO* p. 387, suggests that Phokion addressed the *boule* in this year regarding Alexander's request for triremes, with which he suggested the Athenians comply. Phokion is not known to have served as general in 333/2. (This is not an instance of participation by a general in ekklesiastic debate; nevertheless it was an opportunity for Phokion to influence Athenian military policy.)

CHAPTER TWO

THE AFTERMATH OF COMBAT

Once generals were any distance from Athens the supervision of their conduct by the Athenian *demos* became less immediate. Lacking the ability to communicate quickly with their generals, the Athenians could not themselves respond in all instances to the changing circumstances of a campaign. Decisions pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the army were therefore necessarily left in the hands of Athens' generals. There was presumably little danger in or hesitation over the Athenians' reliance on their generals for decision-making of a more banal sort. But we may wonder whether the *demos* delegated its authority to generals as readily in connection with more important matters. In such instances, we may ask, were generals licensed to act as they thought best, or were they rather expected, when possible, to seek instruction from the *demos* or to operate in accord with established principles? Among the issues which are likely to have been of greater than average concern to the *demos* were, I suggest, the arrangements which were superintended by generals in the aftermath of hostilities. I look to these issues, therefore—the negotiation of settlements with defeated enemies, the use and distribution of the profits of war, and the disposition of prisoners of war and the captive populations of conquered cities—with a view to determining whether the *demos* invested its generals with significant decision-making authority when on campaign.

1. *Negotiating Terms of Surrender*

There is nothing new in observing that Athens' generals were not empowered to conclude treaties of peace and alliance.[1] Our sources suggest that

[1] See Tritle (1988), p. 104; Roberts (1982), p. 36; *GSW* II, pp. 55-56; Kagan (1974), p. 98; Hauvette-Besnault (1885), pp. 129-130. Hornblower (1983), pp. 120-121, argues that Athens' generals must have exercised considerable executive latitude in wartime. He suggests as an example that the alliance which was forged between Akarnania and Athens in c. 438 (Thuc. 2.68.8) was negotiated by Phormion on his own initiative: "...when...Phormio made an alliance with the Akarnanians in north-west Greece...it is inconceivable that he awaited approval from Athens." I do not think the passage justifies this conclusion (μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο [Phormion's capture of Argos] ἡ ξυμμαχία πρῶτον ἐγένετο 'Αθηναίοις καὶ 'Ακαρνᾶσιν), but at any rate, whether Phormion sought authorization or not, there is no reason to believe that the agreement he negotiated was binding on the Athenian state before its ratification by the *demos*.

any such agreements generals might negotiate with foreign states were subject to review by the Athenian *demos* and were not binding until ratified by the *ekklesia*.[2] Agreements reached by generals regarding the capitulation of defeated armies or invested cities, however, differed from the above in that the renegotiation of terms of surrender was impracticable.[3] Thus the *ekklesia* cannot, as with treaties of alliance, have exercised authority after the fact over the terms of surrender its *strategoi* negotiated. If the *demos* did influence its generals' settlements, it must have done so beforehand, by means of preliminary instructions, or *in mediis rebus*, the general consulting with the *demos* prior to finalizing an agreement with the enemy. The limitations of ancient communications must have rendered the latter scenario in many instances impossible, but there is support in our sources for the conclusion that in negotiating terms of surrender Athens' generals were most often operating in accord with the explicit directions or, at the least, the expectations, of the *ekklesia*.

In 428/7 the Athenians dispatched a fleet of forty ships against Mytilene and instructed the generals of the expedition, should they not take the city in

[2] Settlements made with Selymbria and Daphnous by the generals who served in the Hellespont between 410 and 407 were ratified in 407/6 by the *ekklesia* (ML 87 and 88). (See Andrewes [1953], particularly p. 8, who argues that the generals of the Hellespont were not serving in an official capacity during these years. If so, this is not a characteristic example of the *ekklesia* exercising *post factum* control over its generals' negotiations.) The *symmachiai* which Thrasyboulos of Steiria negotiated between Athens and the Odrysians Amedokos and Seuthes in 390/89 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.26; Diod. 14.94.2) were ratified subsequently in Athens (*IG* ii^2 21 and, probably, 22). In 374/3 Timotheos, having, we are told, summoned a number of states in or near Thrace ἐπὶ συμμαχίαν, brought envoys from those states to Athens to conclude the arrangements (Diod. 15.47.2-3). Chabrias concluded an agreement with Keos in 363/2 which was later ratified by the *ekklesia* (*IG* ii^2 111 = *GHI* 142, particularly ll. 17-19). The generals Kephisodotos (of Acharnai) and Chabrias negotiated agreements with Charidemos in 360/59 and 359/8 respectively. Both settlements were later rejected at Athens (Dem. 23.167, 171-172). At some time before 342 (*AO* p. 355) Chares evidently made an agreement with the Ainians regarding their *syntaxis*, and a certain Thoukydides proposed a decree, subsequently indicted as illegal, aimed at approving this act ([Dem.] 58.37-38; Hansen [1974], no. 21). Cf. Ste. Croix (1963), p. 116, on the need for agreements made by ambassadors to be ratified by their governments.

Generals evidently did have the authority to arrange armistices. The Athenian *strategoi* serving in Lesbos in 428/7 agreed to grant the Mytileneans an armistice during which they would send ambassadors to Athens (Thuc. 3.4.2-4). In 425 the generals at Pylos negotiated the conditions of an armistice with the Spartans, who likewise used the time thus obtained to send a delegation to Athens with a view to making peace (4.15-16). That generals were empowered to negotiate armistices is not surprising given that what was under consideration was not a final settlement with the enemy but rather a temporary cessation of hostilities.

[3] The Plataians, once they discovered what lay in store for them, may have hoped for a renegotiation of the terms of their surrender to the Spartans in 427 (Thuc. 3.59.3: ...καὶ δίκαιον, εἰ μὴ πείθομεν, ἐς τὰ αὐτὰ καταστήσαντας τὸν ξυντυχόντα κίνδυνον ἐᾶσαι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑλέσθαι...), but it was not forthcoming. The Romans too allegedly regretted the terms which their consuls had negotiated when trapped by the Samnites at the Caudine Forks. But a surrender cannot readily be repudiated, as the Samnite Gaius Pontius makes clear at Livy 9.11.

a first assault, to demand of the Mytileneans that they surrender their ships and destroy their fortifications (Thuc. 3.3.3, 3.4.1). On this occasion, that is, the concessions which were to be demanded of Mytilene in the event that the city capitulated immediately were established ahead of time by the Athenian *ekklesia* rather than by the generals on the scene. Although evidence to that effect is lacking, we may imagine that on other occasions as well generals received from the *ekklesia* prior to their departure from Athens instructions regarding the terms of surrender they were to propose to the enemy.

An initial proposal of surrender similar to that delivered to the Mytileneans was made by the generals[4] Demosthenes and Kleon prior to their assault on Sphakteria in 425/4. They suggested that the Spartans who were trapped on the island surrender themselves and their weapons, and guaranteed in return that the captives would endure only a mild form of imprisonment until such time as there was a general settlement (4.30.4: ...προκαλούμενοι, εἰ βούλοιντο, ἄνευ κινδύνου τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ἄνδρας σφίσι τά τε ὅπλα καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κελεύειν παραδοῦναι, ἐφ' ᾧ φυλακῇ τῇ μετρίᾳ τηρήσονται, ἕως ἄν τι περὶ τοῦ πλέονος ξυμβαθῇ). We are not told in this case that in making their offer the generals were following the explicit directions of the Athenian *ekklesia*, and they need not have been. But I would argue that the terms which Demosthenes and Kleon offered to the Spartans did not deviate significantly, if at all, from what the *ekklesia* expected them to offer. The fate of any whom the Athenians would capture on Sphakteria had been established in Athens prior to Kleon's departure for Pylos: the general had announced to the Athenians gathered in assembly that he would bring his prisoners alive to Athens (4.28.4; cf. ch. 2 n. 39). The proposal which the generals subsequently made to the Spartans differed from what we are told had been determined already in the *ekklesia* in that it specified what would become of the captives once they reached Athens: the Spartans would be kept in confinement, the conditions of their captivity would be relatively comfortable (φυλακῇ τῇ μετρίᾳ),[5] and they would be held until there was a general

settlement. It is possible that these details had not been discussed in the *ekklesia*, that they were introduced into the proposal by Demosthenes and Kleon themselves. But I doubt that the most significant of these particulars, that the Spartans would be kept in custody, was an invention of the generals: the transportation of prisoners to Athens in the late fifth and early fourth centuries appears to have been followed regularly by their imprisonment.[6] The Athenians very likely intended from the first to keep their (potential) Spartan captives in custody, as indeed they later did, and Demosthenes and Kleon may well have known as much. Had the terms proposed by the *strategoi* prior to their assault on Sphakteria been accepted by the Spartans, the Athenians themselves, I suggest, would have found no fault with their generals' settlement.

Of particular interest for the present discussion is the surrender of Poteidaia to Xenophon, Hestiodoros, and Phanomachos in 430/29. The three generals of the expedition negotiated with the enemy relatively lenient terms of surrender: the Poteidaians were allowed to vacate their city in safety, each taking with them some clothing and a specified amount of money (Thuc. 2.70). The settlement was not to the liking of the Athenians back home, who, Thucydides reports, criticized their generals—and may have prosecuted them (see the excursus to ch. 8, nos. 5-7)—because they had made the arrangement without consulting the *ekklesia*: ...Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τούς τε στρατηγοὺς ἐπῃτιάσαντο ὅτι ἄνευ αὐτῶν ξυνέβησαν... (2.70.4). In the clause which follows Thucydides explains more fully the Athenians' grounds for complaint: they thought their generals could have secured from the Poteidaians an unconditional surrender (ἐνόμιζον γὰρ ἂν κρατῆσαι τῆς πόλεως ᾗ ἐβούλοντο). We might draw from Thucydides' account one of two conclusions. Either generals were always expected to consult with the *demos* regarding the terms of capitulation they were negotiating with invested cities, or they were expected to seek instruction when the benefit to Athens of the terms they were considering fell below some threshold level of acceptability.[7] The latter conclusion is suggested by Thucydides' γάρ clause at 2.70.4, and—though the Poteidaian surrender is the only occasion I am aware of regarding which we are expressly told that generals negotiated a surrender wholly without the explicit

[4] I use the term "general" with reference to Kleon in the context of the Pylos campaign loosely: his appointment to that command in 425/4 does not imply that he was admitted at the same time to the *strategia*. Cf. ch. 1 n. 30.

[5] It is not clear what is meant by φυλακῇ τῇ μετρίᾳ (see Panagopoulos [1978], pp. 82-83; Ducrey [1968b], pp. 95 and 227). When the Spartans did finally surrender to the Athenians they did so on less favorable terms than had been offered initially. The conditions of the confinement they subsequently endured were not necessarily moderate. It is true that Nikias and Alkibiades saw to the welfare of the Spartans (Thuc. 5.43.2, 6.89.2; Plut. *Nic.* 9.6, *Alc.* 14.1), but the prisoners were evidently put in chains during at least part of their detention. Thucydides writes that when the Spartans were brought to Athens from Sphakteria the Athenians bid them be guarded in fetters until some agreement was reached (4.41.1; Diodorus claims they were brought to Athens in chains [12.63.4]). A reference to the Spartans in Aristophanes' *Knights* likewise portrays them as fettered: "And now those ears of corn which Kleon brought from there, / having bound them in wood (ἐν ξύλῳ) he parches them and wants to sell them" (393-394). (The ξύλον to which Aristophanes refers was a device similar to a pillory, a board with holes for securing a man's head and hands: Ducrey [1968b], pp. 225-228.)

[6] Thuc. 4.57.3-4 (the Cytheraeans were imprisoned, although the Aeginetans were executed), 5.3.4, 5.84.1; Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.13-14, 1.5.19.

[7] The *demos*, for example, may have been content with any agreement which, unlike the terms granted the Mytileneans in 428/7, retained for the Athenians the possibility of profit through the sale or ransom of captives.

input of the *ekklesia*—it is, I believe, the more likely conclusion. I suggest, that is, that there were some settlements which generals might conclude with a defeated enemy which were acceptable to the Athenians more or less without exception, and that generals were therefore not expected to consult with the *demos* before concluding agreements on these terms. Our evidence does not allow us to identify what constituted "acceptable" terms—and what was acceptable to the *ekklesia* need not have remained a constant throughout the period with which we are concerned—but I would assume at the least that generals who succeeded in winning the unconditional surrender of an opposing force were not required before concluding the agreement to consult with their home government: the unqualified surrender of an enemy was surely an abiding desideratum of the *ekklesia*, without exception acceptable to that body, with which would lay, according to the settlement's terms, complete authority over the disposition of the surrendered enemy.[8]

That generals were sent to Mytilene in 428/7 with explicit instructions regarding the concessions they were to demand of that city's inhabitants indicates that the *ekklesia* involved itself directly at least sometimes—how often it did so is impossible to determine—in the negotiation of terms of surrender. When the assembly did not provide its generals with instructions, I suggest that it nonetheless exercised indirect influence over the settlements its *strategoi* concluded, since generals were motivated in their negotiations by their appreciation of what the *demos* wanted from them (an aspect of which was the threat of disciplinary action which would attend their noncompliance with the assembly's expectations; cf. ch. 7 § 2.1). Athens' generals, that is, if they in fact negotiated terms of surrender on any occasion without explicit instructions from their home government, were not for that reason acting to any significant degree on their own authority.

2. *The Profits of War*

2.1. *The Disposal of Booty in Athenian Armies*

The booty which was collected by Athens' armies in the fifth and fourth centuries—and which, having been gathered under official auspices, was the property of the army as a whole, or of the state, rather than of individual

[8] Having once rejected the relatively lenient terms offered by Demosthenes and Kleon, the Spartans who were trapped on Sphakteria were compelled eventually to surrender to the Athenians unconditionally: ἐκηρυξάν (Demosthenes and Kleon) τε, εἰ βούλονται, τὰ ὅπλα παραδοῦναι καὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοις ὥστε βουλεῦσαι ὅτι ἂν ἐκείνοις δοκῇ (Thuc. 4.37.2). The Mytileneans in 428/7 (3.28.1) and the Melians in 416/15 (5.116.3) also surrendered unconditionally.

soldiers[9]—might be disposed of in one of several ways.[10] It could be forwarded or brought to Athens by the generals of an expedition,[11] distributed among the soldiers,[12] or used by Athens' *strategoi* for the support of their troops.[13] Of concern for the present purpose is the role played by the Athenian command in determining which of these alternatives would be elected in any given instance.

There is little evidence which bears directly on the question. At 16.57.2-3 Diodorus reports that Iphikrates, having captured near Corcyra statues intended for dedication at Olympia and Delphi, sent to Athens to ask what he should do with the booty. The Athenians instructed him to use the proceeds for the support of his troops. The passage suggests that final decisions regarding the fate of captured spoils rested with Athens' *demos*, but the incident Diodorus describes may not reflect normal procedure. The religious significance of the prizes taken by Iphikrates may have prompted him to seek instruction when he would otherwise not have done so.[14] At 13.47.7-8 and 13.64.4 Diodorus discusses occasions when Athenian generals plundered enemy territory with a view to procuring booty for the support of their armies.[15] The passages can be taken to suggest that the decision concerning the disposition of the booty thus obtained lay entirely with Athens'

[9] Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.5 mentions Athenian soldiers scattering κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας λείας. Cf. the rule regarding private plunder which obtained in the army of the Ten Thousand (Xen. *Anab.* 6.6.2): καὶ ὁπότε μὲν καταμένοι τὸ στράτευμα ἀναπαυόμενον, ἐξῆν ἐπὶ λείαν ἰέναι, καὶ ἐλάμβανον <οἱ> ἐξιόντες· ὁπότε δὲ ἐξίοι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα, εἴ τις χωρὶς ἀπελθὼν λάβοι τι, δημόσιον ἔδοξεν εἶναι. Pritchett, *GSW* V, p. 388, suspects that this practice was common in ancient armies. For discussion of the distinction between private plunder and common booty see also Ducrey (1968b), pp. 230-233.

[10] Presumably that part of the booty which was used for awards of *aristeia* was separated from the collected plunder before the generals made any final arrangements.

[11] Diod. 11.62.3 and Plut. *Cim.* 13.5; Diod. 12.44.3; Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.8, 11, 13-19 (cf. Diod. 13.68.2, Plut. *Alc.* 32.1, Ath. 535c, and see *GSW* V, p. 422); Dem. 20.77, 80 and Diod. 15.32.2; Nep. *Tim.* 1.2. Dem. 20.77-80 suggests that, at least in the fourth century, the Athenians kept careful records of the booty which Athenian generals brought to Athens.

[12] Diod. 11.82.5 (but cf. Thuc. 1.108.2-3 and *GSW* V, p. 371); Diod. 13.42.3.

[13] Diod. 13.47.7-8; Diod. 13.64.4; Diod. 13.69.5; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.30(?); Polyaen. 3.10.9, Isoc. 15.111, and Arist. *Oec.* 1350b; cf. Dem. 4.29. Presumably the money obtained from the sale of the Hykkaric slaves in 415 (Thuc. 6.62.3, cf. Diod. 13.6.1) was used to maintain Athens' army in Sicily (so also Ducrey [1968b], p. 262).

[14] Cf. Kahrstedt (1924), col. 771: "In besonders gearteten Fällen, wie wenn Iphikrates...geweihte Geräte erbeutet, mag der Feldherr über die Behandlung der Stücke in Athen anfragen, aber das geschieht aus freiem Entschluß und nur um sich gegen die Intrigen der Drahtzieher zu schützen, die die religiöse Ängstlichkeit der Masse ausnützen könnten."

[15] 13.47.7-8: βουλόμενος δὲ τούς τε πολίτας καὶ συμμάχους ἀναπαῦσαι τῶν εἰσφορῶν, τήν τε τῶν πολεμίων χώραν ἐπόρθησε (Theramenes) καὶ πολλὰς ὠφελείας ἤθροισεν. 13.64.4: ...κοινῇ πολλὴν αὐτῆς (the territory of Pharnabazus) πορθήσαντες τούς τε στρατιώτας ἐνέπλησαν ὠφελείας καὶ αὐτοὶ (Alkibiades and Thrasyboulos of Steiria) χρήματα συνήγαγον ἐκ τῶν λαφύρων, βουλόμενοι κουφίσαι τὸν δῆμον τῶν εἰσφορῶν. (Alkibiades and Thrasyboulos may not have been official *strategoi* on the occasion Diodorus describes. See Develin, *AO* p. 165, and Andrewes [1953], pp. 2-9.)

generals, but this interpretation is not inevitable: there is no difficulty in assuming that on the occasions described the generals were operating in accord with instructions given them by the *demos*, to offset the expenses of their campaigns whenever possible through plunder. Indeed, lacking specific evidence for the instructions or expectations of the *demos* regarding its generals' disposal of booty, we cannot assume that Athens' *strategoi* were operating on their own authority on any of the occasions for which information has survived regarding the use to which plunder was ultimately put.

There is, on the other hand, reason to believe that when generals used booty to provide for their armies they did so at the least with the implicit support of the *demos,* if not in fact under its explicit direction. During the fourth century the Athenians often dispatched armies without providing them with adequate financial support.[16] Generals were evidently expected in such instances to provide for their troops through plunder. Their use of booty for this purpose must, therefore, have been enjoined or at least sanctioned by the *demos*. Thus responsibility for the decision did not rest ultimately with Athens' generals.[17] So much we may reasonably conclude, but a more detailed understanding of the principles which governed the disposition of booty won by Athenian armies unfortunately eludes us.[18]

It remains to consider a second question related to the disposition of spoils in Athenian armies. On those occasions when *strategoi* distributed booty among their troops as a means of rewarding them,[19] we may ask, were they free to apportion the captured plunder as they thought best, or was their freedom of action in executing this chore rather constrained by the expectations of the *demos*, or of their troops, such that the distribution was made in accord with established principles? To my knowledge the only evi-

[16] For discussion and testimonia see *GSW* V, pp. 380-382, 394, 424; II, pp. 84-85, 101-103; Pritchett (1971), pp. 89-90.

[17] Pritchett (*GSW* V, pp. 400-401 and 424; cf. [1971], pp. 87-90) concludes that Athens and other Greek *poleis* exercised tight control over the disposition of the profits of war. Kahrstedt (1924), col. 771, on the other hand, argues from Plut. *Cim.* 9.3-6 that Athenian generals (just as their Spartan counterparts) could dispose of booty at their own discretion. But the anecdote preserved in Plutarch does not, I think, imply as much: we cannot assume, as Kahrstedt must, that Kimon was not operating on the occasion described in accord with the instructions of the Athenian *demos*. For discussion of the passage see n. 20 below.

[18] Pritchett, *GSW* V, pp. 382-383 (cf. [1971], p. 85), suggests that generals might use booty to pay their troops and provide awards of *aristeia*, but that they were expected to forward to Athens any additional profits acquired from plunder ("...the soldiers would have received their pay and rewards for aristeia, but...the remainder went to the dekate and the state"; cf. Kahrstedt [1924], col. 771: "Aber was bei der Rückkehr nach Athen nicht aufgebraucht ist, geht in die Staatskasse..."). This may be right, but the evidence Pritchett adduces in support of the suggestion is not to my mind conclusive: that Chabrias and Chares brought booty to Athens from expeditions abroad in the fourth century does not imply that they were operating in accord with a regulation such as Pritchett describes.

[19] As opposed, that is, to providing them with pay; cf. ch. 2 n. 12.

dence which bears on this question is Polyaen. 3.9.31,[20] a description of the procedure Iphikrates followed when distributing booty to his troops: "After a battle Iphikrates distributed to each from the captured spoils things worthy of their labors. And if gifts were brought from cities, from these also he made a distribution to each, not individually, but by tribe and *lochos* and equipment—some to the cavalry, some to the hoplites, and some to the light-armed infantry."[21] The passage is interesting in that it suggests that generals had control over the distribution of booty in their armies insofar as it rested with them to determine the worthiness of potential recipients. But the authority they enjoyed over the procedure may not in fact have been

[20] An anecdote preserved in Plutarch (*Cim.* 9.3-6) and Polyaenus (1.34.2) and ascribed by the former to Ion of Chios merits discussion in this context. According to Ion, Kimon once entertained his dinner companions with the story of his division of captives taken at Sestos and Byzantium. Having been charged by Athens' allies with partitioning the prisoners (*Cim.* 9.3: ...οἱ σύμμαχοι τῷ Κίμωνι διανεῖμαι [the captives] προσέταξαν...), he made a division into two groups, the first consisting of the captives themselves and the second of their clothing and other adornments, an apportionment which was criticized as unequal. Kimon directed the allies to select whichever of the two lots they preferred. They chose the non-human booty, ostensibly the more profitable alternative, but the Athenians—to whom the second lot fell by default—realized a greater profit in the end from the ransom of the captives. Kimon provided for his army for four months from the proceeds of the sale and had money left over in the end for the Athenian treasury. There are difficulties with accepting this story as it stands. While we know that Kimon was involved in driving Pausanias from Byzantium in the late 470's (Just. 9.1.3; for the date see below), there is no indication in our sources that he was ever involved in capturing Sestos, which had been taken initially by the Greeks under Xanthippos in 479/8 (Hdt. 9.114, 117-121; Thuc. 1.89.2). It has been suggested that Kimon recaptured Sestos on the occasion of his expulsion of Pausanias from Byzantium, either taking the city from Pausanias himself—a scenario which leaves unexplained the presence in Sestos of Persian prisoners so long after the city's initial capture (for discussion of this suggestion and its difficulties see *GSW* V, pp. 370-371 n. 525, and Pritchett [1971], p. 83; Fornara [1966], p. 269; Sealey [1966], p. 250; Walker *CAH* V, p. 467; Beloch *GG* II.2², p. 188)—or seizing the city from Persians who were based at nearby Doriskos and had reoccupied it after Xanthippos' departure (*ATL* III, p. 206 n. 55; see Fornara [1966], p. 269, and Sealey [1966], pp. 250-251, for discussion). The historical circumstances of Kimon's occupation of Sestos thus elude us. But if the story preserved by Plutarch is not accurate in all its particulars, it may yet provide information regarding the distribution of booty which reflects historical reality, specifically that Athenian generals in command of armies of the Delian League distributed booty to the allied contingents under their command by dividing the spoils into lots, as Kimon is said to have done, that the generals may have had some degree of freedom when it came to making allotments, although their division would subsequently be subject to criticism, and that the booty was not converted into cash prior to its apportionment.

The evidence for an earlier date for the expulsion of Pausanias from Byzantium—Plut. *Cim.* 6.6, 7.1, and Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 191.37-46—is not compelling, and Thuc. 3.98.1 is strong evidence that Kimon did not reoccupy the city before the siege of Eion: see Badian (1988), pp. 300-302 and 314; Meiggs (1972), p. 73; Rhodes (1970), pp. 395-399; and, in particular, Fornara (1966), pp. 267-271. Among those who favor an early date are Hornblower (1991), p. 217; Develin, *AO* p. 67; Cawkwell (1970), p. 58 n. 28; *ATL* III, p. 159; Jacoby (1947), p. 2 n. 4.

[21] Ἰφικράτης μετὰ μὲν τὴν μάχην ἀπὸ τῶν ληφθέντων ἄξια τῶν πόνων διένειμεν ἑκάστῳ. εἰ δὲ ξένια παρὰ πόλεων ἐκομίσθη, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων διέπεμπεν ἑκάστῳ, οὐ κατὰ ἕνα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ἔθνη καὶ κατὰ λόχους καὶ κατὰ τὰς ὁπλίσεις, ἱππεῦσιν ἄλλα, ὁπλίταις ἄλλα, ψιλοῖς ἕτερα.

very meaningful: (1) It is not clear whether Iphikrates distributed τὰ ληφθέντα individually or, as they did ξένια, by tribe, *lochos*, and type of equipment. If the latter, decision-making regarding the worthiness of potential recipients of the booty will have been reduced to the relatively undemanding task of considering the importance of the contribution which each branch of the army had made in a particular action (cf. p. 49). (2) If, on the other hand, generals distributed booty to their soldiers on an individual basis, the logistics of the operation will probably have been such that (a) in most cases soldiers received the same amount of booty, since awards adjusted for the prowess of individual combatants cannot have been possible in the majority of cases, and (b) when an individual's performance on the battlefield was thought to warrant a more substantial allotment, the general—since he cannot have witnessed firsthand in the course of the fighting the actions of a very large number of his soldiers—will likely have made that award in response to reports received from subordinates. When generals were influenced in their decision-making on such occasions by their subordinates, their own authority over the decisions ultimately reached was, I suggest, to some extent reduced (cf. ch. 3 § 2 for a similar discussion of the awarding of *aristeia* in Athenian armies). Having said so much regarding the information Polyaenus provides at 3.9.31, it must be admitted that it may not be appropriate to generalize from the passage about Athenian practices: Iphikrates may have acted as described when serving as a mercenary leader rather than as an Athenian *strategos*.[22]

2.2. *The Distribution of Booty Among Contingents of Allied Armies*[23]

Our evidence for the distribution of booty in the allied armies whose leadership Athens' *strategoi* shared with non-Athenians in the fifth and fourth centuries is for the most part silent about the extent to which Athenian generals exercised authority over the procedure. I would suggest, however, that Athens' *strategoi* did not enjoy a significant degree of influence over the partitioning of spoils among contingents of the army of the Hellenic League. Typically, it seems, after the battles of the Second Persian War, the allied Greeks made an official collection of the spoils of the enemy (Hdt. 9.80.1 [Plataia]; cf. 8.121 [Salamis], 9.106.1 [Mykale]). From this common store dedications were made to the gods (8.121.1, 9.81.1),[24] and additional

[22] So also *GSW* V, p. 388.

[23] For further discussion of the distribution of booty among allies in ancient (mostly non-Athenian) armies, see *GSW* V, pp. 363-373; Garlan (1977), pp. 158-164; Ducrey (1968b), pp. 258-267; Aymard (1967), pp. 499-512.

[24] On the custom of dedicating tithes of booty to the gods see Pritchett (1971), pp. 93-100, and Ducrey (1968b), pp. 255-257.

sums were set aside for the recipients of *aristeia*[25] and for the commander-in-chief of the allied forces.[26] The common booty was then divided among the individual contingents of the Greeks, evidently in accord with some predetermined principle: Herodotus reports that after the battle of Plataia the allied states[27] received shares of the booty in proportion to their worthiness (9.81.1: ...ἔλαβον ἕκαστοι τῶν ἄξιοι ἦσαν...). The purport of the statement is not entirely clear. How, that is, the relative deservedness of the recipients was determined is not specified.[28] Of the same occasion Diodorus (11.33.1) reports that the booty was divided "according to the number of soldiers" (κατὰ τὸν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀριθμόν), presumably the number contributed by each ally.[29] This information is not necessarily incompatible with that provided by Herodotus: the "worthiness" of the individual contingents can have been a function of the number of troops each contributed. Whatever the principle according to which the distribution was made, however, it is unlikely that Athens' generals were alone responsible for its selection. At best, as representatives of Athens in

[25] That booty was set aside for *aristeia* awarded by the army of the Hellenic League is mentioned only in connection with the battle of Plataia. The implication of Plutarch's account of the occasion is that the award was made from the common store (*Arist.* 20.3), and this is the most likely interpretation of Hdt. 9.81.1 as well. Diodorus, however, describes a less likely scenario, that the Greeks voted *aristeia* to the Plataians *after* the division of booty among the allied contingents (11.33.1).

Macan *ad* 9.81.2 (l. 10) writes: "...according to Hdt. there had been, and was, no award to any state collectively [after Plataia]..., or at least he could not discover any; he might seem here, therefore, to be referring to individuals, but it is likely that individuals, ἀριστεύσαντες, would have been rewarded out of the share of their state and not out of the common or undivided booty...." But individuals were at least sometimes awarded *aristeia* by the allied army as a whole after battles of the Second Persian War (see ch. 3 n. 25). Herodotus could be referring to such awards here, though he need not be. He does not in fact tell us that *aristeia* were not awarded to any state after Plataia. Herodotus' ignorance of the identity of the prize-winning state (9.71.1) is not necessarily incompatible with the assumption (9.81.2) that *some* booty was set apart for the award on this occasion.

[26] Hdt. 9.81-82. For discussion of Pausanias' award see *GSW* V, p. 398, and Pritchett (1971), pp. 54-55.

[27] That ἕκαστοι refers to states rather than individual soldiers is argued at *GSW* V, pp. 369-370.

[28] Sage (1996), p. 126: "On the most likely interpretation it [the distribution of booty in proportion to worthiness] refers to the contribution of forces in terms of numbers of troops and not to a simple subjective assessment of the contributions of each member of the alliance to the victory." Macan *ad* 9.81.1 (l. 8): "On what principle the distribution was effected is not indicated: was it the relative size of the contingents...? Or this simple principle may have been combined with a consideration of services rendered, the proportion of dead, and so forth." For the distribution of booty between allies according to the number of men contributed to an expedition, cf. Diod. 11.25.1, with reference to fifth-century Syracuse, and the second-century B.C. inscription *IC* 3, III.4.53-58.

[29] So Sage (1996), p. 126, and Macan *ad* 9.81.1 (l. 8). Pritchett, *GSW* V, pp. 369-370, however, seems to understand κατὰ τὸν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀριθμόν as a reference to the total number of soldiers in the allied army, in which case the passage would be describing a distribution of booty to individuals rather than to allied contingents.

the allied councils-of-war, they will have shared with their non-Athenian colleagues the responsibility for decisions made regarding the distribution of booty.

Our sources provide information about the division of spoils in allied armies in only a handful of other instances. In the winter of 426/5 the Akarnanians and Amphilochians obtained the support of twenty Athenian ships for a campaign directed against the Ambraciots at Olpai (Thuc. 3.105.3). After the enemy had twice been defeated, Athens' allies divided the spoils, of which the Athenians were given a third (3.114.1: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τρίτον μέρος νείμαντες τῶν σκύλων τοῖς 'Αθηναίοις τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὰς πόλεις διείλοντο [the Akarnanians and Amphilochians]). That the division was made by the Akarnanians and Amphilochians on this occasion may suggest that determining how the booty would be distributed was their prerogative, but it is also possible that they were operating in accord with the terms of an agreement, one reached previously with the Athenian *demos* or concluded on the spot with Athens' generals. In any event, the degree to which the generals influenced the apportionment of spoils on this occasion cannot be determined. Thucydides reports that after the Athenians captured Hykkara in 415/14 they enslaved its inhabitants and, keeping the slaves for themselves, handed the city over to their allies the Egestaians (6.62.3). We are not provided with details about the formulation of the agreement in accordance with which this distribution was made. Presumably, its terms were negotiated by the belligerents ahead of time rather than in the aftermath of battle,[30] but we cannot know whether particulars regarding the distribution of booty were specified in Athens' treaty of alliance with the Egestaians (6.6.2), or were instead agreed upon immediately prior to the battle by the Egestaians and Athens' generals. In the latter case, the generals can have acted on their own authority or in accord with precedent or the explicit directions of the Athenian *demos*: the extent of their influence over the division of the spoils is indeterminate. (The degree of authority which Athens' generals exercised over the distribution of the Hykkaric booty would, at any rate, not necessarily be representative of normal procedure, since the generals involved had been appointed *strategoi autokratores* of the campaign in Sicily. Cf. appendix 13.) Finally, at 16.57.1 Diodorus reports that the Athenians who were fighting on the side of the Phokians in 347/6 received payment that was not in proportion to the number of soldiers they contributed (...'Αθηναῖοι...οὐ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐκπεμπομένων στρατιωτῶν τοὺς μισθοὺς λαβόντες). Once again, this spare allusion to the distribution of booty in an allied army has little to tell us about the influence which Athens' generals exercised over the procedure.

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[30] So Aymard (1967), p. 502; cf. *GSW* V, p. 365. On the passage see also Garlan (1977), p. 160.

3. *Prisoners of War and Conquered Populations*

3.1. *Prisoners Taken in the Course of Military Operations*

As with other types of booty, prisoners of war might be disposed of by Athens' *strategoi* in a number of ways, ransomed by generals in the field,[31] released without ransom,[32] sold as slaves,[33] executed,[34] or sent to Athens, where their fate was determined by vote of the *ekklesia*.[35] That generals regularly operated in accord with the instructions of the *demos* when disposing of their captives by these means is suggested in particular by a decree which the Athenians passed prior to their defeat at Aigospotami. Xenophon reports that the Athenians voted to cut off the right hands of all those they captured if they won the naval battle (*Hell.* 2.1.31: ...εἰ κρατήσειαν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ, τὴν δεξιὰν χεῖρα ἀποκόπτειν τῶν ζωγρηθέντων πάντων...).[36] That such a barbarous decree was in fact passed has been doubted,[37] but its historicity is not inherently unlikely: Ducrey suggests a plausible explanation for the extreme measure, that the Athenians wanted to deprive the enemy of oarsmen while at the same time spreading alarm among their ranks.[38] What is noteworthy for the present purpose is that the decision regarding the fate of Athens' potential captives was made in advance by the Athenian *ekklesia*. It was not left to the discretion of Athens'

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[31] Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.36 (cf. Diod. 15.47.7); [Dem.] 12.3.

[32] Plut. *Alc.* 29.5, *Phoc.* 13.7. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.13 and ch. 2 n. 42.

[33] Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.36; cf. Diod. 12.5.

[34] Thuc. 2.92.2; Hdt. 9.119.2-120; Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.31. Three prisoners, the nephews of Dareios, were allegedly sacrificed to Dionysos Omestes during the Second Persian War (Plut. *Them.* 13.2-4, *Arist.* 9.2, *Pel.* 21.3). For discussion and bibliography see *GSW* V, pp. 208-209.

[35] ML 51.5-7; Thuc. 2.103.1; Thuc. 4.41.1 (cf. Diod. 12.63.3-4; Plut. *Nic.* 10.8); Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.12-13; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.19 (the prisoners were evidently sent to Athens and there imprisoned by the Athenians; cf. Paus. 6.7.4-5); Dem. 20.77, 80 (though Demosthenes does not specify whether these were prisoners of war or the populations of vanquished cities); Ath. 535c.

[36] Plutarch (*Lys.* 9.5) reports that the decree was moved by the general Philokles (*AO* no. 2417), but this detail is probably an unhistorical inference from Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.31, which attributes to Philokles responsibility only for the drowning of a number of prisoners taken at sea. On the proposed mutilation see also Ael. *VH* 2.9 and Cic. *De Offic.* 3.11.46, which report that the Athenians resolved to cut off the right thumbs (*sic*) of their *Aeginetan* prisoners. Presumably, the authors are referring mistakenly to the decree which preceded the battle at Aigospotami. For discussion of that decree see *GSW* V, pp. 236-237 and 422, Kagan (1987), p. 395, and Panagopoulos (1978), pp. 174-176.

[37] The story was rejected by Grote (1862), 5.545. Cf. Ste. Croix (1954-55), p. 14 n. 2. Kiechle (1958), p. 141, accepts Xenophon's evidence.

[38] (1968a), p. 235, cf. (1968b), p. 65 n. 5. According to Plutarch, the Athenians resolved to cut off the right thumbs of their captives rather than their hands (cf. n. 36 above), this with a view to preventing them from wielding a spear, although they might still row (*Lys.* 9.5: ...Φιλοκλῆς ὁ πείσας ποτὲ ψηφίσασθαι τὸν δῆμον ἀποκόπτειν τὸν δεξιὸν ἀντίχειρα τῶν ἁλισκομένων κατὰ πόλεμον, ὅπως δόρυ μὲν φέρειν μὴ δύνωνται, κώπην δὲ ἐλαύνωσι). Ducrey is correct, I believe, in suggesting that Plutarch is mistaken about the Athenians' intentions.

generals in the field.[39] A further consideration likewise suggests that *strategoi* did not themselves normally decide the fate of prisoners of war, namely that generals appear to have sent their captives to Athens with some frequency (cf. ch. 2 n. 35)—and this not only when the army's propinquity to the city would seem to have recommended as much.[40] On these occasions at least the fate of Athens' prisoners was certainly determined by the *demos* rather than its generals. So much is clear, but it seems likely in addition that in sending their prisoners to Athens *strategoi* were acting in obedience to the instructions of the *ekklesia* rather than on their own initiative. It is difficult to imagine otherwise why generals would have taken the trouble to guard their captives and transport them to Athens when they might more conveniently have disposed of them on the spot.

Although, I argue, control over the disposition of prisoners of war rested normally with the Athenian *demos*, our sources suggest that, at least in exceptional circumstances, generals might themselves determine the fate of their captives. Plutarch reports that Alkibiades released without ransom a number of priests and priestesses whom he captured in the territory of Pharnabazos in 410/9 (*Alc.* 29.5), an action which seems unlikely to have been prompted by official instructions.[41] In the same year Thrasyllos captured the crews of four Syracusan ships. He sent all his prisoners to Athens with the exception of a certain Alkibiades, a relative and fellow-exile of the general Alkibiades, who was either released or executed (the reading has been disputed),[42] but who, at any rate, received special treatment at the

[39] For a similar discussion, see *GSW* V, pp. 235-237. We are told by Thucydides (4.28.4; cf. Plut. *Nic.* 7.5) that Kleon announced in the *ekklesia* in 425 that within twenty days he would either kill the Lakedaimonians on Sphakteria or bring them back to Athens as prisoners. I would suggest that Kleon's remark concerning his plans for the potential captives was tantamount to a proposal regarding their disposition, and that this proposal was subsequently approved by the Athenians either implicitly or explicitly (cf. 4.29.1). What we have here, that is, is indirect evidence that the decision regarding the fate of the prisoners was made in advance by the Athenian *demos* rather than by the generals in the field. Cf. p. 42. (Note that when Demosthenes and Kleon were certain of victory they intentionally spared the Lakedaimonians on the island with a view to bringing them alive to Athens [4.37.1].)

[40] In 429/8 Phormion brought certain of his prisoners to Athens from the Corinthian Gulf (Thuc. 2.103.1). Thrasyllos sent prisoners to Athens from Lesbos in 410/9 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.12-13).

[41] Alkibiades may not have been serving in an official capacity at the time, however (see ch. 2 n. 15). Bielman (1994), p. 282, remarks that in releasing these prisoners Alkibiades was conforming to "l'un des principes fondamentaux du code de la guerre en Grèce, l'inviolabilité des sanctuaires et du personnel sacré." (Cf. Ober [1996], p. 56 no. 3.) A good point, which suggests that Alkibiades, if acting independently of the *demos*, was yet operating in accordance with its expectations, and thus not on his own authority *per se*.

[42] ...'Αλκιβιάδην δὲ 'Αθηναῖον, 'Αλκιβιάδου ὄντα ἀνεψιὸν καὶ συμφυγάδα, κατέλευσεν. See Andrewes (1953), p. 4 n. 11, for the suggestion that κατέλευσεν be replaced by ἀπέλυσεν or κατελεήσας ἀπέλυσεν.

hands of his captor (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.13).[43] These two passages suggest that in the case of small numbers of individual prisoners generals sometimes felt free to act independently. More precisely, since it is by no means necessarily the case that such independent action on the part of generals was sanctioned by the Athenian *demos*, we may say that generals may have felt that actions taken by them in contravention of the directions of the *demos* were unlikely in certain circumstances to prompt disciplinary action. They exercised a degree of authority, that is, *de facto* if not *de iure*, and in the end not particularly meaningful, over the fate of the prisoners in their charge.[44]

3.2. *The Captive Populations of Conquered Cities*

The fate of the populations of cities which surrendered to Athenian armies was determined by the terms to which the defeated had agreed.[45] These were negotiated by Athens' generals on the scene,[46] but I have suggested in ch. 2 § 1 that the authority which the *ekklesia* exercised over its generals' negotiations was such that *strategoi* did not themselves influence to a significant degree the settlements they arranged. As the sequel to Mytilene's unconditional surrender to the Athenians in 428/7 shows, however, it was not impossible—despite the assembly's authority over negotiations—for generals to influence the fate of surrendered populations. By the terms of Mytilene's capitulation to Athens, the disposition of the city's inhabitants was left to the discretion of the Athenian *ekklesia*. Until such time as that body made a determination regarding the defeated, Athens' general, Paches,

[43] That Philokles is identified by Xenophon as the general responsible for throwing overboard the crews of two enemy triremes sometime prior to the battle of Aigospotami does not, I think, imply that in so doing he was acting on his own authority (*Hell.* 2.1.31: Φιλοκλῆς δ' ἦν στρατηγὸς τῶν 'Αθηναίων, ὃς τούτους διέφθειρεν).

[44] A third passage requires discussion in this context. Plutarch alleges that Phokion released the Greeks he captured in Euboia in 349/8 because he was afraid Athens' rhetors would compel the *demos* to treat them unfairly (*Phoc.* 13.7: ...οὓς ἔλαβεν αἰχμαλώτους Ἕλληνας ἀφῆκε, φοβηθεὶς τοὺς ῥήτορας τῶν 'Αθηναίων, μὴ πρὸς ὀργήν τι βιάσωνται τὸν δῆμον ἀγνωμονῆσαι περὶ αὐτούς). Aeschines, himself a participant in the Euboian campaign (2.169), reports only that on this occasion the enemy were released under truce (3.88: ...μάχῃ κρατήσαντες ἀφεῖσαν ὑποσπόνδους τοὺς πολεμίους...). The latter author's more spare account is to be preferred to that of Plutarch, who, in explaining the general's motivation, attributes to Phokion an implausible generosity of spirit. The passage is not reliable evidence that Phokion acted independently in disposing of his Greek captives. (Indeed, one might argue, *Phoc.* 13.7 suggests that the disposition of prisoners was regularly determined by the *demos*, since, absent Phokion's alleged humane intervention, the fate of the general's Greek prisoners would have been determined by the Athenian *ekklesia*.) For discussion of the passage see Bielman (1994), p. 281, and *GSW* V, pp. 302-303.

[45] In 425/4, for example, the Cytheraeans agreed to surrender themselves to the Athenians on the condition that their lives be spared (Thuc. 4.54.2). The garrison which was holding Nisaia in 424 surrendered with the guarantee that they would be ransomed (4.69.3; by the terms of the agreement, however, the Spartans in Nisaia were left to the discretion of the Athenians).

[46] Or perhaps by their representatives. The generals Kleomedes and Teisias sent πρέσβεις to negotiate with the Melians in 417/16 (Thuc. 5.84.3).

was debarred from imprisoning, enslaving, or executing them (Thuc. 3.28.1).[47] As is well known, the Mytilenean issue prompted two heated debates in the *ekklesia*. The assembly's initial decision to execute the entire population of the city was reversed on the following day by a fickle *demos* (3.36-48). The valiant efforts of the second crew dispatched by the Athenians with orders for Paches just barely saved the Mytileneans from annihilation (3.49.2-4). The majority of Mytilene's population thus escaped the Athenians' wrath, but more than one thousand[48] of the city's inhabitants were nonetheless executed by the Athenians on the grounds that they had been chiefly responsible for the city's revolt (3.50.1). These unfortunates had been identified by Paches as the ringleaders of Mytilene's insurrection and sent by him to Athens (3.35.1), evidently in response to an order issued by the *ekklesia*.[49] In thus selecting from the Mytileneans those who would meet their judgment in Athens, Paches in fact exercised a considerable degree of influence over the fate of the city's surrendered inhabitants. His authority over the procedure, however, was at no time absolute. The general made his selection at the behest of his home government, with which lay the final decision regarding those he selected, and Paches' actions as *strategos* were, as those of any general, subject to scrutiny and disciplinary action at

47 ...ποιοῦνται κοινῇ ὁμολογίαν πρός τε Πάχητα καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, ὥστε Ἀθηναίοις μὲν ἐξεῖναι βουλεῦσαι περὶ Μυτιληναίων ὁποῖον ἄν τι βούλωνται καὶ τὴν στρατιὰν ἐς τὴν πόλιν δέχεσθαι αὐτούς, πρεσβείαν δὲ ἀποστέλλειν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας Μυτιληναίους περὶ ἑαυτῶν· ἐν ὅσῳ δ' ἂν πάλιν ἔλθωσι, Πάχητα μήτε δῆσαι Μυτιληναίων μηδένα μηδὲ ἀνδραποδίσαι μήτε ἀποκτεῖναι.

48 On the possibility of the number 1000 being a corruption see *HCT ad loc*. The figure is defended by Hornblower (1991), p. 440, and Wilson (1981), pp. 147-148.

49 We are not told as much by Thucydides, but the details of his account make this inference very likely. More than a week after the surrender of Mytilene, the Paralos and Salaminia arrived from Athens and brought news that an enemy fleet had been sighted near Ephesos (3.29.2, 33.1-2). Paches responded to this report by sailing in pursuit of the fleet, but upon his return to Mytilene—and after taking action at Notion, Pyrrha, and Eresos, among other places (3.34-35.1)—he sent to Athens those Mytileneans whom he considered responsible for the city's revolt (3.35.1). When the prisoners arrived, the ambassadors whom the Mytileneans had dispatched to Athens in accordance with the terms of their surrender (3.28.1) were evidently already present (3.36.5). That Paches sent his prisoners to Athens at the behest of the Athenian *demos* is suggested by two considerations: first, that the general waited more than a week after the surrender of Mytilene, and evidently some time after the Mytileneans had themselves sent an embassy to Athens, to dispatch the prisoners, and second, that his selection of the ringleaders followed upon the arrival in Mytilene of the Paralos and Salaminia, whose purpose in sailing east—nowhere mentioned by Thucydides—would be well explained by the assumption that they were carrying orders for Paches regarding the disposition of his captives. (Cf. Classen-Steup *ad* 3.33.2: "Sie [the Paralos and Salaminia] werden wohl, als die Ausfahrt des Alkidas in Athen bekannt wurde, zugleich auf Kundschaft und mit Befehlen für Paches ausgesandt sein." And Classen-Steup *ad* 3.35.1 suggest that Paches was following orders in shipping his prisoners to Athens.)

the hands of the sovereign *demos*.[50] The Athenian *ekklesia* did not in any real sense surrender its authority in 428/7 to its general in Mytilene.

Invested cities did not always surrender to their conquerors,[51] and the fate of their populations was, therefore, not always determined by preliminary negotiation. Skione, for example, evidently did not surrender to the Athenians on terms in 421 (Thuc. 5.32.1), since negotiations undertaken between the Skionians and their besiegers would have been futile. The fate of these former allies of Athens had been determined before ever an expedition was dispatched against them, the Athenians having resolved in 424/3 to execute the rebels once their city was taken (4.122.6; cf. Diod. 12.72.8). The example of Skione shows that the fate of captive populations was sometimes determined prior to a campaign by vote of the *ekklesia*, in which circumstances there was no latitude for Athens' generals to influence the fate of their prisoners.[52] (Whether generals had exercised influence over their fellow citizens when the decrees in question were initially passed is, of course, another question entirely, for discussion of which see ch. 1 § 1.2.) We may wonder whether generals were likewise debarred from exercising influence over the disposition of populations whose fate had not yet been determined either by the terms of a negotiated settlement or by vote of the *ekklesia*. There is to my knowledge no evidence which bears directly on the question.

50 Paches allegedly committed suicide at his *euthyna*, but this story may be apocryphal: see the excursus to ch. 8, no. 9.

51 Cf. the Athenian capture of Mende in 423, for example, which was taken ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως (Thuc. 4.130.6).

52 Diodorus reports (13.2.6, 30.3) that the fate of the populations of Sicily which the Athenians expected to subdue was determined by the generals and *boule* before the departure of the expedition from Athens in 416/15. The story is doubted by Rhodes (1972), p. 41.

PART TWO

STRATEGOI AND THEIR SUBORDINATES

CHAPTER THREE

ATHENS' GENERALS AND THEIR TROOPS AND SUBORDINATE OFFICERS

On those expeditions in which citizen troops took part, Athens' generals were accompanied, observed, and inevitably evaluated by a subset of the Athenian *demos*. The Athenian component of a general's army, though temporarily subordinate in authority to its general, was ultimately his superior, insofar as citizens shared in the authority of the state. That Athens' generals commanded men many of whom would in other contexts have been considered their equals—economically, socially, and politically—suggests that there may have been considerable opportunity in Athenian armies for officers and troops to influence their generals. With a view to exploring the relationship which obtained between generals and their subordinates and, in particular, to considering the degree to which the authority of Athens' generals was limited by their subordinates, I discuss below (1) the extent of the authority which Athens' generals exercised over military discipline and the awarding of prizes of *aristeia*, issues which might be thought to have concerned the rank-and-file most directly and to have provided the principal occasions for interaction between generals and their troops, and (2) the degree to which decisions of the Athenian command were influenced either directly or indirectly by the generals' subordinates.

1. *Military Discipline*

1.1. *The Disciplinary Authority of Generals in the Field*

We are told by the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* that generals of the late fourth century were authorized when in the field to imprison (δῆσαι),[1] ex-

[1] A certain Apollodoros, who was serving as trierarch under Timomachos in 361/0, declined on one occasion to report to his general lest he be imprisoned ([Dem.] 50.51: φοβούμενος δ' ἐγὼ μὴ δεθείην…).

While at Plataia in 479/8 Aristeides arrested some eight men (ὀκτὼ δή τινας ἐκ πολλῶν συνέλαβε…) who were involved in an anti-democratic conspiracy (Plut. *Arist*. 13.3). Two of the conspirators escaped, but the rest were soon released by the general (τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἀφῆκε). Presumably those who were arrested were bound or held under guard pending the general's final decision regarding them, but since they were not in the end sentenced to detention, I would not include this incident among examples of punishment by imprisonment.

pel (<ἐκ>κ[η]ρῦξαι),[2] or fine (ἐπιβολὴν ἐπιβάλλειν)[3] their troops (*Ath. Pol.* 61.2).[4] Their jurisdiction had apparently been more extensive previously:[5] our evidence suggests that in the late fifth and (perhaps) early fourth centuries generals were authorized, at least in some instances, to punish indiscipline with death. At some time during the Sicilian expedition Lamachos ordered the execution of an Athenian soldier who had been caught signaling to the enemy (Lys. 13.67: ...ληφθεὶς ὑπὸ Λαμάχου ἀπετυμπανίσθη).[6] Alkibiades likewise threatened with execution anyone who was caught crossing to Cyzicus before the battle at that site in 411/10 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.15). In the 390's Iphikrates reportedly stabbed with his spear—and presumably killed—a sentry whom he found asleep at his post (Frontin. *Str.* 3.12.2). Frontinus reports, however, that Iphikrates' punishment of the sleeping guard was considered by some unduly severe, and it may be that in acting thus the general was overstepping his authority, either because the sentry's offense did not merit the penalty of execution,[7] with which Iphikrates would have been authorized to punish a more serious offense, or because Athenian generals of the early fourth century were no longer authorized under any circumstances to punish indiscipline with death. It is dangerous, however, to base any conclusion regarding the disciplinary authority of early fourth-century generals on Frontinus' anecdote: the same story was told about the Theban Epameinondas (3.12.3), which suggests that its attribution to Iphikrates may be unhistorical.[8] We are, at any rate, not similarly told of any reaction to the sentences delivered and threatened in the late fifth century by Lamachos and Alkibiades. There is no reason to

2 In 394/3 a soldier was cashiered by his commanders after having, among other offenses, struck a taxiarch (Lys. 3.45: ...μόνος 'Αθηναίων ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐξεκηρύχθη).

3 Punishment by fine, however, was unusual (*Ath. Pol.* 61.2), and no example of generals imposing such a penalty on their soldiers appears in our sources.

4 We are told of generals threatening their troops with disciplinary action at Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.34, Frontin. *Str.* 3.12.1, and Polyaen. 1.40.3 (which contains the same story as that told by Frontinus). The type of punishment which the generals intended to inflict on their soldiers, however, is not specified in any of these passages.

5 So also Harrison (1971), pp. 31-32, Hignett (1952), p. 222, and Kahrstedt (1936), p. 245.

6 Colin (in Daremberg and Saglio, s.v. *strategos*), p. 1526, writes that this incident was exceptional (cf. Parke [1933], p. 78 n. 3), but Alkibiades' threat of 411/10 suggests that Colin may be underestimating the frequency with which generals ordered executions. Our evidence for fifth-century military discipline, however, is too scanty to permit any firm conclusions about the frequency of capital punishment. (For discussion of execution by *apotympanismos* see Hunter [1994], pp. 179 and 242 n. 47, and Rhodes [1981], pp. 539-540.)

7 It is true that Iphikrates' guard was sleeping at an inopportune time (*sub adventum hostium*), but he was not the only sentry posted (*vigilias*). He is therefore unlikely to have done as much harm as those whom Lamachos and Alkibiades punished or threatened with punishment. Moreover, any harm the sentry did would not have been the result of a deliberate act, and intention may have been an important consideration (cf. Saunders [1991], pp. 109 and 112, on involuntariness in Greek law, and cf. ch. 8 n. 19).

8 Rhodes (1981), pp. 683-684, suggests, moreover, that Iphikrates was not on this occasion an Athenian *strategos* (but see *AO* p. 211).

believe that capital punishment was considered inappropriate in these instances, nor need we doubt that Lamachos and Alkibiades were acting in accord with their society's expectations and laws.

Identifying the punishments which Athenian generals could inflict on their soldiers goes only part of the way toward describing their exercise of disciplinary authority over troops. For the rest we should like to know what use generals made of the penal options available to them. Examples of severe discipline[9] and of laxity[10] are preserved in our sources, but our scant evidence prevents us from knowing with certainty which was the more frequent response to misconduct. There is reason to believe, however, that it was not customary for Athens' generals to severely discipline their citizen troops. In a letter delivered to the Athenian *demos* in the winter of 414/13, Nikias numbers among the difficulties confronting him in Sicily the temperament of his Athenian troops: Athenians, he writes, are by nature difficult to command (Thuc. 7.14.2: ...χαλεπαὶ γὰρ αἱ ὑμέτεραι φύσεις ἄρξαι...). The complaint is an apparent allusion to disciplinary problems in the Athenian ranks. Xenophon puts a similar observation in the mouth of the younger Perikles, who complains in a conversation with Sokrates that Athens' hoplites and cavalrymen are disobedient when on military service (*Mem.* 3.5.19: ...τοὺς δὲ ὁπλίτας καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας, οἳ δοκοῦσι καλοκἀγαθίᾳ προκεκρίσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀπειθεστάτους εἶναι πάντων; cf. 3.5.21).[11] Evidently, the penalties which were imposed in Athenian armies for disobedience were regularly insufficient to deter its frequent occurrence. This suggests that as a rule generals did not react with severity to indiscipline.

9 Lys. 13.67; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.15; Frontin. *Str.* 3.12.2.

10 In (probably) the mid-fourth century two hoplites who had taken to dousing a fellow soldier's slaves with urine received a stern but ineffectual talking-to from their general (Dem. 54.4-5). (For the date of the incident see Carey and Reid [1985], p. 69.) Phokion was allegedly lenient in his response to the soldiers in his ranks who stole away from the Athenian camp during the campaign in Euboia in 349/8 (Plut. *Phoc.* 12.3). In 322 an Athenian infantryman deserted his position in the phalanx, rushed against the opposing army, and returned to his place when challenged by one of its number. His misbehavior allegedly elicited from Phokion only a mild rebuke (Plut. *Phoc.* 25.3). (The potential ramifications of the soldier's action were perhaps not particularly serious: while unity was essential for success in hoplite warfare, an individual's enthusiastic rush at the enemy was on the whole far less destructive to the cohesion of the hoplite army and the morale of the troops than would have been running away [*lipotaxion*, which was punishable by *atimia*: Andoc. 1.74]. But another society might have taken the offense more seriously: when consul in Rome in 340 Titus Manlius Torquatus allegedly ordered the execution of his own son for having engaged a Latin cavalryman against orders [Livy, 8.7; for similar orders against engaging the enemy cf. 2.45.8, 7.12.12].) Cf. [Dem.] 50.43-52: the general Timomachos might have compelled a certain Polykles to fulfill his responsibilities as trierarch, but for reasons of his own he chose not to do so.

11 According to Xenophon men serving in the navy were well-disciplined by comparison with the infantry and cavalry: οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὡς εὔτακτοι μέν εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ναυτικοῖς...; (*Mem.* 3.5.18).

We may imagine readily enough an explanation for this laxity. Upon their return to Athens, discontented troops, acting in their capacity as citizens, might initiate or lend assistance to litigation against their former commanders, who were themselves subject to the disciplinary authority of the Athenian *demos*. Generals whose severity had made them unpopular were likely to be punished for their behavior in turn.[12] The threat which Athenian troops posed to their generals is alluded to in Thucydides' account of deliberations between Demosthenes and Nikias in 413. Against Demosthenes' proposal that the Athenians withdraw from Sicily at once, Nikias objects that their citizen troops, once in Athens, will accuse the generals of having accepted bribes to abandon the siege of Syracuse (7.48.4). The passage indicates that generals recognized and were sometimes influenced in their decisions by the threat which their Athenian troops posed to them (cf. ch. 3 § 3.1 and ch. 7 § 2.2). That threat will likely have influenced in particular the severity of each general's reaction to indiscipline. We may believe that Athenian generals, conscious of the impermanence of their authority over the citizens in their ranks, prepared for the inevitable reversal of their and their soldiers' positions at campaign's end by exercising their own disciplinary authority with moderation.

The same considerations would not have influenced generals when they commanded mercenary troops, and it may be that for this reason the generals' treatment of mercenaries differed to an extent from their behavior toward Athenian soldiers. Indeed, Iphikrates' alleged stabbing in the 390's of a sleeping sentry (Frontin. *Str.* 3.12.2), who is likely to have been a mercenary,[13] has suggested to at least one scholar that Athenian generals were wont to inflict more severe punishments on mercenaries than on citizen troops.[14] I am not convinced that this was the case. Mercenary armies of the fourth century were apparently better disciplined as a rule than their citizen counterparts,[15] but their superior discipline need not have been the product of harsher punishments: lengthy training and their general's attention to *esprit de corps* can have produced the same result.[16] There was good reason, moreover, for generals to guard against alienating their mercenary troops.

[12] Cf. *GSW* II, p. 243; Parke (1933), p. 78; Hauvette-Besnault (1885), pp. 104-105. Athenian troops had the potential to damage their generals by other, less hazardous means as well: generals who were not popular with their troops were apt to fail of reelection. Cf. pp. 119-120.

[13] Iphikrates was in charge of the peltasts during the Corinthian War (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.3, 13).

[14] Colin (in Daremberg and Saglio, s.v. *strategos*), p. 1526: "...Iphicrate ose, sans autre forme de procès, percer lui-mème de son épée une sentinelle trouvée endormie à proximité de l'ennemi; mais il a affaire à des mercenaires: ceux-ci, à côté de beaucoup d'inconvénients, offrent du moins sur les troupes nationales l'avantage de se plier à une discipline plus ferme." Cf. Sage (1996), p. 156, and Rhodes (1981), pp. 683-684.

[15] On the *eutaxia* of Iphikrates' troops see Nep. *Iph.* 2.1-2, 4; Polyaen. 3.9.32, 35; *GSW* II, pp. 228 and 236-237; Parke (1933), pp. 77-78; Hauvette-Besnault (1885), pp. 105-106.

[16] See Xen. *Oec.* 21.4-8 on the ability of some generals to instill obedience in their troops.

Unlike citizen soldiers, mercenaries were not compelled to remain in the service of generals whom they considered to be unduly strict: those who were perceived as such may have found it difficult to keep their armies together.[17] The author of the *Athenaion Politeia*, in enumerating the punishments which generals of the late fourth century might inflict on their troops, makes no distinction between the commanders of mercenaries and those of citizen soldiers (61.2). The anecdote which Frontinus reports—assuming its attribution to Iphikrates is historical—does not provide sufficient reason for us to draw that distinction either.[18]

1.2. *Military Tribunals in Athens*

Athenians were not punished for military offenses only while on campaign. After returning to Athens a soldier could be tried for desertion (*lipotaxiou*) or cowardice (*deilias*) or for having thrown away his shield (*apobeblekenai ten aspida*). Trierarchs might face charges of having withheld their ships from action (*anaumachiou*).[19] And Athenians who failed to accompany an expedition could be prosecuted in Athens for evasion of military service (*astrateias*). Athens' generals had a role in penalizing these offenders. We are told specifically that they presided over trials for *astrateia* (Lys. 15.1-4), and it is usually assumed that they presided over other military trials as well.[20] In their capacity as officers of the court, however, generals no longer exercised direct control over the discipline of their troops. That authority was rather invested in the jurors, who in the case of military trials were the defendants' fellow soldiers.[21] Thus generals, who might, upon their return to Athens, stand accused by the men they had so recently commanded, surrendered to those same men authority over the discipline of Athenian troops. Once a general lay down his command his relationship with his sol-

[17] That the Athenians were at least sometimes careful not to alienate the mercenaries in their service is suggested by Thuc. 6.61.5.

[18] To my knowledge, no other explicit reference to an Athenian general's punishment of a mercenary soldier appears in our sources. We hear of punishments imposed by Iphikrates, however, when he was certainly not an Athenian general. While serving as a mercenary commander under the Persian Pharnabazos in 374/3, Iphikrates executed two officers who were involved in a conspiracy and expelled their soldiers from his camp unarmed (Polyaen. 3.9.56: Ἰφικράτης δὲ τὴν προδοσίαν ἐλέγξας τοὺς μὲν ἡγεμόνας ἐκόλασε θανάτῳ, τοὺς δὲ στρατιώτας γυμνοὺς ἐξήλασε τοῦ στρατοπέδου). For a brief discussion of the incident see Parke (1933) pp. 105-106.

[19] Andoc. 1.74; Aeschin. 3.175; Todd (1993), p. 106; Harrison (1971), p. 32.

[20] So Hansen (1991), p. 269; Harrison (1971), p. 32. Lys. 14 and 15 were composed for the same trial. The offense with which the defendant was charged is identified in the former speech as *lipotaxion* and in the latter as *astrateia*. Since we know that generals presided over the trial (Lys. 15.1-4), it is safe to assume, at the least, that they regularly oversaw cases brought for these two offenses.

[21] In cases involving desertion juries were composed of the defendants' fellow soldiers (Lys. 14.5), and soldiers presumably served as jurors for the other military trials as well.

diers was changed: citizen troops assumed in Athens their share of the collective authority of the Athenian *demos*, while generals relinquished to the *demos* and its representative bodies the authority which was theirs in the field.

2. *The Awarding of* Aristeia

In Athens and other Greek states it was customary that prizes (*aristeia*) be awarded after a battle to those soldiers who had especially distinguished themselves in the engagement (οἱ ἀριστεύσαντες).[22] The number of examples preserved in our sources of *aristeia* awarded in Athenian armies is not large, but the chronological distribution of the known instances suggests that the practice of awarding *aristeia* was carried on by the Athenians throughout the classical period.[23] There is ample evidence that prizes of valor were awarded during the Second Persian War, both in the Greek army as a whole (whose leaders[24] voted *aristeia* to individual Greeks, regardless of their city of origin,[25] and to cities[26]) and in the Athenian army[27] (as well

[22] For further discussion of *aristeia* see *GSW* II, pp. 276-290.

[23] Formulations used in referring to the awarding of *aristeia* vary. Those who receive the award may λαμβάνειν τὸ ἀριστεῖον/τὰ ἀριστεῖα (e.g., Hdt. 8.11.2; Diod. 11.27.3; Ath. 215e, 216c; schol. Pind. *I.* 5.65) or τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀριστείων (e.g., Plut. *Cat. Ma.* 1.1, *Sert.* 3.4; App. *BC* 2.19.140; Ath. 215d; Philostr. *Her.* 690.17, 703.4). (The latter construction occurs only in late sources, but one classical author, at least, uses ἀποτυγχάνειν of someone who failed to obtain the award [Aeschin. 3.212 and schol.].) Individuals are also said to "be thought worthy of" the *aristeia* (τῶν ἀριστείων ἠξιωθῆναι: e.g., Isoc. 4.72, 99; 7.75; 8.76; Ar. *Rh.* 1410a9), and receipt of the award may be indicated when a man (or city) is said to "be the best", an idea which can be expressed either with some form of the verb ἀριστεῦσαι (e.g., Hdt. 7.227; 8.17, 74.1; 9.71.2, 81.2, 105; Diod. 11.27.2, 33.1; Plut. *Them.* 17.1; Suda s.v. *aristeion*) or with the verb γενέσθαι and a form of the adjective ἄριστος (e.g., Hdt. 7.226.1; cf. 8.123.2; Plut. *Mor.* 1000b). Finally, the verb διδόναι is frequently used of those who bestow the award (e.g., Hdt. 8.123.1, 124.2; Pl. *Symp.* 220d-e; Plut. *Them.* 17.3, *Arist.* 20.2 [where διδόναι and ἀποδιδόναι are both used; cf. 20.1, where the verb used is παραδιδόναι]; cf. Suda s.v. *aristeion*).

[24] That *aristeia* were awarded during the Second Persian War by the generals of the allied Greek army is suggested by accounts of the vote taken at the Isthmus of Corinth late in 480. See appendix 10.

[25] (1) The Spartiate Dienekes was the best of those (Spartans and Thespians) who defended Thermopylai (Hdt. 7.226.1: Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ καὶ Θεσπιέων τοιούτων γενομένων ὅμως λέγεται ἀνὴρ ἄριστος γενέσθαι Σπαρτιήτης Διηνέκης). Second best were the Lakedaimonians Alpheos and Maron (Hdt. 7.227: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον ἀριστεῦσαι λέγονται Λακεδαιμόνιοι...'Αλφεός τε καὶ Μάρων...). (2) After the first engagement at Artemision the *aristeia* were awarded to the Athenian Lykomedes, who was the first in the battle to take an enemy ship. It is not clear from Herodotus' account whether Lykomedes was awarded as best of all the Greeks who fought at Artemision or as best only of the Athenians (Hdt. 8.11.2: πρῶτος δὲ Ἑλλήνων νέα τῶν πολεμίων εἷλε ἀνὴρ 'Αθηναῖος, Λυκομήδης Αἰσχραίου, καὶ τὸ ἀριστήιον ἔλαβε οὗτος). (3) Polykritos the Aeginetan and the Athenians Eumenes and Ameinias were the individuals "most highly spoken" of in the battle of Salamis (Hdt. 8.93.1: ἐν δὲ τῇ ναυμαχίῃ ταύτῃ ἤκουσαν Ἑλλήνων ἄριστα Αἰγινῆται, ἐπὶ δὲ 'Αθηναῖοι, ἀνδρῶν δὲ Πολύκριτός τε ὁ Αἰγινήτης καὶ 'Αθηναῖοι Εὐμένης τε [ὁ]

as at least some other individual allied armies[28]). We hear of *aristeia* awarded by the Athenians after the second engagement at Artemision[29] and

'Αναγυράσιος καὶ 'Αμεινίης Παλληνεύς...; cf. Ael. *VH* 5.19). It is not clear from Herodotus' account, however, whether these individuals received recognition from the Greek army as a whole or from their own national contingents only. (The language Herodotus uses in the passage is unusual [cf. ch. 3 n. 23], and he may therefore not be referring to an actual award of *aristeia*. That he is, however, is suggested by 8.122 [cf. next note].) On the prize of valor for individuals considered at the Isthmus in 480/79 but never awarded see appendix 10.

[26] (1) The Athenians won the award after the second engagement at Artemision (Hdt. 8.17: τῶν δὲ Ἑλλήνων κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἡμέρην ἠρίστευσαν 'Αθηναῖοι καὶ 'Αθηναίων Κλεινίης ὁ 'Αλκιβιάδεω). (2) Aegina and Athens may have won the first and second prizes respectively after Salamis. Herodotus tells us that the Aeginetans were the "most highly spoken of" in the battle, and after them the Athenians (Hdt. 8.93.1: for the Greek see previous note). The language Herodotus uses in the passage is unusual, but that Aegina was awarded the *aristeia* is suggested by Herodotus at 8.122, where Apollo demands of the Aeginetans the *aristeia* of the battle at Salamis. Most later authors award the *aristeia* to Aegina as well: Diod. 11.27.2 (cf. 11.55.6), Plut. *Them.* 17.1, *Mor.* 871c, schol. Pind. *I.* 5.63. Aelius Aristides, however, claims the Athenians won the prize (1.149 [but see schol.], 168, and cf. 273 Behr). (3) Herodotus does not tell us whether *aristeia* were awarded after the battle at Plataia. His own opinion, an inference from the action of the battle, is that the Spartans surpassed the other Greeks in *arete* on that day (9.71.1: ...ὑπερεβάλοντο ἀρετῇ Λακεδαιμόνιοι). Later sources report that *aristeia* were in fact awarded. According to Diodorus the prize went to Sparta (11.33.1: ...ἔκριναν ἀριστεῦσαι πόλιν μὲν Σπάρτην, ἄνδρα δὲ Παυσανίαν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον). Plutarch awards the prize to Plataia (*Arist.* 20.2-3). (On Plutarch's account see app. 10 n. 3 and *GSW* II, pp. 283-286.) (4) The Athenians were the best of the Greeks at Mykale (Hdt. 9.105: ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ μάχῃ Ἑλλήνων ἠρίστευσαν 'Αθηναῖοι καὶ 'Αθηναίων Ἑρμόλυκος ὁ Εὐθοίνου...). After the Athenians the Corinthians, Troizenians, and Sikyonians were best (Hdt. 9.105: μετὰ δὲ 'Αθηναίους Κορίνθιοι καὶ Τροιζήνιοι καὶ Σικυώνιοι ἠρίστευσαν). (Isocrates refers on a number of occasions to the Athenians' winning of *aristeia* during the Persian War [4.72, 99; 7.75; 8.76], but he does not specify the action(s) for which the Athenians won the award.)

[27] We are nowhere in fact told that the *aristeia* awarded in the Athenian army during the Persian War were voted by the leaders of the Athenian army alone rather than by the multi-national leadership of the allied Greek army. It seems likely, however, that Athens' generals were alone responsible for the presentation of awards to Athenians when the competition did not include other Greeks. It is certainly the case, moreover, that the *aristeia* awarded to the Spartan Eurybiades after Salamis were awarded by the Spartans alone (Hdt. 8.124.2). Cf. next note.

[28] (1) We are told by Herodotus that among the Thespians at Thermopylai a certain Dithyrambos made a name for himself, but Herodotus' language does not make it clear that Dithyrambos was awarded *aristeia* (7.227: Θεσπιέων δὲ εὐδοκίμεε μάλιστα τῷ οὔνομα ἦν Διθύραμβος Ἁρματίδεω). (2) Prizes may have been awarded in the Aeginetan army after Salamis (Hdt. 8.93.1: see ch. 3 n. 25). (3) Upon their return to Sparta after the battle of Salamis the Spartans awarded *aristeia* to Eurybiades (Hdt. 8.124.2: ἀριστήια μέν νυν ἔδοσαν Εὐρυβιάδῃ ἐλαίης στέφανον, σοφίης δὲ καὶ δεξιότητος Θεμιστοκλέϊ, καὶ τούτῳ στέφανον ἐλαίης...; cf. Plut. *Them.* 17.3; Ael. Arist. 3.342-343 Behr). It is not clear whether this prize was awarded to Eurybiades because of his conduct at Salamis or in recognition of more general achievements in the war against the Persians. Plutarch (*Them.* 17.3) tells us Eurybiades' award was for ἀνδρεία, but this detail was likely added by the author for the sake of parallelism: ...Εὐρυβιάδῃ μὲν ἀνδρείας, ἐκείνῳ (Themistokles) δὲ σοφίας ἀριστεῖον ἔδοσαν.... (The Spartans awarded *aristeia* to Themistokles also on this occasion, in recognition of his σοφία and δεξιότης: Hdt. 8.124.2, above; cf. Diod. 11.27.3; Plut. *Them.* 17.3; Ael. Arist. 3.342-343 Behr. [The understanding that the olive crown awarded to Themistokles constituted an award of *aristeia* requires that ἀριστήια be supplied in Herodotus' second clause. That Themistokles received *aristeia* was apparently not the understanding of

after the battles at Plataia[30] and Mykale,[31] and Herodotus may be referring to prizes awarded in the Athenian army rather than the Greek army as a whole in his accounts of the first engagement at Artemision and the battle of Salamis.[32] Later in the century, after the battle at Poteidaia in 432, *aristeia* were awarded to Alkibiades, who was crowned and given a panoply in recognition of his distinguished service in the engagement (Pl. *Symp.* 220d-e; Isoc. 16.29-30; Plut. *Alc.* 7.5; Diog. Laert. 2.23; cf. Ath. 215c-216c).[33] Later still, perhaps at the battle of Knidos in 394,[34] Iphikrates was honored and may have been awarded *aristeia* for capturing an enemy *strategos*.[35] Atrometos of Kothokidai, father of the orator Aeschines, was awarded the prize while on service in Asia,[36] and Aeschines himself was crowned for his fighting at Tamynai in Euboia in 349/8 (Aeschin. 2.169;

Diodorus: ...ἐτίμησαν αὐτὸν διπλασίοσι δωρεαῖς τῶν τὰ ἀριστεῖα εἰληφότων.]) (4) We have seen that Herodotus does not report on the awarding of *aristeia* to cities after Plataia (cf. ch. 3 n. 26). He likewise does not tell us whether *aristeia* were awarded in the Spartan army after the battle. Herodotus' own opinion is that Aristodemos was the best of the Lakedaimonians who fought (9.71.2: καὶ ἄριστος ἐγένετο μακρῷ Ἀριστόδημος κατὰ γνώμας τὰς ἡμετέρας...), and after him Posidonios, Philokyon, and Amompharetos (9.71.2: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον ἠρίστευσαν Ποσειδώνιός τε καὶ Φιλοκύων καὶ Ἀμομφάρετος Σπαρτιῆται). All of these died in battle, and all except Aristodemos were honored by the Spartans after their deaths (9.71.4: οὗτοι...πλὴν Ἀριστοδήμου...τίμιοι ἐγένοντο...). Herodotus does report that the Spartiates who fought in the battle discussed which of them was best—they preferred Posidonios to Aristodemos since he, unlike Aristodemos, had not wanted to die in battle—but the language Herodotus uses does not suggest that this discussion took place in the context of an official award of *aristeia* (9.71.3: καίτοι γενομένης λέσχης ὃς γένοιτο αὐτῶν ἄριστος, ἔγνωσαν οἱ παραγενόμενοι Σπαρτιητέων...Ποσειδώνιον...ἄνδρα γενέσθαι ἀγαθόν; cf. 9.72.1: οὗτοι μὲν τῶν ἐν Πλαταιῇσι ὀνομαστότατοι ἐγένοντο).

29 A certain Kleinias won the award (Hdt. 8.17: for the Greek see ch. 3 n. 26).

30 Herodotus reports that a certain Sophanes (who died in battle in 465/4 when serving as *strategos* [Hdt. 9.75]), a Dekeleian, was "reputed to have distinguished himself" at Plataia (9.73.1: Ἀθηναίων δὲ λέγεται εὐδοκιμῆσαι Σωφάνης ὁ Εὐτυχίδεω). This reference to Sophanes, which serves to introduce Herodotus' story about the heroic past of Dekeleia (9.73.2-3), in itself does not suggest that Sophanes was awarded the *aristeia*. But Herodotus is more explicit when he returns to his discussion of Sophanes at 9.74.1 (τούτου τοῦ δήμου ἐὼν ὁ Σωφάνης καὶ ἀριστεύσας τότε Ἀθηναίων...).

31 Hermolykos was best of the Athenians at Mykale (Hdt. 9.105: for Greek see ch. 3 n. 26).

32 Lykomedes won the prize after Artemision (Hdt. 8.11.2: see ch. 3 n. 25), and Eumenes and Ameinias may have been awarded *aristeia* after Salamis (Hdt. 8.93.1: see ch. 3 n. 25 and app. 10 n. 2), but in each case it is not clear whether the award was "national" or "international".

33 Antisthenes evidently dated Alkibiades' receipt of the *aristeia* to 424 (Ath. 216c).

34 Pritchett, *GSW* II, pp. 62 and 278, suggests that the event described by our sources occurred during that battle.

35 We are told by a scholiast of Dem. 21.62 that Iphikrates was praised for his *aristeia* (τῆς ἀριστείας ἐπαινεθείς). The language leaves room for doubt that Iphikrates was awarded the *aristeia*. Cf. [Plut.] *Mor.* 187a.

36 Aeschin. 2.147: συμβέβηκε δὲ αὐτῷ...στρατεύεσθαι μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ, ἀριστεύειν δ' ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις...; Vit. Aeschin. 1.33-37: ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ Ἀτρόμητος...στρατευόμενος ἐν Ἀσίᾳ ἀριστείων ἠξιώθη.

Vit. Aeschin. 1.52-53), an honor which may likewise have constituted an award of *aristeia*.[37]

We are told by Isocrates (16.29), Plato (*Symp.* 220e), and Plutarch (*Alc.* 7.5) that the award of *aristeia* to Alkibiades in 432 was made by Athens' generals, and, though information to that effect is lacking,[38] there is little reason to doubt that it was the generals who awarded *aristeia* in the Athenian army throughout the classical period.[39] How they selected the recipients of the award is less clear. In our consideration of the extent and character of the generals' authority over their troops we may wonder in particular whether generals were influenced by their subordinates to any extent when selecting award winners.[40]

Plato's discussion of Alkibiades' receipt of the *aristeia* in 432 suggests that the rank-and-file may have played some role in the awarding of prizes of valor. The character of Alkibiades in that dialogue discusses briefly the events which led up to his receipt of the award:

> When the battle took place for which the generals awarded me the *aristeia*, no one else saved me but this man [Sokrates], who did not wish to leave me behind wounded, but helped in saving both my arms and myself. And at that time, Sokrates, I actually bid the generals to give the *aristeia* to you, and you will neither fault me for this nor say I am lying. But, in fact, the generals were looking to my reputation and wanted to give the *aristeia* to me, and you were more eager than they that I win the award rather than yourself (*Symp.* 220d-e).[41]

37 The Athenian *demos* itself also crowned Aeschines after he arrived in Athens bringing news of the Athenian victory at Tamynai (2.169).

In his speech *On the Embassy* Aeschines informs us that he was praised in 363 for his fighting at the Nemean ravine (2.168: ...οὕτως ἠγωνισάμην, ὥστε ὑπὸ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἐπαινεῖσθαι; cf. Vit. Aeschin. 1.50-51). It is unlikely that Aeschines' remark is a veiled reference to an award of *aristeia*: had his achievement in 363 been sufficient to earn him that award, the author would probably have said as much in his speech.

38 Polyaenus (3.9.31) tells us that Iphikrates regularly announced before battles that prizes would be awarded to the best man in each unit of his army (hoplites, peltasts, cavalry, etc.). That Iphikrates did so while serving as an Athenian *strategos* rather than (or in addition to) as a mercenary commander, however, is not specified by the author.

39 Comparison with awards of *aristeia* in other Greek states (cf. *GSW* II, p. 288) and in the allied Greek army which fought the Second Persian War (cf. ch. 3 n. 24) would have suggested, even without the evidence of Alkibiades' award, that *aristeia* were awarded in the Athenian army by Athens' generals rather than, for example, by lesser military officials or by vote of the rank-and-file.

40 A second interesting but unanswerable question is, how were decisions regarding *aristeia* made when an expedition was under the command of two or more generals? Plato attributes to *strategoi*, in the plural, the decision to award the *aristeia* to Alkibiades in 432. (Isocrates suggests that a single general made the award [16.29: ...στεφανωθῆναι καὶ πανοπλίαν λαβεῖν παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ]). But how the generals arrived at their decision is not discussed. (The allied Greek generals who fought the Second Persian War evidently awarded *aristeia* by vote [cf. appendix 10], but we cannot be sure that Athenian generals in joint command of an expedition followed a similar procedure.)

41 ...ὅτε γὰρ ἡ μάχη ἦν ἐξ ἧς ἐμοὶ καὶ τἀριστεῖα ἔδοσαν οἱ στραηγοί, οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐμὲ ἔσωσεν ἀνθρώπων ἢ οὗτος, τετρωμένον οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ συν-

The generals in command at Poteidaia, we are told, heard Alkibiades testify on Sokrates' behalf before they awarded the prize to Alkibiades himself.[42] The passage thus suggests that it was at least possible for soldiers to offer testimony in connection with awards of *aristeia*. Whether such input was ordinarily accepted or, indeed, solicited by generals is not clear from Plato's account, but it is difficult to believe that generals regularly awarded prizes without receiving intelligence from other quarters about their troops' actions in an engagement. Without such information, generals could have considered for rewards only those relatively few who had fought in their immediate vicinity during the battle and whose actions they had witnessed and remembered amid the chaos.[43] This would scarcely have been an equitable procedure. That generals received information from their subordinates therefore seems a likely conclusion. These informants may have included subordinate military officials, but Plato's account suggests that enlisted men too offered testimony in connection with the awards.[44]

So much only is suggested by probability and by Plato's account of Alkibiades' receipt of the *aristeia* in 432. But Plato may provide further information about the awarding of prizes in the Athenian army. In his *Laws* the author describes the organization of Magnesia, a fictional, model city which he locates on Crete. Part of Plato's discussion concerns the punishment of military offenses and the awarding of prizes of valor in the Magnesian army. His description of the award is more detailed than anything we know of the procedure followed in the Athenian army:

> After the suits for evasion of military service have been decided, the *archontes* are again to summon an assembly of each of these [classes of soldiers, i.e., hoplites, cavalry, etc.], and whoever wants to may contend for the *aristeia* in his own class, offering proof or the testimony of witnesses that is not related to a previous war but concerns the expedition on which the Magnesians are currently engaged (*Leg.* 943b-c).[45]

διέσωσε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέ. καὶ ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τότε ἐκέλευον σοὶ διδόναι τἀριστεῖα τοὺς στρατηγούς, καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι οὔτε μέμψῃ οὔτε ἐρεῖς ὅτι ψεύδομαι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῶν στρατηγῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὸν ἀξίωμα ἀποβλεπόντων καὶ βουλομένων ἐμοὶ διδόναι τἀριστεῖα, αὐτὸς προθυμότερος ἐγένου τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σαυτόν.

42 The generals may also have heard Sokrates testify to Alkibiades' merits, as Plut. *Alc.* 7.5 suggests. That they did is neither precluded nor implied by Plato's account.

43 For discussion of the confusion of hoplite battle see Hanson (1989), pp. 185-193. See also Thuc. 7.44.1: ...οὐδὲ ταῦτα οἱ παραγενόμενοι πάντα πλὴν τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος μόλις οἶδεν.

44 There is no evidence that Alkibiades served as a military officer in the Poteidaian campaign.

45 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἐκδικασθεισῶν τῶν τῆς ἀστρατείας δικῶν, πάλιν ἑκάστων ἄρχοντας ποιῆσαι σύλλογον, ἀριστείων δὲ πέρι κρίνεσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἔθνεσι, μὴ περὶ προτέρου πολέμου μηδὲν παρεχόμενον μήτε τεκμήριον μητε μαρτύρων πιστώσεις λόγων, αὐτῆς δὲ περι τῆς στρατείας τῆς τότε γενομένης αὐτοῖς.

In Plato's Magnesian army, then, the rank-and-file play a fairly large role in the awarding of *aristeia*. Soldiers take the initiative in presenting themselves as candidates for the award (*ton boulomenon*) and offer evidence in support of their claim for the prize. Others not in the running for the *aristeia* can participate in the process by offering testimony on the behalf of others. The military archons of Magnesia, on the other hand, evidently do nothing more than sit in judgment on the evidence presented to them by their subordinates.[46] They do not themselves select candidates for the award from the army at large.

We cannot assume that the award procedure Plato imagines for his fictional society is identical in all or any of its particulars to that actually practiced in the Athenian army of Plato's day.[47] Nevertheless the details of the procedure Plato describes do not conflict with the limited evidence we have for the awarding of *aristeia* in the Athenian army. It thus remains possible that Plato's award procedure was modeled on that followed by the Athenians, whose generals may, therefore, have played as limited a role in the selection of candidates for the *aristeia* as did Magnesian military archons. Athenian generals, in other words, may have been allowed (or expected—the procedure need not have been governed by prescriptive regulations) to consider for the *aristeia* only those soldiers who had presented themselves as candidates for the award, or who had been "nominated" for the prize by their fellow soldiers.

The imposition of such restrictions, whether formal or not, on the generals' selection of prize-winners is one means by which the influence of generals over the award procedure may have been limited. In this case the influence generals lacked will have been exercised instead by their subordinates, whose prerogative it would be to earmark candidates for the award. The influence of generals over awards may likewise have been limited, and surrendered by generals to their subordinates, by a second, informal means

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46 Plato does not in fact say who will award the *aristeia* to prize-winners. He tells us only that Magnesia's military *archontes* are to call an assembly of soldiers at which the *aristeia* will be adjudged. Pritchett, *GSW* II, p. 278, assumes that the prize will be conferred by the soldiers themselves, and this is possible. Given our other evidence for the awarding of *aristeia* in Greek armies by military leaders (cf. ch. 3 n. 39), however, I think it somewhat more likely that Plato had in mind that the general rather than the soldiers would award the prize. (In the ideal state he describes in the *Republic* Plato does call for those winning the *aristeia* to be crowned by their fellow soldiers—who are also to exchange kisses with the award winner—rather than by their commanding officers: τὸν δὲ ἀριστεύσαντά τε καὶ εὐδοκιμήσαντα οὐ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς ὑπὸ τῶν συστρατευομένων μειρακίων τε καὶ παίδων ἐν μέρει ὑπὸ ἑκάστου δοκεῖ σοι χρῆναι στεφανωθῆναι; [468b]. This does not imply, however, that the soldiers were to determine who the prize winners would be.)

47 Certainly the penalties Plato describes for military offenses differ somewhat from the Athenians' punishment of those same offenses: Saunders (1991), pp. 324-328.

as well. However much freedom generals enjoyed *in theory* to select candidates of their choice from the pool of potential recipients of *aristeia*, they may yet have been influenced by their subordinates to some degree when awarding the prize. We may wonder, that is, whether generals were free to award the *aristeia* to anyone of the candidates they wished without concern for the resentment an unpopular selection could engender among their troops, or whether they were in fact compelled to confer the award in accordance with what they perceived to be the will of the majority of their soldiers.

Our sources unfortunately provide virtually no evidence relevant to our consideration of the indirect influence soldiers may have enjoyed over the awarding of *aristeia*. Plato's account of Alkibiades' receipt of the prize in 432 could be read to suggest that the decisions of generals with regard to *aristeia* might be arbitrary, not based on the testimony offered before them, and therefore not motivated by concern for the reaction of the rank-and-file: Plato suggests that the generals awarded the prize to Alkibiades because of his social position and despite his testimony on Sokrates' behalf. But it would be inappropriate to read so much into Plato's account. In order to praise Sokrates more effectively, the character of Alkibiades in Plato's dialogue may be misrepresenting the award of *aristeia* he describes, either by intentionally omitting reference to testimony offered by others in support of his own candidacy for the award, or by insinuating that the generals' preference of himself to Sokrates was prompted by something other than considerations of merit. We therefore ought not conclude from the passage either that the generals at Poteidaia made their decision without regard for popular opinion, or that Athenian generals regularly awarded *aristeia* by arbitrary decision.

In the end, this discussion raises more questions than it answers. I have identified means by which soldiers *can* have influenced their generals' award decisions, but whether generals were influenced by their subordinates in fact remains unclear. At the least we may conclude from probability and from Plato's account of Alkibiades' receipt of the award in 432 that it is unlikely that Athenian generals awarded *aristeia* wholly without input from their subordinates.

3. *The Role of Subordinates in Decision-Making*

3.1. *The Influence of the Rank-and-File on Decisions of the Athenian Command*

Athens' generals were not susceptible to the influence of their subordinates only when evaluating the latter's accomplishments and demerits. If popularity among the rank-and-file—or at least the absence of disapproval—was of concern to Athens' *strategoi*, as I have suggested it was, then in principle any decision of the Athenian command was vulnerable to the indirect influence of a general's troops. I suggest in ch. 3 § 1.1 that generals were conscious of the threat which their citizen troops represented (cf. ch. 7 § 2.2). Athenian soldiers who were displeased with their generals' conduct in office might testify against their former commanders when once they had returned to Athens. Thucydides reports that Nikias' unwillingness to withdraw from Syracuse after the defeat at Epipolai was prompted in part by his appreciation of this threat. The Athenians in the army, although they in fact favored withdrawal immediately after the defeat, would, Nikias claimed, allege upon their return to Athens that the generals had been bribed to leave Sicily (7.48.4; cf. ch. 5 § 2.2 no. 3). The passage, whether or not it reflects the historical reasons for Nikias' intransigence on this occasion, suggests that Athens' generals could be influenced in their decisions by consideration of the response which their troops might have to a proposed action.

The threat which soldiers posed to their commanders, however, is one reason only that Athens' generals might be influenced indirectly in their decision-making by consideration of their subordinates' will. A more immediate concern with their soldiers' morale is likely to have had greater influence over generals than the hypothetical and relatively remote danger posed to them by disgruntled troops. Their soldiers' eagerness to fight or reluctance to remain inactive, that is, were apt to prompt action on the part of generals. These considerations were reportedly behind a number of actions taken by generals during the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides suggests that the eagerness of Demosthenes' soldiers to fight was among the reasons the general was planning a landing on Sphakteria in the summer of 425/4.[48] In

[48] 4.29.2: τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένη προσέλαβε [Kleon] πυνθανόμενος τὴν ἀπόβασιν αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν νῆσον διανοεῖσθαι. οἱ γὰρ στρατιῶται κακοπαθοῦντες τοῦ χωρίου τῇ ἀπορίᾳ καὶ μᾶλλον πολιορκούμενοι ἢ πολιορκοῦντες ὥρμηντο διακινδυνεῦσαι.

In this context I should note the strategy adopted by Archidamos during the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica in 431. The Spartan king thought that by laying waste Acharnai he would so outrage the Acharnians, who contributed 3000 hoplites to Athens' army, that they would urge on their fellows to battle. Archidamos thus imagined that this substantial component of the Athenian forces would be able to influence the command decisions of its general, and his expectations were by no means absurd: the ravaging of Acharnai did in fact prompt opposition to Perikles' strategy, but that opposition did not in the end result in a changed policy (Thuc. 2.20.4-22.1).

422/1, we are told, Kleon was "compelled" (ἠναγκάσθη) to move against Amphipolis because his troops were displeased with their inactivity.[49] The unwillingness of the soldiers to delay in their current position after the Athenian defeat at Epipolai in 413 is likewise numbered by Thucydides among the considerations which prompted the generals to deliberate after that defeat.[50]

Insofar as generals took into consideration in their decision-making what they perceived to be the will of their troops, the rank-and-file exercised some degree of indirect influence over the command decisions of Athens' generals. But there is evidence that soldiers sometimes brought more direct pressure to bear on their commanders as well. Although their superiors were opposed to Demosthenes' plan of fortifying Pylos while the fleet was detained there in 426/5, it was the soldiers themselves who in the end determined that the promontory would be fortified (Thuc. 4.4.1: ...ἡσύχαζεν [Demosthenes] ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας, μέχρι αὐτοῖς τοῖς στρατιώταις σχολάζουσιν ὁρμὴ ἐνέπεσε περιστᾶσιν ἐκτειχίσαι τὸ χωρίον). After the lunar eclipse of autumn 413/12 the Athenians in Sicily urged their generals to postpone the retreat which had been planned (7.50.4: καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἵ τε πλείους ἐπισχεῖν ἐκέλευον τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐνθύμιον ποιούμενοι...; cf. ch. 5 § 2.2 no. 5). Their objection to the withdrawal was evidently among the reasons for the Athenians' subsequent delay (διὰ τοῦτο). Later in the same campaign, the sailors' refusal to board their ships again after their defeat in the Syracusan harbor prevented Nikias and Demosthenes from putting into action their plan for a second battle (7.72.4: καὶ ξυγχωροῦντος Νικίου τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ βουλομένων πληροῦν αὐτῶν οἱ ναῦται οὐκ ἤθελον ἐσβαίνειν...; cf. ch. 5 § 2.2 no. 6).[51]

It is clear from the evidence cited above that soldiers could exercise both direct and indirect influence over the command decisions of their generals. Whether they did so regularly is unfortunately a matter of guesswork, but I believe our evidence points to the conclusion that it was not uncommon for

[49] 5.7.2: τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ἀχθομένων μὲν τῇ ἕδρᾳ...αἰσθόμενος τὸν θροῦν καὶ οὐ βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς διὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καθημένους βαρύνεσθαι, ἀναλαβὼν ἦγεν.

Thucydides' explanation for Kleon's action on this occasion is likely to be the product of his bias against the general (see *HCT ad* 5.7.2, Kagan [1974], pp. 323-325). But even if Kleon was not motivated by his troops' discontent, that scenario must have been credible to Thucydides' fifth-century audience.

[50] 7.47.1: οἱ...στρατηγοὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐβουλεύοντο.... τοῖς τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρήμασιν ἑώρων οὐ κατορθοῦντες καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ἀχθομένους τῇ μονῇ. Cf. 7.48.4, ch. 5 § 2.2 no. 3, and Plut. *Nic*. 22.1-2.

Plutarch claims that during the siege of Samos in 440 it was difficult for Perikles to restrain his Athenian troops, who were impatient with the delay and eager to fight. The same detail is not provided, however, by either Thucydides (1.117) or Diodorus (12.28.2).

[51] Thuc. 4.4.1 may provide a further example of soldiers exercising direct influence over command decisions during a campaign. See ch. 3 § 3.2.

generals to be influenced by considerations of their subordinates' will. On four occasions in his account of the Sicilian expedition Thucydides provides evidence that generals were influenced by their subordinates either directly (7.50.4, 72.3-4) or indirectly (7.47.1, 48.4). The frequency of these incidents in the course of the Sicilian campaign—whose unusual length admittedly may have affected to some extent the relationship which obtained between the commanders and their troops—suggests that generals may have been influenced by their subordinates with comparable frequency during campaigns about which we are less well-informed. At the least it is not unreasonable to suppose that generals regularly took the morale of their troops into consideration when making campaign-related decisions, as to do otherwise would have been foolhardy, and this is in itself a means by which soldiers might exercise some small degree of influence over their generals' command decisions.

3.2. *The Participation of Subordinate Officers in Councils-of-War*

In addition to whatever indirect influence Athens' subordinate military officers may have exercised over the decision-making of their superiors—and generals arguably can have been affected to some extent in their case as well by considerations of morale and of potential disciplinary action in Athens (cf. ch. 3 § 3.1 and ch. 7 § 2.2)—there is evidence that taxiarchs sometimes influenced command decisions directly through their participation in councils-of-war, though with what frequency they did so we cannot know.[52] Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition provides our clearest evidence for the participation of taxiarchs in deliberations of the Athenian command: Athens' generals and taxiarchs together resolved to respond to the Syracusans' blockade of their harbor in 413/12 by engaging the enemy at sea (7.60.2: καὶ ξυνελθόντες οἵ τε στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ταξίαρχοι...ἐβουλεύσαντο...). On a previous occasion also, however, Athens' taxiarchs appear to have been involved to some extent in their generals' decision-making. In 425 Demosthenes, who at the time held no official position, accompanied the Athenian fleet around the Peloponnese, having it in mind to use the fleet to fortify a position on the Peloponnesian coast. When the Athenians were detained at Pylos, however, Demosthenes was unable to persuade the generals Eurymedon and Sophokles (son of Sostratides) to fortify the position (4.3.2-3). Failing in this most direct attempt to accomplish his ends, Demosthenes evidently appealed as well to the soldiers and taxiarchs, who were likewise not persuaded: ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἔπειθεν οὔτε τοὺς στρατηγοὺς οὔτε τοὺς στρατιώτας, ὕστερον καὶ τοῖς ταξιάρχοις

[52] It is unlikely that Thuc. 7.43.1 refers to the involvement of subordinate officers in the generals' deliberations, but see appendix 12.

κοινώσας... (4.4.1). Thucydides' language does not make clear precisely what role the taxiarchs assumed on this occasion, whether they were themselves a target for Demosthenes' appeal or were a conduit through which Demosthenes communicated with the *stratiotai*. The passage may in fact be corrupt.[53] That the taxiarchs and soldiers were somehow involved in the process seems clear enough, but we cannot know whether Demosthenes' attempt to influence the generals' policy by appeal to their subordinates was extraordinary or had some basis in normal procedure.

A further incident requires discussion in this context. We are told by Thucydides that in the deliberations which followed the Athenian defeat at Epipolai in 413/12 Nikias objected to his colleague's suggestion that the generals withdraw their army from Sicily (7.48.1-49.1). In particular, Nikias did not want to have the fact of their voting for withdrawal "openly," "among many" reported to the enemy: ...οὐκ ἐβούλετο αὐτὰ ἀσθενῆ ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐδ' ἐμφανῶς σφᾶς ψηφιζομένους μετὰ πολλῶν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγγέλτους γίγνεσθαι (7.48.1). On a subsequent occasion Nikias again objected to an open vote: ...ἀλλ' ἢ μὴ φανερῶς γε ἀξιῶν ψηφίζεσθαι... (7.50.3). The passages suggest two questions. First, what does it mean that the hypothetical votes to which Nikias objected were to be carried on ἐμφανῶς/φανερῶς? Are we to imagine that the decisions would be made before the whole army, or would the audience be composed instead, for example, of the Athenians' subordinate officers? Second, is μετὰ πολλῶν at 7.48.1 synonymous with ἐμφανῶς, a redundancy highlighting the idea of a public procedure, or does it rather mean that many would participate in the vote?[54] If the latter, who are the "many" who were to take part in the decision-making? The implications of these passages are not clear, but the information Thucydides provides suggests that Athens' rank-and-file and/or subordinate military officers were sometimes witness to the decision-making of the Athenian command, a scenario which increases to an extent the likelihood that Athens' generals were influenced indirectly in their decisions by what they perceived to be the will of their subordinates. μετὰ πολλῶν at 7.48.1 may also provide further evidence of the direct influence which subordinates sometimes enjoyed over their generals' command decisions. It is at least possible that the hypothetical participants of the vote to which Nikias refers would have included the taxiarchs,[55] and the franchise may have extended

[53] See *HCT ad loc.*

[54] For the first suggestion see Krüger *ad loc.* Dover in *HCT ad loc.* understands μετὰ πολλῶν to mean that many would vote. See also the translations of Smith ("in full council") and Hobbes ("with the votes of many").

[55] So Classen-Steup *ad loc.*

further still, to the trierarchs and, although this seems to me highly unlikely, to the full Athenian component of the army.[56]

[56] Cf. *HCT ad* 7.48.1. Gomme seems to suggest (*HCT ad loc.*) that Thuc. 3.28.1 is evidence that the general Paches consulted his soldiers regarding the Mytileneans' surrender in 428/7: ...ποιοῦνται [the Mytileneans] κοινῇ ὁμολογίαν πρός τε Πάχητα καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον. He suggests as well that a reference at *GHI* 63.19-20 to land being handed over to the Mytileneans (or perhaps to Athenian cleruchs; see *HCT* II, pp. 330-331) ὑπὸ τῶν | στ]ρατηγῶν [καὶ] τῶν στρατιωτῶν is evidence that Paches consulted his troops regarding the truce. I do not think either passage implies anything, however, about the participation of Paches' troops in their general's deliberations.

PART THREE

STRATEGOI AND THEIR COLLEAGUES

CHAPTER FOUR

STRATEGOI AND THE POLEMARCH

In 487/6 the Athenians adopted a new procedure for appointing to office their college of nine archons. Thereafter the polemarch and his colleagues were selected by lot from a panel of 100 previously elected candidates (*Ath. Pol.* 22.5).[1] For some years prior to this reform sortition had played no role, or a less important role, in the selection of Athens' archons. It has therefore frequently been suggested that the polemarch's powers were diminished as a result of the reform, and this seems likely.[2] But whatever the circumstances under which it occurred, it is clear that the polemarch eventually ceased to exercise real military authority: by the late fourth century those appointed to the office retained only ceremonial military functions (*Ath. Pol.* 58). If the polemarch's influence over military affairs long survived the reform of 487/6, we have no trace of it. Nor do we hear of any individual polemarch after Kallimachos, who held the office in 490 and fought at Marathon.

In the interest of determining the extent to which generals shared authority with other military officials, we should like to know what the relationship between the *strategoi* and polemarch was before 487/6, when both certainly exercised control in the military sphere. The evidence available to us is ambiguous, however. We are told by the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* (22.2) that the *polemarchia* was the chief military office in Athens in 501/0 (τῆς δὲ ἁπάσης στρατιᾶς ἡγεμών). The implication of the author is that the polemarch retained his superiority over the *strategoi* until (at

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[1] According to the *Ath. Pol.*, 500 men were pre-elected. The number should probably be emended to 100. See Rhodes (1981), pp. 273-274, and Badian (1971), pp. 17-21. Against the emendation, however, see Staveley (1972), p. 239 n. 59.

[2] For this view see, for example, Hammond (1969), p. 116. Badian (1971), pp. 9-27, does not see the reduction of the polemarch's powers as a necessary or immediate result of the reform of 487/6. (On the stature of Athens' archons prior to the reform cf. Frost [1968], pp. 114-115, and Gomme [1944], p. 323 n. 13.) Badian argues that the procedural change may not have adversely affected the caliber of those who held the archonships. This may be right, but what the reform can have changed is the Athenians' perception of their archons. However qualified those appointed to office were in fact, each can still have been the least popular of ten candidates elected for the position. The Athenians may have been unwilling, and reasonably so, to invest military authority in an official whom only a minority of voters had elected to the position. Thus the reform can have prompted a reduction of the polemarch's authority over the military without significantly altering the quality of the archons elected. Against Badian's view see also Kelly (1978), p. 14.

least) 487/6, for we are not told of any diminution of the polemarch's status before that date (22.5). This is clear enough, but Herodotus does not provide as coherent a picture of the role played by the polemarch at Marathon. In his account of that battle and the council-of-war which preceded it Herodotus supplies the following information about Kallimachos and the *polemarchia*. (1) As polemarch Kallimachos had a vote equal to the *strategoi* in councils-of-war,[3] yet (2) he did not exercise his right to vote at the generals' initial deliberations (6.109.1-2). (3) When he did exercise that right, Kallimachos' vote seems to have carried more weight than that of any individual *strategos*: although the majority of the generals had decided not to engage the Persians,[4] Kallimachos' vote tipped the balance in favor of battle (6.109.2, 110). (4) Kallimachos apparently never held operational command, which was rotated among the generals from day to day,[5] but (5) he did command the Athenians' right wing in the battle (6.111.1), the position of highest prestige. Finally, (6) Kallimachos had been elected to office by lot (6.109.2). Of these, numbers four and six are ostensibly not consis-

[3] Herodotus says that Kallimachos was ἑνδέκατος ψηφιδοφόρος (6.109.2), but perhaps more to the point is the parenthetical statement in the following: ...ἦν γὰρ ἑνδέκατος ψηφιδοφόρος ὁ τῷ κυάμῳ λαχὼν Ἀθηναίων πολεμαρχέειν (τὸ παλαιὸν γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ὁμόψηφον τὸν πολέμαρχον ἐποιεῦντο τοῖσι στρατηγοῖσι), ἦν δὲ τότε πολέμαρχος Καλλίμαχος Ἀφιδναῖος... ("...the man who obtained by lot the office of polemarch over the Athenians was the eleventh voter (for in the past the Athenians made the polemarch to have a vote equal to the generals), and on that occasion Kallimachos of Aphidna was polemarch..."). Hammond (1969), pp. 122-123 (cf. [1968], p. 49 n. 142), has suggested that by τὸ παλαιόν in the above Herodotus does not mean the time of the battle of Marathon but earlier, prior to 490 and probably before the reforms of 501/0. The author notes that on all occasions but one (3.58.2) Herodotus uses τὸ παλαιόν to refer to a time anterior to its context, and he always uses it to refer to events before 500 B.C. According to Hammond's interpretation, the polemarch had only a casting vote in 490 (he was ἑνδέκατος ψηφιδοφόρος), and Herodotus is explaining to his readers in his parenthetical statement the origins of that arrangement, that in still earlier times the polemarch had had an equal vote with the generals. It is not necessary to construe the passage as Hammond does, however: τὸ παλαιόν can refer to the time of its context (and does, at 3.58.2), and there is no good reason to believe that Herodotus would not use the expression to refer to an event later than 500 B.C. If τὸ παλαιόν is understood to refer in this instance to 490, the passage makes better sense. In that case Herodotus will have been explaining to his audience what must have seemed strange to them given the changed functions of the polemarch in the mid-fifth century, that before their time, when the battle of Marathon was fought, the polemarch had an equal vote with the generals. (So also Badian [1971], p. 26 n. 68, and Burn [1969], p. 119.)

[4] It is frequently assumed that the generals' votes were tied 5-5, but I think Hignett (1963), p. 57 n. 1, must be correct in interpreting ἐνίκα ἡ χείρων τῶν γνωμέων at 109.2 as meaning that those opposed to battle outnumbered those in favor. Against this view Lazenby (1993), p. 57 n. 28, writes: "But the words 'ἐγίνοντο δίχα αἱ γνῶμαι' and 'ὡς δὲ δίχα τε ἐγίνοντο' surely imply that the views were *equally* divided, and since this produced stalemate, the worse view *was* prevailing...." But in fact these passages do not imply a division of the votes into equal parts, since δίχα need not refer to *equal* division (and surely does not, for example, at Thuc. 6.10.4; cf. Ste. Croix [1972], p. 118 n. 76, on δίχα at Thuc. 1.40.5).

[5] Hdt. 6.110: μετὰ δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν ἡ γνώμη ἔφερε συμβάλλειν, ὡς ἑκάστου αὐτῶν ἐγίνετο πρυτανηίη τῆς ἡμέρης, Μιλτιάδῃ παρεδίδοσαν· ὁ δὲ δεκόμενος οὔτι κω συμβολὴν ἐποιέετο, πρίν γε δὴ αὐτοῦ πρυτανηίη ἐγένετο. Cf. Plut. *Arist.* 5.2.

tent with the evidence of the *Athenaion Politeia* for the superiority of the polemarch to the *strategoi*.[6]

Arguments can, however, be made against the evidence of Herodotus in both instances. First, it is not clear from other sources that a system of rotating military command was ever employed by the Athenians (see ch. 5 § 2.1).[7] If Herodotus is mistaken in this respect about the command structure at Marathon, he may be mistaken as well in reporting that the generals rather than polemarch held operational command. It would not be surprising if Herodotus did thus exaggerate the importance of the *strategoi* in his account: he may not have been familiar with early fifth-century constitutional history, and his sources may themselves have exaggerated the importance to the campaign of the general Miltiades.[8] Second, that Kallimachos was selected by lot directly contradicts the *Athenaion Politeia*, according to which the college of archons was filled by straight election prior to 487/6 (22.5).[9] It is possible, in other words, to reject the evidence of Herodotus in favor of that of the *Athenaion Politeia*, and some modern scholars have done just that.[10] Others accept the evidence of both sources and suggest that before 487/6 archons were selected by a procedure which neither author fully explains: a board of archons was first elected, then each of those elected was assigned his particular office by lot. This theory has the advantage of explaining how the college of archons came to be appointed to office by a two-stage procedure after 487/6. It is more likely that the method instituted in the reform—the selection by lot of ten archons from among 100 previously elected—developed from a simpler two-stage process than that it was the invention of the reformer.[11]

[6] That Kallimachos was selected by lot (no. 6) suggests he was inferior to the *strategoi*, who were certainly elected to office (Hdt. 6.104.2; *Ath. Pol.* 22.2). Kallimachos' failure to vote in the first instance (no. 2) is consistent with a number of interpretations. It is possible that he was excluded from the generals' deliberations because of his inferior status, that the generals were discussing amongst themselves what their advice to their commanding officer should be, or that Kallimachos, as chairman of the council-of-war, simply refrained from voting initially (the last is the suggestion of Badian [1971], p. 26 n. 68).

[7] Macan (1895), I, pp. 367-368, suggests that πρυτανήιη (Hdt. 6.110, see ch. 4 n. 5) has been misunderstood, that it may not have been the supreme military command which rotated among the generals on a daily basis, but rather primacy of place in battle order, or some other mark of distinction. This is possible. But it is clear that whether or not he misunderstood his sources Herodotus assumed that a general whose πρυτανήιη it was had the authority, at least, to determine whether an engagement would be sought.

[8] For discussion of the latter possibility see Bicknell (1970), pp. 429-431.

[9] Pausanias (1.15.3) also reports that Kallimachos had been elected polemarch, and according to Idomeneus (Plut. *Arist.* 1.7-8) Aristeides was elected eponymous archon in 489/8.

[10] Develin (1979), pp. 466-467; Buck (1965), p. 96; Burn (1962), p. 246; Hignett (1952), p. 322; Fritz and Kapp (1950), p. 165; HW II, pp. 110 and 357-358; Macan (1895), I, p. 365.

[11] Proponents of the two-stage procedure are Staveley (1972), p. 240 n. 65, Badian (1971), p. 25, Bicknell (1971), pp. 147-149, and Lang (1959), p. 88. Cf. Hansen (1990b), p. 61, and

What is clear is that Herodotus cannot be correct in suggesting that archons were selected by simple sortition before 487/6. It is unlikely that the method of archon selection adopted in that year had as its predecessor a procedure in which election played no part. The significance of the reform is surely that sortition—the increased use of which was a characteristic of Athens' radical democracy—was either introduced into the process of archon selection or that its use was broadened. Kallimachos, therefore, was either elected to office, as the *Athenaion Politeia* reports, or selected by the sort of two-stage procedure which Badian and others suggest was in use. Because Herodotus' reference to the lot is probably not a careless error,[12] and because a two-stage procedure is a more likely starting point for the reform of 487/6 than straight election, I am inclined to believe the latter.

The explanation makes some sense of our divergent evidence. According to this reconstruction, Kallimachos had not been elected specifically to the *polemarchia*. As an elected archon he had some voice in the generals' strategic decision-making (Hdt. 6.109.1-2), but he was not a military official *per se* and so yielded operational command to the *strategoi*, which meant at the least that he could not make the decision to engage the enemy (6.110). Kallimachos did hold a prestigious position in command of the army's right wing (6.111.1), but this may not have demanded any particular expertise: commanders of hoplite forces probably did not significantly influence the progress of a battle once it had begun.[13] The implication of the *Athenaion Politeia* that the polemarch was hegemon of the army after 501/0 (22.2) may be true in the limited sense that he was the official whose individual authority in the military sphere was greatest: whatever the responsibilities of the *polemarchia* were, they were performed by a single archon, while the responsibilities of the *strategia* were divided among ten men. It is most important to recognize that between 501/0 and 487/6 the balance of power between *strategoi* and polemarch was probably ill-defined. It is possible that the terms of their relationship were clearly delineated in theory, but that relationship had not yet been tested by fire: we know of no other occasion after 501/0 in which the generals had operated in concert with the

Rhodes (1981), p. 273, who think it a possibility. The procedure is referred to but not accepted by Hammond (1968), p. 50, and Macan (1895), I, p. 365, and II, pp. 157-158. Against Badian's argument in particular see Kelly (1978), pp. 10-14. Buck (1965), p. 97, argues that a somewhat different method of archon selection, instituted by Solon, obtained before 487/6: he suggests that the Areopagos selected the archons from among a number previously elected by the tribes, then submitted its choices to the *ekklesia* for approval.

[12] The argument is made by Badian (1971), p. 24.

[13] See Spence (1993), p. 173, and Wheeler (1991), pp. 124 and 155 n. 16.

polemarch. Athens' commanders at Marathon may not themselves have known what the limits of their authority were.[14]

[14] For the view that the *strategoi* were subordinate to the polemarch before 487/6 see: Fornara (1971), pp. 72-73 and cf. pp. 3-4 n. 11, p. 6 and n. 16; Bicknell (1970), pp. 427-431; Burn (1969), p. 119, and (1962), p. 246; Hignett (1963), p. 62, and (1952), p. 171; Jameson (1955), p. 79; Kahrstedt (1936), p. 152 n. 1; How (1919), p. 52; Macan (1895), I, p. 365, and II, pp. 156-158. Against this view see Hammond (1968), p. 49, and Rhodes (1981), pp. 264-265. Badian (1971), pp. 26 and 31-32, stresses the ambiguity of the polemarch's position in 490. I have found his argument most persuasive.

CHAPTER FIVE

AUTHORITY IN THE *STRATEGIA*

The authority of individual generals within the *strategia* was necessarily limited to some extent by the fact that their office was collegiate. The responsibilities of leadership and the power that attended promotion to the state's most important elective office were divided among ten men, while the likelihood that any of them would undermine the state by appropriating autocratic powers was correspondingly reduced. But it remains possible that individual generals were sometimes elevated to positions of superiority within the *strategia*, the general thus promoted enjoying greater constitutional authority relative either to all of his colleagues on the board of generals or to that subset of the board with which he was serving on a particular expedition. With a view to determining how authority was divided among Athens' generals I address below the following questions: (1) Did the Athenians ever invest one of their ten generals with superior authority vis-à-vis all of his colleagues in the *strategia*? (2) When a single expedition was commanded by more than one Athenian general, how were decisions made by the joint command?

1. *Evidence for Generals with Special Powers*

For more than a century there has been debate about the relative degrees of constitutional authority enjoyed by Athens' generals. Some scholars have maintained that superior powers were granted to one of Athens' ten *strategoi* either regularly or when the situation demanded it. Others have held that strict constitutional equality obtained in Athens' *strategia*, and that to the extent that any general enjoyed more authority than his colleagues, he did so by virtue not of constitutional perquisites but through his *auctoritas*. The latter is currently the prevailing view, but the contention that there was a general with superior powers does not lack modern supporters. I discuss below the evidence which has been adduced in support of that theory. In each instance arguments *can* be made to support either of the above positions, but it is my view that the burden of proof lies with those who would claim the Athenians regularly or frequently delegated to one member of their state's most influential office a preponderance of military authority.

To my mind, the evidence which has been urged in support of that position is not sufficient.

1.1. *Multiple Representation in the* Strategia *and Election* ex hapanton

We are told by the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* that as of 501/0 Athens' generals were elected one from each tribe (22.2-3: ἔπειτα τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ᾑροῦντο κατὰ φυλάς, ἐξ ἑκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα, τῆς δὲ ἁπάσης στρατιᾶς ἡγεμὼν ἦν ὁ πολέμαρχος. ἔτει δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα δωδεκάτῳ νικήσαντες τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην...). This system of election to the *strategia*, however, had evidently been abandoned in whole or in part by 441/0, in which year two generals from the same tribe are known to have served together.[1] This and subsequent examples of double tribal representation in the *strategia* were explained long ago by Beloch (1884), pp. 275-288, as the product of a system of election whereby nine of Athens' generals were elected *kata phulas* while the tenth was elected *ex hapanton*, without reference to tribe, and was invested by the *demos* with superior authority vis-à-vis the other *strategoi*. Beloch's view has been influential: while there has been considerable debate in the last century over particulars—over the details of the election procedure, for example, the reasons for the adoption of the system, the frequency with which it was employed, and whether superior authority was in fact conferred by the *demos* on the general elected *ex hapanton* or was rather the informal effect of the manner of his election[2]—Beloch's basic assumptions have been largely accepted, that double representation in the *strategia* was the effect of a system which combined tribal representation with election *ex hapanton* and which somehow elevated in authority the general elected by the latter means.

These assumptions were challenged by Fornara in 1971 (pp. 19-27). He argues that the system of election posited by Beloch is not necessary to explain the known instances of multiple representation in the *strategia*. Rather, they are the effect of the Athenians' adoption of a second system of election to which the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* refers at 61.1: having previously been elected one from each tribe, we are told, all of Athens' generals were elected *ex hapanton* in the late fourth century, when the *Athenaion Politeia* was composed (χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀρχὰς ἁπάσας, <στρατηγοὺς> δέκα, πρότερον μὲν ἀφ' ἑκάστης φυλῆς ἕνα, νῦν δ' ἐξ ἁπάντων...). The passage says nothing

[1] Perikles and Glaukon, both of the tribe Akamantis, appear in the list of generals of that year provided by Androtion (*FGH* 324 F 38).

[2] For pertinent discussion see the bibliography referred to by Fornara (1971) at p. 20 n. 32 as well as: Bicknell (1979), pp. 111-112, and (1972b), pp. 103-111; Staveley (1972), pp. 40-47; Hammond (1969), pp. 128-139; Lewis (1961), pp. 118-123; Hignett (1952), pp. 348-353; Ehrenberg (1945), pp. 130-132; and Wade-Gery (1931), p. 89, and (1930), p. 38.

about the date of the change from tribal representation in the *strategia* to election *ex hapanton*. It certainly does not imply that that change was a recent innovation in the author's day. There is therefore no obstacle to believing that the Athenians' adoption of election *ex hapanton* for its entire board of *strategoi* predated the instances of multiple representation for which we have evidence.[3]

Fornara's reconstruction is preferable in my view to those to which the author objects because it explains the known instances of election *ex hapanton* in the fifth century without requiring the invention of an intermediate stage of election for which there is no evidence other than the fact of multiple representation.[4] That no such intermediate stage of election was employed by the Athenians cannot of course be proved, but at the least we may say that multiple representation need not be explained by recourse to a theory which presumes the existence of a *strategos* with superior authority.[5] By Fornara's reconstruction the phenomenon of election *ex hapanton* does not provide evidence of a disparity in authority within the

[3] Whereas some scholars identify instances of double representation by one tribe only in certain years, Fornara maintains that in the years 433/2, 431/0, and 426/5 two tribes each supplied two generals to the *strategia*, while in 432/1 one tribe supplied two generals and another three (see p. 71 and the entries for individual years; cf. Bicknell [1972b], p. 107). The phenomena of "double double representation" and "double triple representation" cannot readily be explained by the intermediate stage of election posited by Beloch. Confirmed instances of either would therefore tend to support Fornara's reconstruction, but the author's arguments for their occurrence in the years noted above have failed to convince (see, e.g., Thompson [1974], pp. 622-623). If Fornara's arguments for multiple representation cannot prove his case, however, neither is the absence of thoroughly credible instances of this phenomenon proof against Fornara's reconstruction.

[4] Hansen (1988a), pp. 69-70, argues that Fornara's reconstruction is disproved by *P. Oxy.* 1804 fr. 4.4-6, which preserves a fragment of a speech of Hyperides (*Against Autokles*) that was delivered in 360. The fragment shows that the election of generals by tribe was referred to in Hyperides' speech: "Ten *strategoi* were elected, one from each tribe. Hyperides in the *Against Autokles*." Hansen argues that the most likely interpretation of this evidence is that tribal representation was still practiced at the time the speech was delivered or had only recently been abandoned by the Athenians. Lacking the context of the fragment, however, it is impossible to be sure that Hyperides was in fact referring to current or recent practices. I do not agree with Hansen that it is "most unlikely" that the speech refers to a mid-fifth-century reform (or perhaps to the election procedure of the early fifth century rather than the reform *per se*)—Hyperides' references in the same speech to Sokrates (fr. 55) and the Thirty Tyrants (fr. 61) show that his allusions were not confined to current events—and therefore do not agree that the preserved passage is sufficient evidence against the eminently sensible reconstruction proposed by Fornara. (For other responses to Fornara see Rhodes [1981], pp. 265-266 and 677-678; Thompson [1974], pp. 420-421; Connor [1974], pp. 621-624; and Bicknell [1972b], p. 112.)

[5] It is also possible, of course, to accept that the Athenians employed an intermediate stage of election without believing that they invested generals elected *ex hapanton* with superior powers. Dover (1960), pp. 61-63, believes election by this means conferred on generals only "the authority of prestige." Jameson (1955), p. 71, concludes that there is no evidence the general elected *ex hapanton* was anything more than chairman of the board's discussions, in which the majority view prevailed. Cf., however, Fornara (1971), p. 28 n. 2: "How the regular establishment of a chairmanship would not convey with it special power is unclear to me."

strategia: the appearance of generals of the same tribe in a single board of *strategoi* rather says nothing whatever about the authority or prestige of any of the generals of that tribe.

1.2. *The αὐτός-Formula and Other Emphatic Terminology*

Our sources sometimes refer to groups of *strategoi*, either the entire board of generals or that portion of the board which has been appointed to a particular command, in such a way that the name of one of the generals is emphasized over those of his colleagues. This may be done, broadly speaking, in one of two ways: either all the generals with whom the source is concerned are named, and the name of one of the generals emphasized (for example, by its initial placement in a list of names whose sequence is not determined by tribal order), or only one general is mentioned by name while his colleagues are referred to generically (for example, ὁ δεῖνα καὶ οἱ συνάρχοντες).[6] That individual generals within a group are thus emphasized by our sources has been taken as evidence for a disparity of authority within the *strategia*, the generals thus distinguished being, it is assumed, superior in authority to the colleagues in connection with whom they are named.

Dover (1960), pp. 63-71 and 75-76, and Fornara (1971), pp. 28-39, have argued against this interpretation of our sources' terminology. Instances in which the same group of generals is referred to by different formulae suggested to Dover (pp. 64-66) that the various means by which a source might emphasize the name of one member of a board are identical in meaning.[7] Occasions in which our sources emphasize the names of different members of the same board therefore suffice to show that an author's emphasis of a general's name by any means is not evidence that that general was superior in authority to his colleagues, either throughout his year in office or for the duration of the campaign which he and they commanded.[8] Two particularly clear examples of this phenomenon are cited by Dover (pp. 66-67): (1) The three generals who were dispatched in 432/1 to sail around the Peloponnese—Karkinos, Proteas, and Sokrates—are named in that order (which is not tribal order) by Thucydides (2.23.2: ἐστρατήγει δὲ Καρκίνος τε ὁ Ξενοτίμου καὶ Πρωτέας ὁ Ἐπικλέους καὶ Σωκράτης ὁ Ἀντιγένους). This is *not* the order in which the generals of this campaign appear at *IG* i³ 365.30-31, however, where Sokrates is mentioned first (also not in tribal order): παρέδομεν στρατεγοῖς] | [Σοκ]ράτε[ι *h*αλ]αιεῖ, Προτέαι

[6] Dover (1960), pp. 63-64, provides an extensive list of means by which the name of one member of a board may be emphasized. Cf. Fornara (1971), pp. 28-29, with reference specifically to Thucydides' terminology.

[7] Cf. Fornara, pp. 30-31, with reference to Thucydides.

[8] This evidence does not rule out the possibility that a position of superiority on the board concerned was rotated among its members. On the possibility of a rotating command see ch. 5 § 2.1 and Dover, pp. 68 and 71-72.

Αἰχσον[εῖ, Καρκίνοι Θορικίοι...). (2) In Xenophon's enumeration (*Hell.* 1.5.16) of the ten generals who were elected to the *strategia* for 406/5, Konon's name appears first (the order of the list is not determined by tribal order): ...στρατηγοὺς εἵλοντο ἄλλους δέκα, Κόνωνα, Διομέδοντα, Λέοντα, Περικλέα, Ἐρασινίδην, Ἀριστοκράτην, Ἀρχέστρατον, Πρωτόμαχον, Θράσυλλον, Ἀριστογένην. In referring to the same board of generals, however, Lysias (21.8) emphasizes the name of Thrasyllos: ...τοὺς δὲ μετὰ Θρασύλλου δέκα εἵλεσθε.... I agree in the main with the conclusions reached by Dover and Fornara, that an author's emphasis of one member of a board does not imply his superiority within that board, that the individual so distinguished was probably emphasized because he happened for one reason or another to be "uppermost in the writer's mind at the time of writing,"[9] and that the traditional explanation for these emphatic formulae emerged not from empirical evidence but from the assumption that a hierarchy existed in the *strategia.*[10] I am not completely persuaded, however, by either author's interpretation of two especially problematic pieces of evidence, Thuc. 1.116.1 and 2.13.1.

Among the means by which the names of individual generals are sometimes emphasized by our sources is the αὐτός-formula: one *strategos*, that is, is named together with the pronoun αὐτός and an ordinal number (ἐστρατήγει ὁ δεῖνα τρίτος αὐτός). The use of this formula in a number of contexts, unrelated to the *strategia*, in which there can be no question that the man whose name is thus emphasized was superior to his colleagues[11] suggests that the formula likewise implies no legal distinction when used with reference to *strategoi* in joint command of an expedition. There is no difficulty in assuming that in such instances the formula indicates only that the *strategos* referred to by name was one of a board of generals whose number is indicated by the ordinal.[12] On two occasions, however, Thucydides' use of the expression δέκατος αὐτός with reference to Perikles is less readily explained. The passages have been taken as evidence of Perikles' superiority in the *strategia* in the years to which Thucydides refers.

[9] Dover (1960), pp. 68-69. I would suggest, in addition to the examples provided by Dover, that Thucydides emphasizes Kallias at 1.61.1 (...πέμπουσιν...Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου πέμπτον αὐτὸν στρατηγόν...) and Lysikles (*A O* no. 1856) at 3.19.1 (...ἐξέπεμψαν...Λυσικλέα πέμπτον αὐτὸν στρατηγόν) rather than any of their respective colleagues because these two generals died on the campaigns Thucydides is describing (1.63.3; 3.19.2).

[10] Fornara (1971), pp. 32-33.

[11] The formula is used at Dem. 28.16 with reference to Demosthenes' guardians, at Pl. *Apol.* 32c with reference to Sokrates and the four other men whom the Thirty ordered to arrest Leon of Salamis, and at Aeschin. 2.178 of ambassadors, where the meaning of the passage cannot be that Aeschines was superior in authority to his colleagues in that office. See Fornara (1971), p. 33, and Dover (1960), p. 70.

[12] For the view that a general named as τρίτος αὐτός, for example, had greater authority than his colleagues, see *HCT ad* 1.46.1, Hignett (1952), p. 353, Beloch (1884), pp. 281 and 285. Jordan (1975), pp. 129-130 and n. 44, argues that in Thucydides the formula implies superiority only at 2.79.1 and 3.3.2 (with 3.4.3; note that Jordan writes "3.2 and 4.3"). Elsewhere, the commanders referred to in the ordinal were not *strategoi* but "*archontes*".

Thucydides' first reference to Perikles as δέκατος αὐτός occurs in his account of the campaign against Samos in 441/0. The Athenians, we are told, "fought a naval battle off Tragia with forty-four ships, Perikles serving as general δέκατος αὐτός" (1.116.1: ...τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ναυσὶ καὶ τέσσαρσι Περικλέους δεκάτου αὐτοῦ στρατηγοῦντος ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς Τραγίᾳ...). There is some difficulty in accepting, in accordance with the interpretation of the αὐτός-formula advocated above, that Perikles was serving as general on this occasion with nine others: (1) Of the sixty ships which the Athenians had dispatched to the Samian theater, sixteen were sent subsequently to Karia, Chios, and Lesbos and therefore did not take part in the naval battle (1.116.1). Sophokles (son of Sophillos), one of Athens' generals in this year, evidently accompanied the fleet which sailed north: the poet Ion reports having met Sophokles in Chios "when he sailed to Lesbos as general" (Ath. 603e). If Ion is to be believed, then ten Athenian *strategoi* cannot have taken part in the battle off Tragia. (2) Sometime after the battle the Athenians dispatched a further forty ships to Samos (1.116.2). Thucydides does not tell us who was in command of these reinforcements, but if they were under the command of *strategoi*, this too is evidence that Perikles was not one of ten generals serving in Samos at the time he is described as δέκατος αὐτός. That Perikles was thus described with reference to the entire board of generals on an occasion when the entire board was ostensibly not present has suggested to some that the use of the formula in this instance is evidence of Perikles' superior authority vis-à-vis all of his colleagues in the *strategia.*[13]

In defense of a more banal interpretation of Thuc. 1.116.1, however, I would suggest (1) that the description of Perikles as δέκατος αὐτός does not pertain to the naval battle off Tragia alone[14] but rather to the entire Samian campaign, in which Perikles *was* one of ten generals (the absence of some number of generals from the battle being in that case irrelevant); and (2) that the forty ships that were dispatched from Athens after the battle off Tragia were not in fact under the command of generals.[15] In this passage, that is, I suggest that δέκατος αὐτός implies nothing more than is usually meant by the use of the αὐτός-formula, that Perikles served on this occa-

[13] So Bloedow (1987), pp. 20-21; *HCT ad loc.*; Jameson (1955), pp. 78-79; Hignett (1952), p. 353; Hauvette-Besnault (1885), p. 76. Cf. Schwahn (1935), col. 1080; Scheele (1932), p. 7; HW II *ad* 6.103.1; Beloch (1884), pp. 281 and 285.

[14] So Bloedow (1987), p. 21.

[15] Cf. Fornara (1971), p. 34.

sion as one of ten generals. This explanation is, admittedly, not entirely satisfactory, but in the absence of more convincing evidence that Perikles enjoyed greater constitutional authority than his colleagues in 441/0, or that αὐτός-formulae imply legal superiority, it is reasonable to conclude that Perikles' superiority is not implied at Thuc. 1.116.1.

Thucydides refers to Perikles as δέκατος αὐτός a second time at 2.13.1, in his account of the antecedents of the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attica. Perikles, "who was *strategos* of the Athenians δέκατος αὐτός," addressed the Athenians in the course of an assembly meeting (...Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου στρατηγὸς ὢν 'Αθηναίων δέκατος αὐτός...προηγόρευε τοῖς 'Αθηναίοις ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ...). On this occasion it is clear that fewer than ten generals were in Athens (1.64.2, 65.1; 2.29.6). As with the passage discussed above, therefore, the description of Perikles with reference to the entire board of generals has been taken as evidence that he held superior authority within the board. Again, this interpretation of the evidence is not necessary. Thucydides uses the αὐτός-formula elsewhere to refer to that portion of a board of generals which has been assigned to a particular command (1.61.1, 2.79.1, 3.3.2, 3.19.1, 4.42.1; cf. 1.46.2, 5.4.1, 8.35.1). On this occasion, however, Perikles is not acting in the capacity of one of a number of commanders of a particular expedition: while I believe that Perikles was in fact appointed to the command in Attica in 431 (cf. ch. 5 § 1.3), I would argue that that appointment had not yet been made. (It may indeed have been made in response to the speech Perikles delivered on this occasion.) It would therefore not have been accurate to describe Perikles on this occasion with reference only to a subset of the board of *strategoi*, not even to that portion of the board which was currently in Athens because not assigned to any command. Perikles was therefore described, *faute de mieux*, by virtue of his relationship to the entire board of generals, as any general might have been, I suggest, under similar circumstances. One might ask why Thucydides wrote στρατηγὸς ὢν 'Αθηναίων δέκατος αὐτός in this passage in preference to, say, ὢν εἷς τῶν δέκα στρατηγῶν. But if the two expressions were in fact synonymous, then it is unlikely that Thucydides himself was exercised over the decision.

The explanations which have been proposed by Dover and Fornara for Thucydides' use of the expression δέκατος αὐτός at 1.116.1 and 2.13.1 are not to my mind persuasive. Dover argues that in both passages Thucydides describes Perikles with reference to the whole board of generals in order to emphasize that Perikles was not an autocrat, this with a view to correcting the exaggerated impression of Perikles which might be expected to develop in later tradition (p. 76). Bloedow (1987), pp. 19-22, argues against

Dover's suggestion,[16] and I agree that Thucydides' account of the Samian expedition, in which he makes no apparent attempt to minimize Perikles' role, suggests that the author's use of the expression was not motivated by his desire to combat distortion (p. 22). Fornara concludes that δέκατος αὐτός, as other instances of the αὐτός-formula, "expresses or reflects without attempt at precision the special eminence of certain members of the strategic college or underscores something noteworthy in their participation in events" (p. 36). This is very like Dover's conclusion that the individual named in the αὐτός-formula (on those occasions when it was not applied to Perikles) was uppermost in the author's mind at time of writing (p. 68), and I do not disagree. I am not persuaded, however, by Fornara's specific explanations of 1.116.1 and 2.13.1. He argues that Perikles' very participation in the Samian campaign was noteworthy and therefore emphasized at 1.116.1: Perikles, Fornara imagines, was not a general who "normally took part in warfare." Bloedow (1987), p. 23, is right to point out that there is no evidence whatever for such a conclusion. At 2.13.1, on the other hand, the expression δέκατος αὐτός, Fornara suggests, somehow points to Perikles' role as both a general and a leading politician, and does so more accurately than other expressions would have. But Fornara, who accepts that in other instances the ordinal in the αὐτός-formula refers to the number of generals involved in the operation under discussion,[17] does not adequately explain the use of the ordinal δέκατος on this occasion. My own impression is that Thucydides' references to Perikles as δέκατος αὐτός at 1.116.1 and 2.13.1 mean nothing more than other instances of the αὐτός-formula, that Perikles was acting on these occasions in his capacity as one of ten generals.

1.3. *Thuc. 2.21.3: στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι*

We are told by Thucydides at 2.21.3 that in 431, during the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, the Athenians found fault with Perikles because he, who was their general, did not lead them against the enemy: ...ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι.... Bloedow (1987), p. 26, argues that the passage is evidence of Perikles' superior authority: "The ability...to lead, or not to lead, the army out suggests something akin to supreme power.... To attempt to extract strict collegiality from such a description of events in Athens requires some highly fancy mental gymnastics."[18] An explanation for the passage which is consistent with a theory of strict colle-

[16] Fornara (1971), pp. 33-36, is likewise not persuaded by Dover's argument.

[17] "On the one hand, that Pericles held special powers at Samos and that his superior position is proven by these words would follow—and not even necessarily then—only if it were clear that nine other generals were not on the scene" (p. 34).

[18] Cf. Hornblower (1991), p. 275: "If we had no other evidence about the status of Athenian *strategoi* we would not guess from this sentence...that Pericles was one of an annually elected and strictly accountable panel of ten."

giality, however—and which does not strain credibility—is possible. I would argue that Perikles (who had, after all, immediately prior to the invasion given the Athenians advice with which they found favor [2.13-14.1]) had been appointed to take charge of the defense of Attica,[19] in the same way that a general might be appointed to any command, and that it was in his capacity as *strategos* of this campaign that he did not lead out Athens' troops.[20] That it was Perikles who dispatched cavalry against the invaders (2.22.2), evidently without consulting the *ekklesia*, is consistent with this interpretation (as it is with that proposed by Bloedow).[21] As general in command in Athens, I suggest, Perikles exercised control over his army's response to the enemy just as he would have had the theater of operation been outside of Attica. Thus he could decide to send out detachments—and to engage the enemy or not—without reference to his home government. These decisions might in the event meet with criticism in Athens—they might indeed be countermanded by the Athenian *ekklesia*—but the command decisions of any general on any campaign were likewise vulnerable to reversal at the hands of the *demos*.

1.4. *Thuc. 2.22.1: ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα*

I have discussed already in ch. 1 § 1.1 a number of possible interpretations of Thuc. 2.22.1. Bloedow (1987), pp. 12, 17, and 27, sees the passage as evidence that Perikles enjoyed extraordinary powers in 431, but several explanations of the passage are possible which do not require that we attribute to the general a position of constitutional superiority within the *strategia*.

1.5. *Thuc. 2.65.4: πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν*

In the summer of 430 the Athenians fined Perikles and removed him from the *strategia* (Thuc. 2.65.3; Diod. 12.45.4; Plut. *Per.* 35.4; cf. the excursus

[19] So also Hammond (1969), p. 127 and n. 2, and cf. *AO* p. 102.

[20] We are told specifically that Perikles "guarded the city" (Thuc. 2.22.1: ...τήν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε...). Perikles' responsibilities were probably similar to those which would be entrusted in the fourth century to the *strategos epi ten choran*. Cf. p. 16.

[21] This situation is comparable in several respects to another which occurred some years later. In the course of an assembly debate in 425/4 Kleon criticized Nikias for not sailing out against Sphakteria. I argue elsewhere (see ch. 1 n. 50) that Nikias had been appointed to the command in Sphakteria, and that it was because he was general of that expedition that he was singled out by Kleon for abuse.

We are told by Plutarch (*Phoc.* 9.3) that Phokion was unwilling on some occasion to lead the Athenians against an enemy. Plutarch does not provide details about the incident, however, and we cannot know whether the situation was comparable to those described by Thucydides. (Plutarch may be referring to Phokion's refusal in 317 to lead the Athenians to regain the Peiraieus [cf. Nep. *Phoc.* 2.5]. See the excursus to ch. 1, n. 21.)

to ch. 8, no. 4). Some time later they returned him to office (either reinstating him in the *strategia* in 430/29 or electing him to office for 429/8),[22] and on that occasion, Thucydides tell us (2.65.4), "they entrusted to him all their affairs": ...στρατηγὸν εἵλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν....[23] The passage has frequently been discussed in connection with the question of Perikles' status vis-à-vis his colleagues. Most recently, Bloedow (1987), pp. 24-25, has revived the argument that Thucydides here provides evidence of Perikles' superior powers. Since στρατηγὸν εἵλοντο describes a formal act of the Athenian *demos*, he argues, πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν is likely to as well. Having thus narrowed the semantic range of the clause, the author concludes that the formal act to which it refers is the Athenians' conferment of supreme power on Perikles by assembly vote.

Bloedow's argument for identifying πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν as a reference to a formal act of the *demos*, however, is unconvincing. When one of a pair or series of coordinate verbs in a Thucydidean sentence refers to a formal act it is not necessarily the case that the others do as well.[24] Without a compelling reason for assuming that a formal act is meant by the clause, there is likewise no good reason to conclude that it refers to an official award of powers rather than to the Athenians' *informal* acceptance of Perikles as their principal political leader.

That the clause πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν need not refer to the conferment of special authority has been argued already by Dover (1960), p. 75,[25] who cites as a counter-example Thuc. 6.15.4, where there is clearly no question of the granting of extraordinary powers: displeased with Alkibiades for his conduct, we are told, the Athenians eventually became hostile to him and "entrusted [their affairs] to others" (ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες). Bloedow's argument against this example—that it is not an exact parallel of 2.65.4 because ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες is here "used in a broad sense"—is not convincing.[26]

[22] For the view that Perikles was reinstated in the *strategia* see *HCT ad* 2.65.4. On his election to the *strategia* for 429/8 see Fornara (1971), p. 55.

[23] At 8.82.1 Thucydides similarly tells us that in 411 the Athenians at Samos elected Alkibiades general and entrusted their affairs to him: ...στρατηγόν τε αὐτὸν εὐθὺς εἵλοντο μετὰ τῶν προτέρων καὶ τὰ πράγματα πάντα ἀνετίθεσαν....

[24] Sometimes the verbs will thus correspond (e.g., at 5.28.1 and 6.73.1), and sometimes they will not: see, for example, Thuc. 6.51.2 (ἐψηφίσαντο...ἐκέλευον) and 8.1.3 (where ἐλέσθαι appears in a string of infinitives [all dependent on χρῆναι] of which it alone obviously refers to a formal act of the *demos*).

[25] Cf. *HCT ad* 2.65.4, 6.15.4, and 8.82.1; Ste. Croix (1956), p. 3.

[26] On the following passages, which might also be taken as evidence of a disparity in the constitutional authority enjoyed by Athens' generals, see Dover (1960), p. 74, with whose explanations I agree: Thuc. 4.28.1 (cf. pp. 21-22 above); 4.29.1 (cf. ch. 1 n. 55); 4.77.1 (cf. *HCT ad loc.*); and Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.3. On the alleged superiority of the *strategos epi tous hoplitas* in the fourth century see appendix 11.

2. *The Division of Authority among Generals in the Field*

Whether or not the Athenians ever conferred on one of their *strategoi* extraordinary authority relative to the rest of the board of generals is a question largely irrelevant to the issue to be considered here, how authority was divided among generals who shared the command of a single expedition. If there was in fact a "president" of the *strategia*, we may imagine that he acted as the superior of his colleagues on those occasions when he shared the command of an expedition with one or more of them. But he could not have participated in every Athenian campaign. Even granting the existence of a general with superior powers, therefore, it will frequently have been the case that Athens' campaigns were conducted under the leadership of two or more *strategoi* who were not serving in the capacity of *Oberstratege*. We may wonder in such cases whether the generals were equal in authority or if one or another of them served as the superior of his colleagues either temporarily or for the duration of the campaign. By way of answering this question I consider below how leadership decisions were made by Athenian generals when exercising joint command of a single expedition.[27]

2.1. *Rotation of Command*

It is possible that in the case of expeditions conducted by more than one Athenian general the command of the army—and with it, one may suppose, some degree of superiority vis-à-vis colleagues with regard to decision-making—was rotated among Athens' generals, passed from one to the next after some pre-determined period of time. This means of dividing authority among a campaign's military leaders was not unknown to Athenian armies, at least in the fourth century: it was employed on occasion during that period in the case of expeditions whose command was shared by Athenian *strategoi* with allied generals (see ch. 6 § 3).[28] But our evidence for the rotation of command on campaigns led only by Athenian generals is meager. Herodotus reports that during the Marathon campaign the πρυτανήιη (which is usually understood to mean "operational command") of the Athenian army was rotated among the generals from day to day (6.110; cf. Plut. *Arist.* 5.2 and p. 80). This may indeed have been the case, but we cannot be certain that the information Herodotus provides is accurate. That Athens' generals held operational command at Marathon is ostensibly a contradiction of other information found in Herodotus' narrative which suggests that

[27] Against the view that supremacy on a campaign is indicated by the αὐτός-formula, see ch. 5 § 1.2 above.

[28] It is possible that a rotating command was employed by the Athenians and their allies in the late fifth century as well (see ch. 6 § 2), but there is no certain evidence that this was the case.

the generals were all subordinate to the polemarch. The conflicting details Herodotus provides in his account can with some difficulty be molded into a coherent picture of the Athenian command at Marathon (see ch. 4), but in the end there can be no certainty about the status of Athens' generals vis-à-vis either one another or the polemarch in the early fifth century.[29]

Further evidence for the rotation of command in Athenian armies is provided by Diodorus in his accounts of the battles of Arginousai (13.97.6: ...ὁ στρατηγὸς Θρασύβουλος, ὃς ἦν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν...) and Aigospotami (13.106.1: ...Φιλοκλῆς ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν ἀφηγούμενος...). In neither case, however, is Diodorus' information substantiated by Xenophon's more detailed accounts of these battles (1.6.29-38; 2.1.27-30). Finally, a scholiast on Dem. 21.164 claims that the command was rotated among Athens' generals at Tamynai in 349/8 (εἰ πλείους ἦσαν οἱ στρατηγοί, παρὰ χρόνον ἦρχον. ἐλθόντος οὖν τοῦ καιροῦ ἐπὶ Φωκίωνα ὥστε ἄρχειν μετεπέμψατο τοὺς ἱππέας...). Such late evidence, however, is not in itself convincing. Arguments against a rotating command have been made already by Jameson (1955), pp. 79-82, and Dover (1960), pp. 71-72.[30] I would add only that, in the absence of more credible testimony, it is unlikely that a rotating command was employed in Athenian armies in the late fifth century, for we see no evidence of such a system of command where we would most expect to find it, in Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition.[31]

2.2 *Decision-Making in the Field: The Sicilian Expedition*

On a number of occasions Thucydides provides information which points to the procedure by which Athens' generals arrived at command decisions during the Sicilian expedition. In what we are told about their deliberations there is no suggestion that one of the *strategoi* had greater authority than his colleagues over decision-making by virtue of a rotating command. Rather, the relevant passages in Thucydides either suggest or are consistent with the conclusion that the Athenian generals in Sicily made decisions by majority vote, each exercising the same degree of authority as his colleagues over the decision-making procedure.[32] The information which Thucydides provides is detailed below:

[29] For discussion of Herodotus' evidence see also Lazenby (1993), p. 58; Shrimpton (1980), pp. 25-26; Hignett (1963), pp. 62-63, and (1952), p. 171; Burn (1962), p. 246.

[30] See also Hignett (1952), pp. 171 and 247 n. 3, and Kahrstedt (1936), p. 152 n. 1. Hammond (1969), pp. 123-124, Schwahn (1935), col. 1080, Scheele (1932), p. 6, and Hauvette-Besnault (1885), p. 55, accept that a rotating command was employed in Athenian armies.

[31] Cf. Lazenby (1993), pp. 58-59 n. 31.

[32] The conclusions reached in this section are predicated on the understanding that Menandros and Euthydemos were not *strategoi* in 413/12. See appendix 12.

1. When the generals Nikias, Alkibiades, and Lamachos arrived at Rhegion in Italy, they considered what their strategy in Sicily would be. Each general voiced a different opinion, but in the end Lamachos lent his support to the suggestion which had been proposed by Alkibiades, and it is this plan which the Athenians adopted (6.46.5-50.1; cf. Plut. *Nic.* 14.3, *Alc.* 20.2-3).[33] The passage provides our clearest evidence that decisions of the Athenian command in Sicily were made by majority vote.
2. After his arrival in Sicily Demosthenes devised a plan to capture the Syracusans' counter-wall by first gaining control of Epipolai (7.42.3-4). He made a preliminary attack on the wall with siege engines, evidently undertaking this action on his own authority (7.43.1: ἔπειτα μηχαναῖς ἔδοξε τῷ Δημοσθένει πρότερον ἀποπειρᾶσαι τοῦ παρατειχίσματος). The attempt failed, however, and Demosthenes followed through with his plan to attack Epipolai, having first gained the support of Nikias and his other colleagues (7.43.1: ...πείσας τόν τε Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνάρχοντας, ὡς ἐπενόει, τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ἐποιεῖτο; cf. Diod. 13.11.3; Plut. *Nic.* 21.3-6).[34] That Demosthenes acted on his own authority on the first occasion but sought the consent of his colleagues on the second is odd, but the explanation may be that Demosthenes' preliminary attack on the wall was a relatively minor affair, involving only a part of the Athenian forces, whereas the attack on Epipolai was undertaken by the entire army (7.43.2: τὴν πᾶσαν στρατιάν). That individual generals

It is impossible to be certain, but I see no reason to assume that the relationship among the generals of the Sicilian expedition was altered by the fact that some of them—Nikias, Alkibiades, and Lamachos, the generals originally dispatched in 416/15—had been appointed *strategoi autokratores* (see appendix 13). Since the assembly expanded to an equal degree the powers of the campaign's initial three commanders, there will have been no disparity in authority among them by virtue of their position as *autokratores*. Presumably, therefore, their relationship in the field will have mimicked that of generals who shared commands without being granted expanded authority. That relationship is illustrated by Thuc. 6.46.5-50.1 (no. 1 above), which suggests that Nikias, Alkibiades, and Lamachos made decisions by majority vote. Eventually, Alkibiades and Lamachos were replaced by other generals who did not share with Nikias the title of *autokrator*. The evidence of Thucydides, however, is compatible with the conclusion that at this time too there was no disparity in authority among the generals. Those incidents which might be taken to suggest that Nikias was superior to his colleagues—nos. 3 and 5 in the discussion—need not be explained by resort to this conclusion, while other evidence, particularly no. 4, suggests that decisions of the Athenian command were yet made by majority vote.

33 Similarly, after the battle of Arginousai in 406/5 the generals Diomedon, Erasinides, and Thrasyllos, Xenophon reports, each proposed a different course of action (*Hell.* 1.7.29-30). In the end the plan of Thrasyllos was adopted. Disagreements among *strategoi* were not always amicably decided: that between Chares and his colleagues Timotheos and Iphikrates in 356/5 ended in Chares charging his fellow generals with *prodosia* (see ch. 8 excursus, nos. 56-58).

34 For discussion of the implications of the plural ξυνάρχοντας see appendix 12.

in a joint command enjoyed some freedom of action over limited military actions must be assumed. The incident is not, I think, inconsistent with the suggestion that decisions of the Athenian command in Sicily were made by majority vote.

3. In the wake of their failure to capture Epipolai, Demosthenes, Nikias, and Eurymedon considered what course of action the Athenians should take. Demosthenes favored abandoning the siege of Syracuse and returning to Athens, but Nikias opposed withdrawal and refused to lead the army away.[35] Demosthenes suggested in turn that the Athenians remain in Sicily but withdraw to Thapsos or Katane. He was supported in this suggestion by Eurymedon, but the majority decision did not in this instance prevail. Nikias continued to oppose his colleague's suggestion, and in the end the Athenians remained where they were (7.47.1-49.4; cf. Diod. 13.12.1-3; Plut. *Nic.* 22.1-4). It is true that Nikias got what he wanted on this occasion, despite that his was the minority view, but he evidently did not do so by virtue of being superior in authority to his colleagues: we are told specifically that the Athenians' failure to withdraw from Syracuse was the result of hesitation (ὄκνος), procrastination (μέλλησις), and the suspicion (ὑπόνοια) that Nikias had information to which the other generals were not privy (7.49.4).[36] Thus the incident is not evidence for a disparity in the authority enjoyed by generals in the field. It rather suggests that the Athenian command, if its decisions were made by majority vote, nevertheless might not operate well in the event of a strong difference of opinion. A general who was ready to steadfastly oppose his colleagues—and who was willing to face whatever consequences such opposition might entail—could succeed in undermining the majority decision of the collegiate command.[37]
4. After the Syracusans were reinforced by forces under the Spartan Gylippos, Athens' generals (or at least two of them) began to regret that they had not withdrawn from Syracuse after the defeat at Epipolai (7.50.3; cf. Diod. 13.12.5; Plut. *Nic.* 22.5). Nikias evidently would yet have preferred that the Athenians remain where they were, but, we are told, he was not *as* opposed to the idea of retreat as he had been previously: ...καὶ ὡς αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας ἔτι ὁμοίως ἐνηντιοῦτο.... With Nikias no longer vehement in his objection to withdrawal the ma-

35 For related discussion see pp. 74-75.

36 Jameson (1955), p. 84, suggests that Nikias prevailed on this occasion because of the influence he enjoyed as "senior general".

37 For a similar instance of a general opposing the majority view of his colleagues see Thuc. 8.27 and *HCT ad* 8.27.1.

jority view of his colleagues prevailed, and the generals gave orders for retreat.

5. When the Athenians were on the point of leaving Syracuse, a lunar eclipse occurred which prompted opposition to the retreat from several quarters. Athenians in the army urged the generals to delay; soothsayers advised remaining at Syracuse for twenty-seven days; and Nikias refused even to deliberate before those twenty-seven days had passed. The Athenians consequently stayed where they were (7.50.4; cf. Diod. 13.12.6; Plut. *Nic.* 23.1-2, 7-9).[38] Thucydides does not tell us what opinions Demosthenes and Eurymedon held after the eclipse, but it is likely enough, given the author's silence, that they continued to favor immediate withdrawal. If so, despite holding the majority opinion, the two were compelled once again to yield to Nikias' intransigence, coupled on this occasion with the opposition of their troops and soothsayers. As previously (see no. 3 above), I do not think the incident incompatible with the suggestion that decisions of the Athenian command were made in principle by majority vote. But just as the effective implementation of that procedure was vulnerable to obdurate resistance from within the Athenian command itself, so was it vulnerable to resistance from without, and particularly to popular opposition in the Athenian component of the army (cf. ch. 3 § 3.1).
6. During the delay which followed the lunar eclipse the Syracusans and their allies began to blockade the Syracusan harbor with a view to preventing the Athenians from escaping. The blockade prompted the Athenians to attempt to fight their way out of the harbor,[39] but their efforts were unsuccessful (7.60.1-71). The Athenians were badly defeated in the battle, and popular sentiment favored an immediate retreat by land (7.72.2). At this juncture, Demosthenes approached Nikias and proposed that they man their ships and once again engage the enemy at sea (Δημοσθένης δὲ Νικίᾳ προσελθὼν γνώμην ἐποιεῖτο...). Nikias agreed, but in the event the sailors refused to cooperate, and the generals were obliged to yield to their subordinates' will (7.72.3-4; cf. Diod. 13.18.1-2 and ch. 3 § 3.1). That Demosthenes and Nikias were unable to implement their decision in the end does not detract from the fact that Demosthenes sought Nikias' support for his plan and that the decision to engage the Syracusans a second time was made conjointly

[38] In the event, Nikias evidently did agree to attempt retreat before twenty-seven days had elapsed. See *HCT ad* 7.72.4.

[39] On this occasion the Athenian generals and taxiarchs met and together decided to engage the enemy at sea (7.60.1-3; cf. Diod. 13.14.3; Plut. *Nic.* 24.4-6). Thucydides does not provide details which would be helpful for the present discussion, but the participation of the taxiarchs in the deliberations is noteworthy. For discussion of the passage see ch. 3 § 3.2.

by the two commanders. There is no indication that either enjoyed authority superior to that of the other.

In two further instances Thucydides provides the barest of references to decisions of the Athenian command:

7. Demosthenes and Nikias, we are told, together decided to postpone their retreat by land for a day (7.74.1: ...ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς...).
8. In the course of the retreat they decided on one occasion to move the army during the night (7.80.1: τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς τῷ Νικίᾳ καὶ Δημοσθένει ἐδόκει...ἀπάγειν τὴν στρατιάν...). In neither passage is there any suggestion that either general was superior to the other.[40]

The information Thucydides provides about the Sicilian expedition suggests that in the case of other, less well-documented late fifth-century military campaigns conducted under the leadership of more than one Athenian general command decisions were made by majority vote, each general participating fully and equally in the deliberative process.[41] There is no indication in Thucydides' account that any one of the generals stationed in Sicily ever exercised greater authority than his colleagues over the decision-making procedure by virtue either of a rotating command or of powers vested in him by the Athenian *demos*.[42] Those occasions in which the majority decisions of the generals were not implemented are not, I suggest, evidence that the general whose minority view prevailed was superior in authority to his colleagues. Rather, although decisions of the Athenian command were made in principle by majority vote, the effective implementation of those decisions could be hindered—though probably unusually—by strong opposition both from within the command itself and from the Athenian component of the army.

[40] I should note that Plutarch claims at *Nic.* 20.6-7 that the naval battle in which the Athenians were engaged immediately before the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon in Sicily was undertaken by them at the insistence of the generals Menandros and Euthydemos. Wanting to distinguish themselves, we are told, the two forced the decision to fight (ἐξεβιάσαντο ναυμαχῆσαι), thereby overruling Nikias, who was opposed to engaging the Syracusans before the arrival of reinforcements. Thucydides provides no such information in his account of the battle (7.36-41; cf. Diod. 13.10.4), however, and Plutarch's details are likely to be mere embellishment.

[41] Cf. Fornara (1971), p. 36 and n. 28.

[42] Plutarch reports, however, that after Alkibiades' recall Nikias only nominally shared the leadership with Lamachos; in fact, we are told, he was in sole command (*Nic.* 14.4: ...λόγῳ μὲν ἀπολειφθεὶς δεύτερος ἡγεμών, δυνάμει δὲ μόνος ὤν...; 15.1: ἀποπλεύσαντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου...τὸ πᾶν ἤδη κράτος ὁ Νικίας ἔσχεν). On Plutarch's imposition of a chain of command on the Athenian generals in Sicily see Dover (1960), p. 73. See also Hammond (1969), p. 125, who accepts Plutarch's evidence, and cf. Beloch (1884), p. 286, who believes Nikias was probably the chairman (that is, in his view, the στρατηγὸς τρίτος αὐτός) of the three *strategoi autokratores* in Sicily.

CHAPTER SIX

ATHENS' *STRATEGOI* AND ALLIED COMMANDERS

Throughout the classical period Athens was frequently involved in joint operations, expeditions which were conducted by two or more states and whose forces were composed of contingents provided by each ally. Depending on the nature of their agreement with the confederates and their commitment to a particular undertaking, states participating in an allied campaign might or might not provide generals together with the fighting men they contributed. When generals were provided they presumably retained command of their state's contingent under most circumstances, but the authority of allied generals over their national units is likely to have been subordinated to that of a supreme commander who was invested with leadership of the entire allied army either temporarily or for the duration of the campaign. A number of questions relating to the authority of Athens' generals arise in connection with the state's participation in the fifth and fourth centuries in joint operations in which she shared leadership with one or more allied states. (1) With whom on each occasion did the supreme leadership (if any) of allied campaigns lie? (2) By whom were questions related to campaign leadership decided, the states which contributed forces to an allied expedition, for example, or the allied generals themselves, acting as representatives of their respective governments? And (3) when Athenian generals were present on campaigns but were not invested with supreme command, to what extent was their authority in the field attenuated?

1. *The Hellenic League*

The defense of Greece against the Persians during 480 and 479 and offensive operations against Cyprus and Byzantium in 478/7 were conducted by a coalition of states, the "Hellenic League", which had united in 481/0 in anticipation of the Persian invasion (Hdt. 8.145).[1] Athens was a prominent member of this association and contributed to it the largest single contingent of ships (8.1, 42.2, 44.1), yet she was not the league's hegemon.

[1] It is possible that the Athenians sent help to Sparta in 462/1 in accordance with their obligations to Sparta as allies in the Hellenic League. So Brunt (1953), p. 153, and Larsen (1940), p. 205, but see Hornblower (1991), p. 158, and *HCT* I, p. 300, and cf. Ste. Croix (1972), p. 380 (app. 32).

Athenian leadership of the combined Greek fleet had been proposed at the first meeting of the allies,[2] but the objection of certain league members[3] to the suggestion had prompted the Athenians to withdraw their claim (8.2-3). Control of the navy thereafter passed to the Spartans, whose leadership on land had presumably never been in question. Spartan officers thus served as the supreme commanders of the league's naval and land operations.[4] Each allied state in turn supplied a general to command its own contingent.[5]

Although the Spartans were the recognized leaders of the Greek coalition, they did not exercise unlimited authority over the conduct of allied campaigns. Decisions relating to the prosecution of the war were made by representatives of the member states. On at least two occasions delegates of the allies (*probouloi*) met in the Peloponnese[6] for the purpose of deliberation, first in the autumn of 481 (7.145), and a second time in the spring of 480 (7.172.1).[7] Subsequent decisions of the league were made by the allied

[2] According to Plutarch (*Them.* 7.3) the question of the Athenians' command of the fleet arose much later, when the Greeks were at Artemision. Herodotus clearly states that the Greeks discussed the leadership of the coalition no later than at the first league congress (8.3.1), but that he refers to the debate in a brief digression from his account of the Artemision campaign may have suggested to Plutarch that the question arose on that occasion.

[3] The hostility of Aegina to Athens and the recognition by other league members of the need to placate the Aeginetans were probably behind this rejection of the Athenians as leaders of the fleet (so Brunt [1953], p. 139).

[4] Sparta's position as leader of the Hellenic League differed markedly from her hegemony of the Peloponnesian League. On the latter see Ste. Croix (1972), pp. 105-123 and 339-340.

[5] Thus the Spartan king Leonidas held supreme command at Thermopylai, but each city which sent forces to the pass supplied its own general (Hdt. 7.204). At Artemision (8.2.2) and Salamis (8.42.2) the Spartan Eurybiades had the greatest authority, whereas Themistokles commanded the Athenian contingent on both occasions (8.4.2; 8.57.1). Pausanias was the supreme commander at Plataia (Diod. 11.29.4; Plut. *Arist.* 15.5), and Aristeides led the Athenians (Hdt. 9.28.6). At Mykale Leotychidas commanded the Greeks (8.131.2-3, 9.90.1) and Xanthippos the Athenian contingent (9.114.2). Pausanias commanded the Greeks at Cyprus and Byzantium (Thuc. 1.94.2), while Aristeides and Kimon commanded the Athenians (Diod. 11.44.2 [Aristeides]; Plut. *Arist.* 23.1 [Aristeides and Kimon], *Cim.* 6.1 [Kimon]). It must be admitted, however, that nothing in Herodotus' brief account of the expedition to Thessaly, the first action of the newly-formed league, suggests that Sparta's general had more authority on that occasion than his Athenian counterpart (7.173). On the relationship of the Spartan supreme command to the generals of the allied contingents see also Hammond (1969), pp. 134-135.

[6] According to Pausanias (3.12.6), the *probouloi* first met in Sparta. This evidence has been doubted (Hignett [1963], p. 98), but see Brunt (1953), p. 148 n. 2. In the spring of 480 the meeting was held at the Isthmus of Corinth.

[7] At the first congress the Greeks decided, among other things, to end whatever feuds were in progress among allied states (Hdt. 7.145.1). Plutarch reports that Themistokles was largely responsible for reconciling the Greeks before the invasion (*Them.* 6.5), which suggests that he participated in the first congress as an Athenian *proboulos*. But Herodotus makes no mention of Themistokles' involvement on this occasion, and Plutarch's evidence is not to be trusted: when discussing events of the Second Persian War in his lives of Themistokles and Aristeides, Plutarch repeatedly attributes to his subjects actions which Herodotus ascribes to the Athenians in general (see, for example, Plut. *Them.* 7.3-4 vs. Hdt. 8.3; Plut. *Arist.* 12.1-3 vs. Hdt. 9.26-27; Plut. *Arist.* 14.4-5 vs. Hdt. 9.21; Plut. *Arist.* 16.1-7 vs. Hdt. 9.46-47). On Plutarch's tendency

generals in a series of councils-of-war.[8] Herodotus provides conflicting evidence about the degree of authority which Sparta's commanders exercised at these meetings. According to that author Spartan generals acted autocratically on at least two occasions. First, after one of several councils during which the withdrawal of the fleet to the Isthmus was considered, the Spartan general Eurybiades reportedly decided on his own authority that the Greeks would remain at Salamis.[9] Later in the war, Leotychidas decided to honor a Samian embassy's request for help without first consulting the allied generals, to whom the Samians had also addressed their plea (9.90-91).[10] In several other instances, however, Herodotus' account suggests that decisions of the league were taken by majority vote (8.9, 49.1, 108.4-109.1), and it is reasonable to believe that this was the normal procedure. Sparta's commanders may at times have made decisions without their

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to exaggerate the role of his subjects cf. Stadter (1989), pp. xlix-l and n. 48, Hignett (1963), p. 21, and *HCT* I, p. 70 n. 2.

8 Certain and possible references to councils-of-war in Herodotus are: (1) 7.173.3. (2) 8.4-5. (Though Herodotus may here be describing private discussions that culminated in a council-of-war rather than a council-of-war itself.) (3) 8.9. (The historicity of this debate is in question. See Hignett [1963], p. 183, and HW II, p. 238. Lazenby [1993], p. 129, thinks the story plausible.) (4) 8.18. (This debate is also probably not historical; see Hignett [1963], p. 190, and cf. Lazenby [1993], p. 129.) (5) 8.19. (This may not be a true council-of-war, since no decision appears to have been taken. Note also that Themistokles summoned the meeting rather than the Spartan commander-in-chief.) (6) 8.49. (7) 8.56. (According to Herodotus, the events described at 8.49 and 8.56 were a part of the same council-of-war, but chronological difficulties suggest that he has conflated two meetings. See HW II, pp. 254 and 378.) (8) 8.58-63. (9) 8.71.2. (This was probably not a council-of-war of the Hellenic League *per se* since the decision was made by the Peloponnesians alone.) (10) 8.74-75.1, 78, 81-83. (11) 8.108.1. (12) 8.108, 111.1. (13) 8.132. (There is no specific reference to a council-of-war, but that a meeting was held is suggested by the passage.) (14) 9.50-51. (15) 9.86.1. (16) 9.90.2-91. (17) 9.98.1. (18) 9.106.2-4. (19) 9.114.2.

It is not clear whether the decision to defend Thermopylai and Artemision was made by the congress of the Greeks or a council-of-war, or both. When the defense of Thessaly was abandoned, the Greeks who had been sent north returned to the Isthmus of Corinth (7.173.3-4). Once arrived the commanders of the expedition (this is presumably what Herodotus means by οἱ Ἕλληνες at 7.175.1), Themistokles and the Spartan Euainetos (7.173.2), considered their options (7.175.1-2, 177). It is reasonable to believe that the generals deliberated in conjunction with the league's representatives. The *probouloi* had been meeting at the Isthmus before forces were sent to Thessaly (7.172.1), and they were probably still there when the troops returned: the expedition had been brief (7.173.2). Herodotus does not specify, however.

9 Herodotus is consistent in attributing responsibility for this decision to Eurybiades: during the preceding meeting Themistokles addressed the Spartan directly (8.60α, 62.1), as if he alone were competent to decide the issue, and subsequent criticism of the decision was directed at Eurybiades (8.74.2). Hignett (1963), p. 204, writes regarding this incident: "Herodotus is at least right in describing the decision as resting with Eurybiades alone, the function of the counsel being merely advisory." His confidence does not seem warranted.

10 Brunt (1953), p. 140, includes among references to Spartan autocracy the decision of Eurybiades to remain at Artemision (Hdt. 8.4-5), but this is not a good example. On that occasion Themistokles persuaded Eurybiades to stay at Artemision by bribing him, but once Eurybiades' compliance was bought Themistokles had also to overcome the opposition of the Corinthian Adeimantos. Eurybiades' decision was evidently not final. (The story may, at any rate, be apocryphal. See HW II, pp. 236-237.)

colleagues' consent, but they could not have habitually abused the goodwill of their allies, on whose continued cooperation the success of the league depended.[11] Moreover, any arrangement which did not provide for the equal representation of member states is unlikely to have won acceptance at the first meeting of the league's representatives.[12]

We might expect that the influence of Athens' generals over council decisions was, if formally equal to that of other league members, in practice somewhat greater: the military contribution of Athens to the coalition was considerable. Indeed, we are told that Themistokles was able, if only temporarily (8.74.2-75.1), to prevent the Greeks from withdrawing to the Isthmus by threatening them with Athens' desertion of the alliance (8.62.2-63; cf. 8.136, 140-144; 9.6, 11.1-2). But it is unlikely that the Athenians' military strength allowed them to control league policy as a rule. In order to influence the decisions of the coalition Athens' generals needed to gain the support of the majority of their allies. That task was made difficult by the membership in the league of numerous Peloponnesian states whose interests sometimes diverged from those of the Athenians and whose ties to Sparta in the Peloponnesian League made more likely their adherence to Spartan policy.[13] If Herodotus has preserved with any accuracy the tenor of the councils-of-war which preceded the battle of Salamis, we may believe that Themistokles failed repeatedly to convince a majority of his colleagues to fight at Salamis (8.49.2, 56, 75.1), a suggestion which the Peloponnesians opposed (8.75.1; cf. 8.59, 61.1).[14] On other occasions Athenian generals were able to influence league decisions,[15] but their unim-

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11 We are told that the Spartan Pausanias did mistreat his Greek allies in 478/7, but this abuse of power was not allowed to continue. Pausanias himself was recalled, and the allies' resentment of his behavior was a factor in the transference of their allegiance from Sparta to the Athenians (Thuc. 1.95; Diod. 11.44.5-6, 46.4-5; Plut. *Arist.* 23.1-5, *Cim.* 6.2-3; Nep. *Arist.* 2.3).

12 Brunt (1953), p. 140, assumes that decisions were taken by majority vote at the league congresses, since the same was true of decisions of the Peloponnesian League.

13 For a nearly complete list of those allies who fought the war see the inscription of the Serpent Column (ML 27 = *GHI* 19). The Peloponnesians were united in their judgment on several occasions: 8.75.1, 8.108.4, 9.106.3, 9.114.2. If they regularly voted as a bloc, it will have been difficult for Athens' generals to affect policy by argumentation. It is interesting that, according to Herodotus, Themistokles never succeeded in doing so. His successes resulted from bribery (8.4-5), intimidation (8.62.2-63), and artifice (8.76).

14 It is possible that the Peloponnesians' insistence on withdrawing to the Isthmus is exaggerated in Herodotus' account (HW II, pp. 380-381), but that they resisted fighting at Salamis is not implausible. See Lazenby (1993), pp. 157-162.

15 (1) Themistokles convinced the Greeks to remain longer at Artemision by bribing the Spartan and Corinthian generals (Hdt. 8.4-5). (2) The Peloponnesians in Samos yielded to the Athenians, whose spokesman was presumably the general Xanthippos, on the question of the Ionians' emigration to mainland Greece (9.106.3). (3) In a final council-of-war the Athenians decided to remain in the Hellespont and besiege Sestos while the Peloponnesians resolved to return home (9.114.2). This is not an example of the Athenians influencing league policy, however, since their decision did not affect the league as a whole.

pressive record of successes suggests nevertheless that Athens' military contribution to the league did not allow her generals to dictate league policy.[16]

2. *Other Allied Operations of the Fifth Century*

Most of the joint campaigns in which Athens was involved in the remainder of the fifth century are likely to have been operations of the Delian League, an alliance of states which was formed in 478/7 for the purpose of further prosecuting the war against Persia and which endured for the better part of the century. Athens was hegemon of the alliance (Thuc. 1.96.1, 97.1), and in that capacity she commanded the league's forces in war.[17] Because of this arrangement there was no occasion for diplomatic bickering over the leadership of campaigns undertaken by the league. But Athens was also party in the fifth century to extra-league alliances, and in those cases there will have been need for agreements regarding the leadership of joint operations if military actions were ever undertaken by the allies in common. Unfortunately, although we know that Athenian generals commanded in concert with non-Athenians on numerous occasions during the fifth century (see e.g., Thuc. 2.29.6, 4.36.1; cf. 2.95.3), there is to my knowledge information about the arrangements which the allies made in one instance only.

In 420 the Athenians allied with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis. Among the terms of their alliance were provisions regarding the leadership of joint campaigns. Two types of operations in which the participating states might become involved were distinguished in the allies' treaty, those in which one state was the principal belligerent and sought the assistance of one or more of the others, and those in which the allies undertook a campaign in common. In the former case leadership of the allied forces was to be entrusted to the state requesting help for as long as the war was conducted in its territory. (We are not told who would hold the supreme command of the allied forces if the fighting spread beyond the borders of the state which had requested help.) In the latter case, when hostilities were undertaken in common by the allies, the command was to be divided equally among them. (*GHI* 72 ll. 24-26 [= *IG* i^3 83]: ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡ μεταπεμψαμέ]νη τῆι σ | [τρατιᾶι χρήσθω ἡγεμονεύουσα, ὅταν ἐν τῆι αὐτῆς ὁ πόλεμος ἧι· ἐὰν δέ ποι δόχσηι ἁπάσα]ις ταῖς | [πόλεσιν κοινῆι στρατεύεσθαι,

[16] Cf. Hands (1965), p. 59: "...in insisting that Sparta should be leader by sea as well as by land they [the Peloponnesians] must surely have expected that the fact that Athens had made by far the major contribution to the confederate fleet would not be allowed to influence strategy unduly in her favour."

[17] Sources for the Delian League can be found in Index III of Hill (1951). On Athens' hegemony see also Larsen (1940), pp. 197-199.

τὸ ἴσον τῆς ἡγεμονίας μετεῖναι ἁπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν.)[18] It is not clear from the treaty how the equal division of command among the allied generals was to be effected, whether, that is, the generals would share the command simultaneously—and not entrust the supreme command to the leadership of any one contingent—or would rotate the hegemony among themselves. If the latter, we must remain ignorant of the principle according to which the command was to pass among the allies.[19]

Sources for Athens' agreement with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis in 420 provide our only information about the arrangements Athens made in the fifth century for the leadership of joint expeditions. It remains to consider, however, the implications of an incident which occurred in the winter of 426/5. In the summer of 426 the Athenian general Demosthenes met with a disastrous defeat in Aitolia and, fearing disciplinary action, chose to remain in the West rather than return to Athens at campaign's end (Thuc. 3.98.5). Demosthenes was sent for in the following winter by the Akarnanians, who asked him to be hegemon of their expedition in relief of Amphilochian Argos (3.105.3). He agreed and served alongside their generals in that capacity (3.107.2, 109.2). The Akarnanians also procured the support of twenty Athenian ships which were cruising off the Peloponnese under the command of Aristoteles and Hierophon (3.105.3).[20] We are told nothing about the status of these commanders vis-à-vis Demosthenes or the Akarnanian generals, nor do we hear anything further regarding their participation in the subsequent events of the campaign.[21]

[18] The text of the inscription is preserved, with some differences in form, at Thuc. 5.47. The allies can be seen dividing the command, evidently according to the terms of the alliance, at 5.67.2. In a battle around Tegea in the summer of 418 the Mantineians, we are told, held the right wing (and presumably the supreme command) because the fighting took place in Mantineian territory (οἱ δ' ἐναντίοι αὐτοῖς δεξιὸν μὲν κέρας Μαντινῆς εἶχον, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐκείνων τὸ ἔργον ἐγίγνετο...). This leadership arrangement corresponds to that prescribed by the terms of the alliance for occasions in which one ally has requested the support of another for a war in its own territory. The Mantineians, then, were perceived as having summoned the allies to their assistance, and this must be what their suggestion of Tegea as a target at 5.62.2 amounted to.

[19] Each ally might, for example, hold the command for a set period of time (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.14). It is unlikely, however, that the agreement called for the hegemony to be held by that ally in whose territory the war was currently being waged. This means of dividing the command was *essentially* what was to be employed when a campaign was undertaken as the result of one of the allies requesting help from the others (though admittedly we are only told who held the command when the fighting occurred in the territory of the state requesting help). The language of the alliance suggests that in the event of an expedition undertaken by the allies in common the command was to be divided by some means other than that used when one ally initiated a joint campaign.

[20] The two may have been either navarchs or *strategoi*. They are accepted as *strategoi* by Davies (1981), p. 159; Fornara (1971), p. 58; Krause (1914), pp. 9 and 37; and Beloch (1884), p. 291. See, however, *AO* p. 127 and Jordan (1975), pp. 128-129.

[21] We are told, however, of actions of the Athenian fleet (3.112.7). The involvement of Aristoteles and Hierophon in the Akarnanians' campaign appears to have been minimal. They

That the Akarnanians, allies of Athens, made an arrangement with Demosthenes rather than the Athenian *demos* regarding the leadership of an expedition they undertook with Athenian assistance may have important implications for the present discussion, but unfortunately we cannot draw any definitive conclusions from the incident. There is some question about what Demosthenes' status was when he acceded to the Akarnanians' request. The question depends primarily on whether he had been elected to the *strategia* for 427/6 or 426/5 (or for both years); his activities in Aitolia in the summer of 426 may have been the work of either year. If Demosthenes was general for 427/6 only, his *strategia* will have expired by the winter of 426/5,[22] and there would be no question but that he undertook service with the Akarnanians in a private capacity. If, on the other hand, Demosthenes had been elected to the *strategia* for 426/5, and had not been deposed by the Athenian *demos* after the Aitolian debacle,[23] he will still have been an Athenian general in the winter of that year. Yet I would argue that if Demosthenes was a *strategos* he was nonetheless not acting in that capacity when he served as hegemon in Argos, since he evidently had withdrawn from active service of his own volition after the defeat in Aitolia. Whatever the official status of Demosthenes in the winter of 426/5, therefore, the Akarnanians' agreement with him regarding the leadership of their campaign cannot be taken as evidence that Athenian generals negotiated questions of leadership with allies when in the field. Having said as much, however, I would ask how the arrangement which the Akarnanians made with Demosthenes would have differed had he been acting in the capacity of an Athenian general. Might not the Akarnanians in that case also have arranged for him to act as hegemon without first negotiating with the Athenian *demos* regarding his status in the allied army? Or was the relationship to be assumed by Athenian and allied generals under such circumstances always prescribed in advance by the terms of their states' alliance, or by convention, such that there was no need for generals in the field to address questions of this kind? We should like to know whether Athens' generals were ever required when abroad to haggle over rank with the allied command. Unfortunately, the evidence available to us does not permit so close a reconstruction of the relationship between Athenian generals and their non-Athenian colleagues.

provided support by sea (3.112.7) and probably lent *epibatai* to the Akarnanians for the land campaign (3.107.4), but the two commanders themselves need not have left their ships.

22 So Hornblower (1991), p. 516; *AO* p. 125; Fornara (1971), p. 57; Sealey (1967), p. 104; Treu (1956), p. 427; Pritchett (1940), p. 472; Adcock, *CAH* V, p. 228.

23 Lewis (1961), p. 120, argues that Demosthenes served as general in 426/5 and was deposed after his defeat (cf. Mattingly [1966], p. 174). Gomme, *HCT ad* 3.105.3, 107.1, believes he was still in office in the winter of 426.

3. *Fourth-Century Leagues and Alliances*

In the course of the fourth century Athens was party to a number of alliances of Greek states. Our sources do not always provide detailed information about the agreements which were concluded by the allies. But in a number of instances we are told specifically of decisions made regarding the leadership of joint campaigns, and less direct information is sometimes provided which hints at the relationship among allied commanders.

A number of states, chief among them Athens, Boiotia, Corinth, and Argos, allied against Sparta in 395/4 and fought a series of campaigns over the next several years in the vicinity of Corinth. We are told by Diodorus (14.82.2) that decisions regarding the allies' conduct of the war were made by representatives of the confederate states, who met at Corinth in a *koinon synedrion* (διῴκουν τὰ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον). Xenophon makes no mention of this council but reports that the enemies of Lakedaimon met—we are not told where—and discussed, among other particulars related to the conduct of the war, the leadership of the confederate army (*Hell.* 4.2.11-13: περὶ ἡγεμονίας τε διεπράττοντο). Taken by itself Xenophon's account might suggest that the allied leadership was under consideration by the generals themselves[24]—nothing in his narrative precludes the possibility[25]—but it seems more likely given what we are told by Diodorus that negotiations were undertaken rather by the allies' representatives in Corinth. What they decided about the leadership is suggested by Xenophon's account of the Battle of Nemea. Prior to the commencement of that battle, we are told, the right wing of the allied army was held at one time by the Athenians and at another by the Boiotians. Once the Boiotians assumed that position they ordered the allies to prepare for battle (*Hell.* 4.2.18), a display of authority on their part which suggests that they had assumed command of the confederate army. It is reasonable to believe, given the Boiotians' behavior, that a contingent's placement on the army's right wing at Nemea implied its leaders' assumption of the supreme command of the allied forces. The rotation of that position among the allies[26] suggests in turn that during this campaign

24 So Mosley (1971), p. 509.

25 Xenophon tells us that those who were negotiating about the leadership of the army also discussed what the depth of the allied phalanx should be. It may seem improbable that such a detail, which one might think would be determined in part by the circumstances of a particular battle, would be discussed far from the battlefield by non-generals. But whether we attribute these discussions to the allied generals or the representatives in Corinth, Xenophon's account suggests that the depth of the phalanx was discussed before the allies ever reached Nemea (*Hell.* 4.2.13-14). (In the event the Boiotians disregarded the sixteen-rank formation that was agreed upon [4.2.18].) Distance from the battlefield, therefore, is not a valid objection to the suggestion that the phalanx depth (as well as other matters being negotiated) was under consideration by the *synedrion*.

command of the confederate forces was rotated among the allies, the general(s) of each contingent probably assuming leadership for a pre-determined period of time.[27]

In 378/7 the Athenians founded a league of states, the Second Athenian Confederacy, whose purpose was to prevent the Lakedaimonians from suppressing the freedom and autonomy of the league members (*IG* ii^2 43.9-11; Diod. 15.28.3-4) and which remained in existence until it was dissolved by Philip of Macedon after the Battle of Chaironeia in 338/7 (Paus. 1.25.3). Representatives of the allied states met in a *koinon synedrion* in Athens (Diod. 15.28.4), and decisions of the league were made jointly by the *synedrion* and the Athenian *ekklesia*.[28] Our sources provide conflicting evidence regarding provisions made for the leadership of league campaigns. We are told by Diodorus that the Athenians were the recognized *hegemones* of the league (15.28.4: ἡγεμόσι χρωμένας Ἀθηναίοις), which suggests that allied operations were conducted under the leadership of Athenian generals alone.[29] But both Athenian *strategoi* and Theban *boeotarchoi* are known to have commanded forces in Boiotia between 378 and 375 (Plut. *Pel.* 16-17; Polyaen. 2.1.2).[30] This may mean that Athenian leadership of league operations was not demanded by the "constitution" of the league, or that Athenians were on other occasions also joined in the command of league campaigns by non-Athenians. I suspect, however, given Athens' status as hegemon of the Confederacy, that the joint leadership of Boiotia and Athens during the Boiotian War was exceptional and reflects the arrange-

[26] Xenophon tells us only that the right wing was held alternately by the Athenians and Boiotians, but it is likely enough that that position was held as well by, at least, the Corinthian and Argive contingents.

[27] Hammond (1986), p. 457, suggests that the command passed daily from one contingent to another. Cf. (1969), p. 124.

[28] On the relationship of the *synedrion* and the *ekklesia*, see Cargill (1981), pp. 115-128.

[29] The usual assumption seems to be that Athenian generals commanded all league campaigns (so, e.g., Cargill [1981], p. 78 and n. 33 and pp. 128 and 191; Beloch *GG* III.1, p. 150; cf. Hammond [1986], p. 487), but Diod. 15.28.4 is the only piece of evidence I know of which suggests as much directly. The charter of the confederacy (*IG* ii^2 43, Cargill [1981], pp. 16-47) and the league membership alliances for which there is epigraphical evidence contain no provisions concerning the military command of league operations (*IG* ii^2 35 [Chios? see Cargill, p. 52; *SV* 248], 40? [Thebes; see Cargill, pp. 52-56, 60; *SV* 255], 41 [Byzantium; *SV* 256], 42 [Methymna; *SV* 258], 44 [Chalkis; *SV* 259], 96 [Corcyra, Akarnania, Kephallenia; this multiple alliance seems to have been aborted, however, since only Pronnoi on Kephallenia appears in the list of league members preserved on *IG* ii^2 43: see Cargill, pp. 68-74; *SV* 262], and 404 [the cities of Keos]).

[30] On the re-establishment of the *boiotarchia* after the liberation of Thebes in 379/8 see Buckler (1979). There is to my knowledge no evidence for the participation of non-Athenian generals in other league campaigns. Non-Athenians did serve as subordinate military officials, however: [Dem.] 49.48 refers to Boiotian navarchs and trierarchs serving under Timotheos.

ment agreed upon by those powers at the time—whatever its terms may have been—rather than league practice in general.[31]

In the years after 375/4 Athens and the league together made alliances with a number of Greek *poleis* and confederations of *poleis*. Among these Cargill (1981), pp. 68-82, numbers Corcyra (374/3); Kephallenia (373 or 372); Leukas (possibly; late 370's); the Peloponnesian League (369/8); Prokonnesos (possibly; 364-362); Arkadia, Achaia, Elis, and Phleious (362/1); the Thessalian League (361/0); Chalkis (c. 341); and Eretria (c. 341).[32] Athens and her league also allied with Philip of Macedon in 346/5. We have specific information about the provisions that were made regarding the leadership of joint operations in the case of two of the alliances listed above. The Peloponnesians and Athenians agreed in 369/8 that in the case of expeditions undertaken conjointly by their respective leagues, leadership by both land and sea would be shared by the Spartans and Athenians, each holding the command in turn for five days at a time.[33] This decision was made by the Athenian *ekklesia* and by Peloponnesian ambassadors who had been sent to Athens with plenipotentiary authority to negotiate the terms of the alliance (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.1, 14). In 362/1 Athens and the league allied with Arkadia, Achaia, Elis, and Phleious. Among the terms of the agreement adopted by the allies' governments was the provision that in the case of joint expeditions each state would enjoy leadership while within its own territory (*IG* ii^2 112.34-35: [ἡγεμονίαν δὲ ἔχειν ἐ] | ν τῆι αὑτῶν ἑκά[στους...).[34] The same agreement had been reached in 363/2 by a slightly different combination of states—Athens, Arkadia, Achaia, Elis, and Sparta—before they together fought the Boiotians and their allies at the Battle of Mantineia (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.3: περὶ μέντοι ἡγεμονίας αὐτόθεν διεπράττοντο ὅπως ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἕκαστοι ἡγήσοιντο).[35] In this earlier instance as well the decision regarding the leadership of the campaign

[31] Cf. Hammond (1986), p. 487: "In one case, which may have been a unique exception to the general rule, the supreme command on land was not held by Athens; for in 377-375 Thebes evidently commanded the operations in Boeotia."

[32] Cargill, pp. 57-60, argues that there was also a brief alliance between Thebes and the league before Thebes became a league member after the raid of Sphodrias in 378 (see *SV* 254 and 255 [and add Diod. 15.28.5]).

[33] Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.12-14; cf. Diod. 15.67.1, Ael. Arist. 1.301 Behr. We are in fact told by Xenophon only that the Athenians adopted the proposal, but that he does not refer to Peloponnesian opposition to the arrangement suggests that it was accepted as well by the Peloponnesian ambassadors in Athens. Before this arrangement was adopted the Athenian *boule* had proposed (and the proposal was seconded by a certain Prokles of Phleious) that in the case of joint operations the Athenians have leadership by sea and the Spartans leadership by land (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.2-11).

[34] The inscription is admittedly largely reconstructed at this point, but the reading is not unlikely, particularly given the information provided at Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.3.

[35] See the discussion at *GHI* 144 for evidence that the Battle of Mantineia preceded the alliance of 362/1.

was made by the governments of the participating states rather than by their generals.[36]

We may conclude in addition a very little bit about the 346/5 alliance of Philip and the Athenian league. Some time after the alliance had been ratified, Philip sent two letters to the Athenians asking that they send troops to his aid (Dem. 19.51-52; Aeschin. 2.137). In the event the forces were not dispatched, but Demosthenes suggests that *had* they been they might have been sent under the command of Athens' general Proxenos (19.52). We may assume that this scenario would have been consistent with the terms of the alliance between Philip and the league, and that in the case of operations conducted jointly by the allies, Athenian *strategoi* would join Philip in the military command.

In the late 340's and early 330's the Athenians were successful in uniting a number of Greek *poleis* in an anti-Macedonian coalition. Among the states whose support the Athenians won were Achaia, Arkadia, Argos, Messenia, and Megalopolis, which became allies of Athens in 343/2 (*IG* ii^2 225; schol. Aeschin. 3.83; cf. Dem. 9.72; Plut. *Dem.* 27.3-4; [Plut.] *Mor.* 841e, 851b), and Akarnania, with whom the Athenians reached an agreement in 341/0 (Aeschin. 3.97-98, cf. 3.256). In 339/8, in the wake of Philip's seizure of Elateia, the Athenians also sought and procured an alliance with Boiotia (Dem. 18.168-179; Aeschin. 3.140; Diod. 16.84-85.2). Other Greeks joined Athens in her opposition to Macedon, but we are told only in the case of these states what arrangements were made with regard to the leadership of allied forces. In negotiations with Athenian ambassadors, among them Demosthenes, Athens' Peloponnesian and Akarnanian allies agreed in 341/0 to contribute to the Greek cause more than 2000 hoplites a piece and to surrender control of these forces to the Athenians (Aeschin. 3.98). A more complicated arrangement, also negotiated by Athenian ambassadors, was reached with Boiotia in 339/8. Leadership by sea was to be shared by the Athenians and Boiotians,[37] but it was evidently agreed either that leadership by land would be given to the Thebans outright or that it would be entrusted to that ally in whose territory the war was currently being waged.[38] In either case, since the fighting occurred in Boiotian territory,

[36] Xenophon tells us this agreement was reached "at once" (αὐτόθεν), evidently immediately after the Athenians and Lakedaimonians agreed to send help (7.5.3) and before the Athenian forces combined with their allies (7.5.6-7). It is therefore unlikely that the decision was made in the field by the allied generals.

[37] Aeschin. 3.143: ...τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τὴν μὲν κατὰ θάλατταν ἐποίησε (Demosthenes) κοινήν.... We are not told whether the leadership by sea was to be held by the allies simultaneously or in turn.

[38] Aeschin. 3.143; cf. 3.106, 145; for the embassy see: Dem. 18.178-187, 211-215, 221, 237, 244; Aeschin. 3.256; Din. 1.16, 24; Diod. 16.85.1. Aeschines' language at 3.143 suggests that the Athenians did not simply surrender leadership by land to the Boiotians: Demosthenes, he says, τὴν δὲ κατὰ γῆν, εἰ μὴ δεῖ ληρεῖν, ἄρδην φέρων ἀνέθηκε Θηβαίοις...

the Boiotians will have held the leadership in the event entirely to the exclusion of the Athenians.

After the death of Alexander in 323 the Athenians once again organized an anti-Macedonian coalition of Greek states. Pausanias reports that each contingent of the allied army was commanded by its own general, but that the Athenian *strategos* Leosthenes (son of Leosthenes) was elected as supreme commander of the confederate forces (1.25.5).[39] We are not told by whom Leosthenes was appointed, but there is evidence that a *koinon synedrion* was established in connection with the war, and it is likely that decisions regarding the allied leadership were made by the delegates to this council.[40] When Leosthenes died in battle the Athenians replaced him with Antiphilos, who likewise enjoyed a position of superior authority in the Greek army: Diodorus describes him as *strategos* of the Greeks rather than of the Athenian contingent alone (18.15.7). Antiphilos, however, shared his authority at the least with a certain Menon of Thessaly, who commanded the allied cavalry (Diod. 18.15.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 25.5). The two are described by Diodorus as *hegemones* of the Greeks, and it is they, we are told, who together decided to treat for peace after the allied defeat at Krannon (18.7.6). If Pausanias and Diodorus have preserved historically accurate information regarding the leadership of the Greeks during the Lamian War, we must believe that changes were made in the command structure of the Greek army after the death of Leosthenes, at least insofar as two generals were elected to the position previously held by Leosthenes alone.

("entrusted the leadership by land utterly to the Thebans, if we are not to talk nonsense..."). If the leadership was given outright to the Thebans, why did Aeschines qualify his remark with the phrase εἰ μὴ δεῖ ληρεῖν? Perhaps instead it was agreed that leadership by land would be held by that party in whose territory the campaign was conducted, an arrangement which amounted to the Athenians' surrender of command to the Boiotians. Cf. Harris (1995), p. 131: "The terms of the treaty called for Athens...to yield command [by land] of the allied army entirely to the Thebans. Despite Aeschines' criticisms, this was probably a necessary concession since the campaign against Philip took place in territory under Theban control. It was customary in Greek alliances for the allied army, when in the territory of one of the allies, to obey the generals from that state." See Mosley (1971) for discussion of the rationale behind Athens' concessions to Thebes on this occasion.

[39] Diodorus only hints at the relationship which obtained between Leosthenes and the other Greek generals. He reports that at one point during the war the Aitolian contingent returned home having first asked Leosthenes for permission to do so (18.13.4: ἀξιώσαντες τὸν Λεωσθένην). This suggests that at the least Leosthenes had some authority over the Aitolians in the army, but that he did may not have any bearing on his relationship with the allied generals: Diod. 18.9.5 suggests that the Aitolians contributed troops but no commander to the Greek cause.

[40] An inscription dated to 306/5, *IG* ii^2 467, honors a certain Timosthenes of Karystos, who is referred to as a *synedros*. The probable context of Timosthenes' service in that capacity is the Lamian War. See Niese (1893), p. 204 and n. 2, and cf. Parke (1933), p. 205.

4. *Summary*

Much regarding the relationship of Athens' generals to allied commanders must remain in the dark. What can be said in answer to the questions introduced at the beginning of this chapter is that when we have clear information about the status of Athens' *strategoi* vis-à-vis their allied colleagues, it is not the generals themselves who negotiate the terms of that relationship, but rather the Athenian *ekklesia* or elected representatives of Athens other than the *strategoi.* Different agreements regarding the status of allied generals were reached: the supreme command of an allied army might be entrusted for the duration of a campaign to one state (as during the Second Persian War) or rotated among the allies (as was agreed in the alliance of Athens, Arkadia, Achaia, Elis, and Phleious in 362/1). Certainly Athens' generals did not always exercise supreme leadership of the campaigns with which they were involved, but we can say little about the degree to which Athenian generals forfeited control when they were subordinated to the command of an allied general. We know that when Athens' generals served under the hegemony of the Spartans during the Second Persian War the Athenians could yet exercise influence over the prosecution of the war through their participation in allied councils. But the influence of Athens' generals over the decisions of the allies was limited. Their considerable military contribution to the undertaking did not allow the Athenians to dictate league policy. I know of only one other piece of evidence which bears directly on the question of the subordination of Athens' *strategoi* to the command of allied generals: in his speech *Against Ctesiphon* Aeschines complains that because the Athenians had surrendered leadership by land to the Boiotians in 339/8, the Athenian general Stratokles was unable to provide for the safety of his army in the ensuing campaign (3.143: ...παρὰ τὸν γενόμενον πόλεμον μὴ κύριον γενέσθαι Στρατοκλέα τὸν ὑμέτερον στρατηγὸν βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῆς τῶν στρατιωτῶν σωτηρίας). When involved in joint operations generals remained in control of their state's forces, and I suppose they retained ultimate control over what became of their army insofar as they might always withdraw their troops from a campaign (as the Eleians did in 418 [Thuc. 5.62.2] and as the Athenians threatened to do in 480 [Hdt. 8.62.2-63]). But that option was not always practicable, and the experiences of Athens' generals in the Persian War and of Stratokles in 338/7 suggest that whatever the strength of Athens' military contribution to a particular undertaking, Athenian generals were deprived of some freedom of action whenever they were part of an allied expedition over which they did not exercise supreme, sole command.

PART FOUR

STRATEGOI AND THE *DEMOS*

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE *DEMOS* AND GENERALS IN THE FIELD

The preceding chapters have touched repeatedly on the influence of Athens' citizens over their generals' conduct both in Athens and in the field. I have suggested, for example, that generals were constrained in exercising what authority they possessed over the convening of *ekklesiai* by the consideration that their abuse of that power might provoke hostility among their fellow citizens (ch. 1 § 1.1); that generals regularly operated in accord with the instructions of the *demos* when disposing of their prisoners of war (ch. 2 § 3.1); that the relationship which Athens' *strategoi* enjoyed with allied commanders was defined not by the generals themselves but by the Athenian *ekklesia* or its representatives (ch. 6). I address this same issue more directly in the present chapter. The authority which Athens' generals might exercise when in the field was limited both directly and indirectly by a *demos* that was jealous of its own authority and wary of entrusting undue influence to any of its constituent members. I consider below the tools which the Athenians employed in thus supervising the actions of their most powerful elected officials.

1. *Campaign Instructions and Mid-Campaign Communication*

Our evidence indicates that the Athenian *ekklesia* involved itself closely in its generals' conduct of military expeditions, both by providing *strategoi* with explicit instructions prior to their departure from Athens,[1] and by re-

[1] Thuc. 1.45.3 with 1.49.4 (433/2); Thuc. 1.57.6, Diod. 12.34.3 (433/2); Diod. 12.44.1 (431/0; that instructions were given the generals is only implicit, however, at Thuc. 2.26.1); Thuc. 2.85.5 and cf. 2.85.6 (429/8; the commander here referred to periphrastically may not have been a general, though Gomme at *HCT ad loc.* suggests that he was and that Thucydides suppressed his name for personal or political reasons); Thuc. 3.3.3 with 3.4.1 (428/7); Thuc. 3.86.4 (427/6); Diod. 12.65.1 (426/5; Thucydides, however, does not refer to the assembly's instructions at 3.91.2); Thuc. 4.2.3 (425/4); Diod. 12.81.2 (417/16; but Thuc. 5.84.1 does not refer to the instructions of the *demos*); Thuc. 6.8.2 (416/15; cf. 6.47, 7.11.2); Thuc. 7.20.1 (414/13); Thuc. 7.20.2 (414/13); Thuc. 7.29.1 (414/13); Dem. 15.9 (367/6). In addition to the above explicit references in our sources to the assembly's directives there are a number of passages in which the fact of instructions having been issued seems to be implied: Thuc. 2.69.1 (430/29); Thuc. 3.86.4 (427/6); Thuc. 8.9.2 (413/12).

At 13.2.6 and 13.30.3 Diodorus reports that the *boule* and the generals of the Sicilian expedition together made decisions regarding the fate of their prospective captives prior to the

ceiving intelligence from the field[2] and issuing additional instructions to its generals in mid-campaign.[3] The large number of references in our sources to both sorts of involvement by the assembly and the chronological distribution of the incidents referred to suggest that the direct and continued in-

departure of the fleet from Athens in 416/15. The story, doubted by Rhodes (1972), p. 41, does not appear in Thucydides and may not be true.

Hansen (*Eisangelia* no. 90) suggests that the decree to which Demosthenes refers at 23.104 contained instructions given to Autokles prior to his departure to Thrace in 362/1. Tritle (1988), pp. 71-72, argues that *IG* ii^2 207.19 preserves a fragment of the instructions which were issued to the generals Chares, Charidemos, and Phokion prior to a campaign in (perhaps) 349/8: δι]ακωλύοντας τὸμ πόλεμον πολεμε[ῖσ]θα[ι. (The date of the campaign is uncertain. For bibliography see *AO* p. 291 and Tritle [1988], p. 183 n. 97.)

For related discussion see ch. 2 §§ 1, 3.1, and 3.2. See also *GSW* II, pp. 43-45, for examples of instructions given to Spartan and Athenian commanders before their departure on campaigns.

2 Evidence for mid-campaign communication between Athens' generals and their home government: Thuc. 2.85.4 (429/8); Moer. fr. 213 (= Eup. fr. 308), Luc. *Pr. Laps*. 3, schol. Ar. *Plut*. 322 (425/4); Thuc. 7.8.1-2, 7.10-15, 7.11.1 (414/13; cf. Diod. 13.8.6, Plut. *Nic*. 19.10, Luc. *Pr. Laps*. 3); Xen. *Hell*. 1.7.4, 17 (406/5); [Dem.] 49.13(?) (373/2; it is not clear whether τῶν ἀφικνουμένων ἀπὸ στρατεύματος ἀπαγγελλόντων ἐν τῷ δήμῳ refers to official messengers sent to Athens from the field); Dem. 23.151 (c. 365/4); Diod. 16.21.4, Nep. *Tim*. 3.4 (356/5); *IG* ii^2 110.6-7 (363/2); *IG* ii^2 127.17 (356/5); Dem. 23.183 (354/3); *IG* ii^2 187.6-7 (before 353/2; relevant section fragmentary); *IG* ii^2 213.6-9 (347/6); Aeschin. 2.134 (347/6); Aeschin. 2.90 (347/6); *IG* ii^2 408.6-8 (c. 330; relevant section fragmentary); Lycurg. fr. 105 (c. 338; Lysikles [*AO* no. 1857] is said to have communicated with the *boule*, not the *ekklesia*); Plut. *Phoc*. 23.7 (323/2); Dem. *Ep*. 6.1 (323/2; Antiphilos communicates with the *synedroi* of the allies rather than the Athenian *ekklesia*); Plut. *Arat*. 16.3 (date?). It is not clear whether Isoc. 7.81 refers to intelligence received from the generals in mid-campaign. That there was communication between generals and the *ekklesia* is elsewhere implied: Thuc. 1.64.2 (432/1); 3.18.3 (428/7); 4.27.1 (425/4).

At Thuc. 4.30.4 we hear that Kleon communicated with Demosthenes after being appointed to the command in Pylos in 425/4. It is not clear whether a reference at 4.29.2 to information received by Kleon regarding Demosthenes' plans in Pylos is likewise evidence of private communication between the two. Kleon may have learned of Demosthenes' intentions rather when the situation in Pylos was discussed at an assembly meeting.

The author of [Plut.] *Mor*. 837c reports that Isocrates accompanied Timotheos on some unspecified number of campaigns and composed that general's dispatches to Athens.

Aeschin. 2.73 provides interesting indirect evidence that it was usual for the *ekklesia* to be in regular communication with its generals. In 347/6, we are told, the assembly resolved to send a certain Antiochos to locate the general Chares, with whom the Athenians had lost contact. The tone of the passage suggests that the assembly's ignorance of its general's whereabouts was highly irregular.

For discussion of the mid-campaign communication between Spartan and Athenian *hegemones* and their respective home governments see also *GSW* II, pp. 45-56. On the written communication of generals with the Athenian *demos* see Lewis (1996), pp. 149-152. See also Hornblower (1987), pp. 39-40.

3 Thuc. 3.36.3 (428/7; see also ch. 2 n. 49, where I argue that in sending some 1000 Mytileneans to Athens for punishment [3.35.1] Paches was following the instructions of the *ekklesia*); Xen. *Hell*. 6.2.2 (375/4); Xen. *Hell*. 6.4.1 (372/1); Xen. *Hell*. 7.4.1 (366/5). That the *ekklesia* issued instructions to its generals is implicit at Diod. 14.92.2 (390/89; on Iphikrates' generalship in that year see *AO* p. 211).

volvement of the *ekklesia* in military campaigns was a regular feature of Athenian warfare beginning from at least the last third of the fifth century.[4]

There is no need to discuss in detail here the many references in our sources to the instructions which the *ekklesia* issued to its generals. It is sufficient to make two observations. First, the instructions of the assembly, sometimes very broad definitions of the objectives of a campaign (e.g., Thuc. 4.2.3, 7.29.1), were at other times detailed and specific. The circumstances under which Lakedaimonios, Diotimos (son of Strombichos), and Proteas were authorized to engage the Corinthians in 433/2, for example, were defined precisely by the *ekklesia* prior to the generals' departure from Athens (1.45.3). In 428/7 Kleippides and his colleagues were instructed to make particular demands of Mytilene in the event that a first assault on that city proved ineffectual (3.3.3). The Athenian *ekklesia*, such examples suggest, did not merely provide its generals with manpower and a place to deploy it. It could and, at least sometimes, did concern itself with the particulars of its generals' expeditions.[5] Second, the directives of the *ekklesia* were not without effect: the careful attention which Lakedaimonios and his colleagues gave when in the field to following the instructions with which they had been dispatched to Corcyra in 433/2[6] suggests that generals did not lightly disregard the orders of their home government.[7]

4 Cf. Fornara (1971), p. 38: "In any event, the Athenians avoided the possibility, more dangerous even than irrational censure of individuals, of becoming the servants and not the masters of their elected leaders. For the sake of its own preservation the Demos exerted stern control over its strategoi and exercised its sovereign authority not merely in the general formulation of policy but in the detailed supervision of that policy's execution." For a different view see Hornblower (1983), pp. 120-121, who emphasizes rather the freedom of action enjoyed by generals in the field and who views the *strategia* as a restraint on the authority of the *ekklesia*.

5 Fornara (1971), p. 37 n. 34, makes a sensible observation regarding the implications of the Athenians' appointment of *strategoi autokratores* in 416/15: "The precision of the instructions given Lacedaemonius, Diotimus, and Proteas (1, 45.3) in 433 undoubtedly was exceptional. But the need for the unusual step to create στρατηγοὶ αὐτοκράτορες for the Sicilian campaign implies that ordinarily there was tight definition of the tasks assigned to strategoi." On *strategoi autokratores* see appendix 13.

6 Thuc. 1.49.4: ...μάχης δὲ οὐκ ἦρχον δεδιότες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν πρόρρησιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων. Cf. 1.53.4: the Athenians are made to paraphrase in their response to the Corinthians the directions they had been given by the *ekklesia* (1.45.3).

7 The generals who were dispatched to Sicily in 416/15 were sent out, we are told, "as allies to the Egestaians against the Selinountines, and, if they had the advantage in the war, to resettle the Leontinians, and with respect to other matters in Sicily to do whatever they thought best for Athens" (Thuc. 6.8.2: ...βοηθοὺς μὲν Ἐγεσταίοις πρὸς Σελινουντίους, ξυγκατοικίσαι δὲ καὶ Λεοντίνους, ἤν τι περιγίγνηται αὐτοῖς τοῦ πολέμου, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πρᾶξαι ὅπῃ ἂν γιγνώσκωσιν ἄριστα Ἀθηναίοις). Hornblower (1983), p. 121, observes that at Thuc. 6.47-49 the generals debate strategy "as if all the options are wide open. Only Nikias mentions their specific brief from the People to proceed against Selinous [6.47.1: καὶ Νικίου μὲν ἦν γνώμη πλεῖν ἐπὶ Σελινοῦντα πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ, ἐφ' ὅπερ μάλιστα ἐπέμφθησαν...], and his views do not prevail." Hornblower himself notes that there is a discrepancy in Thucydides' account, since we are told at 7.11.2 that the generals were sent not against Selinous primarily but against Syracuse (Συρακοσίους ἐφ' οὓς ἐπέμφθημεν; cf.

2. *The Threat of Disciplinary Action*

2.1. *Fear of Punishment*

Principal among the reasons generals had for following the instructions with which they were dispatched to the field was, I suggest, their fear of the disciplinary action which threatened to attend their noncompliance with the assembly's expectations. Lakedaimonios and his colleagues, who gave such careful attention to the orders of the *ekklesia* during the battle of Sybota in 433/2, did so, we are told, out of fear (Thuc. 1.49.4: δεδιότες). They were wise to be thus circumspect, for the risk from prosecution which generals faced was considerable (see ch. 8). Other incidents recorded by our sources likewise suggest that the behavior of generals in the field was sometimes motivated by their appreciation of their fellow citizens' penchant for punishing failed magistrates. Demosthenes elected not to return to Athens after his defeat in Aitolia in 427/6 because, Thucydides reports, he was afraid of the Athenians on account of what had happened (3.98.5: Δημοσθένης δὲ περὶ Ναύπακτον καὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα ὑπελείφθη, τοῖς πεπραγμένοις φοβούμενος τοὺς 'Αθηναίους). Nikias, arguing against his colleagues' proposal to withdraw from Syracuse after the defeat at Epipolai in 413/12, cited as a reason to remain the possibility that the Athenians would disapprove of their decision and would prosecute and condemn the generals upon their return to Athens (7.48.4-5; cf. ch. 5 § 2.2 no. 3).[8] Chabrias, finally, is said by Diodorus to have refrained from pursuing the remnants of a defeated Spartan fleet after the battle of Naxos in 376/5 because he was mindful of what had befallen Athens' generals after their victory at Arginousai some thirty years earlier. Prompted by his fear of a similar fate, Chabrias elected to attend to his shipwrecked and dead, as the Arginousai generals had not, rather than follow up his victory (15.35.1).[9]

HCT ad loc.). Apart from this consideration, however, I would argue that the behavior of the generals in Sicily to which Hornblower refers would not fairly be described as disregard for the orders of the *ekklesia*. Of the three proposals offered, Nikias' plan to effect a settlement between Selinous and Egesta at once (6.47) admittedly addressed the primary interest of the *ekklesia* (as stated by Thucydides at 6.8.2) most directly. But Alkibiades' suggestion that the Athenians acquire allies in Sicily before attacking Selinous was by no means a departure from the instructions of the *demos* (6.48), and the strategy Lamachos proposed, to attack Syracuse immediately, did not necessarily preclude subsequent action against Selinous (6.49). The generals, it seems to me, were considering at 6.47-49 how best to carry out the orders of their home government, not whether or not to do so.

[8] The generals' fear of prosecution is not, however, cited by Thucydides as a reason for their remaining at Syracuse (7.49.4). For the text of 7.48.4 see ch. 7 n. 16.

[9] For a similar discussion see *GSW* II, pp. 31-32. Diodorus reports (12.46.3-4) that despite Athenian losses from the plague and the despondency of his troops Hagnon continued the Athenian siege of Poteidaia while he was stationed there in 431/0 and 430/29 because he was afraid to do otherwise (...ἐφοβεῖτο λῦσαι τὴν πολιορκίαν· διόπερ ἠναγκάζετο διακαρτερεῖν...). This detail is not substantiated by Thucydides, however (2.58).

2.2. *Witnesses for the Prosecution: Colleagues and Subordinates as Potential Threats*

Making the threat of disciplinary action a somewhat more immediate concern for generals on campaign was the fact that they were surrounded on all sides by potential witnesses for the prosecution in the person of their colleagues in the *strategia* and their subordinates. Military officers and citizen troops were witness to the actions of generals on campaign and might, in their capacity as constituent members of the Athenian *demos*, testify against or themselves prosecute their former colleagues or commanders upon their return to Athens.[10] A number of such incidents are recorded in our sources. In 406/5 the trierarchs Theramenes and Thrasyboulos (of Steiria) gave testimony against the generals under whom they had served at Arginousai (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.4, 6, 31; 2.3.32, 35; ch. 8 excursus, nos. 23-30).[11] Adeimantos was prosecuted by Konon in 393/2 in connection with their shared command at Aigospotami in 405/4 (Dem. 19.191; ch. 8 excursus, no. 33). In 360/59 the trierarch Apollodoros brought accusations against Autokles, Menon, and Timomachos, generals under whom he had served successively in Thrace in 362/1 and 361/0 (Dem. 36.53, for Timomachos cf. [Dem.] 50.46-52; ch. 8 excursus, nos. 48, 49, and 51). Demosthenes, a trierarch serving under the command of Kephisodotos (of Acharnai) in 360/59, is said by Aeschines to have acted subsequently as one of that general's accusers (3.51-52; ch. 8 excursus, no. 54).[12] Charges made by Chares against his colleagues Iphikrates and Timotheos after the battle of Embata in 356/5 led in the end to the deposition and prosecution of the two generals (Diod. 16.21.4; Nep. *Tim.* 3.4; ch. 8 excursus, nos. 56-58).[13]

In addition to the possibility that a general's colleagues and subordinates would participate directly in trials arising from their shared campaigns, servicemen returning to Athens might also threaten a general's future by less direct means. As members of the Athenian *demos*, military officials and citizen troops were potential participants in the *ekklesia* as well as the

[10] On the surveillance of generals by their subordinate officers and troops cf. *GSW* V, p. 494 and n. 754. It was also possible, of course, for generals to be supported at their trials by men who had served under them. See Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.7 and 32 and Diod. 13.101.5.

[11] That Thrasyboulos participated in the attack on the generals is suggested at Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.5-6.

[12] Roberts (1982), p. 219 n. 33, argues, plausibly enough, that Demosthenes did not himself accuse Kephisodotos but was rather summoned to give testimony at that general's *eisangelia*.

[13] Iphikrates was one of Timotheos' prosecutors in 373/2 ([Dem.] 49.9; ch. 8 excursus, no. 42), but he had not served with Timotheos in the campaign to which the latter's trial pertained.

That it was not unusual for Athenians who had served together in one or another collegiate office—not the *strategia* only—to denounce each other is suggested at Dem. 19.190-191.

dikasteria.[14] Athenians who were dissatisfied with a general's performance in the field might, if nothing else, diminish that commander's chances for reelection to the *strategia* and injure his reputation by the accounts they gave of their campaign experiences to family and friends.[15]

That the men they commanded were perceived by generals as having the capacity to injure them is suggested in several passages, most notably in Thucydides' account of the council-of-war which followed the Athenian defeat at Epipolai in 413/12. Nikias, arguing with his colleagues against a proposed withdrawal from Syracuse, predicts that their soldiers, once returned to Athens, will denounce the generals before the Athenian people: "'Many of the soldiers here, indeed the majority,' he said, 'who now cry that they are in distress, will say the opposite when they get to Athens, that their generals were bribed to withdraw. I myself, understanding the Athenian character, do not want to meet my end at the hands of the Athenian people, condemned unjustly on a disgraceful charge, instead of, if need be, risking the same fate on my own at the hands of the enemy'" (7.48.4).[16] At [Dem.] 49.12 we are told that Timotheos claimed after his deposition from the *strategia* in 373/2 that he had anticipated while on campaign the possibility that his trierarchs would give evidence against him. Plutarch, finally, claims that Phokion responded with leniency to the desertion of some of his soldiers from the Athenian camp during the Euboian campaign of 349/8 because, among other reasons, he imagined that the soldiers' consciousness of their own guilt in this respect would make them less apt to denounce him upon their return to Athens (*Phoc*. 12.3: ...κἀκεῖ τοιαῦτα συνειδότας αὐτοῖς ἧττον αὐτοῦ καταβοήσασθαι καὶ μὴ πάνυ συκοφαντήσειν). Thus generals, I believe, were well aware that their Athenian colleagues and subordinates had the capacity to do them injury. The presence on their campaigns of these representatives of the *demos* served, I suggest, as a disincentive to generals to disobey the explicit instructions of the Athenian *ekklesia* or to act contrary to the expectations of that body.

[14] Cf. Gomme at *HCT* I, pp. 23-24: "...Greek officers had to command, on land, men who were their social as well as their political equals, at sea many who were, if of humble origin, not for that reason less active as critics and voters in the ekklesia."

[15] Once returned to Athens from Poteidaia, Sokrates talked to his acquaintances about the recent battle: Plato, *Chrm*. 153b-c. We hear at [Dem.] 49.13 of communication between servicemen on campaign and their family and friends in Athens. Damaging reports sent privately from the field might injure a general's standing in Athens before ever his troops returned to gossip in the *agora*. I mention here also the accusations which were made against Alkibiades by his colleague Thrasyboulos of Steiria (Plut. *Alc*. 36.1-4) and/or by soldiers returning to Athens from Samos in 407/6 (Diod. 13.73.6). Their charges, which led eventually to Alkibiades' failure at the polls and retirement to the Chersonese, were evidently not made in the context of official action taken against the general (cf. appendix 15).

[16] τῶν τε παρόντων στρατιωτῶν πολλοὺς καὶ τοὺς πλείους ἔφη, οἳ νῦν βοῶσιν ὡς ἐν δεινοῖς ὄντες, ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένους τἀναντία βοήσεσθαι ὡς ὑπὸ χρημάτων καταπροδόντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀπῆλθον. οὔκουν βούλεσθαι αὐτός γε ἐπιστάμενος τὰς 'Αθηναίων φύσεις ἐπ' αἰσχρᾷ τε αἰτίᾳ καὶ ἀδίκως ὑπ' 'Αθηναίων ἀπολέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, εἰ δεῖ, κινδυνεύσας τοῦτο παθεῖν ἰδίᾳ.

CHAPTER EIGHT

DISCIPLINARY ACTION

Athens' generals fought alongside their subordinates and shared with them the risk of dying in combat (see appendix 14). As elected officials who were accountable to the *demos* for their behavior in office, however, Athens' *strategoi* had more to fear than the enemy ranged against them: the disapproval of their fellow citizens could be equally lethal. Athenian generals were liable to prosecution both at the end of their term and at any time during their year in office. Nor were the Athenian people loath to inflict severe penalties on magistrates who had failed them. It is my purpose in the present chapter to describe the means by which the Athenian *demos* scrutinized and disciplined its generals and to quantify to the extent possible the risk which generals faced from prosecution: the frequency with which the Athenians disciplined their generals must be considered in any discussion of the balance of power between *strategoi* and *demos*.

1. *Deposition*

We know that in the fourth century Athenian magistrates were subject to regular scrutiny. Each prytany their financial accounts were investigated by a board of *logistai* (*Ath. Pol.* 48.3; Lys. 30.5). The results of this investigation were likely discussed at the next *kuria ekklesia*, at each of which the Athenians held a vote (*epicheirotonia*) on the conduct of their magistrates in office. An *archon* who was found on this occasion *not* to be performing well—against whom, that is, there was a vote of *apocheirotonia*—was deposed, recalled to Athens if need be, and tried in an *agon timetos* (i.e., a trial in which the penalty was not prescribed by law but was determined by the jury, which chose between proposals made by each party).[1] If the de-

[1] *Ath. Pol.* 43.4: [The *prytaneis* proclaim] μίαν μὲν κυρίαν, ἐν ᾗ δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐπιχειροτονεῖν εἰ δοκοῦσι καλῶς ἄρχειν...; 61.2: ἐπιχειροτονία δ' αὐτῶν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν πρυτανείαν ἑκάστην, εἰ δοκοῦσιν καλῶς ἄρχειν· κἄν τινα ἀποχειροτονήσωσιν, κρίνουσιν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, κἂν μὲν ἁλῷ, τιμῶσιν ὅ τι χρὴ παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, ἂν δ' ἀποφύγῃ, πάλι[ν] ἄρχει. Dem. 26.5 provides evidence that the *apocheirotonia* of an official implied his deposition: ...ὅταν ἀποχειροτονηθῶσί τινες τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, παραχρῆμα πέπαυνται ἄρχοντες καὶ τοὺς στεφάνους περιῄρηνται.... In most cases deposition led to trial by *eisangelia*. Of the 28 known depositions, 24 were certainly followed by prosecution. (Those which did not lead to prosecution or for which we have no evidence of

posed official was acquitted, it was possible for him to resume his office,[2] provided that his tenure had not expired by that time. We know of four instances in which this form of deposition was used against generals: our sources use the verb ἀποχειροτονέω with reference to the depositions of Timotheos, Autokles, Kephisodotos (of Acharnai), and Philokles (son of Phormion).[3] The deposition of Timotheos in 373/2 is the earliest known use of the procedure. It is not clear whether *apocheirotoniai* took place in Athens before that date; nor do we know whether this procedure was the only means available for deposing magistrates thereafter. But whatever the specifics, it is clear that the Athenians had some mechanism in place for de-

subsequent prosecution are ch. 8 excursus, nos. 18, 19, 35, and 44.) In the case of 16 of these 24 there is good reason to believe that the defendant was prosecuted by *eisangelia*. (Nos. 4, 16, 23-30, 32, 34, 42, 45, 47, and 54. In these cases the catalogue in Hansen, *Eisangelia*, should be consulted for discussion.) One of the remaining eight trials was an *apophasis* (that of Philokles in 323, for discussion of which see Hansen [1991], pp. 293-294), but we cannot be sure what type of prosecution was used in the case of the other seven (nos. 31, 40, 41, 48, 56, 57, and 58; see also ch. 8 excursus, n. 1). Hansen, *Eisangelia*, pp. 42-43, suggests that deposition was "normally the first step towards an *eisangelia*," and this would seem to have been the case. The deposition and trial by *apophasis* of Philokles, however, shows that deposition could lead to trials by other procedures as well. (But see ch. 8 excursus, no. 63: it is possible that Philokles' deposition led to a trial other than that attested in 323.)

[2] *Ath. Pol.* 61.2 (for the Greek see previous note) suggests that magistrates who were acquitted resumed their office automatically, but the case of Timotheos may offer evidence to the contrary. In 373/2 Timotheos was deposed by *apocheirotonia* and tried. The evidence for the sentence he received in that trial is contradictory: [Plut.] *Mor.* 836d suggests that Timotheos was found guilty ([Lysias] συνέγραψε δὲ λόγω καὶ Ἰφικράτει, τὸν μὲν πρὸς Ἁρμόδιον, τὸν δὲ προδοσίας κρίνοντι Τιμόθεον, καὶ ἀμφοτέροις ἐνίκα), but the author of [Dem.] 49.10 tells us that the Athenians acquitted him (...μόλις μὲν [Timotheos] ἐπείσθητε ἀφεῖναι, στρατηγοῦντα δὲ αὐτὸν ἐπαύσατε; 49.23: ἀπολελυμένῳ τοίνυν τῆς αἰτίας...). In either case, Timotheos was not allowed to resume his generalship at the conclusion of the trial ([Dem.] 49.10). Tuplin (1984), pp. 567-568, argues persuasively that the general was in fact acquitted: if Timotheos was found guilty, then either he or his prosecutors must have proposed as a penalty his deposition from the *strategia*, but neither is likely to have done so; in a trial of such importance (he was charged with προδοσία, Plut. *Mor.* 836d), in which the defendant could reasonably fear a sentence of death, it is unlikely that Timotheos' prosecutors would have been content with his deposition from the *strategia* as a penalty, and it is equally unlikely that Timotheos would have dared to propose deposition as a penalty lest it be rejected by the jurors immediately; it is therefore probable that Timotheos was found not guilty. That he was nonetheless not allowed to resume his generalship suggests that the reinstatement of deposed magistrates upon acquittal was not automatic, but occurred only if the *apocheirotonia* were reversed by vote of the *ekklesia* (so also MacDowell [1978], p. 169, and Sinclair [1988], p. 147). In the case of Timotheos the Athenians were unwilling to take that step.

[3] Ch. 8 excursus, nos. 42, 48, 54, and 63. The only other known instance of *apocheirotonia* is that of the board of *thesmothetai* in 344/3 ([Dem.] 58.27-28). Plutarch (*Lys.* 5.2) does use the verb ἀποχειροτονέω with reference to the (alleged) deposition of Alkibiades in 406, but earlier sources do not corroborate this information, and it is possible that Plutarch was mistakenly applying a technical term that was current in the fourth century to a fifth-century event. See ch. 8 excursus, no. 22, and appendix 15.

posing magistrates at least as early as 430/29, when they removed Perikles from the *strategia*.[4]

I am concerned in this chapter primarily with determining the extent of the risk which generals faced from prosecution. To that end I will want to know how often generals were tried in connection with their *strategiai*. The frequency with which they were deposed is not relevant to this question since prosecution was not in all cases preceded by the defendant's deposition. But in the interest of reconstructing the experience of generals in the field and of describing the means by which the *demos* might influence their behavior, it is desirable nonetheless to know how often generals were deposed: if deposition was infrequent, it will not have significantly affected the generals' experience.

Although it is not possible to determine the frequency of deposition with much precision, we can get a sense of how frequently generals were deposed by several means. (My discussion is limited, however, to the period from 431/0 to 322/1. Our evidence for depositions before the Peloponnesian War is too scanty to be of any help.) First, we can establish secure lower limits for the frequency of deposition by taking the ratio of certain or probable depositions to the total number of *strategiai* possible. These lower limits are bound to be too low: they rest on the unlikely assumption that we know already of all the depositions which occurred during the period with which we are concerned. A higher rate of frequency can be suggested, the ratio of certain or probable depositions to the number of *strategiai* for which we have evidence. These figures may approximate the frequency with which generals were deposed more closely than will the lower limits we establish. But it should be remembered that they rest on the assumption that our sample of evidence is representative, that is, that the *strategiai* for which we do not have evidence ended in deposition with more or less the same frequency as those for which there is evidence. Finally, we can determine what percentage of known trials were certainly or probably preceded by deposition, although this method too is problematic. We know of 28[5] occasions on which generals were (certainly or probably) deposed or recalled to Athens to stand trial (which I take to imply deposition), but there may well have been many more: there is evidence for between 17 and 31 trials against generals (14 are questionable) which *may* have been preceded by the deposition of the defendant, but our evidence for these is not sufficient

[4] Diod. 12.45.4, Plut. *Per.* 35.4. Thuc. 2.65.3 refers only to the fine imposed on Perikles. For discussion of his deposition see Hornblower (1991) *ad loc.*; Roberts (1982), pp. 30-34; Fornara (1971), p. 55; HCT *ad loc.*

[5] See Table 2. There were actually somewhat more than 28: we do not know how many other generals were deposed with Eukrates in 405/4 (ch. 8 excursus, no. 32).

for us to decide either way.[6] Moreover, we cannot know how frequently our sources neglect to mention that legal action of any sort was taken against a general.

We have evidence of 14 depositions occurring between 431/0 and 405/4. Two of these should be discounted for the purpose of determining our lower limit, that of Kleophon, who was tried in the spring of 405/4 but who may not have been a general, and that of Alkibiades, whose deposition in 415 was not related to his performance in office.[7] Eleven of the 12 remaining depositions occurred after the failure of the Sicilian expedition, and eight of the deposed were those generals who were recalled to Athens *en masse* after the battle at Arginousai. Our evidence for deposition, in other words, is weighted to the last years of the war. This imbalance need not reflect an increase in the Athenians' eagerness to use the procedure against their generals: the mass deposition after Arginousai was an extraordinary event that may not be indicative of a trend. If we take the whole period together, ignoring the uneven distribution of known depositions over the course of the war, we find that the rate of deposition during these years can have been no lower than 4.3%, that is, the ratio of certain depositions (12) to the total number of *strategiai* possible (280).[8] Deposition may, of course, have been more frequent: about 7% of the *strategiai* for which we have evidence during these years ended in deposition.[9] Perhaps more telling is that about half of the trials we know of were preceded by the deposition of the defendant from office.[10]

[6] These are ch. 8 excursus, nos. 1, 2*, 3 (these between 501/0 and 432/1); 5*, 6*, 7*, 8, 10*, 11*, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17*, 20, 21 (between 431/0 and 405/4); 36*, 37, 38, 39?, 43, 46, 49, 50?, 51, 52?, 53, 55*, 59?, 60, 61*, 62 (between 404/3 and 322/1). (Question marks indicate that the deposed official may not have been a general. Asterisks indicate that there is doubt that a trial occurred, or doubt that a trial was related to the defendant's *strategia*, although that the defendant served as general is itself not in question.)

[7] He was recalled to Athens to stand trial for his role in the profanation of the Mysteries.

[8] There were at least 280 *strategiai* during the War: 10 per year x 27 years + 10 additional generals elected by the revolutionary government in Athens in 411. (I am ignoring in this calculation the possibility of there having been more than 10 generals in any year. On special elections see Fornara [1971], pp. 74-75.)

[9] Twelve or 13 depositions (depending on Kleophon's status; only the deposition of Alkibiades in 415 is here excluded) of between 178 and 187 known *strategiai*. The lower figure represents all those *strategiai* which Develin (*AO*) accepts as certain (whether or not their date is secure) in addition to five *strategiai* for which there is epigraphic evidence but debate about the name to be restored in the inscription (423/2 [Eurymedon?]; 418/17 [Alkibiades?]; 410/9 [Eumachos?]; 409/8 and 407/6 [Perikles?]). The higher figure represents both certain and all questionable *strategiai* listed by Develin. (Fornara [1971] recognizes 175 *strategiai* in the same period.)

[10] Ten or 11 depositions (depending on Kleophon's generalship) of between 19 and 22 trials against generals. I do not include among these the depositions of Alkibiades (ch. 8 excursus, no. 16), Phrynichos (no. 18), or Skironides (no. 19). Alkibiades' deposition and trial were not related to his *strategia*, and there is no evidence that the depositions of Phrynichos and Skironides led to trial.

Between a third and a half of the trials for which we have evidence from 404/3 to 322/1 were preceded by deposition.[11] During these years between 8 and 14 generals were deposed. Not surprisingly, the majority of these depositions took place in the second quarter of the fourth century, when prosecutions were particularly frequent. If we discount the six depositions which are uncertain, we arrive at a lower limit for the frequency of deposition in this period of just under 1%.[12] Again, the actual rate of deposition during these years may have been considerably higher. Between 4% and 7% of the *strategiai* for which we have evidence ended in deposition.[13]

Between a third and a half of the trials we know of, then, were preceded by the defendant's deposition from office, and the percentage may have been higher still: it should be remembered that in many cases we simply cannot tell whether a trial was preceded by deposition. Our evidence suggests, then, that deposition was frequent enough during the late fifth and fourth centuries to have been on the minds of Athens' generals. It was not a seldom-used legal procedure which they could afford to disregard.

2. Euthynai

Once their terms were completed, Athenian magistrates[14] of the post-Ephialtic period were obliged to undergo an *euthyna*, an examination of their financial accounts and conduct in office. Our evidence for fifth-century *euthynai* is limited,[15] but we are relatively well informed about the form this scrutiny took in the fourth century and in the case of the majority of Athens' magistrates. (As I discuss below, the *euthynai* of *strategoi* may have differed from those of other archons in some particulars.) Within thirty days of the expiry of a magistrate's office, his accounts were investigated

[11] Between 8 and 12 depositions of 21 to 30 trials. The depositions of Thrasyboulos of Steiria (ch. 8 excursus, no. 35) and Iphikrates (no. 44) are not included among these. Thrasyboulos was deposed but never tried—he died before ever returning to Athens—and there is no evidence that the deposition of Iphikrates led to a trial.

[12] That is, the ratio of certain depositions (8) to possible *strategiai* (820).

[13] From 8 to 14 depositions of between 185 and 214 known *strategiai*.

[14] In the fourth century, at least, Athenian archons were not alone in being ὑπεύθυνος. Aeschines informs us that anyone who performed public duties—trierarchs and priests, for example—was subject to the *euthyna*: ...οὐδείς ἐστιν ἀνυπεύθυνος τῶν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν πρὸς τὰ κοινὰ προσεληλυθότων (3.17-22). (Jurors were the notable exception in being *anupeuthynos* [Ar. *Vesp*. 587].)

[15] On the question of fifth-century *euthynai* see Piérart (1971), pp. 526-573, who argues that the procedure by which archons were audited was changed after 403/2. In the fifth century *euthynoi* probably had greater authority over audits than they did in the fourth: the decree of Patrokleides of 405/4 suggests that *euthynoi* were empowered to condemn and sentence outgoing magistrates: ...καὶ ὅσων εὔθυναί τινές εἰσι κατεγνωσμέναι ἐν τοῖς λογιστηρίοις ὑπὸ τῶν εὐθύνων καὶ τῶν παρέδρων... (Andoc. 1.77-79). *Logistai* may have played a role in fifth-century *euthynai* as well, but we do not know what their functions may have been.

by a board of ten auditors (*logistai*)[16] and their ten assistants (*synegoroi*). After this preliminary investigation, and whether or not any misdeed had been discovered, each magistrate was called into a *dikasterion* presided over by the *logistai* (*Ath. Pol.* 54.2). There it was possible for anyone who wished to accuse him of financial misconduct (Aeschin. 3.23; Dem. 18.117).[17] Charges that could be made at this juncture included, but were not necessarily limited to,[18] embezzlement (*klope*), bribe-taking (*dora*), and *adikion*. What is meant by the last is not clear, but it was obviously a less serious offense than the other two: conviction on a charge of *adikion* resulted in only a simple fine while embezzlement and bribe-taking were punishable by a tenfold fine.[19] As far as we know, this was the largest penalty which could be imposed for conviction in this stage of the *euthyna*. If a magistrate was charged with financial misconduct by either the *logistai* or a speaker in the *dikasterion*, his guilt or innocence was decided by the jury before whom he was accused (*Ath. Pol.* 54.2). If no accusation was made, the magistrate's accounts were considered settled and the first part of his *euthyna* was successfully completed.

In the three days[20] which followed a magistrate's appearance in the *dikasterion* it was possible for anyone who wished to accuse him of misconduct that was not limited to his handling of money. Accusations were submitted to the *euthynos* of the archon's tribe, one of ten *euthynoi* (one per tribe) who was charged with receiving and evaluating complaints made against outgoing officials. If the *euthynos* thought an accusation justified, he referred it to the appropriate authorities, to the Forty in the case of a private suit or to the thesmothetes if a public suit. These magistrates were responsible in turn for bringing the case to trial (*Ath. Pol.* 48.4-5). There does not appear to have been a limit to the penalty which could be imposed in trials resulting from the second stage of the *euthyna*: we are told at *Ath. Pol.* 48.4 that anyone who submitted an accusation to an *euthynos* named in his complaint the penalty (τίμημα) which seemed to him appropriate to the outgoing magistrate's offense. Presumably, the trial which ensued was an *agon timetos*, and the penalty which the complainant suggested served as

[16] This board of *logistai* was not the same as that which investigated the financial accounts of magistrates each prytany (*Ath. Pol.* 48.3; Lys. 30.5).

[17] Presumably accusations made during this first stage were limited to the financial sphere, since accusations of any sort could be made during the second stage of the *euthyna* (*Ath. Pol.* 48.4; so MacDowell [1978], p. 171).

[18] The point is made by Rhodes (1981), p. 598.

[19] MacDowell (1978), p. 171, and Rhodes (1981), p. 599, suggest that *adikion* involved the loss of public funds through neglect or incompetence rather than through willful misconduct.

[20] For an alternative reading of *Ath. Pol.* 48.4 which would allow 30 days within which accusations might be made (*viz.*, ἐντὸς λ' ἡ[μερῶν for ἐντὸς γ' ἡ[μερῶν), see Rhodes (1981), p. 561, who finds the longer period credible.

the prosecution's proposed sentence in that case. The jury will have decided between this suggestion and one proposed by the defendant.

Unfortunately it is impossible to know how similar the experience of *strategoi* at their *euthynai* was to that of other magistrates. We are told in the *Athenaion Politeia* and elsewhere that the *logistai* handled the *euthynai* of all outgoing Athenian archons (54.2; Harp. s.v. *logistai kai logisteria*; Suda s.v. *hegemonia dikasteriou* and *logistai*).[21] But this evidence is contradicted in the *Athenaion Politeia* itself and in the *Onomasticon* of Pollux, which tell us without further explanation that the *euthynai* of *strategoi* were the responsibility of Athens' thesmothetes (*Ath. Pol.* 59.2; Poll. 8.87-88). It may be that the authors were referring in these passages only to the thesmothetes' role in the second stage of the *euthyna*.[22] But this interpretation leaves unexplained the authors' specific reference to *strategoi*: the thesmothetes might have a hand in the prosecution of any outgoing magistrate during the second part of the *euthyna*, not only that of generals. Alternatively, the *euthynai* of *strategoi* may in fact have differed significantly from those of other magistrates. It is possible, for example, that the thesmothetes alone were responsible for the *euthynai* of generals, that is, that the *logistai* and *euthynoi* took no part in the procedure. I am inclined to believe that the thesmothetes did at least play a greater role in the *euthynai* of *strategoi* than in those of other magistrates: otherwise the references to *strategoi* in the *Ath. Pol.* and Pollux are inexplicable.

The majority of Athens' archons underwent their *euthynai* in Hekatombaion and Metageitnion, the first two months of the Athenian year, when their terms were completed and their positions relinquished to a new crop of *archontes*.[23] But the *euthynai* of generals could not be so easily scheduled. Unlike the majority of Athens' archons, *strategoi* could hold office repeatedly.[24] Generals who had been reelected were likely to be on campaign in mid-summer when the *euthynai* of the previous year's officials were conducted. Given their military responsibilities, *strategoi* could not

21 See also Hauvette-Besnault (1885), p. 60 and n. 1, for further sources on *logistai*.

22 So Rhodes (1981), p. 661.

23 It is possible that an exception to this schedule was made in the case of ambassadors, whose *euthynai* may regularly have followed immediately upon the conclusion of their embassies (so Hansen [1991], p. 223). In 347/6 two embassies were sent by the Athenians to Philip of Macedon, the first returning in Anthesterion of 346 (February/March), the second departing in Munychion (April/May) (for a chronology of the year see Ellis [1976], p. 17). Aeschines and Demosthenes, who served as ambassadors on both occasions, underwent their *euthynai* for the first embassy before departing on the second (Dem. 19.211). Their audits, that is, took place before the end of the Athenian year, when the *euthynai* of other magistrates were conducted. An alternative explanation is possible, however: Aeschines and Demosthenes may have been audited prior to the second embassy in accordance with a law which forbad *hypeuthynoi* to leave the country before submitting their accounts (Aeschin. 3.21).

24 A man could sit in the *boule* twice, and all military offices could be held repeatedly. Otherwise no *arche* could be held more than once (*Ath. Pol.* 62.3).

reasonably have been expected to return to Athens from the field to submit to an audit. It is possible that generals instead regularly underwent their *euthynai* at some more convenient time of the year.[25] But this does not appear to have been the case: in the fall of 373/2 Timotheos was deposed from the *strategia*, tried by *eisangelia*, and acquitted; he was not reinstated in office,[26] but remained in Athens until the summer of 372 ([Dem.] 49.28), at which time he left the city in order to avoid his *euthyna* for the *strategia* from which he had been deposed ([Dem.] 49.25).[27] The case of Timotheos suggests that generals of his day were not audited at random times during the year when they happened to be available. Their *euthynai*, as those of most other magistrates, were rather scheduled for the first months of the new year.[28] It follows that annual *euthynai* for reelected *strategoi* were not possible, and that as a rule[29] generals underwent their audits only after their last successive *strategia*.[30]

Given the large number of *euthynai* which were conducted in Athens annually, it is at first glance surprising that we know of only two instances in which the prosecution of a general certainly resulted from his audit (Phormion and Paches).[31] There are, in addition, a number of trials for which we have limited information and which may have been *euthynai*,[32]

25 So MacDowell (1978), p. 170.

26 See ch. 8 n. 2.

27 See Hansen, *Eisangelia*, pp. 45 and 63 and cat. no. 80 n. 7.

28 Aristotle at *Rh.* 1411a6-7 speaks of Chares being eager to undergo his *euthyna*: ...σπουδάζοντος Χάρητος εὐθύνας δοῦναι.... This may mean that Chares had some control over the scheduling of his audit, but need not.

29 In a speech dated to 330 Aeschines lists a number of activities from which those who had not yet undergone their *euthynai* were prohibited (3.21). They could not, for example, leave the country (cf. ch. 8 n. 23), consecrate their property, or be adopted into another family. These prohibitions might present difficulties for generals who held numerous successive *strategiai* and were not—so I have suggested—being audited regularly. Indeed, the prohibition against leaving the country could not have been enforced against Athens' generals unless they were audited each term prior to their first departure from Athens. Presumably, exceptions to this prohibition were made for generals holding successive *strategiai*. If the other prohibitions were regularly enforced during the fourth century and further exceptions were not made for generals, then we must imagine that *strategoi* wishing to engage in any prohibited activity were required first to undergo a specially-scheduled *euthyna*.

30 So also Ostwald (1986), p. 79; Glotz (1929), p. 228; Hauvette-Besnault (1885), p. 61. Hignett (1952), p. 244, thinks that generals who had been reelected were audited annually, but that their *euthynai* were mere formalities. Cf. Kagan (1974), pp. 91-92, who suggests that during Perikles' long tenure of the *strategia* the regular scrutiny of his financial accounts had become perfunctory. See also Roberts (1982), pp. 25-26.

31 For discussion of the circumstances surrounding Phormion's *euthyna* see Androt. *FGH* 324 F 8; Ehrenberg (1945), pp. 123-127; *HCT* II, pp. 233-237; and Westlake (1968), pp. 53-59. Plutarch (*Arist.* 26.5, *Nic.* 6.1) reports that Paches committed suicide in the court as a result of his conviction, but the story is probably apocryphal. See Roberts (1982), pp. 136-140; Westlake (1975), pp. 113-116.

32 See the excursus to ch. 8. On the difficulties of differentiating *euthynai* from *eisangeliai* see Hansen, *Eisangelia*, pp. 45-49.

but the number of suspected cases remains small even so. I do not think we should infer from this that the *euthyna* was a formality: that Timotheos left Athens in order to avoid his audit suggests that the procedure had at least some legal bite ([Dem.] 49.25).[33] Presumably, few generals were given trouble at their *euthynai*—at least in the fourth century and perhaps in the fifth as well—because they, as other Athenian magistrates, were subject to scrutiny and recall throughout their tenure. Discrepancies in their financial accounts—and any other problems which were associated with their performance in office—were likely discussed at the *kuriai ekklesiai*, when the Athenians voted on the conduct of their magistrates in office and when magistrates could be deposed and recalled to Athens. Prior to the end of the year, therefore, many complaints will already have been addressed. The *euthyna* provided Athenians with one further occasion on which they might censure their magistrates, but the opportunity was not radically different from what had been available to them all along.[34]

3. *Frequency of Prosecution*

We have seen that the prosecution of a general could be initiated either by his deposition from office or at his *euthyna*, but these were not the only occasions on which charges could be made against generals (or former generals): Konon's prosecution of Adeimantos in 393/2 for treason allegedly committed during his *strategia* of 405/4 suggests that generals were never entirely safe from prosecution.[35] For the present purpose it is necessary to identify neither the precise date of a general's prosecution nor the procedure used against him. I am concerned here only with determining as nearly as possible the frequency with which generals were subjected to any prosecution whatever in connection with their *strategiai*.

Our evidence is not sufficient to permit any conclusion about the frequency with which generals were prosecuted during the first two-thirds of the fifth century. The percentage of *strategiai* for which we have evidence between 501/0 and 479/8 is low (4.8%-7.4%), and while the percentage of known *strategiai* between 478/7 and 432/1 is relatively high (17.7%-20.6%), we hear of only one case in which a general (Kimon) was prosecuted during those 48 years. It is possible, of course, that the paucity of our evidence accurately reflects the infrequency of prosecution during the *pentakontaetia*, but the number of prosecutions known from the period is suspiciously low.

33 The story told by Diodorus (12.3.3) and Plutarch (*Alc.* 7.3) of Perikles' concern when compelled to render his financial accounts to the *demos*—if it is right that the story concerns a *strategia*-related *euthyna*—suggests the same conclusion.

34 My conclusion regarding the infrequency of attested *euthynai* is the same as that reached by Hansen, *Eisangelia*, p. 63.

35 The example may be an extreme one, but I think the point valid nonetheless. Because prosecutions could be initiated by means other than deposition or *euthyna*, I have not thought it safe to conclude that any trial which was not an *euthyna* was certainly preceded by the general's deposition from office.

The data available for the Peloponnesian War period is more abundant: we have evidence for between 64% and 67% of the *strategiai* which were held during the 27 years of that war. Between 10.7% and 11.8% of these known *strategiai* resulted in the prosecution of the general holding the office.[36] It is, of course, possible that our sample of evidence is not representative. Naturally, the frequency with which generals were prosecuted during the war will have been lower if the roughly 100 *strategiai* for which we do not have evidence during the period ended in prosecution less frequently than those *strategiai* for which we do have evidence. Nonetheless, the lowest possible rate of prosecution for the war years is 6.8%-7.9%, that is, the ratio of *strategiai* ending in prosecution (19-22) to the total number of *strategiai* possible (280). During the Peloponnesian War, then, at least seven and perhaps as many as twelve generals were tried on average every decade, or about one per year.

We have evidence for no more than 26% of the *strategiai* that were held between 404/3 and 322/1. These generalships are distributed more or less evenly across the period, but the 21-30 trials which are known to have occurred during the same years are not so evenly spaced. Prosecutions were frequent in the mid-fourth century: as many as 12 generals were tried between 366/5 and 360/59, many in connection with activities in the north Aegean. The distribution of known *strategiai* and trials in the period is shown in Table 1. Between 17.2% and 19.4% of the *strategiai* for which we have evidence in the first half of the fourth century (404/3-356/5)—or something less than two on average per year—ended in prosecution.[37] The

36 For an explanation of these figures see Table 2 and Table 1 n. 1. I do not include among the trials of the Peloponnesian War that of Alkibiades in 415/14 (ch. 8 excursus, no. 16). I do include the 393 trial of Adeimantos (no. 33) because he was prosecuted in connection with his *strategia* of 405/4.

37 Hansen, *Eisangelia*, p. 60, and (1990a), p. 217, discussing the frequency of *eisangeliai* against *strategoi* between 432 and 355, concludes that about 20% of Athens' generals were tried by this procedure at some point in their careers. His figure is the ratio of known *eisangeliai* against generals during those years (he counts 35 *eisangeliai* against 33 different generals) to known individual generals (160). My approach to the question is different from that of Hansen in two respects. (1) I have not limited the trial types considered to the *eisangelia*. (2) I have determined the rate of prosecution using the ratio of trials to *strategiai* rather than *strategoi*. This method allows one to determine, roughly, how likely it was that some general would be prosecuted in any one year. With a little more calculation the numbers arrived at can be made to answer the question Hansen asks, that is, how likely was it that the average general would be prosecuted during the course of his career? I said above that during the Peloponnesian War the rate of prosecution—in other words the chance that any *strategia* would end in prosecution—was between 10.7% and 11.8%. During these years each general held office, on average, twice (between 94 and 98 generals held between 178 and 187 *strategiai*). Given the

lowest possible rate of prosecution for the same period is 3.8%-5%. Thus at least four generals and perhaps as many as twenty were prosecuted on average in every decade of the first half of the century. Prosecution appears not to have been as frequent thereafter. Of the *strategiai* known from the second half of the fourth century, between 3.3% and 3.7% only are known to have ended in prosecution. The lowest possible rate of prosecution for the same period is between .6% and 1.2%.

4. *Sentences*

We have seen that generals were prosecuted frequently between 431/0 and 356/5. That prosecution was frequent does not imply that it posed a substantial threat to Athens' generals, however. Unless the conviction rate among generals was high and the penalties awarded against them particularly unpleasant, a general's fear of prosecution may not have been sufficient to influence his behavior significantly. I discuss below the results of the trials we know of. The implication of our evidence is that generals who were prosecuted were usually convicted, and the sentences they received were usually severe. It should be remembered, however, that the trials for which we have evidence may not be a representative sample. We cannot

likelihood of any one *strategia* ending in prosecution (10.7%-11.8%), the probability that a man serving as general twice would be prosecuted (by any procedure) in connection with one of those *strategiai* is between 20.3% and 22.2% (probability = 1 - [the probability that he would *not* be tried in connection with the first *strategia*] x [the probability that he would not be tried in connection with the second *strategia*]). These figures are close to that arrived at by Hansen for the probability that a general would be tried by *eisangelia* during his career (20%). They are also close to the figures which would be arrived at using Hansen's method to determine the likelihood that a general would be prosecuted by any procedure during the Peloponnesian War years: 20.4%-22.3% (the lower figure is the ratio of [1] the minimum number of trials which would have taken place if all certain and uncertain generals are taken into account [20], to [2] the total number of certain and uncertain generals [98]; the higher figure is the ratio of [1] the maximum number of trials that would take place if only the certain generals are taken into account [21], to [2] the number of certain generals [94]). For the fourth century the discrepancy between the methods is larger, however. Between 404/3 and 322/1 the average number of generalships held by each general was, again, two (between 83 and 96 generals held between 185 and 214 *strategiai*). Given a probability of 11.7%-13.5% that a *strategia* would end in prosecution during these years, the likelihood that a general who served twice would be prosecuted in connection with one of those *strategiai* is between 21.0% and 26.0%. Hansen's method produces a higher rate of prosecution: 26.0%-30.1% (the lower figure is the ratio of [1] the minimum number of trials which would have taken place if all certain and uncertain generals are taken into account [25] to [2] the total number of certain and uncertain generals [96]; the higher figure is the ratio of [1] the maximum number of trials that would take place if only the certain generals are taken into account [25], to [2] the number of certain generals [83]). The method I have used is preferable to that used by Hansen because it allows one to calculate different prosecution rates given different numbers of *strategiai* served, and because it is somewhat more accurate. (Consider the extreme case: if 10 generals serve 10 terms each, and each is tried once in his career, the probability that a general will be tried, using Hansen's method, is 100%. The other method produces a probability of 65%.)

know how frequently our sources neglect to mention that generals were prosecuted, nor whether they mention disproportionately those trials in which harsh penalties were imposed.[38]

We know the outcome of 20 of the 22 trials for which we have evidence between 431/0 and 405/4. (The results of these trials are summarized in Figure 1.) Of these 20, as many as 19 ended in conviction. Fourteen of those convicted were sentenced to death, and 9 of the 14 were executed. The other 5 convicted defendants were sentenced to death *in absentia*, which means that they fled Athens—or never returned to Athens when summoned—rather than face trial. By failing to stand trial defendants guaranteed that they would be found guilty,[39] and defendants in *agones timetoi* such as *eisangeliai* guaranteed as well that they would be sentenced to whatever penalty was proposed by the prosecutor in their trial.[40] It is reasonable to believe that prosecutors in such cases proposed capital punishment: there is no reason why they should not. Defendants in *eisangeliai* who chose not to return to Athens, then, were in effect sentencing themselves to perpetual exile. Except in unusual circumstances (as, for example,

[38] It sometimes served the interests of speech writers to refer to trials in which severe penalties were awarded. In his speech against Aeschines, Demosthenes lists a number of generals who were either sentenced to death or fined large amounts (19.180). His purpose is to convince the jury to convict Aeschines, who, Demosthenes suggests, is more deserving of a severe sentence than had been any of the others he mentions: ...'Εργόφιλος, Κηφισόδοτος, Τιμόμαχος, τὸ παλαιόν ποτ' 'Εργοκλῆς, Διονύσιος, ἄλλοι, οὓς ὀλίγου δέω σύμπαντας εἰπεῖν ἐλάττω τὴν πόλιν βεβλαφέναι τούτου. This passage is our only source for the trial of one of the five generals Demosthenes lists: Dionysios, ch. 8 excursus, no. 38. Similarly, Hyperides at 3.1-2 lists a number of *eisangeliai* in which the defendants were accused of such serious offenses that they did not dare remain in Athens to stand trial (which means that they were sentenced to death *in absentia*; see ch. 8 n. 40). Hyperides' purpose is to contrast the *eisangelia* of Euxenippos, against whom comparatively trivial charges have been brought, with *eisangeliai* of the past. This passage is the only source for two of the four trials against generals which Hyperides mentions: Philon and Theotimos (though there is doubt that they were generals; see ch. 8 excursus, nos. 50 and 52). We hear, then, of at least three trials specifically because they resulted in severe sentences or because the charges that were brought against the defendants were serious.

[39] Alkibiades, for example, was convicted by default when he did not return to Athens for trial: οἱ δ' 'Αθηναῖοι ἐρήμῃ δίκῃ θάνατον κατέγνωσαν αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν μετ' ἐκείνου (Thuc. 6.61.7); οἱ μὲν οὖν 'Αθηναῖοι παραδόντες δικαστηρίῳ τοῦ τε 'Αλκιβιάδου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συμφυγόντων τὰ ὀνόματα δίκην ἐρήμην κατεδίκασαν θανάτου (Diod. 13.5.4). See *LSJ* s.v. ἐρῆμος III for other examples of judgment by default.

[40] In case of conviction, the jury in *agones timetoi* chose between penalties proposed by each party. Since the defendant was not present, the only penalty they could choose was that suggested by the prosecution. See Hansen, *Eisangelia*, pp. 35-36: "In quite a number of *eisangeliai* the accused fled the country before the trial. Even if the sources only state that he was found guilty *in absentia* we may conclude that he was sentenced to death. The penalty proposed by the prosecutor was undoubtedly capital punishment and the jurors were precluded from voting for a penalty proposed by the defendant. The jurors presumably heard the speech for the prosecution and passed a verdict of guilty and a sentence of death by one and the same vote."

in the case of Alkibiades), it is not likely that a man who had been condemned to death in Athens would ever return.

Of the five remaining trials which ended in conviction during this period, the penalties awarded in two are not known. The defendants in the other three trials were fined. We do not know the amount of one of these fines, that imposed on Eurymedon in 425/4 (Thuc. 4.65.3), but the other two were considerable. Our sources disagree about the amount which Perikles was compelled to pay in 430/29, but by all accounts the fine was large: the lowest figure which Plutarch (*Per.* 35.4) reports is 15 talents, a sum which would take an oarsman of the day several lifetimes to earn.[41] The highest figure which Plutarch mentions is 50 talents, and Diodorus reports that Perikles was fined as much as 80 talents (12.45.4). Phormion was fined 100 *minai* (= 1.67 talents) at his *euthyna* in 429/8. This was a much smaller fine than that reportedly imposed on Perikles, but Phormion was nonetheless unable to pay it, and he suffered *atimia* as a result.[42]

We know of only one general who was acquitted between 431/0 and 405/4, Anytos, son of Anthemion,[43] who was charged with treason in 409/8 after he failed to relieve Pylos (ch. 8 excursus, no. 21). The author of the *Athenaion Politeia* (27.5) and numerous later sources report that Anytos secured his acquittal by bribing the jury.[44] The accusation is telling whether

[41] Rowers during this period probably earned on average a drachma a day, or 1/6000 of a talent (Thuc. 3.17.4, 6.8.1). (On the payment of crews see Gabrielsen [1994], pp. 110-114.) Similarly, at the end of the fifth century skilled workers made between 1 and 1.5 drachmas daily (*IG* i^3 475-476). But 15 talents would also have been a large expense for more wealthy Athenians: the average annual costs of a trierarchy were about 3000 drachmas (Gabrielsen [1994], pp. 215-216).

[42] Schol. Ar. *Pax* 347 = Androt. *FGH* 324 F 8. The Athenians soon relieved Phormion of his *atimia*. Not long after the trial the Akarnanians sent an embassy to Athens asking that Phormion be sent out to them as general. Because he was *atimos*, however, Phormion could not be sent. The Athenians therefore provided him with enough money to pay the fine and so regain his citizen rights (schol. Ar. *Pax* 347; cf. Plut. *Dem.* 27.8 and [Plut.] *Mor.* 846d for a similar arrangement made for the benefit of Demosthenes). In the end, Phormion's son Asopios was sent to Akarnania in his father's stead, presumably because Phormion himself had died or was otherwise unable to take command. According to Thucydides, however, the Akarnanians did not ask originally for Phormion as general, but rather for a son or relative of Phormion (3.7.1). The fragment of Androtion which the scholiast to Aristophanes preserves indicates that Phormion was not dead by the time the Akarnanian embassy arrived in Athens. We may imagine, therefore, that the ambassadors requested a relative of Phormion rather than Phormion himself because they were aware, or were made aware upon their arrival in Athens, of Phormion's legal status. For discussion see Harding (1994), pp. 101-104 (who suggests the winter of 430 as a date for the Akarnanian embassy described by Androtion and who does not identify that embassy with the one described by Thucydides at 3.7.1); Jacoby, *FGH* 324 F 8; and Ehrenberg (1945), pp. 123-127. Cf. also Paus. 1.23.10, a less detailed account of the Athenians' remission of Phormion's debt than that provided by the scholiast.

[43] This is the same Anytos who would number among Sokrates' accusers in ten years' time (for sources see *PA* 1324).

[44] For sources see Hansen, *Eisangelia* no. 65.

or not it is true: acquittal was not the usual result of Athenian political trials in the late fifth century.[45]

We know the outcome of 26 of the 30 trials for which we have evidence between 404/3 and 322/1. (The results of these trials are summarized in Figure 2.) As many as seven of these 26 trials ended in acquittal. Nineteen others ended in conviction. Nine of those convicted were certainly sentenced to death, and six were certainly or probably fined. As in the Peloponnesian War period, the fines which were awarded in these trials were considerable. We do not know the amount which Agyrrhios was required to pay in 389/8, but we do know that it was more than he could afford. Agyrrhios was imprisoned for years before he was able to pay (ch. 8 excursus, no. 36). Pamphilos (no. 37) and Kephisodotos of Acharnai (no. 54) were each fined 5 talents. Pamphilos, at least, was not able to pay the fine, and he died in debt. Timotheos was fined 100 talents in 356/5 (no. 57). According to Isocrates, this was the largest fine which the Athenian *demos* had ever imposed (15.129). It was certainly more than Timotheos could afford: he went into exile to avoid paying the exorbitant sum (Plut. *Mor.* 605f) and died soon thereafter.[46] Finally, Melanopos was fined three talents in 355/4 (no. 59).

[45] According to Diodorus (13.64.6), Anytos failed in his mission because he was prevented by storms from rounding Cape Malea in the Peloponnese. High winds are frequent around the Cape, and it was not unusual in antiquity for sailors to have difficulty navigating there. The Corcyraeans, for example, cited their inability to round the Cape as the reason for their failure to help the Greeks at Salamis (Hdt. 7.168.4). A proverb preserved by Strabo (8.6.20: Μαλέας δὲ κάμψας ἐπιλάθου τῶν οἴκαδε) and the difficulties which a series of Greek heroes allegedly encountered when sailing in the area (Menelaus [*Od.* 3.288], Agamemnon [*Od.* 4.514], Odysseus [*Od.* 9.80, 19.187], and Jason [Hdt. 4.179.2]) suggest that the hazards of rounding the Cape were notorious. (Cf. Casson [1991], p. 142, who claims that until recently modern Greek sailors sang, "Cape Malea, Cape Malea; help me Christ and all the Saints!" Casson attributes the proverb found in Strabo to the Greeks' fear of piracy in the area rather than to the weather, but Strabo clearly states [διὰ τὰς ἀντιπνοίας] that the danger was from high winds.) That the explanation for Anytos' failure to relieve Pylos was credible may explain his acquittal. See Engels (1990), p. 51 and Table 6, for modern data on the strength of winds around the Cape.

[46] Timotheos was dead in 353 (Isoc. 15.101). After his death Timotheos' fine was commuted by the Athenians to 10 talents and paid by Timotheos' son Konon (*AO* no. 1687) (Nep. *Tim.* 4.1). On Timotheos' finances see *APF* pp. 509-510.

FIGURE 1

RESULTS OF TRIALS AGAINST *STRATEGOI*, 431/0-405/4[1]

19-22 Attested Trials of *Strategoi*					
19 certainly or probably* found guilty				1 acquitted	2 outcome of trial unknown
3 fined	14 sentenced to death		2 sentence unknown		
	5 certainly or probably* sentenced to death *in absentia*	9 executed			
4, 8, 12	13*, 14*, 15*, 29, 30	20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31?, 32	9, 33*	21	11?, 17?

[1] If there is question that a trial occurred, or that the defendant in a trial was a general, I include a question mark after the trial number (numbers refer to the excursus to chapter 8). Asterisks mark trials for which the sentence is not certain.

FIGURE 2

RESULTS OF TRIALS AGAINST *STRATEGOI*, 404/3-322/1[1]

21-30 Attested Trials of *Strategoi*						
found guilty					7 certainly or probably* acquitted	4 outcome of trial unknown
ertainly or bbably* fined	9 sentenced to death		1 fined or sentenced to death	3 sentence unknown		
	5 sentenced to death *in absentia*	4 certainly or probably* executed				
?, 37, 45*, 54, , 59?	41, 47, 50?, 51, 52?	34, 40, 46, 62*	38	55?, 61?, 63?	39?*, 42*, 43*, 49*, 56, 58, 64*	48, 53, 60, 65?

[1] See the note to Figure 1.

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF TRIALS AND KNOWN *STRATEGIAI*, 404/3-322/1

Years	*Strategiai* for Which There is Evidence		Total *Strategiai* Possible	Ratio of Known to Possible *Strategiai*	Number of Known Trials	Probability of Prosecution[1]
	Certain	Uncertain				
404/3-387/6	28	11	170	16.5-22.9%	3-5[2]	10.3-14.3%
386/5-356/5	75	8	310	24.2-26.8%	15-19[3]	20.5-21.3%
355/4-338/7	43	5	180	23.9-26.7%	2-3[4]	4.2-6.9%
337/6-322/1	39	5	160	24.4-27.5%	0-1[5]	0-2.3%
404/3-322/1	185	29	820	22.6-26.1%	21-30[6]	11.7-13.5%

[1] The lower probability is the ratio of (1) the minimum number of trials that would have taken place if both certain and uncertain generalships are taken into account, to (2) the total number of certain and uncertain generalships. The higher number is the ratio of (1) the maximum number of trials that would have taken place if only the certain generalships are taken into account, to (2) the number of certain generalships.

[2] Ch. 8 excursus, nos. 34, 36*, 37, 38, 39? Question marks indicate doubt that the defendant was a general. Asterisks indicate doubt that a trial occurred, or doubt that a trial was related to the defendant's *strategia*.

[3] Ch. 8 excursus, nos. 40-43, 45-49, 50?, 51, 52?, 53, 54, 55*, 56-58, 59*?

[4] Ch. 8 excursus, nos. 60, 61*, 62.

[5] Ch. 8 excursus, no. 63?

[6] I include here ch. 8 excursus, nos. 64 and 65*, which are undated.

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF *STRATEGIAI*, FATALITIES,[1] DEPOSITIONS, AND TRIALS, 501/0-322/1[2]

Years	*Strategiai* for Which There is Evidence		Total *Strategiai* Possible	Ratio of Known to Possible *Strategiai*	Number of Fatalities	Number of Depositions	Number of Trials
	Certain	Uncertain					
501/0-479/8	11	6	230	4.8-7.4%%	2	0	1-2
478/7-432/1	83	14	470	17.7-20.6%	8-9[3]	0	1
431/0-405/4	178	9	280	63.6-66.8%	22	13-14[4]	19-22[5]
404/3-322/1	185	29	820[6]	22.6-26.1%	4-5[7]	8-14[8]	21-30[9]

[1] I include the numbers of *strategoi* who were killed in action for the purpose of comparison. The fatality rates of Athens' generals are discussed in Appendix 14.

[2] The numbers of certain and uncertain *strategiai* were compiled using *AO* (cf. ch. 8 n. 9 above). Two *strategiai* have been added which do not appear in *AO*, however: Meidias, the son of Kephisodoros, was general at least twice between 371/0 and 350/49. (For the evidence of Meidias' generalships see Tritle [1992a]; on the range of dates possible for his *strategiai* see particularly pp. 491-492 n. 23.) These figures are not very different from those of Hansen (1990a), pp. 237-238 and n. 105. For the period from 432/1 to 355/4 he arrives at 289 *strategiai*. *AO* lists between 287 and 316. For lists of *strategoi* other than *AO*, see Hansen (1989b), *APF* pp. 156-166, Fornara (1971), and Beloch (1884), pp. 289-298, and *GG* II.2, pp. 260-269.

Plutarch (*Per.* 16.3) tells us that Perikles was general for 15 successive years after the ostracism of Thoukydides, son of Melesias, and that Phokion (*Phoc.* 8.1) was general 45 times in his career; Dinarchus (3.12) tells us that Philokles (*AO* no. 2422) was general more than ten times; Antiphon, the son of Lysonides (Philostr. *VS* 1.15), Apollodoros (Pl. *Ion* 541c), and Archinos (Dem. 24.135) are likewise reported to have held the generalship on numerous occasions. Of these *strategiai* I have included in my calculations only those for which there is independent evidence. Where none exists I have ascribed to the general concerned only one *strategia*. (In support of Plutarch's evidence for Phokion's numerous *strategiai* see Tritle [1992b], pp. 19-23.)

[3] The discrepancy depends on the position of --odotos in 446/5. See Table 3.

[4] Ch. 8 excursus, nos: 4, 16, 18, 19, 23-30, 31?, 32. Question marks indicate that the deposed official may not have been a general.

[5] Ch. 8 excursus, nos.: 4, 8, 9, 11*, 12-15, 17*, 20, 21, 23-30, 31?, 32, 33. I do not include the seven cases included in the excursus to ch. 8 in which no trial is attested: 5*, 6*, 7*, 10*, 18*, 19*, 22*. Question marks indicate doubt that the defendant was a general. Asterisks indicate doubt that a trial occurred, or doubt that a trial was related to the defendant's *strategia* (although the generalship is itself not in question).

[6] 820 *strategiai* rather than the expected 830, since no generals were elected in 404/3.

[7] This discrepancy depends on the position of Kedon in 376/5. See Table 3.

[8] Ch. 8 excursus, nos.: 34, 35*, 40*, 41*, 42, 44, 45*, 47*, 48, 54, 56-58, 63? (Question marks indicate that the deposed official may not have been a general. Asterisks mark cases in which deposition is questionable.)

[9] Ch. 8 excursus, nos.: 34, 36*, 37, 38, 39?, 40-43, 45-49, 50?, 51, 52?, 53, 54, 55*, 56-58, 59?, 60, 61*, 62, 63*, 64, 65*.

EXCURSUS

DEPOSITIONS AND TRIALS OF *STRATEGOI*, 501/0-322/1[1]

1 MILTIADES

DATE: 490/89 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 2 DEPOSED?: ?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL:[2] guilty; fined 50 talents; imprisoned when he was unable to pay fine (Hdt. 6.136.3; Plut. *Cim.* 4.4)

[a] Miltiades was prosecuted by Xanthippos in connection with his failed campaign in Paros. It is clear that he was not recalled from the field to stand trial: our sources suggest that he withdrew from Paros and returned to Athens on his own initiative (Hdt. 6.134-136; Nep. *Milt.* 7; cf. appendix 3). It is possible that Miltiades was deposed upon his return, but we do not know if this occurred.

[1] I have not included in this table those generals who were deposed in 411 by the assembly of soldiers at Samos (Thuc. 8.76.2). Their deposition was not an act of the Athenian *demos per se* and does not reflect normal practice. For a list of trials against military leaders throughout Greece see *GSW* II, pp. 5-10.

If there is doubt that a trial occurred, or doubt that a trial was related to a defendant's *strategia*, a question mark appears after the general's name.

I have not been very concerned with the type of trials which generals underwent, and for the most part I have not included arguments concerning this in the table. In all cases Hansen's catalogue (in *Eisangelia*) should be consulted for discussion and more complete documentation. I have departed from Hansen's identification of trials on only four occasions. In these cases his judgment is as follows: 1. Kimon (463/2), *eisangelia*; 2. Pamphilos (389/8), *euthyna* (see Hansen [1989a], p. 10 n. 32); 3. Chabrias (357/6), *euthyna*? (see *Eisangelia*, pp. 62 n. 36 and 63 n. 39); 4. Hegesileos (349/8), *euthyna*? (see *Eisangelia*, p. 63 n. 39). Hansen identifies as possibly or presumably *eisangeliai* the trials of Dionysios (388/7), Menon (360/59), and Timotheos (360/59). I have added a question mark after identifying these as *eisangeliai* because I have thought the evidence for this identification insufficient: they are listed in our sources together with other trials, all or some of which are known to have been *eisangeliai*. Hansen also identifies six trials as *eisangeliai* because they were preceded by the deposition of the defendant. These are the trials of the two anonymous generals of 379/8, Autokles (360/59), Iphikrates (356/5), Timotheos (356/5), and Menestheus (356/5). I have likewise added a question mark after identifying these as *eisangeliai*: while depositions frequently resulted in *eisangeliai*, other types of trials may have been initiated by this means as well (see ch. 8 n. 1).

[2] Major sources only are listed in the table.

2 THEMISTOKLES?

DATE: 479/8 TRIAL TYPE:
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: — DEPOSED?: ?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: no trial attested

[a] ὁ δῆμος τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπέστησεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς στρατηγίας, καὶ παρέδωκε τὴν ἀρχὴν Ξανθίππῳ τῷ Ἀρίφρονος (Diod. 11.27.3)

By reporting that Themistokles was deposed and his command transferred to Xanthippos, Diodorus (or his source, Ephorus) may only be offering an explanation for Themistokles' apparent absence from the *strategia* in 479/8 (so Podlecki [1975a], p. 95). For full discussion of the problem and bibliography see Hignett (1963), pp. 275-278.

3 KIMON

DATE: 463/2 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia* or *euthyna*[a]
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 5 DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: acquitted (Plut. *Cim.* 15.1)

[a] Kimon's trial is referred to as an *euthyna* at *Ath. Pol.* 27.1. According to Plutarch, however, the trial was initiated in the assembly (*Per.* 10.5, *Cim.* 14.5), which suggests that it was rather an *eisangelia* (so Hansen, *Eisangelia* no. 5 n. 1). The details of the trial have been much discussed and need not concern us here. For recent discussion see Carawan (1987), pp. 202-205 (who suggests that Kimon was indicted by the *ekklesia* but tried before the Areopagos), and Ostwald (1986), pp. 40-41 (who argues that the trial was an *euthyna* which was tried by the Areopagos but referred for final disposition to a popular tribunal).

4 PERIKLES[a]

DATE: 430/29 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 6 DEPOSED?: yes[b]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: fined (Thuc. 2.65.3); Plut. *Per.* 35.4: between 15 and 50 talents; Diod. 12.45.4: 80 talents

[a] According to Diodorus (12.39.2, 45.4) and Plutarch (*Per.* 32.3-4, 35.4), Perikles was brought to trial on two separate occasions, the first time for sacrilege and the second in connection with his *strategia* of 430/29. Some scholars (e.g., Hansen, *Eisangelia* no. 6 n. 5), following Beloch (1884), pp. 330-335, reject the first trial as a dou-

blet and believe that only the trial of 430/29 was historical. Others, following Frost (1964a), pp. 69-72 (cf. [1964b], pp. 392-399), accept that there were two trials and connect the first with the trial of Pheidias in 438/7 and Perikles' role as *epistates* of the statue of Athena. For recent discussion of the problem and bibliography see Carawan (1987), pp. 177-179, Ostwald (1986), pp. 191-194, and Roberts (1982), pp. 31-32, 59-60, and 204 n. 20.

[b] ...[the Athenians] ἀποστήσαντες αὐτὸν [Perikles] τῆς στρατηγίας...ἐζημίωσαν αὐτον ὀγδοήκοντα ταλάντοις (Diod. 12.45.4); ...[the Athenians] ἀφελέσθαι τὴν στρατηγίαν καὶ ζημιῶσαι χρήμασιν [Perikles]... (Plut. *Per.* 35.4)

5-7 XENOPHON?, PHANOMACHOS?, HESTIODOROS?

DATE: 430/29 TRIAL TYPE:
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: — DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: no trial attested[a]

[a] In the winter of 430/29 Xenophon, Phanomachos, and Hestiodoros negotiated terms of surrender with Poteidaia without first consulting the Athenian *demos* (Thuc. 2.70). Thucydides tells us that as a result the Athenians ἐπῃτιάσαντο their generals (2.70.4), which can mean that a formal accusation was laid against them (so Kagan [1974], p. 98 n. 85; cf. *GSW* V, p. 418), but need not. We do not know if the generals were accused or merely criticized by their fellow citizens, nor do we know if they were deposed and tried. (It is clear, however, that if there was a trial the generals were not convicted, since at least two of the three were reelected to the *strategia* for the following year. See Table 3 n. 6). For discussion see Roberts (1982), pp. 34-36.

8 PHORMION

DATE: 429/8 TRIAL TYPE: *euthyna*[a]
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: — DEPOSED?: no[b]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: fined 100 *minai*; suffered *atimia* when he could not pay (*FGH* 324 F 8)

[a] Schol. Ar. *Pax* 347 = Androt. *FGH* 324 F 8.

[b] Jacoby (*FGH* IIIB vol. 1, pp. 135-137) argues that Phormion was deposed. This is possible, but we are not told as much by any source.

9 PACHES

DATE: 428/7 TRIAL TYPE: *euthyna*[a]
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: — DEPOSED?: no
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: ?; reportedly killed himself at trial (Plut. *Arist.* 26.5)

[a] Plut. *Arist.* 26.5, *Nic.* 6.1 For discussion see Roberts (1982), pp. 136-140; Westlake (1975), pp. 113-116.

10 LACHES?

DATE: 426/5 TRIAL TYPE:
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: — DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: no trial attested[a]

[a] Laches was serving in Sicily from 427/6 and was relieved by Pythodoros in the winter of 426/5 (Thuc. 3.115.2, 6). He may have been tried in connection with this campaign: the trial scene in Aristophanes' *Wasps* (894-1008), in which the dog Kuon prosecutes his fellow dog Labes for having eaten a Sicilian cheese (894-897), has been taken by some to parody an actual prosecution of Laches by Kleon for embezzlement in Sicily. (E.g., Ostwald [1986], pp. 212-213 n. 59; Beloch [1884], pp. 337-339. Among those who doubt that Aristophanes' parody reflects an historical trial are Westlake [1975], pp. 115-116, and [1960], p. 402 n. 67; MacDowell [1971], pp. 163-165; Jacoby *FGH* IIIb Suppl. 1, pp. 500-501, and Suppl. 2, pp. 405-406; and *HCT* I, pp. 430-431.) Whether or not Laches was eventually prosecuted, his return to Athens before the end of his second term does not imply that he was deposed.

11 HIPPOKRATES?

DATE: 426/5 TRIAL TYPE:
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: — DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: ?[a]

[a] Antiphon wrote a speech against a certain Hippokrates, either the doctor or the general ([Plut.] *Mor.* 833d10-11). No details of the trial are known.

12-14 EURYMEDON, PYTHODOROS, SOPHOKLES (son of Sostratides)

DATE: 425/4
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 7-9
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangeliai* or *euthynai*
DEPOSED?: ?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: Eurymedon: guilty: fined; Pythodoros and Sophokles: guilty: death *in absentia*?[b]

[a] Sophokles, Pythodoros, and Eurymedon were prosecuted upon their return to Athens from Sicily in the spring of 424 (Thuc. 4.65.3). We do not know if the generals were deposed and tried before the end of their year in office or if their trials resulted from their *euthynai*.

[b] Thucydides tells us that Pythodoros and Sophokles went into exile (4.65.3). We do not know if exile was the sentence given in their trials or if the defendants fled before trial, in which case they will have been sentenced to death *in absentia*. If the generals were sentenced to exile they were probably not tried by *eisangelia*: sentences given in *eisangeliai* appear to have been limited in practice to death and fines (see *Eisangelia*, pp. 35-36).

15 THUCYDIDES

DATE: 424/3
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 10
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia* or *euthyna*[a]
DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: death *in absentia*?[b]

[a] Amphipolis fell to Brasidas in the winter of 424/3 (Thuc. 4.89.1, 102-108; see also *HCT* III, pp. 558 and 720). The deposition and trial of Thucydides probably followed soon thereafter (so Hansen, *Eisangelia* no. 10): it is not likely that the Athenians waited several months before taking action against the man they held responsible for the loss of this strategically important city. Our sources do not permit certainty, however.

[b] Thucydides tells us he was exiled (5.26.5). It is likely that he never returned to Athens and was consequently sentenced to death *in absentia*. See *Eisangelia* no. 10 n. 7 and pp. 35-36.

16 ALKIBIADES

DATE: 415/14
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 12
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia in absentia*
DEPOSED?: yes[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: death *in absentia* (Thuc. 6.61.7; Diod. 13.5.4)

[a] καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν Σαλαμινίαν ναῦν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἥκουσαν ἐπί τε Ἀλκιβιάδην ὡς κελεύσοντας ἀποπλεῖν ἐς ἀπολογίαν ὧν ἡ πόλις ἐνεκάλει... (Thuc. 6.53.1); ...[the Athenians] πέμπουσιν ὅυτω τὴν Σαλαμινίαν ναῦν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν ἐπί τε ἐκεῖνον.... εἴρητο δὲ προειπεῖν αὐτῷ ἀπολογησομένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ξυλλαμβάνειν δὲ μή... (Thuc. 6.61.4-5); οὐ γὰρ [the enemies of Alkibiades] πρότερον ἐπαύσαντο, πρὶν ...[Alkibiades] ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου μετεπέμψαντο... (Isoc. 16.8); ...*ei* [Alkibiades] *nuntius a magistratu in Siciliam missus esset, ut domum ad causam dicendam rediret*... (Nep. *Alc.* 4.3); ...ὁ δῆμος...ἀπέστειλε τὴν Σαλαμινίαν ναῦν εἰς Σικελίαν, κελεύων τὴν ταχίστην ἥκειν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν (Diod. 13.5.2); ...[the *demos*] ἀπέστειλε τὴν Σαλαμινίαν ἐπ' αὐτόν, οὐ φαύλως αὐτό γε τοῦτο προστάξας, μὴ βιάζεσθαι μηδ' ἅπτεσθαι τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ τῷ μετριωτάτῳ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι, κελεύοντας ἀκολουθεῖν ἐπὶ κρίσιν καὶ πείθειν τὸν δῆμον (Plut. *Alc.* 21.7). (Trial not related to defendant's *strategia*.)

17 LAISPODIAS?

DATE: 414/13
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: —
TRIAL TYPE:
DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: ?[a]

[a] Antiphon wrote a speech against Laispodias (title known from Harpocration, s.v., *inter alia*, *Galepsos*). No details of the trial are known; nor can we be certain that Laispodias was tried in connection with his *strategia*.

18-19 PHRYNICHOS? (son of Stratonides), SKIRONIDES?

DATE: 412/11
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: —
TRIAL TYPE:
DEPOSED?: yes[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: no trial attested

[a] ...Φρύνιχον...παρέλυσεν ὁ δῆμος τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τὸν ξυνάρχοντα Σκιρωνίδην... (Thuc. 8.54.3)

20 ARISTARCHOS

DATE: 411-406 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 63 DEPOSED?: ?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: execution (Lycurg. 1.115)

[a] We do not know when between 411 and 406 Aristarchos was tried, nor whether he was first deposed from the *strategia* (which he held in 411).

21 ANYTOS

DATE: 409/8 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*[a]
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 65 DEPOSED?: ?[b]
RESULT OF TRIAL: acquitted, reportedly by bribing jury (Diod. 13.64.6; *Ath. Pol.* 27.5)

[a] The trial is referred to as an *euthyna* at *Lex. Seg.* 236.6. That the assembly was involved in the case, however, suggests that it was an *eisangelia*. See *Eisangelia*, pp. 46-47 and no. 65 n. 1.

[b] In the winter of 409/8 Anytos was sent to relieve those who were besieged in Pylos (Diod. 13.64.6; on the time of year see Beloch, *GG* II.2, pp. 249-250, and *Eisangelia* no. 65). Storms prevented Anytos from rounding Cape Malea in the Peloponnese, and he returned to Athens without having accomplished anything (cf. ch. 8 n. 45). He was tried for treason as a result and was acquitted. Hansen, *Eisangelia* no. 65, dates the trial to 409. The date implies that Anytos was deposed from the *strategia* and tried before the completion of his term. We cannot know if this was the case.

22 ALKIBIADES?

DATE: 407/6 TRIAL TYPE:
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: — DEPOSED?: no?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: no trial attested

[a] After the battle of Notion in 407/6 Alkibiades withdrew from Samos, where the Athenian fleet was stationed, and retired to the Chersonese. It is not clear whether he left office of his own accord or because he had been deposed. I incline to the former explanation. The sources for Alkibiades' retirement and the problems associated with those sources are discussed in appendix 15.

23-30 THRASYLLOS, PERIKLES, LYSIAS, DIOMEDON, ARISTOKRATES, ERASINIDES, PROTOMACHOS, ARISTOGENES

DATE: 406/5 TRIAL TYPE: see below[a]
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 66 DEPOSED?: yes[b]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: 6 executed; Protomachos and Aristogenes: death *in absentia* (Diod. 13.101.7-102)

[a] Erasinides: *eisangelia* and *graphe klopes*; Protomachos and Aristogenes: *eisangeliai in absentia*; the rest: *eisangeliai*

[b] οἱ δ' ἐν οἴκῳ τούτους μὲν τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἔπαυσαν πλὴν Κόνωνος (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.1); ὁ δῆμος προέθηκεν αὐτοῖς [the generals] κρίσιν, καὶ Κόνωνα μὲν ἀπολύσας τῆς αἰτίας προσέταξε τούτῳ τὰς δυνάμεις παραδίδοσθαι, τοὺς δ' ἀλλους ἐψηφίσατο τὴν ταχίστην ἥκειν (Diod. 13.101.5)

31 KLEOPHON? (may not have been a general)[a]

DATE: 405/4 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*, *endeixis*, or *apagoge*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 139 DEPOSED?: yes[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: execution (Lys. 13.12)

[a] Kleophon was tried in the spring of 404 while Theramenes was away from Athens negotiating terms of peace (Lys. 13.10-12). (As Krentz [1982], p. 36 n. 23, points out, it is not clear whether Kleophon was tried during Theramenes' first or second embassy. The trial will nonetheless have occurred before the end of March 404, when the Athenians accepted the Spartans' peace terms [Plut. *Lys.* 15.1].) That Kleophon was tried in the spring implies that, if he was in fact a general, he was first deposed from the *strategia*. His generalship is questionable, however: the only source which identifies him as a *strategos* is the scholiast to Ar. *Ran.* 679. For discussion of the problem see Jameson (1955), pp. 86-87 (pro-generalship), and Lewis (1961), p. 123 (anti-generalship).

32 EUKRATES *et al.*

DATE: 405/4 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 67 DEPOSED?: yes[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: execution (Lys. 13.38, 63)

[a] Eukrates and other generals not named by our sources were accused and arrested shortly before the Athenians surrendered to Sparta in March of 404 (Lys. 13.34-35).

33 ADEIMANTOS

DATE: 393/2
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 68
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia* or *graphe prodosias*[a]
DEPOSED?: no[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty?[b]

[a] Adeimantos was not tried in connection with his 405/4 *strategia* until 393/2, when Konon, his prosecutor, returned to Athens (Dem. 20.68; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.16). That the trial of Adeimantos took place so long after his *strategia* suggests that the procedure was not an *euthyna* (cf. *Eisangelia* no. 68 n. 1).

[b] See *Eisangelia* no. 68 n. 7: the context in which Demosthenes mentions the trial (19.191) suggests that Adeimantos was found guilty, although we cannot know for sure.

34-35 ERGOKLES, THRASYBOULOS (of Steiria; he was not tried)[a]

DATE: 390/89
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 73, —
TRIAL TYPE: Ergokles: *eisangelia*[b]
DEPOSED?: yes, yes?[c]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: execution (Lys. 29.2; Dem. 19.180)

[a] Thrasyboulos was probably among those with Ergokles who were recalled to Athens. He was killed before he returned to Athens for trial.

[b] Lysias uses the term εὐθύνας, but we need not take him literally: the trial must have been an *eisangelia* since it was heard by the Athenian assembly; it was apparently possible to use the term *euthyna* to denote a "calling to account in a more general sense" (so Hansen, *Eisangelia*, pp. 46-47; cf. εὐθύνας at ML 52.71).

[c] ...ὑμεῖς ἐψηφίσασθε...τοὺς ἄρχοντας τοὺς μετ' ἐκείνου [Ergokles] καταπλεῖν εὐθύνας δώσοντας (Lys. 28.5)

36 AGYRRHIOS?[a]

DATE: 389/8?
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: —
TRIAL TYPE: ?
DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: fined; imprisoned when he could not pay (Dem. 24.134-135)

[a] Agyrrhios spent years in prison before he was able to pay back money he owed to the state (Dem. 24.134-135). We do not know if his trial was related to his *strategia* of 389/8 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.31). See *Eisangelia*, p. 62, and Roberts (1982), p. 194 n. 62.

37 PAMPHILOS

DATE: 389/8
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: —
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia* or *euthyna*
DEPOSED?: ?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: fined 5 talents; died in debt ([Dem.] 40.20, 22)

[a] Pamphilos was tried at some time in his career, apparently for embezzlement and probably in connection with his campaign in Aegina in 389/8 (Dem. 40.20, 22; Pl. Com. fr. 14K; schol. Ar. *Plut.* 174). We do not know if Pamphilos' trial was preceded by his deposition from the *strategia*. It is true that the Athenians withdrew Pamphilos and his troops from Aegina, where they had been conducting siege operations (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.5). But Xenophon gives us no reason to suspect that this withdrawal was prompted by the deposition of Pamphilos; his account suggests only that the Athenians were abandoning a campaign which had gone against them and were retrieving from the island the besieging force which had been left there (5.1.2-5). Pamphilos' legal troubles can have begun after his return to Athens. (Sinclair [1988], p. 151 n. 71, expresses some doubt that the trial of Pamphilos was related to his 389/8 *strategia*.)

38 DIONYSIOS[a]

DATE: 388/7?
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 74
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*?
DEPOSED?:
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: fined or sentenced to death (Dem. 19.180)

[a] Demosthenes includes Dionysios in a list of generals who were prosecuted and convicted (19.180). No particulars of the trial are known. He may have been tried in connection with his *strategia* of 388/7, but this is not certain.

39 THRASYBOULOS? (of Kollytos; may not have been a general)

DATE: 387
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 75
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*
DEPOSED?: ?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: acquitted?[b]

[a] Thrasyboulos was tried in connection with his defeat off Abydos in the spring of 387 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.26-27). The precise date of his trial is not known, nor do we know if Thrasyboulos was deposed from the generalship.

[b] Hansen, *Eisangelia* no. 75, suggests that Lysias would have referred to Thrasyboulos' sentence if he had been found guilty (Lys. 26.21-24).

40-41 TWO ANONYMOUS GENERALS

DATE: 379/8 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangeliai*? (one *in absentia*)
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 77-78 DEPOSED?: yes?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: one executed, one sentenced to death *in absentia* (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.19)

[a] οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι ὁρῶντες τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ῥώμην καὶ ὅτι πόλεμος ἐν Κορίνθῳ οὐκέτι ἦν, ἀλλ' ἤδη παριόντες τὴν Ἀττικὴν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εἰς τὰς Θήβας ἐνέβαλλον, οὕτως ἐφοβοῦντο ὥστε καὶ τὼ δύο στρατηγώ...κρίναντες τὸν μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, τὸν δ'...ἐφυγάδευσαν (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.19)

Although we are not told that the generals were deposed, it is likely that they were. I agree with Hansen, *Eisangelia* nos. 77-78 n. 8, that they were probably tried during the winter: "ἐφοβοῦντο...strongly indicates that the trials follow immediately upon the Lakedaimonians' winter campaign against Boiotia." (For the time of year of the Spartan campaign see Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.14.) If the generals were tried in the winter, before the expiry of their office, it is likely that they were first deposed from the *strategia*.

42 TIMOTHEOS

DATE: 373/2 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 80 DEPOSED?: yes[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: acquitted? (see ch. 8 n. 2)

[a] οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι... παύσαντες αὐτὸν [Timotheos] τῆς στρατηγίας Ἰφικράτην ἀνθαιροῦνται (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.13); ἐπειδὴ δὲ [Timotheos] ἀπεχειροτονήθη μὲν ὑφ' ὑμῶν στρατηγός... ([Dem.] 49.9, cf. 49.12); ...[Timotheos] ἀπέβαλε τὴν στρατηγίαν... (Diod. 15.47.3)

43 CHABRIAS

DATE: 366/5 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 84 DEPOSED?: ?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: acquitted? (we know, at least, that Chabrias was not executed: Dem. 21.64)

[a] Chabrias was charged with treason in connection with the Thebans' occupation of Oropos in 366/5. Hansen (*Eisangelia* no. 83 n. 2) thinks it likely given the importance of the loss that the Athenians deposed and tried Chabrias immediately. The evidence does not permit certainty.

44 IPHIKRATES?

DATE: 365/4 TRIAL TYPE:
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: — DEPOSED?: yes[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: no trial attested

[a] ...ἐπειδὴ τὸν μὲν Ἰφικράτην ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε... (Dem. 23.149)

Kallet (1983), pp. 244-245, suggests that ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε does not refer to deposition and that Iphikrates was not deposed. Harris (1989) argues convincingly in response that Iphikrates was deposed but did not return to Athens to face trial. Iphikrates instead went into exile at the court of his brother-in-law Kotys in Thrace.

45 ERGOPHILOS

DATE: 363/2 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 86 DEPOSED?: yes?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: fined? (Dem. 19.180; Arist. *Rh.* 1380b10-13)

[a] ...ἀπηλλαγμένου μὲν Ἐργοφίλου, μέλλοντος δ' Αὐτοκλέους ἐκπλεῖν στρατηγοῦ... (Dem. 23.104)

I include Ergophilos among the deposed with some reservation. The language of Dem. 23.104 (ἀπηλλαγμένου μὲν Ἐργοφίλου) suggests that he was removed from office prematurely (cf. Thuc. 1.129.1: ...Ξέρξης...κελεύει αὐτὸν [Artabazus] τήν τε Δασκυλῖτιν σατραπεῖαν παραλαβεῖν Μεγαβάτην ἀπαλλάξαντα, ὃς πρότερον ἦρχε...; and see LSJ s.v. ἀπαλλάσσω I.A.3), but I do not think it implies it. It is possible that Ergophilos returned to Athens no earlier than the termination of his office in mid-summer 362, at which time Autokles succeeded him in the Hellespont.

46 KALLISTHENES

DATE: 363/2 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 85 DEPOSED?: ?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: execution (Arist. *Rh.* 1380b12-13; Aesch. 2.30)

[a] I will not go so far as to include among the deposed Kallisthenes, Ergophilos' colleague in the *strategia* of 363/2. The two men were tried within a day of each other sometime in 362 (Arist. *Rh.* 1380b12-13). If we knew that those trials were held before the end of the year 363/2, that is, before Kallisthenes and Ergophilos completed their year in office, it would be reasonable to assume that they were both first deposed from the *strategia*. Unfortunately we do not know when in 362 the men were tried. (That Ergophilos was deposed does not imply that he was tried before the end of the year. Autokles [no. 48] was tried more than a year after his deposition.) We therefore cannot speak of a deposition of Kallisthenes with any reasonable degree of certainty. (But cf. Roberts [1982], pp. 21, 113, and 194 n. 62, who thinks it probable that both Ergophilos and Kallisthenes were deposed.)

47 LEOSTHENES

DATE: 362/1 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia in absentia*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 88 DEPOSED?: yes?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: death *in absentia* (flees before trial; Hyp. 3.1-2; Diod. 15.95.3; Aeschin. 2.21, 124 with schol.)

[a] οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι παροξυνθέντες τοῦ μὲν Λεωσθένους ὡς προδότου θάνατον κατέγνωσαν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐδήμευσαν, ἑλόμενοι δὲ στρατηγὸν Χάρητα καὶ ναυτικὴν δύναμιν δόντες ἐξέπεμψαν (Diod. 15.95.3)

Diodorus' account suggests that Leosthenes and Chares were generals in the same year. Chares' replacement of his colleague in that year and the latter's subsequent trial would suggest that Leosthenes was deposed from office. (Diodorus dates Leosthenes' *strategia* to 361/0, but Roberts [1982], p. 209 n. 82, and Schäfer [1856], p. 116 n. 3, have argued persuasively for a date of 362/1. Leosthenes and Chares can have served together in the *strategia* in either year.)

48 AUTOKLES

DATE: 361/0[a] TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*?
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 90 DEPOSED?: yes[b]
RESULT OF TRIAL: ?

[a] Although Autokles was deposed in the spring of 361, his trial did not take place until the winter of 361/0 (see *Eisangelia* no. 90 n. 12).

[b] Αὐτοκλέους ἀποχειροτονηθέντος ([Dem.] 50.12)

49 MENON

DATE: 360/59[a] TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*?
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 95 DEPOSED?: ?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: acquitted? (we know, at least, that he was not executed: *IG* ii^2 124.10)

[a] Menon was sent to replace Autokles in the spring of 362/1 ([Dem.] 50.12). His trial did not take place until 360 (see *Eisangelia* nos. 90 n. 12 and 95 n. 7). We do not know if Menon was deposed from the *strategia*. That his activities began late in the year suggests that he was not.

50 PHILON? (may not have been a general)[a]

DATE: 361/0 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia in absentia*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 89 DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: death *in absentia* (flees before trial)

[a] Our only evidence for Philon's career is Hyp. 3.1-2. He was charged with treason and fled before his trial. We do not know if he was deposed, nor can we be certain that he was a general.

51 TIMOMACHOS

DATE: 361/0 TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia in absentia*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 91 DEPOSED?: ?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: death *in absentia* (flees before trial; Hyp. 3.1-2; schol. Aeschin. 1.56)

[a] We do not know whether Timomachos was tried before or after the end of his year in office. We know only that he had not been deposed after four months of service ([Dem.] 50.39, 53).

52 THEOTIMOS? (may not have been a general)[a]

DATE: 361/0
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 94
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia in absentia*
DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: death *in absentia* (flees before trial; Hyp. 3.1-2)

[a] Hyp. 3.1-2 is our only evidence for Theotimos' career. We are told that he lost Sestos, was impeached by *eisangelia*, and went into exile before his trial. We do not know if he was deposed, nor can we be certain that he was in fact a *strategos*.

53 TIMOTHEOS

DATE: 360/59[a]
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 93
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*?
DEPOSED?: ?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: ?

[a] Hansen (*Eisangelia* no. 93 n. 6) argues that the trial took place in 360: Demosthenes mentions the prosecution of Timotheos together with other trials which date to that year (36.53). If Hansen is correct, the trial will have been preceded by the deposition of Timotheos from the *strategia*, but the argument is not conclusive.

54 KEPHISODOTOS (of Acharnai)

DATE: 360/59
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 96
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*
DEPOSED?: yes[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: fined 5 talents (Dem. 23.167)

[a] ...ἀπεχειροτονήσατε μὲν τὸν στρατηγόν [Kephisodotos] (Dem. 23.167, cf. 23.168); ...[Kephisodotos] 'Αλωπεκόννησον πολιορκῶν ἀπεχειροτονήθη... (Harp. s.v. *Kephisodotos*)

55 CHABRIAS?

DATE: 357/6
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: —
TRIAL TYPE: ?
DEPOSED?: ?[a]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: ?[a]

[a] Hansen, *Eisangelia*, p. 62 n. 36, argues that toward the end of 358/7 Chabrias was deposed from the *strategia*, tried, and condemned: the general's name was erased from a treaty of alliance (*IG* ii^2 124 = *GHI* 153) which was concluded with Euboia in the following year. I agree with Develin, *AO* pp. 275-277, that the erasure of Chabrias' name from the treaty is not sufficient evidence to warrant Hansen's conclusion, particularly since Chabrias' death—another event of 357/6—may have occurred before the treaty was formalized.

56-58 IPHIKRATES, TIMOTHEOS, MENESTHEUS

DATE: 356/5
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 100-102
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*?[a]
DEPOSED?: yes[b]
RESULT OF TRIAL: see below[c]

[a] The trial is described by Dionysius Halicarnassius as both an *eisangelia* and an *euthyna* (*Lys.* 12.30-33). That it was preceded by the deposition of the generals suggests that it was in fact an *eisangelia*. See ch. 8 n. 1 and ch. 8 excursus n. 1.

[b] *populus*...[Iphikrates and Timotheos] *domum revocat: accusantur proditionis* (Nep. *Tim.* 3.5); ...οἱ δ' 'Αθηναῖοι παροξυνθέντες καὶ κρίσιν τῷ 'Ιφικράτει καὶ Τιμοθέῳ προθέντες ἐζημίωσαν αὐτοὺς πολλοῖς ταλάντοις καὶ τῆς στρατηγίας ἀπέστησαν (Diod. 16.21.4)

We are not told specifically that Menestheus was deposed, but he was tried together with Timotheos and his father Iphikrates for his part in the campaign which the three conducted against the allies (Isoc. 15.129; Dion. Hal. *Din.* 13.46-48). It is likely that he was deposed along with his colleagues, despite the silence of our sources.

[c] Menestheus and Iphikrates were both acquitted (Isoc. 15.129; see *Eisangelia* no. 100 n. 13). Timotheos was found guilty and fined 100 talents (Din. 3.17; Isoc. 15.129; Nep. *Tim.* 3.5). He went into exile to avoid paying the fine (Plut. *Mor.* 605f).

59 MELANOPOS? (may not have been general)[a]

DATE: 355/4?
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: —
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia*?[b]
DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: fined 3 talents (Dem. 24.127)

[a] Demosthenes informs us that Melanopos was convicted of treason and fined three talents (24.127). The trial could be related to a *strategia*: "Melanopos" has been suggested as the name of the general referred to in an inscription dated to 355: [Μελάνω]πον τὸν στρ[ατηγὸν] (*IG* ii^2 150.5). The reading is far from certain, however, and the connection of the trial mentioned by Demosthenes with a *strategia* in 355 is not proved.

[b] That Melanopos was convicted of treason suggests that the trial was an *eisangelia* (Hyp. 5.7-8).

60 HEGESILEOS

DATE: 349/8
TRIAL TYPE: ?[a]
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: —
DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: ?

[a] Hegesileos was tried in connection with his campaign to Euboia (Dem. 19.290 with schol.). We do not know what procedure was used against him.

61 PROXENOS?[a]

DATE: 347/6
TRIAL TYPE: *apophasis*
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: —
DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: ? (imprisoned, perhaps for failure to pay a fine; Din. 1.63; Dem. 19.280 with schol.)

[a] We know that Proxenos was tried on some occasion before the Areopagos Council (Dem. 19.280 with schol.; Din. 1.62-63), but it is not clear that the trial was related to his *strategia*.

62 LYSIKLES (*AO* no. 1857)

DATE: 338/7
TRIAL TYPE: *eisangelia* or *euthyna*[a]
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: 112
DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: sentenced to death (Diod. 16.88)

[a] We do not have sufficient information to determine the procedure by which Lysikles was tried.

63 PHILOKLES? (son of Phormion; may not have been general)[a]

DATE: 323
TRIAL TYPE: *apophasis* [b]
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: —
DEPOSED?: yes[c]
RESULT OF TRIAL: guilty: ?[d]

[a] For discussion of the question of Philokles' generalship, see appendix 16.

[b] For the present purpose I am assuming that Philokles was tried by *apophasis* in 323 both for having admitted Harpalos into the Peiraieus during his *strategia* of 325/4 and for bribery in connection with the Harpalos affair. But there is reason to suspect that Philokles was prosecuted in connection with his *strategia* prior to 323, in a separate trial: (1) It would be odd, albeit not unprecedented (cf. Autokles), if Philokles were not tried for an offense committed in late 325/4 until the spring of 323. One might suggest that Philokles' trial was postponed when he came under suspicion in the Harpalos affair, but the Areopagos did not publish its list of suspected bribe-takers until more than six months after Philokles' deposition (Din. 1.45). Many Athenians may have had their suspicions about Philokles before that time, but it is not likely that popular suspicion alone would have prompted the postponement of his trial. (2) We know that Philokles was not the first to be tried in the Harpalos affair (Din. 1.105-106; Hyp. 1.6-7; Dem. *Ep.* 2.14), but Dinarchus informs us that he was the first to be handed over to the *dikasterion* by the assembly (3.14: ...τὸν δῆμον ἅπαντα κατήγορον τούτου γεγενημένον καὶ προκεχειρικότα πρῶτον τῶν ἄλλων ἐπὶ τὸ τὴν τιμωρίαν ἐν ὑμῖν δοῦναι). Worthington suggests as an explanation for this apparent inconsistency (in private correspondence, but cf. [1992], pp. 277, 315, and 327) that Dinarchus may here be telescoping a first trial of Philokles for his *strategia* of 325/4 into the context of the Harpalos trials.

[c] καὶ ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἅπας οὔτ' ἀσφαλὲς οὔτε δίκαιον νομίζων εἶναι παρακαταθέσθαι τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας, ἀπεχειροτόνησεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ἐφήβων ἐπιμελείας... (Din. 3.15).

[d] Philokles went into exile, which may mean that he was exiled by the court or that he fled Athens after his trial (Dem. *Ep.* 3.31).

64 CHARES[a]

DATE: ?
TRIAL TYPE: ?
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: —
DEPOSED?: ?
RESULT OF TRIAL: acquitted?[b]

[a] Aeschines refers to Chares' frequent accusers: ...καὶ ταῦτα ὑμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν ἀεὶ τοῖς Χάρητος οἱ κατήγοροι δεικνύουσι... (2.71). No specifics are known about the trials against him.

[b] The implication of Dem. 19.332 is that Chares was acquitted whenever tried (Sinclair [1988], p. 151 n. 71).

65 PHOKION?

DATE: ?
TRIAL TYPE: *euthyna*[a]
EISANGELIA CAT. NO.: —
DEPOSED?: no
RESULT OF TRIAL: ?

[a] Plutarch (*Phoc.* 9.4) speaks of the Athenians demanding that Phokion render his accounts: ...τραχυνομένου τοῦ δήμου πρὸς αὐτὸν σφόδρα, καὶ τῆς στρατηγίας εὐθύνας ἀπαιτοῦντος.... It is not clear that the *euthyna* referred to resulted in prosecution.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSIONS

Should someone unacquainted with the history of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. select as his only source for the period the relevant biographies of Plutarch, he would come away from reading that author seriously misled. Preoccupied with the character of prominent figures, and devoid of any sustained interest in constitutional theory or practice, Plutarch presents a city which, whatever its formal system of administration, has surrendered its affairs to a series of great men. These leading politicians, often serving as *strategoi*, dispatched Athens' forces and responded to foreign embassies and sent Athenian cleruchs abroad, all against a backdrop of a nearly impotent *ekklesia*. We can forgive Plutarch if his conception of the history of Athens was colored by his own program, "biography, not history" (*Alex.* 1), and by his experiences under the principate some five hundred years after Perikles' death. But we must not ourselves cast Athens in an imperial mold on the Roman model and portray its elected officials as near autocrats unless our evidence suggests that this vision of Athens adequately reflects historical reality.

I have been concerned with determining whether Athens' generals enjoyed a significant degree of authority over their city's military operations by virtue of their tenure of the *strategia*. A survey of the evidence suggests that substantial authority in the military sphere did not in fact attend election to that office. However much influence prominent generals enjoyed in Athens as a result of their rhetorical skill or other attributes, they and lesser figures did not, I suggest, exercise effective control over campaign-related decision-making either in Athens or in the field in their capacity as *strategoi*. The conditions of ancient warfare demanded that generals at any remove from Athens themselves oversee without reference to the *ekklesia* the day-to-day conduct of their city's military expeditions. But the power to make low-level decisions while on campaign did not, I would argue, amount to a meaningful degree of authority. Throughout the classical period, it was Athens' *ekklesia* and not its *strategoi* which, in all important respects, determined how the city's campaigns would be conducted and concluded. The Athenian *demos*, whose will was manifested in decisions of the *dikasteria* as well as in ekklesiastic *psephismata*, did not surrender its

authority to the *strategia*, but maintained throughout the period a pervasive control over the city's military operations.

The means by which the authority of generals over military operations was limited were many. Most basic is that the *strategia* was collegiate. Having been elected to their city's most important office, individual generals nevertheless shared that distinction with nine other men whose constitutional authority was, our evidence suggests, equal to their own. Command of particular expeditions, moreover, was frequently entrusted by the *ekklesia* to two or more *strategoi* at a time, a consequence of which was that decisions made in the field were often the product of consideration by more than one Athenian general. Less frequently in Athens' history, generals shared their authority with other military officials. In the early fifth century, in a manner which we cannot fully trace, generals acted in conjunction with Athens' polemarch, and on occasion throughout the fifth and fourth centuries they shared command with the *hegemones* of allied states with which Athens had undertaken joint campaigns.

The freedom of action of generals in the field was restricted as well by means of the instructions which the *ekklesia* issued to its *strategoi* both before their departure from Athens and in mid-campaign. These ranged from detailed descriptions of what was expected of generals to rather broad definitions of the objectives of an expedition. Whatever their level of specificity, the assembly's directives appear to have commanded respect. We may posit readily enough an explanation for the tendency of generals to comply with their government's instructions. The Athenians subjected their *strategoi* to regular scrutiny both upon their departure from office and in mid-year. At any time in the course of their *strategiai* generals might be recalled to Athens from the field and tried in connection with their conduct of a campaign. Depositions and trials occurred regularly enough that the possibility of campaign-related prosecution must have been perceived by generals as a genuine threat. Our evidence suggests, moreover, that generals who were prosecuted in connection with their *strategiai* were usually convicted, and that the sentences passed against them were usually severe. The threat of disciplinary action therefore provided a strong incentive for generals to act in compliance with the directives of the *ekklesia* or, where no such explicit direction had been provided, with what they perceived to be the expectations of their home government.

Communication between the *ekklesia* and its generals abroad appears to have been frequent, but the exchange of letters and messengers between the two was not the only means by which the Athenians were informed about the performance of their *strategoi* in the field. Generals were surrounded when on campaign by representatives of the *demos* in the person of their officers and citizen troops. It was inevitable that a general's subordinates

would recount their experiences in the field to family and friends in Athens, whether by private communication in the course of an expedition or upon their return home. These lower strata of the army thus had the capacity to damage the reputations of their commanding officers in Athens, but they posed a threat to generals for other reasons as well. As constituent members of the Athenian *demos* a general's subordinates might testify against, or themselves prosecute, their former commanders. At the very least, disgruntled servicemen returned to Athens were not likely to reelect an unpopular general to the *strategia* or vote sympathetically in the event that they served as dikasts at that general's trial. Because officers and troops had the capacity to damage their commanders, generals were wise when on campaign not only to act in accordance with the instructions of the Athenians, but to consider as well what the response of their subordinates would be to any command decisions they might make. However far generals marched their troops from the borders of Attica, they did not leave Athens' *pnyx* and *dikasteria* far behind.

APPENDIX ONE

MANNING THE WALLS AND MANNING THE *PNYX*

In his discussion of Thuc. 2.22.1 and the moratorium on *ekklesiai* which obtained during the invasion of 431, Dover (1960), p. 75, suggests that while the Peloponnesians were in Attica the generals' consent may have been required for an assembly to be convened because "to collect the citizens was to denude the walls." Kagan (1974), p. 56, likewise writes that if the citizens "were called to assembly the city walls would be undefended; if they stayed at their posts the assembly would be peculiarly unrepresentative." Neither consideration, however, is a thoroughly convincing explanation for the apparent failure of Athens' officials to summon an *ekklesia* during the Peloponnesians' first invasion. Thucydides, reporting on Athens' army strength at the beginning of the war, tells us at 2.13.6-7 that 16,000 men were posted in Athens' garrisons or detailed to guard the city's walls. These 16,000 were made up of metic hoplites and the oldest and youngest of the Athenians (that is, those Athenians who were between the ages of 18 and 19 or between 50 and 59). In addition to these 16,000, the Athenians could field some 15,800 Athenians: 13,000 hoplites, 1200 cavalry, and 1600 archers. Now, it is clear that the number of Athenians who had the right to attend an *ekklesia* was larger than the number of men the city could field. We lack definitive evidence, however, for the size of Athens' citizen population at the beginning of the war.[1] For this reason, and because it is not necessary for my argument that the total number of Athens' citizens be taken into account, I consider in the following only those Athenians to whom Thucydides refers at 2.13.6-7. For the present purpose I assume (A) that all of the 16,000 who were detailed to guard Athens' walls and garrisons were required for that purpose at all times during the invasion of 431 (that is, that they did not work in shifts, as was presumably the case[2]); and (B) that the only Athenians who would have been able to attend an *ekklesia*

[1] For recent discussion see Hansen (1988b), pp. 14-28, who suggests that there may have been as many as 60,000 citizens in 431.

[2] So also Hansen (1981b), p. 20. Cf. Thuc. 7.28.2: πρὸς γὰρ τῇ ἐπάλξει τὴν μὲν ἡμέραν κατὰ διαδοχὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι φυλάσσοντες, τὴν δὲ νύκτα καὶ ξύμπαντες πλὴν τῶν ἱππέων, οἱ μὲν ἐφ' ὅπλοις †ποιούμενοι†, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους, καὶ θέρους καὶ χειμῶνος ἐταλαιπωροῦντο.

Removing these 16,000 from consideration, we need not be concerned with what percentage of them were Athenians rather than metics, nor need we consider whether the figure 16,000 should be emended (for discussion of which possibility see Hansen, p. 19).

during the invasion were those of the 15,800 referred to by Thucydides who were not abroad on military expeditions at the time. Thus confining ourselves, we should arrive at a most conservative figure for the number of citizens who were available to attend an assembly while the Peloponnesians were in Attica. Of the 15,800 whom the Athenians could field, we know of 4600 who were away from Athens on military expeditions at the beginning of the invasion (1.61.4, 64.2; 2.29.6, 31.2). A further 1400 Athenians were dispatched against the Peloponnese during the invasion (2.23.1-2). (They apparently set out, however, after the Peloponnesians had left their camp at Acharnai. Since it was the Peloponnesians' ravaging of Acharnai which prompted the most heated opposition to Perikles' passivity [2.21.3], hostility to his strategy will have been voiced prior to the departure of these 1400 from Athens. And if the *demos* was in fact agitating during the invasion for the convening of an *ekklesia*—"if", because the Athenians' discontent with Perikles' policy need not have been expressed by this means [see pp. 10-11]—this too is likely to have begun before the dispatch of the 1400.) Following Thucydides' account, then, we may conclude that in addition to those who were required to defend Athens' walls there were between 9800 and 11,200 citizens eligible for active service in Athens during the Peloponnesian invasion. Nearly 10,000 citizens, that is, and probably many more, could have been spared to attend an *ekklesia* during the invasion without there being any negative effect on the city's defenses. Moreover, since *ekklesiai* of the period probably attracted fewer than 6,000 citizens on most occasions (Hansen [1983a], p. 18), an assembly convened during the invasion need not have been any less well attended than those summoned at other times.

(2) It is true, as Kagan (1974), p. 56, notes, that an *ekklesia* convened while the Peloponnesians were in Attica in 431 would have been unrepresentative: at any given time, large numbers of Athens' oldest and youngest will have been engaged in the defense of Athens' walls and therefore unable to participate in an assembly.[3] But would the potential for their under representation in the *ekklesia* have been seen as reason not to summon a meeting? It was always the case that Athenians on military service abroad were denied the opportunity to participate in assemblies, and their absence from Athens may have resulted in *ekklesiai* which were not representative. Yet on these occasions assemblies were convened despite the possibility that certain age groups might be underrepresented on the *pnyx*, and although military obligations were depriving some Athenians of the opportunity to

[3] After 338, 18-19 year-olds probably were not entitled to attend *ekklesiai*; this may not have been the case in the fifth century (*Ath. Pol.* 42.5; Hansen [1991], pp. 89, 129).

exercise their civic rights.[4] The situation in 431 was not different in kind from what would have been the case whenever Athenians were abroad on campaigns. Nonetheless it is true that larger numbers of Athenians than usual would have been denied the option of participating in the *ekklesia* during the invasion because of the necessity of guarding the walls against enemy attack. That so many citizens would have been unable to attend an assembly may have mattered to the Athenians or to their officials, who may have responded by not holding *ekklesiai* while the Peloponnesians were in Attica. My own suspicion, however, is that this consideration was not a cause of the Athenians' failure to assemble during that period.

[4] The absence of the fleet from Athens in 411 worked to the advantage of the oligarchs, who were able to effect a revolution free of the interference of a large number of democratically-minded citizens. (For the navy's hostility to the oligarchy see, e.g., Thuc. 8.72.2, 75-76, 86.1-4.)

APPENDIX TWO

THE MILTIADES DECREE

There is some evidence for the debate which preceded the Athenian decision to meet the Persians in the field in 490. Herodotus, our principal source for the campaign, makes no mention of such deliberation (6.103.1), but Aristotle refers to a decree proposed by the general Miltiades which called for the Athenians to take provisions and take the field (*Rh.* 1411a10; cf. Dem. 19.303), and Cornelius Nepos, writing in the first century B.C., refers explicitly to debate in Athens. According to Nepos, Athens' ten generals disagreed about whether the Athenians should meet the Persians or take refuge behind their walls. Miltiades favored engagement, and his opinion prevailed after 1000 Plataians arrived in Athens eager to repulse the invaders (*Milt.* 4.4-5.2). The historicity of the Miltiades decree and the debate described by Nepos is discussed most profitably in conjunction with a passage in Herodotus to which Nepos' account bears resemblance. Herodotus informs us that after they had taken the field Athens' generals disagreed about whether they should fight the Persians. The matter was resolved by the vote of the polemarch Kallimachos, who had, however, apparently not taken part in the generals' initial discussions.[1] Miltiades won Kallimachos' support in the debate by arguing that a battle would minimize the likelihood of the Athenians medizing. The decision to fight thus made, the Athenians nevertheless did not engage the Persians for some days, until it was Miltiades' turn to command: according to Herodotus, the presidency (πρυτανηίη) of the *strategia* passed daily from one general to another, while the polemarch never held command at all (6.109-111).[2]

We have evidence, then, for two debates, one occurring prior to the Athenians' departure from Athens, the other when the Athenians were already in the field. We may believe that neither debate is historical, that both are, or that either Herodotus or Nepos has transposed the discussion from its historical venue. There is nothing inherently implausible about there having been a debate among the Athenian commanders in the field. Herodotus reports that there was a delay of some days between the arrival of the Atheni-

[1] He had at least not voted on the first occasion (6.109.1-2). Cf. ch. 4 n. 6.
[2] For related discussions see ch. 4 and ch. 5 § 2.1.

ans in Marathon and the battle itself.[3] He implies that Miltiades was waiting for the day of his presidency before he attacked, but a more likely explanation for the delay is that the Athenians were awaiting the arrival of the Spartans,[4] who had promised to send help after their celebration of the *Karneia.*[5] During their time in Marathon the Athenian commanders may well have debated amongst themselves the advantages of continued delay versus the desirability of fighting at once, while morale in the army was high and the likelihood of treason in Athens relatively small. That the Athenians eventually did fight before the Spartans arrived suggests either that the disadvantages of delay had come to outweigh the benefits or that the Persians initiated hostilities and thus forced the Athenians to fight before they were willing.[6]

That some such discussion occurred in the field among Athens' commanders is plausible.[7] It is likewise plausible, indeed virtually certain, that the dispatch of forces to Marathon was preceded by debate in Athens, but I do not believe that Nepos has preserved in his narrative any accurate information about that debate. Nepos' account suggests that Athens' generals were alone in deciding whether the Athenians should defend their walls or take the field against the invading Persians: no one other than the *strategoi* is mentioned as having participated in the discussion, nor is there any indication either that the generals' opinions were aired in a public forum or that their consensus was ratified by the *demos* (*Milt.* 4.4-5.2). This is contrary to what we would expect, namely, that the formal decision to take the field was made by the Athenian *demos*, however responsible the *strategoi* may have been for the policy adopted.[8] Nepos is unlikely to be correct in attributing to the generals complete responsibility for decision-making in this

[3] Later sources place the battle earlier, on the day of the Athenians' arrival at Marathon (Isoc. 4.87, Suda s.v. *Hippias*) or the following day (Nep. *Milt.* 5.3-4, Plut. *Mor.* 350e), but Herodotus is likely to have had more reliable information about the timing of the fight (cf. Lazenby [1993], p. 59).

[4] Lazenby (1993), p. 59; Burn (1962), p. 246. There must have been some strategic advantage to delaying battle. Herodotus' explanation is not sufficient. (Cf. HW II, p. 357: "Miltiades holds the command for several days by grace of his colleagues, who cede their days to him, and yet, though convinced that the interests of Athens demand instant battle for fear of internal sedition...he will not engage till his own day comes round....")

[5] Hdt. 6.106. The Spartans were evidently prohibited from engaging in military operations during the *Karneia*. Cf. Thuc. 5.54.2 and see HW II, pp. 109 and 223.

[6] Lazenby (1993), pp. 59-62, argues that, contrary to the implication of Herodotus, the Persians did take the initiative.

[7] It is possible, however, that Herodotus has not accurately described the details of their debate. Specifically, Herodotus' portrayal of Kallimachos as a minor player in the generals' discussions may be mistaken. If Athens' generals were subordinate to the polemarch between 501/0 and 487/6 (for discussion of which possibility see chapter 4), we may believe that Kallimachos, as supreme commander at Marathon, had a greater role than Herodotus suggests in whatever discussions of strategy took place before the battle.

[8] So also How (1919), p. 53, and Macan (1895), II, pp. 208-209.

instance. More probably, the author has transposed to an earlier occasion the council-of-war which Herodotus describes. Nepos' debate is similar to that of Herodotus both in subject matter and in the pivotal role which the author ascribes to Miltiades. Nepos, moreover, has almost certainly transposed to Athens another element of Herodotus' story. He reports that the Plataians arrived in Athens before the Athenians decided to take the field (*Milt.* 5.1), but according to Herodotus, who is likely to have been better informed than Nepos about the chronology of the campaign, the Athenians were already at Marathon when the Plataians arrived (6.108.1).[9] I think it likely that Nepos has compressed his account of the campaign, removing to the Athenian stage events which occurred later at Marathon, and thereby conflating two separate traditions, that Miltiades proposed a decree calling for the Athenians' mobilization before the battle, and that there was disagreement among the generals about whether or not to fight the Persians.[10] I have already suggested that the latter tradition has some historical basis. It remains to consider the historicity of the Miltiades decree.

It is reasonable to believe that a mobilization decree was issued prior to the Athenians' departure for Marathon, but we may doubt whether Miltiades was its proposer. The sources which identify him as such are late. A passage in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* suggests that a decree proposed by Miltiades called for the Athenians to take the field having first provisioned themselves (1411a10). Demosthenes (19.303) and Aelius Aristides (3.160 Behr) mention without further explanation a decree of Miltiades which scholiasts on the passages place in the context of the Marathon campaign.[11] That no source earlier than the fourth century refers to the decree is worrying: it is too easy to imagine that later tradition attributed to Miltiades, a likely enough suspect, responsibility for the Athenians' decision to meet the barbarian.[12] Nevertheless Herodotus' silence does not mean that the implication of our fourth-century sources is mistaken. The matter is irresolvable, but my doubts about the identification of Miltiades as the decree's proposer

[9] How (1919), pp. 53-54, favors Herodotus' timing of the Plataians' arrival and argues that the Plataians would not have sent help before the Athenians decided to take the field against the Persians.

[10] Hignett (1963), p. 70, likewise suggests that Nepos has moved Herodotus' debate to Athens. Burn (1962), p. 241 n. 12, and Green (1970), p. 34, question rather the debate described by Herodotus. Lazenby (1993), pp. 50-52, doubts that the Athenians would have considered the defense of their walls a practical alternative to taking the field, as Nepos claims they did.

[11] Plut. *Mor.* 628e adds that the decree was passed when the tribe Aiantis was in prytany. Pausanias mentions that a decree moved by Miltiades called for slaves to be freed prior to the battle of Marathon (7.15.7).

[12] Podlecki (1975a), p. 160, sees in the Miltiades decree "a late attempt to fabricate a mobilization decree before Marathon and provide Miltiades with the honour of having initiated a piece of legislation to equal Themistocles'—no doubt with Themistocles' as its model."

are strong enough: for the present purpose I will assume that Miltiades was not responsible for the Athenians' mobilization before Marathon.[13]

[13] That Miltiades was the proposer of the decree is accepted by Hammond (1968), pp. 33-34, and How (1919), p. 53. Doubts are expressed by Podlecki (1975a), pp. 160-161, Rhodes (1972), p. 17 n. 4, and Macan (1895), II, p. 219. See also Habicht (1961), p. 20, who questions the historicity of the decree primarily because the information which Plutarch adds (*Mor.* 628e), that the decree was passed during the prytany of Aiantis, is probably not historical.

APPENDIX THREE

490/89: MILTIADES' PARIAN EXPEDITION

Sometime after the repulse of the Persians at Marathon,[1] Miltiades sailed against the island of Paros. The expedition was a failure. Miltiades sustained an injury and returned to Athens, where he was tried, convicted, and fined 50 talents. He died not long afterward from his injury (Hdt. 6.132-136; Eph. *FGH* 70 F 63; Nep. *Milt.* 7). This much about the campaign is more or less clear. Disagreements in our sources prevent us from being as certain about the purpose of Miltiades' expedition[2] and the reason for its failure.[3]

[1] Bicknell (1972a), pp. 225-226, dates the expedition to late in the campaigning season of 490. His argument depends on his accepting the evidence of Ephorus (*FGH* 70 F 63) and Nepos (*Milt.* 7.3-4) that Miltiades withdrew from Paros because he feared the intervention of the Persians, who were still in the Aegean. (According to Hdt. 6.118, Datis stopped at Mykonos and Delos *en route* to Asia.) Macan (1895), II, pp. 249-250, argues that the expedition could have been made no earlier than the spring of 489 because the Athenians would not have risked sending their forces out while the Persian fleet was nearby. How (1919), p. 60, likewise dates the expedition to 489, but his argument is less persuasive. He suggests that there was an interval between the Marathon and Parian campaigns during which Miltiades enjoyed his renown, citing as evidence Hdt. 6.132: μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν Μαραθῶνι τρῶμα γενόμενον Μιλτιάδης, καὶ πρότερον εὐδοκιμέων παρὰ Ἀθναίοισι, τότε μᾶλλον αὔξετο. But I do not think the passage implies an interval of any particular length between the campaigns. If we accept the reason advanced by Ephorus and Nepos for Miltiades' withdrawal, we ought accept as well Bicknell's date of the campaign. Cf. n. 3 below.

[2] According to Herodotus, Miltiades attacked Paros because of a personal grudge against a certain Parian, although he alleged as a pretext for the expedition (presumably after the fact, at his trial) the Parians' support of the Persians in 490 (6.133.1). Herodotus does not mention any objective of Miltiades' expedition other than Paros. According to Ephorus (*FGH* 70 F 63) and Nepos (*Milt.* 7.1-2), however, Paros was one of many medizing islands that Miltiades attacked. It would not be surprising if Miltiades intended to attack other islands, if he did not do so in fact. Paros was not the only island which had sided with the Persians. But it should be noted that Herodotus is at least consistent in identifying Paros as the lone objective of the expedition: that Miltiades returned to Athens without any money, as Herodotus reports (6.135.1), suggests that he had not had success against other islands. For discussion of the purpose of Miltiades' expedition see Develin (1977), pp. 571-577.

[3] Ephorus reports that the Parians had been about to surrender to Miltiades but had changed their minds after a fire on the nearby island of Mykonos convinced them Persian help was coming (*FGH* 70 F 63). That Ephorus does not explain why Miltiades was unable to take the island despite the inhabitants' intransigence is a weakness, particularly as he tells us the Parians' walls were already falling: τῶν τειχῶν πιπτόντων. Nepos' story is similar to that of Ephorus but has the advantage of explaining Miltiades' departure from the island. He reports that the fire (*in continenti*, in this case) convinced both the Parians and Miltiades that the Persian fleet was *en route*, and that Miltiades returned to Athens as a result (*Milt.* 7.3-4). Herodotus' story is rather different. He tells us that Miltiades went to the temple of Demeter on Paros, perhaps in order to steal a sacred object. At the doors of the temple Miltiades became frightened, and he turned back. He injured his leg while jumping down from the precinct wall and later sailed home (6.134-135.1). The implication of Herodotus' account is that Miltiades' expedition was thwarted by divine nemesis (cf. 6.135.3), a not surprising explanation given that his sources for the story were Parian (6.134.1). At the same time, however, Herodotus provides a plausible and sufficient reason for the failure of the expedition: Miltiades had been injured, though we may doubt whether he sustained his wound in the manner which Herodotus describes. He eventually died from the injury (6.136.3), which suggests that its severity warranted aborting the campaign. Since Miltiades was the author of the expedition and its sole commander, we may imagine that its success depended—or was perceived to have depended—on his leadership, and that it could not readily be continued without him. (Note that Kimon's death was one reason for the withdrawal of the Athenians from Kition in 451/0 [Thuc. 1.112.4]. The Athenians, following Kimon's instructions, allegedly went to some trouble to hide the fact of his death from their enemy [Plut. *Cim.* 19.2].)

That Herodotus provides as plausible a reason as Nepos for the withdrawal of Miltiades from Paros seems under appreciated. Of the failed expedition Bicknell (1972a), p. 226, writes: "Fearing Persian intervention the Athenian commander [according to Nepos] abandoned the siege and sailed back to Athens. With better reason than in Herodotus, who has Miltiades foiled *solely* by Parian ingenuity and tenacity" (my italics). Macan (1895), I, p. 389, says in his note to 6.135.1 that Miltiades ended the siege of Paros because of his injury, yet he writes elsewhere (II, p. 250) that "apart from the personal motives of Miltiades, it is not easy to see, in the text of Herodotus, why the siege should have been abandoned so soon…." The reason for Miltiades' departure from Paros is also obscured in some translations. Herodotus explains at 6.135.1 the circumstances under which Miltiades left Paros: Μιλτιάδης μέν νυν φλαύρως ἔχων ἀπέπλεε ὀπίσω…. Grene translates: "So Miltiades sailed home in a very sad case…." Cf. Powell: "in sorry case". (Rawlinson, however, translates: "So Miltiades returned home sick….") Translations such as these which do not emphasize Miltiades' injury do not convey, in my view, the proper sense of φλαύρως ἔχων, that Miltiades returned to Athens *because he was ill* (cf. LSJ s.v. φλαῦρος III). I see no reason why we cannot believe both Ephorus and Herodotus in this instance: a fire on Mykonos may have changed the Parians' minds about surrendering, while Miltiades' wound compelled him to abort the siege. By this reconstruction only Nepos' rationalization of Ephorus' account—his suggestion that the fire prompted Miltiades' withdrawal—need be discarded.

Of particular concern here is Herodotus' description of the genesis of the campaign. According to that author, Miltiades asked the Athenians for 70 ships,[4] an army, and money; he did not name the country he intended to attack, but won the Athenians' support for the expedition nevertheless by claiming it would bring them gold (6.132). The implication of Herodotus' account is that the Parian campaign was masterminded by Miltiades: he chose its objective, suggested the size of the force that should be used, and offered himself as general. The *demos*, in turn, ratified his suggestions. That the Athenians were not fully apprised of the details of the campaign suggests that Miltiades' control over its initial, deliberative stage was nearly complete.

Nepos' reference to this stage of the expedition neither confirms nor contradicts Herodotus' claim that the campaign had originated with

[4] Herodotus (6.132) and Nepos (*Milt.* 7.1) agree on the number, but there may be a problem: the Athenians had only 50 of their own ships a few years later (Hdt. 6.89) when they sailed against Aegina. On this inconsistency see HW II, p. 100, and Macan (1895), I, pp. 346-347.

Miltiades, but it does imply that the Athenians were aware of their general's intentions when he sailed. According to Nepos the Athenians provided Miltiades with a fleet *in order* for him to attack islands which had medized before Marathon: ...*classem septuaginta navium Athenienses eidem Miltiadi dederunt, ut insulas quae barbaros adiuverant, bello persequeretur* (*Milt.* 7.1). But Nepos' remark is brief and lacking in detail. The author does not appear interested in the origins of the campaign, nor concerned with refuting Herodotus' account of Miltiades' involvement in its planning. It would not be surprising if Nepos has attributed to the Athenians greater familiarity with Miltiades' intentions than they in fact possessed.

Nepos is consistent in excluding from his account any hint of Herodotus' version of the campaign's initial stages: Herodotus claims Miltiades was charged upon his return to Athens with deception of the *demos* (6.136.1), an accusation presumably leveled against him in consequence of his unaccomplished promises to the assembly; according to Nepos, however, Miltiades was charged with treason for having taken bribes from the Persian king (*Milt.* 7.5), an offense in no way connected to Miltiades' behavior before his departure from Athens. Neither author's information is patently false. But the charges of treason and bribe-taking mentioned by Nepos are more likely inventions than that which Herodotus mentions, since they could be no more than inference from the bare facts of the expedition: Miltiades failed to take the island, and treason and bribe-taking were likely enough accusations in such an instance. Indeed, Miltiades' son Kimon was charged with taking bribes from the Macedonian king under roughly similar circumstances in 463/2 (Plut. *Cim.* 14.3). It is just possible that Nepos confused Miltiades' trial with what he knew of the prosecution of Miltiades' son.[5]

There seems no reason to doubt that Miltiades played a significant role in the planning of the Parian campaign. That he did is neither implausible nor contradicted by other evidence. It is less probable that the *demos* was persuaded to provide Miltiades with a fleet and army without being informed of its general's intentions, but I am inclined to believe Herodotus' claim nonetheless. It is difficult to imagine how the tradition of Miltiades' secrecy would have developed were it not true. The story may have been introduced during Miltiades' trial to magnify his alleged deceit of the *demos*, but if it were false could the claim have been invented on that occasion and believed? Most Athenians must have remembered whether Miltiades had announced to the assembly the objective of the campaign he was proposing. If not introduced at the trial, why would this particular story have been invented in later years by enemies of Miltiades' family?[6] However unlikely it may at first seem, the tradition that Miltiades did not inform the *demos* of his intentions is not easily dismissed.

[5] Nepos is at least wrong in naming Stesagoras as Miltiades' defender at his trial (*Milt.* 7.6). Stesagoras had been killed some years before (Hdt. 6.38).

[6] Bicknell (1972a), p. 226 n. 5, suggests that the story of Miltiades' pre-campaign secrecy is one of a number of details of the Parian campaign which put Miltiades in a bad light and which Herodotus heard from Alkmaionid sources. Develin (1977), p. 572, has doubts.

APPENDIX FOUR

THEMISTOKLES AND THE ATHENIAN RESPONSE TO THE SECOND PERSIAN INVASION

If Plutarch is to be believed, the bodies of those who fell at Marathon were barely cold when Themistokles began preparing Athens for the Persians' second coming, casting himself as savior of Greece (*Them.* 3.5). We may doubt whether the general was as prescient and single-minded as Plutarch suggests, but it is clear that he played some role in determining how the Athenians would respond to the invasion.

The Interpretation of the "Wooden Wall" Oracle

At some time prior to the fall of Thermopylai (August or September 480)[1] the Athenians consulted the oracle at Delphi and received two responses, neither encouraging (Hdt. 7.140-141). Both oracles urged the Athenians to flee before the invaders, though the second offered some hope in that it referred to a "wooden wall" (τεῖχος ξύλινον) which alone would not be taken (7.141.3). The interpretation of this phrase was a matter of some debate at Athens. Prominent among the suggestions offered was that τεῖχος ξύλινον referred to Athens' fleet, but this explanation was compromised by a reference in the same oracle to bloodshed at Salamis: the *chresmologoi* understood this to mean that the Athenians would be defeated at sea (7.142). We are told that Themistokles lent support to the view that τεῖχος ξύλινον referred to ships by arguing that the reference to Salamis portended ill for the Persians rather than the Athenians (7.143). The implication of Herodotus is that Themistokles' contribution to the debate was a significant factor in the Athenians' decision to resist the Persians rather than flee.[2]

[1] For the chronology of the invasion see Hammond (1982), p. 81, and Hignett (1963), pp. 448-457. I argue below that the Athenians received the oracles in the autumn of 481.

[2] Hdt. 7.143.3: ταύτῃ Θεμιστοκλέος ἀποφαινομένου 'Αθηναῖοι ταῦτα σφίσι ἔγνωσαν αἱρετώτερα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῶν χρησμολόγων, οἳ οὐκ ἔων ναυμαχίην ἀρτέεσθαι, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν εἶπαι οὐδὲ χεῖρας ἀνταείρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐκλιπόντας χώρην τὴν 'Αττικὴν ἄλλην τινὰ οἰκίζειν.

The accuracy of Herodotus' account has been questioned, however. By the most natural interpretation of his text at 7.145.1,[3] the Athenians received the two oracles sometime prior to the first congress of the Greeks, thus in or before the autumn of 481. But some have objected that the priestess at Delphi cannot have referred to Salamis as the site of a naval battle that early, a year before fighting took place in the straits.[4] A number of scholars have therefore either rejected Herodotus' chronology,[5] or they have rejected the reference to Salamis as a later addition to or alteration of the original oracle.[6] Neither measure is attractive. The most probable date for the oracles is that which Herodotus provides. Although it is possible that the Athenians consulted Delphi after the Greeks' withdrawal from Tempe (May 480), as has been suggested,[7] they are more likely to have done so when first considering what course of action to follow,[8] that is, before the first congress.[9] In his description of the debate at Athens, moreover,

[3] τὰ μὲν δὴ χρηστήρια ταῦτα τοῖσι 'Αθηναίοισι ἐγεγόνεε· συλλεγομένων δὲ ἐς τὠυτὸ τῶν 'Ελλήνων τῶν περὶ τὴν 'Ελλάδα τὰ ἀμείνω φρονεόντων.... Most have understood the pluperfect ἐγεγόνεε to refer to a time before that of the δέ clause (so, e.g., Robertson [1987], p. 3 and n. 3; Hands [1965], pp. 59-60; Hignett [1963], p. 441). Evans (1982-83), p. 26, has suggested, however, that the pluperfect refers instead to a time anterior to the action which was being described before Herodotus began his digression on Athens' oracles (7.140-144). In other words, Herodotus means only that the Athenians consulted the oracle before Xerxes reached Pieria (7.131), thus in or before the spring of 480. But see the lengthy discussion by Hammond (1982), pp. 75-81, of Herodotus' method of demarcating digressions. He believes the Athenians received the oracles before the first congress (p. 79).

[4] The battle was fought in late September of 480. See Hignett (1963), p. 452.

[5] E.g., Evans (1982-83), p. 28; HW II, pp. 181-182; Hauvette (1894), p. 327.

[6] So Lazenby (1993), pp. 100-101; Hignett (1963), p. 443; Labarbe (1957), p. 117; Grundy (1901), pp. 236-239; Hauvette-Besnault (1894), p. 326 n. 1. Fontenrose (1978), pp. 124-128, has rejected as inauthentic Herodotus' version of both responses, though he allows that the Athenians received some oracle which referred to a wooden wall (p. 126). We need not determine for the present purpose whether we have the text of the oracles as they were originally delivered. It is necessary only to consider whether Salamis was mentioned in the oracle the Athenians received.

[7] Among those who date the oracles after Tempe are: Evans (1982-83), p. 28; HW II, pp. 181-182; and Hauvette-Besnault (1894), p. 327. Macan (1908), p. 232, suggests the Athenians consulted Delphi after Artemision, but this is not likely: only some nine days passed between the Athenians' abandonment of that position and the Persians' arrival in Attica, too little time for the consultation and debate which followed to have taken place (so Hignett [1963], p. 442; Labarbe [1957], p. 112 and n. 3; HW II, p. 181). Given the propinquity of the Persian army, moreover, traveling to Delphi after the fall of Thermopylai would have been dangerous for Athens' envoys (Labarbe [1957], pp. 111-112).

[8] So also Robertson (1987), p. 3; Hands (1965), pp. 59-60; Hignett (1963), p. 443.

[9] That the Athenians began deliberating before the first congress seems likely. By the autumn of 481 they had already been aware of the Persians' preparations for some time (Hdt. 7.22.1, 138.1). As the principal target of the expedition (7.138.1), they would naturally have been concerned with developing some plan for defense. Nor are they likely to have waited for allies to join them before beginning deliberation. The Athenians cannot have known prior to the formation of the Hellenic League whether they would receive more support on this occasion than they had at Marathon. It is scarcely plausible that the Athenians postponed deliberation on the chance that the Greeks would mount a united defense.

Herodotus clearly links the discussion of the "wooden wall" to that concerning the reference to Salamis: Themistokles' explication of the latter influenced the Athenians' interpretation of τεῖχος ξύλινον (7.142.3-143). Unless we assume that Herodotus' version of events is grossly distorted, we should accept that references to both Salamis and the wooden wall appeared in the oracle the Athenians originally received. Taken individually, then, both Herodotus' date for the oracle and his evidence for the appearance in it of some reference to Salamis are plausible. We ought not emend his account if we can believe that Salamis was mentioned by the priestess as early as the autumn of 481.

To my mind there is no difficulty in doing so. That the Athenians formulated some plan for defense prior to the first Hellenic Congress is likely. It is at least possible that their plan involved the island of Salamis. Robertson has argued that the Athenians intended to evacuate Attica and use Salamis as a naval base during the war, a strategy suggested by the use to which the island of Lade had been put by the Ionians during their revolt from Persia (Hdt. 6.7, 11).[10] The suggestion is a reasonable one. The Athenians may have expected that they would be unable to prevent Persia's land army from devastating Attica and sacking Athens, but with their newly expanded fleet they could hope to defend an island.[11] I am persuaded by Robertson's argument,[12] but would note that it is also not impossible, as some have claimed,[13] that a naval battle at Salamis was conceived of as early as 481. When considering their defense the Athenians will likely have discussed possible battle sites, despite that the choice of location would not necessarily be theirs in the event. The straits of Salamis can have been mentioned in this context. Whatever the precise thinking of the Athenians in 481, however, it is certainly possible that by the time they consulted the oracle in the autumn of that year they had formulated some plan which involved Salamis, that that island figured in the question which they posed to the Pythia, and that she in turn included a reference to Salamis in her response. We there-

[10] Robertson (1987), pp. 12-17. Hands (1965), pp. 60-61, makes the similar suggestion that the Athenians were contemplating evacuation to Salamis. Parke (1967), p. 104, alludes to a plan to defend Salamis. On Lade as a model for the Athenians' strategy cf. Frost (1980), p. 101.

[11] The similarity of Perikles' "island" strategy is apparent.

[12] I also find persuasive Robertson's theory that τεῖχος ξύλινον referred to the wall which the Peloponnesians eventually built at the Isthmus. He suggests that Delphi was influenced by the Spartans, who wanted to gain the support of the Athenians for their own strategy of defending the Peloponnese. The plan could not be successful unless the Athenian fleet defended the Peloponnesian coast (Robertson [1987], pp. 10-11 and 17-19). (Cf. Grundy [1901], pp. 237-238, who sees Spartan influence behind the second oracle only.) The objections of Lazenby (1993), pp. 99-100 n. 2, to Robertson's suggestion are not persuasive.

[13] E.g., Lazenby (1993), p. 101, and Hignett (1963), p. 442.

fore need not reject Herodotus' account of the involvement of Themistokles in the oracle's interpretation.

Some have credited Themistokles not only with interpreting the "wooden wall" oracle but with inspiring it in order to gain support for his strategy of reliance on the fleet.[14] There is no evidence that Themistokles influenced the oracle in this way, however, and, perhaps more damning, as it stands in Herodotus' text the god's response would hardly have served Themistokles' interests. It could not have been obvious to anyone lacking hindsight that the "wooden wall" to which the oracle referred was Athens' fleet. And the frightening allusion to Salamis in the response was naturally understood at first to portend disaster for the Athenians at sea (7.142.3). Themistokles' main contribution to the discussion surrounding the oracle was his argument ***against*** its most obvious interpretation (7.143.1-2).[15]

I see no reason to believe that Themistokles influenced the oracle at Delphi. Nor need we see his involvement in the oracle's interpretation as one element of an extended effort to prepare Athens for the inevitable Persian invasion, as Plutarch suggests (*Them.* 3.5). It is true that Themistokles was responsible for the expansion of Athens' navy in the late 480's,[16] and several late sources report that from the beginning he intended this fleet to be used against the Persians (Plut. *Them.* 4.1-2; Just. 2.12.12; Ael. Arist. 3.237 Behr). Indeed, according to Plutarch and Aelius Aristides, Themistokles tricked the Athenians into preparing for hostilities with Persia, using Athens' war with Aegina as a pretext for the military expansion he proposed. The suggestion of these late authors is not supported by our fifth-century sources (Hdt. 7.144.1; Thuc. 1.14.3),[17] however, and is probably no more than inference from the circumstances of the fleet's construction.[18]

[14] Schachermeyr (1961-63), pp. 167-168; Labarbe (1957), pp. 117-119; Parke and Wormell (1956), p. 17.

[15] Against the view that Themistokles was behind the oracle see Robertson (1987), p. 10, and Evans (1982-83), p. 27.

[16] For additional sources see *AO* p. 58 and Labarbe (1957), pp. 11-17. I should note that there is no good evidence that Themistokles was a general in the year the naval bill was passed: Nepos (*Them.* 2.1-2) implies that he was, but this may be no more than conjecture. His generalship is certainly a possibility, however.

[17] Podlecki (1975a), p. 69, argues that Herodotus names the war with Aegina as the reason behind Themistokles' naval bill in order to diminish the general's responsibility for the Greek victory in the Persian War, which Athens' newly expanded fleet made possible. Thucydides, Podlecki claims, tries to correct this slur at 1.14.3: ὀψέ τε ἀφ' οὗ 'Αθηναίους Θεμιστοκλῆς ἔπεισεν Αἰγινήταις πολεμοῦντας, καὶ ἅμα τοῦ βαρβάρου προσδοκίμου ὄντος, τὰς ναῦς ποιήσασθαι αἷσπερ καὶ ἐναυμάχησαν. But Thucydides does not say the ships were built for use against the Persians, and thus cannot be said to correct Herodotus (so Badian [1971], p. 6, and cf. Frost [1980], p. 83).

[18] The details lend themselves to the conclusion reached by Plutarch and Aristides: a man whose stratagems were legendary convinced the Athenians to build a fleet for use against Aegina; the ships were constructed but never used for their intended purpose; they happened to be available, however, for the most famous naval battle of antiquity, a battle orchestrated by

We need not suspect Themistokles of artifice in this instance. Athens' war with Aegina was serious and of long duration (Hdt. 7.145.1), reason enough for the Athenians, Themistokles included, to favor the expansion of Athens' fleet.[19]

If Themistokles did not trick the Athenians into increasing their naval forces for war with Persia, if he did not trick them into using that fleet in obedience to oracles he had inspired, he nonetheless contributed considerably to Athens' preparations for the war: when the Athenians might otherwise have decided against confronting the invaders, Themistokles' unlikely interpretation of Apollo's prophesy helped sway public opinion in favor of resistance by sea. It is a less spectacular contribution, perhaps, than those with which Themistokles has sometimes been credited. But it is for that reason more likely than they to be historical.

The Decree from Troizen

Further controversial evidence of Themistokles' involvement in deliberation related to the second Persian invasion is provided by the so-called Themistokles Decree, an inscription from Troizen which dates to the third century B.C. but is purportedly a copy of an original fifth-century resolution.[20] In the inscription Themistokles is named as the proposer of a number of measures relating to the evacuation of Attica (ll. 4-18), the mobilization of Athens' fleet (ll. 18-44), and the recall of her ostracized (ll. 44-47). The authenticity of the decree has been questioned on numerous grounds, among them that it is ostensibly incompatible with Herodotus' account of the war.[21] It is clear that the inscription is not a verbatim copy of proposals

the very man who proposed the fleet be constructed. Given this fertile material, it would perhaps be surprising if Plutarch had not seen evidence of Themistokles' cunning in his sponsorship of the naval bill. (Plutarch [*Them.* 10.1] likewise claims Themistokles was behind the disheartening interpretation of the failure of Athens' snake to eat its food. There is no indication in Herodotus' account [8.41.3] that Themistokles was involved in this incident.)

[19] I would imagine that Themistokles, as other Athenians, was aware during the 480's of the threat posed by the Persians, and it is likely enough that this threat was discussed in connection with Themistokles' naval bill. But it need not have prompted Themistokles to propose that the Athenians expand their fleet.

[20] First published by Jameson (1960), pp. 198-223, with revisions in (1962), pp. 310-315. See also ML 23; *SEG* 22.274; Fornara 55. The bibliography on the decree is enormous. For annotated references see Chambers (1967), pp. 166-169, and Dow (1962), pp. 105-108.

[21] For arguments against the authenticity of the decree see Habicht (1961), pp. 2-11. The evidence of the decree diverges from that of Herodotus in two respects. First, according to the inscription the Athenians resolved to send 100 ships to Artemision while 100 more remained off the coasts of Salamis and Attica (ll. 40-44). Herodotus reports that 127 ships were sent to Artemision initially (8.1.1) and that 53 more followed (8.14.1). We may dismiss this discrepancy as unimportant if we assume that the Athenians did not act in the event as they had resolved (so Jameson [1960], p. 220). Second, the implication of the decree is that the Athenians decided in advance of hostilities to evacuate Attica. (If the Troizen inscription preserves only

originally moved in 480.[22] At worst it is a copy of a fourth-century forgery of negligible value for the study of the Second Persian War.[23] At best it preserves an authentic tradition of decisions taken at the time by the Athenians. Yet even if the evidence of the inscription is in the main historical, there is reason to doubt the historicity of Themistokles' association with the measures it contains.

It has been suggested that the inscription is a compilation of several separate decrees which were enacted (or were alleged to have been enacted) by the Athenians on different occasions.[24] The argument is attractive because the numerous proposals preserved on the stone are so varied, and because a grave chronological problem results if one attempts to date all the enactments to a single occasion.[25] If the inscription is a compilation, however, as seems likely, the attribution of the several decrees it preserves to a single proposer becomes suspect, particularly as the man credited with proposing the measures is Themistokles, around whom a corpus of stories was already beginning to develop in the fourth century.[26] The heading of the inscription

one decree then it clearly indicates that the Athenians decided to evacuate before the battles of Thermopylai and Artemision [ll. 40-44]. If several decrees are preserved in the inscription then the resolution to embark on the ships and defend against the barbarian [ll. 12-15—that ll. 12-18 should be taken together with the evacuation measures of ll. 4-12 is suggested by τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους at l. 12] is a less clear indication that the decision was taken before the outbreak of hostilities.) According to Herodotus, however, the Athenians decided to evacuate when they returned to Athens from Artemision, after learning that the Spartans had not sent an army north to Boiotia, as expected (8.40). Fornara (1967-68), pp. 430-431, argues that the reason here adduced by Herodotus for the Athenians' decision to evacuate is at odds with the rest of his account: that the Plataians began to evacuate immediately after withdrawing from Artemision (8.44.1) suggests that they, and presumably the Athenians as well, had decided to do so while still at Artemision. Since Herodotus includes two contradictory traditions of the Athenians' evacuation, Fornara argues, his account of the Athenians' panicked evacuation after Artemision ought not be used as an argument against the historicity of the Themistokles Decree. Fornara's argument is not entirely convincing: the Athenians and Plataians can have learned when near Chalkis of the Spartans' failure to appear in Boiotia and made plans accordingly (8.44.1). I would nevertheless agree that the Athenians are likely to have discussed evacuation prior to their return from Artemision. Herodotus' evidence to the contrary may indeed be the product of some distorted tradition.

[22] See, for example, the discussions in Burn (1962), pp. 366-377, and Hignett (1963), pp. 458-468.

[23] The historicity of a number of decrees connected with the Persian Wars and mentioned first by fourth-century sources has been questioned. See particularly Habicht (1961), pp. 11-35. I have already discussed the problems associated with the alleged decree of Miltiades (appendix 2).

[24] So Chambers (1967), p. 162; Hignett (1963), p. 463; Burn (1962), p. 377.

[25] See Chambers (1967), pp. 163-165, and Hignett (1963), pp. 464-465. If the inscription preserves a single decree, it must have been passed not long before the expedition to Artemision (ll. 40-44). But this is too late a date for the recall of Athens' ostracized (ll. 44-47), which must have been decreed sometime before the elections of the spring of 480, since Xanthippos, who had been ostracized, was elected general for 480/79.

[26] Frost (1980), pp. 3-39, discusses the development of the tradition surrounding Themistokles' career.

has been altered from the original enactments, if such there were, by the addition of the patronymic and demotic of the proposer, elements not common in Athenian decrees before the mid-fourth century.[27] The identification of Themistokles as proposer of some or all of the decrees preserved on the stone may likewise be unhistorical. At the least we may say that, given its doubtful authenticity, the inscription does not in itself provide sufficient evidence that Themistokles proposed the decree or decrees contained in it. There is also no reliable, independent evidence that would justify the identification of Themistokles as the proposer of any of the measures mentioned in the inscription.

We know from Herodotus (7.144.3) that after receiving the wooden wall oracle (ἔδοξέ τέ σφι μετὰ τὸ χρηστήριον βουλευομένοισι...) the Athenians deliberated and resolved to resist the barbarians with their fleet, together with whatever allies they might acquire.[28] Themistokles' involvement in the discussion which preceded the resolution (7.143) suggests that he may have been the proposer of the decree to which Herodotus refers. But although this resolution has been identified with the decree preserved in the Troizen inscription, particularly its first eighteen lines,[29] there is no good reason to equate the two. The first section of the inscription details elaborate evacuation plans, but there is no indication in Herodotus' account that the Athenians discussed plans for the evacuation of Attica in the debate which followed their reception of the oracle. That debate, moreover, took place in the autumn of 481, prior to the first Hellenic congress.[30] But the first eighteen lines of the Troizen inscription refer to a decision made sometime later, when the Athenians were confident of having as allies the Lakedaimonians and Corinthians (ll. 16-17)[31] and—if Αἰγινητῶν has been restored correctly in l. 17[32]—when Athens and Aegina were no longer at war. The provisions in the first section of the inscription, in other words, must be dated after the first congress of the Greeks.[33]

According to Herodotus, when the Athenian forces returned from Artemision to Athens, it was proclaimed (κήρυγμα ἐποιήσαντο) that each Athenian was to save his children and household as he was able (8.41.1). It has been suggested that this κήρυγμα, not in itself a decree, put into effect a resolution (that is, the evacuation decree preserved in the Troizen inscription) which had been moved previously but which Herodotus does not mention.[34] In this way the evidence of Herodotus, who dates the evacuation of Attica after Artemision, can be reconciled with that of the decree, according to which plans for evacuation (ll. 4-18) were made before that expedition (ll. 40-44). It is likely enough that the Athenians discussed plans for evacuation prior to the pronouncement to which Herodotus refers, and it may be that their intention to evacuate was embodied in a decree similar to that preserved in the Troizen inscription. Whatever the relationship between the κήρυγμα and the inscription may be, however, Herodotus does not associate Themistokles with the pronouncement made on this occasion and does not credit him elsewhere with proposing an evacuation decree. Nor does Herodotus' immediate successor: although Thucydides (1.18.2) refers briefly to the Athenians' decision to evacuate Attica,[35] he does not associate Themistokles with the resolution. There is no fifth-century evidence which attributes to Themistokles responsibility for any of the measures preserved in the Troizen inscription.

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27 See ML 23; Hignett (1963), p. 462; Jameson (1960), p. 206 and n. 22.

28 Chambers (1967), p. 161 n. 3, doubts that Herodotus is here recording an actual Athenian decree, the only evidence for which is his use of the formulaic ἔδοξέ. If Chambers is correct my argument against the association of this passage with the Troizen inscription would be strengthened.

29 So Jameson (1960), pp. 201 and 215. Podlecki (1975a), pp. 149-150, argues that "Herodotus' words are so close to the decree as to preclude their being independent of each other." But the evidence he cites which would link this passage to the decree is not persuasive. (1) He notes the verbal similarity of the phrases indicated in bold print below. The correspondence between the two is slight, however, amounting to no more than the appearance in both of a participle of βούλομαι. (2) He suggests that Herodotus, in the text underlined below, is paraphrasing ll. 5-6 and 12-15 of the decree (also underlined). To compare Herodotus' text to ll. 5-6, however, is to take the latter out of context: these lines refer to handing Athens over to Athena and her fellow gods for protection (φυλάττειν καὶ ἀμύνειν), while in Herodotus' text the subject of the verb δέκεσθαι is the Athenians. What similarities there are between Herodotus and lines 12-15 of the decree—the intention (A) to combat the barbarian (B) using ships is expressed in both passages, and there is in both some indication that (C) all Athenians will serve—are not so striking as to imply a connection between Herodotus and the inscription.

Hdt. 7.144.3: ἔδοξέ τέ σφι μετὰ τὸ χρηστήριον βουλευομένοισι ἐπιόντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα (A) τὸν βάρβαρον δέκεσθαι (B) τῇσι νηυσὶ (C) πανδημεί, τῷ θεῷ πειθομένους, **ἅμα Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βουλομένοισι.**

ML 23 ll. 4-6: ...τὴ[μ] μὲν πό[λιν παρ]ακατ[αθέ]σθαι τῆι Ἀθηνᾶι τῆι Ἀθηνῶ ι μ [μεδεο]ύ[σηι] κ[αὶ τοῖς ἄλλ]οις θεοῖς ἅπασιν (A) φυλάττει]ν κα[ὶ] ἀμ[ύνειν τὸμ βά]ρβαρ[ο]ν ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας....

ML 23 ll. 12-18: (C) τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους Ἀθηναίους ἅπαντας καὶ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς ἡβῶντας (B) εἰσβαίνειν εἰς τὰς ἑτοιμασθείσας διακοσίας ναῦς καὶ (A) ἀμύνεσθαι τὸμ βάρβαρον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῆς τε ἑαυτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων **μετὰ** Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Κορινθίων καὶ Αἰγινητῶν καὶ **τῶν ἄλλων τῶμ βουλομένων κοινωνήσειν τοῦ κινδύνου.**

30 I argue above (pp. 173-174) that Herodotus' evidence for the date of the wooden wall oracle (7.145.1) should be accepted.

31 Herodotus does not refer to any known allies at 7.144.3: the Athenians are to receive the barbarian ἅμα Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βουλομένοισι.

32 Hammond (1982), pp. 85-86, who would date the decree to September 481, restores Χαλκιδέων in place of Αἰγινητῶν.

33 Athens' war with Aegina was ended in consequence of the first Hellenic Congress (Hdt. 7.145.1).

34 So Frost (1980), p. 103; Jameson (1960), p. 204. Chambers (1967), p. 161, believes Herodotus would have mentioned an earlier evacuation decree if one had been passed. Hignett (1963), p. 467 (and cf. p. 464), thinks it suspicious that there is no indication in the inscription that the evacuation decree is provisional.

35 ...οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπιόντων τῶν Μήδων διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασάμενοι ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβάντες ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο.

There is, however, some fourth-century evidence of a decree proposed by Themistokles. Isocrates (15.233) and Demosthenes (18.204) credit the general with advising the Athenians to evacuate their city. In a second passage the latter author refers to a decree of Themistokles whose subject matter he does not name (19.303).[36] The statements of these sources are evidence that there was a tradition current in the fourth century of Themistokles' sponsorship of, at the least, an evacuation decree. They do not, however, attest to the historicity of that tradition. Later sources similarly credit Themistokles with advising the Athenians to evacuate Attica and recall their ostracized.[37] Among these Plutarch (*Them.* 10.4) and Aelius Aristides (3.247 Behr) quote the decree itself. As with our fourth-century sources, however, the testimony of these authors attests only to a continuing tradition of Themistokles' responsibility for the proposals.

In short, though we may reasonably suppose that Themistokles was the proposer of the decree to which Herodotus refers at 7.144.3, we do not have sufficient independent evidence to associate him with any other resolutions related to the invasion. We might guess that Themistokles was the proposer of decrees similar to those preserved in the Troizen inscription, since he was a prominent statesman of the second invasion, but to do so would be dangerous. Tacking onto that general's résumé one likely enterprise after another, one loses sight of the limits of our reliable evidence for his career.

[36] Other fourth-century sources do not associate Themistokles with the proposals. Andocides (1.77, 107) and the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* (22.8) attribute the recall of Athens' ostracized not to Themistokles but to the Athenians as a whole. The latter author also reports (23.1), in words reminiscent of Herodotus at 8.41.1, that Athens' generals issued a proclamation calling for each man to save himself (τῶν γὰρ στρατηγῶν...κηρυξάντων σῴ[ζ]ειν ἕκαστον ἑαυτόν...), but he does not suggest that Themistokles was responsible for the content of the generals' κήρυγμα.

[37] Such as Nep. *Them.* 2.7; Frontin. *Str.* 1.3.6; Plut. *Cim.* 5.2, *Them.* 10.4, 11.1; Ael. Arist. 3.238, 247 Behr. For other late sources for Themistokles and the decree see Jameson (1960), p. 202 n. 6.

APPENDIX FIVE

C. 476/5: KIMON'S SKYRIAN EXPEDITION

In the early years of the *pentakontaetia*, perhaps immediately after their siege of Eion,[1] the Athenians captured the island of Skyros, enslaved its inhabitants, and colonized the land themselves.[2] Plutarch alone of our sources provides detailed information about the genesis of the campaign. The author reports that in 476/5 the Athenians received an oracle which bade them find and bring to Athens the bones of the hero Theseus, who had died on Skyros (*Thes.* 36.1; cf. Paus. 3.3.7). A possible inference from this passage is that the Athenian expedition against the island was made in obedience to the oracle, but Plutarch does not say specifically that this was the case. In another passage Plutarch describes a more immediate reason for the expedition (*Cim.* 8.3-4). After putting in at Skyros some Thessalian merchants were robbed by the pirates who inhabited the island. The theft was condemned by the Amphictyonic Council, and the people of Skyros demanded that the men responsible for the robbery make restitution. Frightened by these circumstances, the thieves wrote to Kimon and offered to surrender the island to him. Plutarch's evidence for the pirates' invitation to Kimon is not substantiated by our other sources for the campaign, but the specifics which he provides in the account lend it credibility. We may believe that Kimon was prompted to attack Skyros by correspondence received from that island. The oracle pertaining to Theseus' bones can have provided a secondary motive (or justification) for undertaking the expedition.

Were Kimon at Athens when propositioned by the Skyrian thieves we might believe that he participated in assembly discussions related to the expedition. At the least he would necessarily have initiated debate (perhaps before the *boule*) by making public the information he had received. But it is unlikely that Kimon was in Athens when the letter arrived. That the thieves communicated with him rather than the Athenian government suggests that Kimon was near Skyros at the time with a fleet (sailing the Aegean after his successful siege of Eion?). We cannot know whether he

[1] The Athenians' siege of Eion is dated to 476/5 by a scholiast of Aeschines 2.31. The campaign may have followed close upon the Athenians' receipt of the oracle (Plut. *Thes.* 36.1-2).

[2] Sources for the campaign are: Thuc. 1.98.1-2; Eph. *FGH* 70 F 191.37-46; Nep. *Cim.* 2.5; Diod. 11.60.2; Plut. *Thes.* 36.1-2, *Cim.* 8.3-6; Paus. 1.17.6, 3.3.7; schol. Ar. *Plut.* 627. For discussion see Podlecki (1975b), pp. 13-16.

communicated with Athens upon receipt of the thieves' invitation, but we may be reasonably confident that Kimon was not present in Athens to discuss the proposed expedition in the assembly.

APPENDIX SIX

456/5: TOLMIDES' *PERIPLOUS* OF THE PELOPONNESE

In 456/5 an Athenian fleet sailed around the Peloponnese, burnt Sparta's dockyards, captured the Corinthian city of Chalkis, and defeated the Sikyonians in battle.[1] According to Diodorus (11.84.3), the Athenians had been persuaded to undertake this expedition by their general Tolmides. It is impossible to know whether Tolmides did in fact advocate the expedition, but the context in which Diodorus' information appears does not inspire confidence. It is unlikely that Diodorus' account of Tolmides' campaign is historical in all its particulars. The author reports that the general was motivated to endorse the expedition by his rivalry with Myronides, who had won a victory at Oinophyta in the previous year and was enjoying considerable renown in Athens (11.83.4).[2] Diodorus' evidence for Tolmides' motivation is worth little, however. We would be right to suspect even a contemporary's description of an individual's motives. All the more so must we doubt the evidence of Diodorus, whose source (Ephorus) himself wrote nearly a century after Tolmides' campaign. Diodorus, moreover, includes in his account of the expedition an unlikely story: Tolmides allegedly tricked three thousand men into volunteering for his campaign and consequently brought with him four times as many troops as the Athenians had authorized him to enroll.[3] Diodorus' story is intrinsically unbelievable and suspiciously like an anecdote he includes in his account of Myronides' Boiotian campaign:[4] that general brought fewer troops to Boiotia than he had enrolled, refusing to wait for those who had not assembled in time and had thereby revealed their inherent cowardice (11.81.5-6). It remains possible that Diodorus (or his source) has appended these unhistorical elements to an

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[1] Thuc. 1.108.5; Aeschin. 2.75 w. schol.; Diod. 11.84; Plut. *Per.* 19.2; Paus. 1.27.5; Polyaen. 3.3; Aristod. *FGH* 104 F 15.1.

[2] ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Τολμίδης ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως, ἁμιλλώμενος πρὸς τὴν Μυρωνίδου ἀρετήν τε καὶ δόξαν, ἔσπευδεν ἀξιόλογόν τι κατεργάσασθαι. διὸ καὶ κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς μηδενὸς πρότερον πεπορθηκότος τὴν Λακωνικήν, παρεκάλεσε τὸν δῆμον δῃῶσαι τὴν τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν χώραν....

[3] Cf. Polyaen. 3.3. Plutarch (*Per.* 18.2) tells a similar story in connection with Tolmides' Boiotian campaign of 448/7. (See Stadter [1989], p. 211, who thinks Plutarch is more likely than Diodorus to have shifted the venue of the story.) Aeschin. 2.75 says Tolmides marched through the Peloponnese with one thousand troops.

[4] Cf. Gomme, *HCT* I, p. 320, who calls both anecdotes foolish. For a related discussion see ch. 1 § 3.1.

historical event, Tolmides' endorsement of the campaign. But that Tolmides persuaded the Athenians to undertake the expedition may itself be a literary invention. This and the general's alleged trickery underscore Tolmides' eagerness to augment his reputation: the general, we are to believe, was so anxious for military achievement that he created a command for himself and attempted to guarantee its success by taking with him as large a contingent as possible. In light of the unhistorical elements of Diodorus' account, we ought doubt his evidence for Tolmides' persuasion of the Athenians in this instance.

APPENDIX SEVEN

KIMON'S ALLEGED RECALL FROM OSTRACISM AND THE 451/0 EXPEDITION TO CYPRUS

Plutarch informs us that after the battle of Tanagra in 457 Perikles proposed that Kimon be recalled from exile (*Cim.* 17.8, *Per.* 10.4).[1] Plutarch himself appears to believe that Perikles proposed Kimon's recall because popular sentiment favored his return (*Per.* 10.3-4). But Plutarch recounts as well the differing opinion of certain authors whom he does not identify. These report that Perikles made his motion after having come to an agreement with Kimon through the agency of the latter's sister, Elpinike. The two men allegedly agreed that Kimon would lead a fleet of two hundred ships against Persian territory after his return from exile. Perikles himself would enjoy superior authority in Athens (*Per.* 10.5; cf. *Mor.* 812f). That Perikles proposed Kimon's recall is substantiated by an earlier source, Antisthenes (c. 445–c. 360), who tells us that Perikles was rewarded for his troubles by Elpinike herself (Ath. 589e: ...φυγαδευθέντος μισθὸν ἔλαβε τῆς καθόδου αὐτοῦ [Kimon] ὁ Περικλῆς τὸ τῇ Ἐλπινίκῃ μιχθῆναι).[2] But no source corroborates Plutarch's evidence of an agreement made between Kimon and Perikles. We may reject as unhistorical Elpinike's involvement in arranging the agreement to which Plutarch refers.[3] The ultimate source for this detail of Plutarch's story is probably the same gossip which inspired Antisthenes' anecdote. It remains to consider, however, whether Kimon's expedition to Cyprus can have been the product of a private arrangement. If we accept the historicity of this secret agreement we must believe that its

[1] Kimon had been ostracized shortly after his ignominious withdrawal from Ithome in 463/2. That he was recalled from exile before the ten years of his ostracism had passed is disputed. Plutarch and others (Theopomp. *FGH* 115 F 88; Nep. *Cim.* 3.3; cf. Andoc. 3.3, Aeschin. 2.172; Ath. 589e) report that he was, but the truce with Sparta which Kimon is credited with negotiating upon his return (e.g., Diod. 11.86.1; Plut. *Cim.* 18.1, *Per.* 10.4) is usually dated to 451, by which time the term of Kimon's ostracism would have expired. For discussion of the problem and bibliography see Stadter (1989), pp. 124-125, and *HCT* I, pp. 326-327. I agree with the latter that we ought not reject as unhistorical the evidence of Kimon's recall.

[2] Given this evidence it is reasonable to believe that Perikles was indeed responsible for Kimon's recall, though we may doubt whether Kimon expressed his gratitude to Perikles by the means described: Elpinike's reputation and Perikles' support of Kimon in this instance will have produced readily enough the sort of gossip we find in Antisthenes' account.

[3] Sealey (1956), p. 239: "The name of Elpinice should arouse and the secret character of the agreement should confirm suspicion." Connor (1971), pp. 60-64, accepts the story as evidence of a short-lived alliance between Perikles and Kimon.

terms became known, a stipulation which is itself unlikely. We must also believe that Perikles was powerful enough in the mid-fifth century to order affairs of the state as he wished: to comply with the terms of the agreement it would be necessary for him not only to secure Kimon's election to the *strategia*, but also to convince the Athenians to approve an expedition against Persian territory and to appoint Kimon as commander of that campaign. But however great Perikles' influence, he cannot have ensured Kimon of any of these outcomes. If an agreement was in fact arranged between the two, its terms cannot have been so specific. The story of Perikles' agreement with Kimon is probably nothing more than an expanded version of the gossip which Antisthenes reports.

In his life of Kimon Plutarch makes no reference to the general's supposed agreement with Perikles. Rather, Plutarch attributes to Kimon alone the decision to make the expedition against Cyprus and Egypt (*Cim.* 18.1). Here too, Plutarch's evidence is dubious. No other source attributes responsibility for the campaign to Kimon,[4] and while Plutarch does explain Kimon's reasoning in choosing his objectives, he makes no reference to deliberation in Athens. His account suggests that the Athenian *demos* had no role whatever in planning or approving the campaign. Given Plutarch's propensity for exaggerating the role of his subjects and the failure of our other sources to corroborate his evidence, it seems likely that Plutarch has here attributed to the general responsibility for the Athenians' collective decision to attack Cyprus and Egypt.

In a third passage Plutarch (*Per.* 20.3) tells of Perikles' resistance to undertaking *another* (πάλιν) expedition against Cyprus and Egypt: ...οὐ συνεχώρει ταῖς ὁρμαῖς τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲ συνεξέπιπτεν, ὑπὸ ῥώμης καὶ τύχης τοσαύτης ἐπαιρομένων Αἰγύπτου τε πάλιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ κινεῖν τῆς βασιλέως ἀρχῆς τὰ πρὸς θαλάσσῃ. It is not clear precisely when Perikles' opposition should be dated. Plutarch may mean that Perikles opposed those who sought to resume hostilities against Cyprus after Kimon's death[5] or that Perikles opposed Kimon's final expedition against Cyprus.[6] In either case, there is no evidence which supports Plutarch's statement, but that Perikles opposed some expedition to Cyprus and Egypt is not inherently unlikely.

[4] Other sources are: Thuc. 1.112.1-4; Isoc. 8.86; Nep. *Cim.* 3.4; Diod. 12.3-4, 13.25.2; Plut. *Per.* 10.5, 20.3(?); Paus. 1.29.13; Ael. *VH* 5.10; Aristod. *FGH* 104 F 13.1; Suda s.v. *Kimon*.

[5] So Stadter (1989), pp. 220-221. In this case πάλιν would refer to Kimon's expedition against Cyprus in 451/0.

[6] See the discussion in *HCT* I, p. 307 n. 1 and pp. 379-380 n. 2. In this case πάλιν would refer to the expedition of 460-454 (Thuc. 1.104, 105.3, 109-110). But if Plutarch does mean that Perikles opposed Kimon's expedition to Cyprus in 451, he is guilty of an inconsistency within the same *Life*, since Perikles' approval of the campaign is implied at *Per.* 10.5.

APPENDIX EIGHT

440/39: PERIKLES, ASPASIA, AND THE EXPEDITION TO SAMOS

In the late 440's war broke out between two allies of Athens, Samos and Miletos. The Milesians, having fared poorly in the fighting, sent an embassy to Athens to ask for the Athenians' support. Their request for Athenian intervention was supported by certain Samian democrats who were anxious to change the form of their government. The Athenians responded favorably to the delegates' appeal. They sent forty ship to Samos, established a democracy on the island, and returned to Athens. But Athenian involvement in Samian affairs was required on a second occasion. After the withdrawal of Athens' fleet, Samian oligarchs overthrew the newly-installed democratic government and handed over to the Persian satrap of Sardis the Athenian troops and officials who had remained on the island. The Athenians consequently returned to Samos with a larger fleet. They invested the island and forced the Samians to surrender after a nine-month siege (Thuc. 1.115.2-117; Diod. 12.27-28; Plut. *Per.* 25-28).

Plutarch informs us that Perikles was responsible for the Athenian decision to attack Samos in the first instance. He reports as well that Perikles was thought to have supported the Milesians' request in order to please his Milesian mistress, Aspasia (*Per.* 24.2, 25.1). Harpocration (s.v. *Aspasia* = *FGH* 76 F 65) likewise names Aspasia as the ultimate cause of the Samian war and cites as his source for the information Duris of Samos.[1] But it is unlikely for two reasons that the story of Aspasia's role in determining Athens' policy is historical. First, the mechanism by which this information could have become accurately known to Duris and later sources is not obvious: had Perikles indeed been influenced by Aspasia he would have been ill-advised to publicize the fact. Next, it is not difficult to imagine how the slander could have developed: Aspasia's participation in conversations usually reserved for males (Pl. *Menex.* 235e-236d), her Milesian origin, and her relationship with Perikles would have suggested the story easily enough to contemporary or later authors. What probably is historical is what the story

[1] Harpocration is discussing Aspasia's responsibility for both the Samian and Peloponnesian wars. He names as sources for his information Theophrastus and Aristophanes (*Ach.* 526-539) as well as Duris. But Aristophanes only refers to Aspasia's role in causing the Peloponnesian War. The same may be true of Theophrastus (so Stadter [1989], p. 233; on Plutarch's use of Duris see also pp. lxxvi-lxxvii).

of Aspasia's influence over Perikles presupposes, that Perikles proposed the Athenian expedition against Samos.

APPENDIX NINE

433/2: PERIKLES AND THE EXPEDITION TO CORCYRA

In the summer of 433 Corcyraean ambassadors arrived in Athens anxious to conclude an alliance with the Athenians and obtain from them support for Corcyra's war against Corinth. The Corinthians, who had learned of their enemy's intentions, sent representatives to Athens at the same time to dispute the proposed alliance. After hearing the arguments of both delegations the Athenians debated the issue at length. In the end they resolved to conclude a defensive alliance with Corcyra and send to that island a fleet of ten ships. Lakedaimonios, Diotimos (son of Strombichos), and Proteas were given command of the expedition (Thuc. 1.31-44; Diod. 12.33.1-2; Plut. *Per.* 29.1).

Although Thucydides' account of the deliberative stage of the expedition to Corcyra is extensive, he does not tell us who of the Athenians participated in the debate which followed the ambassadors' speeches. Plutarch alone of our sources informs us that the Athenians were persuaded to send help to Corcyra by Perikles (*Per.* 29.1). The author further informs us that Perikles sent only ten ships to Corcyra in order to humiliate and discredit Lakedaimonios, the son of Perikles' former rival Kimon (*Per.* 29.2). We may doubt the historicity of this assertion. If Perikles did in fact advocate the dispatch of only ten ships to Corcyra, he alone can have known whether malice toward Lakedaimonios had influenced his thinking. There is, moreover, a likely context for the genesis of this bit of slander. We are told by Thucydides that the Athenians dispatched a second fleet to Corcyra because they were afraid the ten ships originally sent would be too few to help the Corcyraeans (1.50.5).[1] We may imagine that the decision to send a second fleet was made after some discussion in the assembly, but Thucydides provides no details about the Athenians' deliberation. Plutarch, however, appears to preserve some information about the course of the debate. He tells us that Perikles was criticized because the first fleet was too small to help Corcyra but was sufficient to provide Athens' enemies with a cause for complaint. Plutarch does not say that this criticism was leveled against Perikles in the course of an assembly debate, but that it prompted the dispatch of a larger fleet to Corcyra suggests that it was (*Per.* 29.3). The

[1] According to Diodorus (12.33.2), the Athenians had promised from the beginning to send more ships if necessary.

charge that Perikles had endeavored to humiliate Lakedaimonios can have had its origins in the criticism of Perikles which prompted and was aired at this assembly meeting.[2] That the accusation was made at all suggests that Perikles was in fact responsible for the size of the expedition first sent to Corcyra and that he had, as Plutarch reports, persuaded the Athenians to undertake the expedition.[3]

[2] Cf. *HCT* I, p. 178: the story of Perikles' attempt to discredit Lakedaimonios "illuminates the opposition to the alliance with Kerkyra."

[3] That Perikles persuaded the Athenians to send help to Corcyra is doubted by Stadter (1989), p. 265, and (1983), p. 135 (cf. Hornblower [1991], p. 94). Kagan (1969), pp. 237-239, accepts Plutarch's evidence. Ste. Croix (1972), pp. 73-74, thinks it likely that Perikles was behind Athens' defensive alliance with Corcyra.

APPENDIX TEN

VOTE ON *ARISTEIA* AT THE ISTHMUS OF CORINTH, 480/79

After the battle of Salamis the Greeks made attacks on Andros and Karystos, then sailed to the Isthmus of Corinth. There the Greek generals cast votes for those they thought had been the most worthy of the Hellenes ἀνὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον (Hdt. 8.123.1). Each general voted for himself first, but most voted for Themistokles as second best. In the end the issue was not resolved, and the Greeks sailed off to their respective cities (Hdt. 8.123.2-124.1; cf. Plut. *Them.* 17.2, *Mor.* 871d, 1000b; Ael. Arist. 3.338-341 Behr).

Herodotus tells us that immediately after this business at the Isthmus Themistokles went to Sparta, wishing to be honored there "because he had not been honored for his victory by *those who fought at Salamis*" (8.124.2: ὅτι δὲ νικῶν οὐκ ἐτιμήθη πρὸς τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχησάντων...). The italicized phrase suggests that the votes cast at the Isthmus were for the man who had been best in the battle of Salamis rather than, as ἀνὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον at 8.123.1 suggests,[1] for the Greek who had been best in the whole of the war to date.[2] It is also possible, however, that at 8.124.2 Herodotus is merely identifying the participants in the vote at the Isthmus by reference to a recent and quite impressive accomplishment, and that the phrase πρὸς τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχησάντων implies nothing about the action for which the prize was being considered. ἀνὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον at Hdt. 8.123.1, in other words, is not necessarily contradicted by 8.124.2. This possibility and three other considerations, by no

[1] That the vote pertained to Salamis rather than the whole war is apparently the understanding of Pritchett (*GSW* II, p. 285 Table 12). It is more likely, however, that the phrase ἀνὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον refers to the duration of the war than to a single battle (and it is so translated, for example, by Grene ["in the war"] and Rawlinson ["during the war"]): (A) πόλεμος regularly means "war" rather than "battle" in post-Homeric Greek (see LSJ s.v. πόλεμος I). (B) If Herodotus were referring to an award for action in a single engagement, it would be more natural for him to use the preposition ἐν rather than ἀνά. When referring to awards of *aristeia* at 8.17 and 9.105, for example, Herodotus uses the expression ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ναυμαχίῃ/μάχῃ. (At 5.112.1 and 8.17 the expression used is [κατὰ] ταύτην τὴν ἡμέρην.) Macan (1908) *ad* 8.123.1 takes the passage to mean that the prize was to be awarded for the whole war. (He also suggests the story is apocryphal. I see no reason to doubt that Herodotus is describing an historical event, however.)

[2] The possibility that *aristeia* for Salamis were to be voted at the Isthmus is not precluded by Hdt. 8.93.1, where the author reports that Polykritos the Aeginetan and the Athenians Eumenes and Ameinias were the individuals "most highly spoken of" at Salamis. That passage may refer to *aristeia* awarded after the battle among the Athenians and Aeginetans rather than among all the Greeks, or it may not refer to an actual award of *aristeia* (cf. ch. 3 n. 25).

means definitive in themselves, suggest to me that Hdt. 8.123.1 refers to a special award for action not limited to the battle at Salamis.

(1) As it happened, when votes were cast at the Isthmus, all of them, so far as we know, were cast for generals (Hdt. 8.123.2; cf. Plut. *Them.* 17.2, *Mor.* 1000b). This may mean that on this occasion only generals were in the running for the prize (despite that Herodotus implies at 8.123.1 that the prize was open to all Hellenes: τῷ ἀξιωτάτῳ γενομένῳ ῾Ελλήνων). If so, this award of *aristeia* was different from all others known to have been awarded by the Greeks during the Persian War: there is no reason to doubt in the case of the other "international" awards known from the period that receipt of the prizes was open to all the Greeks, regardless of rank. If the Greek generals were the only possible recipients of the *aristeia* to be awarded at the Isthmus, that prize was something different from those customarily awarded after individual battles of the war.

(2) The Greek generals cast their votes at the altar of Poseidon following a particularly solemn procedure, which Pritchett (*GSW* II, p. 289) describes as follows: "The voting tickets were placed on the altar and taken from it by the voters, in order to add solemnity to their decision and to lay a special obligation on them to vote honestly." (For this procedure cf. Dem. 18.134; [Dem.] 43.14; Plut. *Per.* 32.3, *Them.* 17.2.) Unfortunately this is the only passage in which the voting procedure used in awards of *aristeia* is described.[3] We are left to wonder whether such solemnity was considered

[3] The closest thing we have to a second description of the voting procedure used by the allied Greeks appears in Plutarch (*Arist.* 20.1-3). The author reports that after the battle of Plataia a disagreement arose concerning the award. The Athenians were unwilling to give the *aristeia* to the Spartans (and their unwillingness appears to have effectively blocked the award of the prize) (20.1: ...τῶν ᾿Αθηναίων τὸ ἀριστεῖον οὐ παραδιδόντων τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις...). Eventually, at the suggestion of Aristeides, the matter was referred to "the Greeks", apparently all the Greeks as opposed to the leadership of the individual contingents. A certain Theogeiton, a Megarian, suggested that the prize be awarded to some third city, and the Corinthian Kleokritos proposed it be given to Plataia. Aristeides accepted this proposal on behalf of the Athenians, and Pausanias accepted on behalf of the Spartans. Much information might be gleaned from this passage: it suggests that, whatever the official "rules" of the award procedure, unanimity was required to ensure its success; that in the case of dispute, the advice of the assembled Greeks might be sought; that the decision nonetheless remained in the hands of the generals of the allied contingents; that the matter could thereafter be settled not by vote but by the disagreeing parties' acceptance of a proposed solution. None of these pieces of information is inherently improbable, or indeed unlikely, but it would be dangerous to accept Plutarch's story as a historically accurate description of an award of *aristeia.* (1) Plutarch's account differs markedly from that of Herodotus, which suggests that *aristeia* may not have been awarded after Plataia (cf. ch. 3 n. 26). It is unclear which of these authors is reporting more accurate information. (For various opinions of the historicity of Plutarch's information see *GSW* II, pp. 284-286.) (2) It is likely that Plutarch has at the least exaggerated the role of Aristeides in his story. (For examples of Plutarch's attributing to the subjects of his *Lives* actions which Herodotus ascribes to all the Athenians, see ch. 6 n. 7). Even if Plutarch's account were completely accurate, however, it could tell us very little about the voting procedure regularly followed when *aristeia* were awarded: the author is describing an occasion on which the regular procedure did not work, and his description begins only after that procedure has broken down.

necessary when *aristeia* were awarded by vote on other occasions. If not, that the procedure was used at the Isthmus suggests that this occasion differed in some way from other votes on *aristeia*.

(3) The meeting at the Isthmus was held immediately before the Greek army disbanded for the winter of 480/79 (Hdt. 8.124.1), at a time, that is, which was a natural stopping point in the war, when also booty was distributed among the Greeks and dedications were made to the god at Delphi (8.121-122). If the Greeks had it in mind to award *aristeia* for valor exhibited over an extended period, the least surprising occasion for the awarding of such a prize would be just such a transitional point in the war.

The timing of the meeting at the Isthmus, therefore, as well as the (apparently) unusual solemnity of the voting procedure used on that occasion and the rank of all those for whom votes were cast in the event combine to suggest that the award of *aristeia* which nearly took place at the Isthmus in 480/79 was unlike other awards of *aristeia* known from the Persian War. The prize considered at the Isthmus was not to be, I suggest, for the battle of Salamis only. It was to be given in recognition of valor exhibited in all of the war to date, as Herodotus indicates at 8.123.1.

APPENDIX ELEVEN

THE *STRATEGOS EPI TOUS HOPLITAS*

A number of scholars have assumed that after the introduction of annual posts in the *strategia* (*Ath. Pol.* 61.1; cf. pp. 15-16) the *strategos epi tous hoplitas* was superior in authority to his colleagues.[1] To my knowledge, however, very little evidence has been adduced in support of this contention, and none of it persuasive: (1) It is true, as Beloch (1884), p. 284, notes, that the hoplite general was a leading official in Athens during the Roman period.[2] This late evidence, however, implies nothing whatever about the relationship which obtained among Athens' generals in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. (2) Beloch (pp. 282-283) assumes that Thrasyllos was president of the *strategia* in 410/9. That he served as *strategos epi ton hopliton* in the same year, according to Lysias (32.5),[3] evidently suggested to Beloch that that title was synonymous with superior authority. The evidence for Thrasyllos' "presidency", however, is not persuasive.[4] (3) Sarikakis (1976), p. 14, suggests that the superiority of the *strategos epi tous hoplitas* in the late fourth century is "indicated by the prominent position he occupies in the passage of the *Constitution of Athens*, 61.1...". The hoplite general *is* named first in that passage, but this does not imply he was the senior member of the board. (4) Fornara (1971), p. 79, suggests that in the late fifth century the *strategos epi tas naus*—for whose position there is in fact no good evidence[5]—was preeminent among *strategoi*. Later, superi-

[1] In addition to the authors cited below see Tritle (1988), p. 127 and cf. p. 124, who implies, without giving his reasons for thinking as much, that there was a ranking of *strategoi* in the late fourth century, the *strategos epi ten choran* being next in line to the *strategos epi tous hoplitas*.

[2] Sarikakis (1976), pp. 11-21; Geagan (1967), pp. 18-31.

[3] The manuscript reading is in fact disputed, but what is pertinent here is Beloch's understanding of the passage. For discussion of the variant readings see Hammond (1969), p. 116 n. 1. Rhodes (1981), p. 678, does not accept the passage as evidence that Thrasyllos was *strategos epi tous hoplitas*.

[4] Beloch infers Thrasyllos' presidency from the fact that he took command of all of Athens' available troops when Agis attacked the city (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.33).

[5] Fornara detects references to the *strategos epi tas naus* in two passages: (1) At Thuc. 8.54.3 we hear that in 411 the Athenians replaced Phrynichos (son of Stratonides) and Skironides with the generals Diomedon and Leon: ...ἀντέπεμψαν δὲ στρατηγοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς Διομέδοντα καὶ Λέοντα. Fornara understands the entire clause στρατηγοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς to be predicative, and holds that the Athenians sent out Diomedon and Leon *as* στρατηγοὶ ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. But it is also possible that στρατηγούς alone stands as predicate, while ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς is a separate prepositional phrase: "They sent out to the ships Diomedon and

ority in the *strategia* was held rather by the *strategos epi tous hoplitas*. Fornara cites no evidence for the superiority of either general, but he implies that the preeminence of each was related to the importance of their respective spheres of influence. In the fifth century, that is, when naval power was most important to Athens, the *strategos epi tas naus* was superior to his colleagues, whereas the importance of land power in the fourth century coincided with the superiority of the *strategos epi tous hoplitas* (n. 2). While a general in charge of Athens' hoplites might seem to us to hold a more important command than, for example, the *strategos epi tas symmorias*, that impression does not justify the conclusion that the *strategos epi tous hoplitas* in fact enjoyed greater constitutional authority than his colleagues. Fornara's (implicit) argument for the superiority of the hoplite general in the late fourth century is therefore no more persuasive than the other evidence which has been adduced in support of that general's preeminence.

Leon as generals." That this is the more appropriate reading of the passage is suggested by 8.55.1, where we learn of the generals' arrival ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς: ὁ δὲ Λέων καὶ ὁ Διομέδων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι ἀφιγμένοι ἤδη ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναῦς ἐπίπλουν τῇ Ῥόδῳ ἐποιήσαντο. (2) After Alkibiades' retirement to the Chersonese in 407/6 Konon sailed from Andros to Samos in accordance with a vote of the Athenians: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Κόνων ἐκ τῆς Ἄνδρου σὺν αἷς εἶχε ναυσὶν εἴκοσιν ψηφισαμένων Ἀθηναίων εἰς Σάμον ἔπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν (Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.18). Fornara understands the passage to mean that Konon sailed to Samos having been voted στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς by the Athenians: "Conon sailed from Andros with twenty vessels to Samos ψηφισαμένων Ἀθηναίων...ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν." But surely it is more natural here to take ἐπὶ τὸ ναυτικόν with ἔπλευσεν, "he sailed to the fleet." The genitive absolute, meanwhile, need refer only to the Athenians' appointment of Konon to the command in Samos, *not* to his appointment to the position στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. (See also Jordan [1975], p. 123, who argues that Konon was not in fact a *strategos* on this occasion, but rather an *archon tou nautikou*.)

The evidence Fornara cites for the existence of a στρατηγία ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς in the late fifth century is not convincing. There is, moreover, a further reason to doubt that any such generalship existed. The στρατηγία ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς is not among the annual posts named at *Ath. Pol.* 61.1. Following Fornara, therefore, we must believe not only that the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς lost his superiority to the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τοὺς ὁπλίτας in the fourth century, but that the στρατηγία ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς itself ceased to exist. That the diminution of Athens' naval power would prompt the elimination of an annual position once created does not seem likely.

APPENDIX TWELVE

ON THE STATUS OF MENANDROS AND EUTHYDEMOS IN 413/12

In response to the letter Nikias wrote to the *demos* in the winter of 414/13 (Thuc. 7.11-15), the Athenians temporarily elevated to the *strategia* two men who were serving in Sicily under Nikias' command. The new generals, Menandros and Euthydemos, were to serve as *strategoi* "until other generals, once elected, had arrived" (7.16.1: ...ἕως ἂν ἕτεροι ξυνάρχοντες αἱρεθέντες ἀφίκωνται...). Thus, Thucydides informs us in this passage, the original intention of the *demos* was that Menandros and Euthydemos would no longer serve in the capacity of *strategoi* after the arrival in Sicily in 413 of the generals Demosthenes and Eurymedon. But the evidence Thucydides provides elsewhere for the status of Menandros and Euthydemos in 413/12 is ambiguous, and it is possible, although no source says as much, that the two were elected to the *strategia* in the spring of 413 and therefore served as colleagues of Nikias in 413/12 in conjunction with Demosthenes and Eurymedon (so Develin, *AO* p. 155). The question of the status of Menandros and Euthydemos in 413/12 has important implications for our understanding of the relationship which obtained among generals in the field in the late fifth century. Thucydides provides information about a number of occasions in 413/12 in which Athens' generals in Sicily arrived at command decisions (see ch. 5 § 2.2, nos. 2-8, and ch. 5 n. 39). In those passages in which the generals taking part in the deliberations are named, there is no evidence for the participation of Menandros and Euthydemos.[1] (On 7.43.1, however, in which their participation in the deliberations is implied, see below.) If the two were in fact generals in 413/12 their failure to participate with their colleagues in deliberations of the Athenian command on at least some occasions becomes noteworthy. We certainly could not conclude, in the light of this evidence to the contrary, that in the late

[1] Those participating in councils-of-war are named at 7.47.1-49.4, 7.72.3-4, and 7.80.1. They are not named at 7.50.3, 7.50.4, and 7.74.1. At 7.60.1-3 Thucydides mentions a council-of-war in which both generals and taxiarchs took part. Since Thucydides does not name the generals who participated on this occasion, we cannot be sure that Menandros and Euthydemos were not among them, but it is also possible that they took part in the deliberations in the capacity of taxiarchs (cf. ch. 5 n. 39). (We are not told what positions the two held prior to their elevation to the *strategia* in 414/13. Develin, *AO* p. 154, suggests that they were officers of some sort. If Menandros and Euthydemos were not in fact elected generals in 413/12 it is likely enough that they returned to the positions they had held previously once their tenure as *strategoi* ceased.)

fifth century Athenian generals in joint command of a single expedition were each full and equal participants in the formation of command decisions.

Three pieces of information provided by Thucydides suggest that Menandros and Euthydemos did serve as generals in 413/12:

(1) At 7.43.1 Thucydides reports that Demosthenes obtained the consent of "Nikias and his other colleagues" prior to putting into action his plan for an attack on Epipolai (...ἀλλὰ πείσας τόν τε Νικίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνάρχοντας...τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τῶν 'Επιπολῶν ἐποιεῖτο). At this time Demosthenes, Nikias, and Eurymedon were the only generals serving in Sicily, unless Menandros and Euthydemos had continued to serve in that capacity after the arrival of their replacements. Thus we may wonder who the colleagues (plural) other than Nikias were to whom Demosthenes appealed for support. We know that subordinate military officers sometimes did take part in councils-of-war in the field (ch. 3 § 3.2), but it is unlikely that Thucydides would refer to Demosthenes' subordinates in the army as his ξυνάρχοντας.[2] Thus we must assume that the word refers only to *strategoi* and, therefore, that the status of Menandros and/or Euthydemos at this point in the campaign justified Thucydides' reference to one or both of them as *strategoi*. It is possible that the two were in fact generals, but I suggest an alternative explanation for Thucydides' language after consideration of the next piece of information relevant to the status of Menandros and Euthydemos in 413/12.

(2) Thucydides reports at 7.43.2 that the attack on Epipolai for which Demosthenes had gained the support of his colleagues was led by Demosthenes himself, Eurymedon, and Menandros. Nikias, we are told, remained behind in the fortifications, quite probably because his illness prevented him from playing an active role in the encounter (cf. 6.102.2). There is no mention of Euthydemos in Thucydides' account. That Menandros shared command of the army on this occasion with two generals may mean that he had likewise been elected to the *strategia* for 413/12, but it does not imply as much, and Thucydides does not call Menandros a general in his account of the battle.

As an explanation for Thucydides' language at 7.43.1 and for Menandros' role in the attack on Epipolai I would suggest that Nikias' inability to perform his official functions adequately made desirable the occasional assumption of command by Menandros and Euthydemos during what re-

[2] Thucydides nowhere uses the plural participle of ξυνάρχω to refer to Athenian officials who were not serving in the same *arche*. In each instance the ξυνάρχοντες to whom Thucydides refers were colleagues in the *strategia* (1.62.4, 4.54.2, 6.25.2, 7.16.1, 7.16.2, 8.27.1, 8.54.3). ξυνάρχω appears in finite form only at 7.31.5, and in this instance too the reference is to *strategoi*.

mained of the Sicilian campaign (cf. 7.69.4). For this reason the status of Menandros and Euthydemos was sufficiently ambiguous to justify Thucydides' imprecise reference to one or both of them in his account of the attack on Epipolai as Demosthenes' ξυνάρχων/-οντες.

(3) In the final battle in the harbor, we are told, Demosthenes, Menandros, and Euthydemos together "boarded the Athenian ships as *strategoi*" (7.69.4: ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Μένανδρος καὶ Εὐθύδημος (οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐπέβησαν) ἄραντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν στρατοπέδου εὐθὺς ἔπλεον πρὸς τὸ ζεῦγμα τοῦ λιμένος καὶ τὸν παραλειφθέντα...).[3] This is the strongest evidence for the generalship of Menandros and Euthydemos in 413/12, but it may not be conclusive. Fornara (1971), p. 65 and n. 113, has suggested that the predicative position of στρατηγοί in the passage suggests that the two had been "temporarily given that role by the other generals" (cf. Scheele [1932], p. 5). According to this reconstruction, Menandros and Euthydemos were not in fact elected generals in 413/12 but were serving in that capacity during the final naval battle. Develin, *AO* p. 155, objects to this argument for two reasons: (a) because references to Menandros and Euthydemos earlier in Thucydides' account and at Diod. 13.13.2 suggest that the two were generals in 413/12, and (b) because Demosthenes, who is also named by Thucydides among those "serving in the capacity of general" during the battle, was in fact an elected *strategos* at the time.

With regard to Develin's first objection, I have argued above that Thuc. 7.43.1 and 7.43.2 need not imply that Menandros and Euthydemos had been elected to the *strategia* for 413/12. Nor is there other evidence in Thucydides' account (apart from 7.69.4 itself) which suggests that the two served as generals after the arrival in Sicily of Demosthenes and Eurymedon. Diodorus likewise does not provide evidence for the generalship of Menandros and Euthydemos. At 13.13.2 he names the positions assumed by the Athenian command in a battle undertaken against the combined Syracusan and Corinthian fleets: the general Eurymedon commanded the Athenians' right wing (...τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας παρέδωκαν Εὐρυμέδοντι τῷ στρατηγῷ...); Euthydemos was stationed on the left wing (ἐπὶ δὲ θατέρου μέρους Εὐθύδημος ἐτέτακτο...); and Menandros held the center (τῆς δὲ μέσης τάξεως εἶχε τὴν ἡγεμονίαν παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις Μένανδρος...). That Menandros and Euthydemos commanded divisions of the Athenian fleet on the occasion Diodorus describes does not imply that they were elected generals. Diodorus, moreover, may himself provide evidence against the contention that Menandros and Euthydemos were

[3] "Demosthenes, Menandros, and Euthydemos—for these men boarded the Athenian ships as *strategoi*—setting out from their camp sailed straightway to the barrier of the harbor and the passage left behind...."

generals at the time of the battle: in naming the commanders of the Athenian fleet Diodorus is careful to identify Eurymedon as a general, but he does not do the same in the case of Menandros and Euthydemos (so also Scheele [1932], p. 5). Perhaps Thucydides' account suggested to Diodorus or his source that the two were not in fact elected *strategoi* when they served in the capacity of generals in the final battle in the Syracusan harbor.[4]

Develin's second objection to Fornara's position is also, I think, not entirely persuasive. It is true that Thucydides does not distinguish at 7.69.4 between the status of Demosthenes and that of Menandros and Euthydemos, but this does not imply that their constitutional positions were the same and that Menandros and Euthydemos had, as Demosthenes, been elected to the *strategia* for 413/12. Thucydides' predicative στρατηγοί may not refer to the rank of the three commanders but rather to their function in the battle, and there would be no inaccuracy, if Menandros and Euthydemos were not generals, in equating their role in the fighting with that of Demosthenes: all three did in fact serve "in the capacity of *strategoi*" in the battle, whatever their respective ranks at the time. It is not clear to me that Thucydides would be any more specific than he is in this passage in describing the constitutional complexities of the scenario Fornara describes.

The evidence for the generalship of Menandros and Euthydemos in 413/12 is, I suggest, inconclusive. There is, moreover, further reason to doubt that the two were in fact generals. First, Euthydemos evidently did not command the Athenians during the attack on Epipolai: Thucydides makes no reference to him in his account of the battle (7.43.2). (This omission would be surprising if Euthydemos were a general, given that Thucydides is careful in the passage to inform his readers even of the whereabouts of Nikias, who did not participate in the attack.) Second, neither Menandros nor Euthydemos assumed command during the retreat by land that followed the final battle in the harbor (7.75-86).[5] Their conspicuous absence from the Athenian command on this occasion is strong evidence that Menandros and Euthydemos were not generals in 413/12. I suggest, rather, that the two were sometimes called upon during that year to act in the capacity of *strategoi*.[6] Two factors peculiar to the particular historical circumstances

[4] Diodorus actually conflates two naval battles in his account, that in which the general Eurymedon lost his life (13.13.3; Thuc. 7.52.2; this was soon after the lunar eclipse: 13.13.1; Thuc. 7.51-52.1), and the final battle in the Syracusan harbor, in which the enemy were commanded by Agatharchos, Sikanos, and Pythes (13.13.2; Thuc. 7.70.1).

[5] We hear no more of Euthydemos after Thuc. 7.69.4, and it is possible that he died in the naval battle, but Menandros evidently survived: Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.16, 2.1.16, 26; Plut. *Alc.* 36.4.

[6] Cf. *HCT ad* 7.16.1: "After the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon in Sicily, there were three 'full' generals at Syracuse and the association of Menandros and Euthydemos with them in command seems to have been a matter for their discretion."

may account for this unusual arrangement. First, while three generals held command in Sicily at the beginning of 413/12—Nikias, Demosthenes, and Eurymedon—their number was reduced in the course of that year, first because Nikias' illness sometimes rendered him unable to perform the duties of *strategos* fully, and again because Eurymedon died in the autumn of 413. It was therefore desirable for Athens' generals to supplement their ranks at times during the year by informally elevating qualified subordinates to the command.[7] Second, the generals' reliance on Menandros and Euthydemos in particular might be supposed to have had the implicit sanction of the Athenian *demos*, since the Athenians had themselves elevated the two men to the *strategia* temporarily in 414/13. We need not believe that the Athenians followed up this temporary appointment by electing Menandros and Euthydemos to the *strategia* for 413/12.[8]

[7] Thus, when illness (as I suggest) prevented Nikias from joining Demosthenes and Eurymedon in the attack on Epipolai, Menandros acted as his replacement (7.43.2), and after Eurymedon's death (7.52.2) Demosthenes shared command in the final naval battle with both Menandros and Euthydemos (7.69.4).

[8] I have not adduced as evidence against the generalship of Menandros and Euthydemos their failure to participate in a series of councils-of-war in 413 since to do so would involve circular reasoning. One cannot first argue, as I do in ch. 5 § 2.2, that all of Athens' generals participated in deliberations of the Athenian command during the Sicilian expedition, and then use the absence of Menandros and Euthydemos from those deliberations as evidence against their generalship.

APPENDIX THIRTEEN

STRATEGOI AUTOKRATORES

The Athenian *demos* sometimes designated its generals, as well as other officials (e.g., Thuc. 8.67.1, Lys. 13.9), as *autokratores*.[1] The conferment of this distinction on generals was not connected with their election to the *strategia*, nor was the position of *strategos autokrator* an established post to which a general might be appointed after the elections (cf. Hignett [1952], p. 248). Rather, the *demos* designated as *autokratores* generals whom it chose to invest with more extensive authority than would ordinarily have been theirs. Specifically, as others have argued,[2] the *demos* empowered its *strategoi autokratores* to act in certain situations on their own authority, without reference to the *ekklesia*. In thus expanding the powers of its generals, the *demos* voluntarily yielded to the *strategia* a portion of its own authority, but it did not in so doing relinquish control over its *archontes*.

The authority *strategoi autokratores* enjoyed was by no means absolute. So much is indicated by Thucydides' account of the antecedents of the Sicilian expedition. In the first of the two assemblies which preceded the dispatch of Athens' fleet to Sicily in 416/15, we are told, the Athenians appointed Nikias, Alkibiades, and Lamachos as *strategoi autokratores* of the expedition (6.8.2: ...ἐψηφίσαντο...στρατηγοὺς αὐτοκράτορας Ἀλκιβιάδην τε τὸν Κλεινίου καὶ Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου καὶ Λάμαχον τὸν Ξενοφάνους, βοηθοὺς μὲν Ἐγεσταίοις πρὸς Σελινουντίους, ξυγκατοικίσαι δὲ καὶ Λεοντίνους, ἤν τι περιγίγνηται αὐτοῖς τοῦ πολέμου, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πρᾶξαι ὅπῃ ἂν γιγνώσκωσιν ἄριστα Ἀθηναίοις). The authority they were intended by this appellation

[1] Seven generals are named by our sources as *strategoi autokratores*: Themistokles, in 480/79 (Plut. *Arist.* 8.1); Aristeides, in 479/8 (Plut. *Arist.* 11.1); Nikias, Alkibiades, and Lamachos, in 416/15 (Thuc. 6.8.2, 26.1; Diod. 13.2.1; Plut. *Nic.* 12.4, 6, *Alc.* 18.3; cf. *IG* i^2 98b l. 2, where αὐτοκράτορα is restored; it is not similarly restored at *IG* i^3 93b.3); Alkibiades, in 407/6 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.20; Nep. *Alc.* 7.1; Diod. 13.69.3; Plut. *Alc.* 33.2); and Chares, in 358/7 (Dem. 23.173; cf. Isoc. 8.55). It is unlikely that Plutarch has preserved historically accurate information regarding the positions held by Themistokles and Aristeides during the Second Persian War: see Fornara (1971), pp. 13-14; Dover (1960), pp. 72-73; Schwahn (1935), col. 1079.63-66; Scheele (1932), p. 8. Scheele, pp. 8-9, argues that Alkibiades did not in fact hold an official position of superior authority in 407/6; his authority was based rather on his moral ascendancy, as that of Perikles in 429. As Dover (1960), p. 62, points out, however, this interpretation ignores ἀναρρηθείς at Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.20. I see no compelling reason to doubt Xenophon's evidence for Alkibiades' position.

[2] See *GSW* II, p. 42; Fornara (1971), pp. 13-14 and 31 n. 11; *HCT ad* 1.126.8 and 6.8.2.

to enjoy cannot have been absolute, since their powers were later expanded in the course of a second *ekklesia*. On that occasion the *demos* resolved that the generals should be *autokratores* "with respect to both the numbers of the army and the entire expedition, to act as seemed best to them" (6.26.1: ...οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι ἐψηφίσαντο εὐθὺς αὐτοκράτορας εἶναι καὶ περὶ στρατιᾶς πλήθους καὶ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πλοῦ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς πράσσειν ᾗ ἂν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ ἄριστα εἶναι...). Evidently, the generals had not previously been licensed to make decisions regarding the size of the army they would take to Sicily (cf. Hignett [1952], p. 248; Hauvette-Besnault [1885], pp. 77-78).

As a result of the second assembly the generals who were to serve in Sicily were invested by the *demos* with the authority to make decisions on their own regarding the strength of the army to be dispatched and, more generally, regarding "the entire expedition". It is in these particulars that the authority conveyed with the title "*autokrator*" on this occasion seems to have consisted. The *demos*, that is, defined in this instance the sphere of activity within which its *strategoi autokratores* were to enjoy their expanded authority, and this was probably the standard procedure (cf. *HCT ad* 6.8.2). Thus the Athenian *boule* was given full authority in 434/3 over the meetings of the *logistai* (*IG* i[3] 52.9: ...συναγογε͂ς δὲ τõλ λογιστõν ἐ βολὲ αὐτοκράτορ ἔστο), and Theramenes proposed in 405/4 that the Athenians appoint him *presbeutes* with full authority regarding the peace (Lys. 13.9: ...περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης πρεσβευτὴν αὐτοκράτορα...). So too the respect in which the generals of the Sicilian expedition were intended after the first assembly to enjoy expanded powers must have been specified by the *demos*, and Dover (*HCT ad* 6.8.2) is probably correct in suggesting that the limitations of the authority granted them are indicated in the directions which the generals were given on this occasion: "If we are to be guided by the context here, the generals were empowered to decide, without reference back to Athens, when the objects detailed in βοηθοὺς μὲν κ.τ.λ. had been effected, and to decide on the military and diplomatic means to be used" (cf. Scheele [1932], p. 3).

However much authority was granted *strategoi autokratores* to accomplish the tasks assigned them by the *demos*, the generals were not, our evidence suggests, exempt for that reason from the normal scrutiny and disciplinary procedures to which *strategoi* were regularly subject (cf. Hammond [1969], p. 127; *HCT ad* 1.126.8). We know from Thucydides that Nikias communicated frequently with the Athenians regarding events in Sicily (7.8.1-2, 7.10-15). Perhaps more importantly, we are told that Nikias was concerned—or at least affected being concerned—that the Athenians would find fault with their generals and would likely prosecute them should they withdraw from Sicily unbidden (7.48.4-5). Similarly, Alkibiades, who at the

time held the position of ἁπάντων ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.20), was arguably motivated by his fear of punitive action when he elected to withdraw to the Chersonese in 407/6 rather than return to Athens (see appendix 15). Clearly, in addition to having itself defined the sphere of activity within which its *strategoi autokratores* were to enjoy expanded powers, the Athenian *demos* exercised control over these generals by both direct and indirect means while they were in the field.[3]

[3] For discussions of *strategoi autokratores* not cited above see *GSW* V, p. 383 n. 547; Jordan (1975), p. 119 and n. 16; Beloch (1884), pp. 285-287.

APPENDIX FOURTEEN

FATALITIES

We know of some 38 generals (see Table 3) who died at the hands of Athens' enemies between 501/0 and 322/1. The majority of these deaths occurred during the Peloponnesian War: about 12% of the *strategiai* for which we have evidence during that period resulted in the death of the general holding the office. This figure is the ratio of *strategiai* known to have ended in the general's death (22) to the number of *strategiai* between 431/0 and 405/4 for which we have evidence (between 178 and 187). There are a considerable number of *strategiai* in the period for which we have no information,[1] however, and we cannot know how many of these ended in the death of the general. If more than 12% did, our fatality rate for the period would increase, but it is perhaps more likely that the rate is lower than 12%: our sources may have more frequently mentioned those campaigns in which generals died in battle, leaving us with an exaggerated impression of the dangers of the generalship. Nonetheless, the lowest possible rate (and one that is improbably low since it is based on the unlikely premise that we know of all the generals who died during the Peloponnesian War) is 8%, that is, the ratio of *strategiai* known to have ended in death (22) to the total number of *strategiai* possible in the period (280).

Attempts to determine the fatality rate of Athens' *strategoi* for the rest of the period under discussion are less profitable. While we have evidence for between 64% and 67% of the *strategiai* possible during the Peloponnesian War, we know of no more than 22% of those possible for the other years between 501/0 and 322/1.[2] A fatality rate based on this limited body of data is likely to be less meaningful than that found for the Peloponnesian War years. For what it is worth, however, between 4.3% and 5.7% of the *strategiai* for which we have evidence between 501/0 and 322/1 (excluding the years from 431/0 to 405/4) ended in the death of the *strategos*.[3]

[1] There were at least 280 *strategiai* during the War. See Table 2.

[2] See Table 2: for the non-Peloponnesian War years we have evidence for between 279 and 328 of a possible 1520 *strategiai*, or between 18.4% and 21.6%.

[3] Between 14 and 16 fatalities of from 279 to 325 known *strategiai*. See Table 2.

TABLE 3*

WAR FATALITIES OF *STRATEGOI*, 501/0-322/1[1]

NO.	DATE OF DEATH	*STRATEGOS*	EVIDENCE OF DEATH
1	490/89	Miltiades[2]	Nep. *Milt.* 7.5; cf. Hdt. 6.136
2	490/89	Stesileos	Hdt. 6.114
3	465/4	Sophanes[3]	Hdt. 9.75; cf. schol. Aeschin. 2.31
4	459/8	Phrynichos (*AO* no. 2518)[4]	*IG* i³ 1147.6
5	459/8	Hippodamas	*IG* i³ 1147.63
6	459/8	Dikaiogenes	Is. 5.42
7	451/0	Anaxikrates	Diod. 12.3.4
8	448/7	Tolmides	Diod. 12.6.2; Plut. *Ages.* 19.2, *Per.* 18.3; Paus. 1.27.5, cf. 1.29.14
9	448/7	Epiteles	*IG* i³ 1162.4
10	446/5	--odotos[5]	
11	432/1	Kallias	Thuc. 1.63.3; Diod. 12.37.1
12	430/29	Melesandros	Thuc. 2.69.2
13	430/29	Xenophon	Thuc. 2.79.7; Diod. 12.47.3; Plut. *Nic.* 6.3
14	430/29	Kalliades (or Hestiodoros)[6]	Plut. *Nic.* 6.3
15	430/29	Phanomachos	Diod. 12.47.3
16	428/7	Asopios	Thuc. 3.7.4
17	428/7	Lysikles (*AO* no. 1856)	Thuc. 3.19.2
18	427/6	Charoiades	Thuc. 3.90.2; *FGH* 577 F 2
19	427/6	Prokles	Thuc. 3.98.4
20	424/3	Hippokrates[7]	Thuc. 4.101.2; Paus. 3.6.1, 9.6.3
21	422/1	Kleon	Thuc. 5.10.9; Androt. *FGH* 324 F 40; Diod. 12.74.2; Plut. *Nic.* 9.4; *Vit. Thuc.* 3; schol. Ar. *Pax* 283, 284
22	418/17	Laches	Thuc. 5.74.3; Androt. *FGH* 324 F 41
23	418/17	Nikostratos	Thuc. 5.74.3; Androt. *FGH* 324 F 41

* Notes to Table 3 begin on p. 206.

24	414/13	Lamachos	Thuc. 6.101.6; Diod. 13.8.1; Plut. *Nic.* 18.3; schol. Ar. *Thesm.* 841
25	413/12	Eurymedon	Thuc. 7.52.2; Diod. 13.13.4; Plut. *Nic.* 24.3; Just. 4.5.7; schol. Thuc. 7.52
26	413/12	[Demosthenes][8]	Thuc. 7.86.2; Diod. 13.33.1; Plut. *Nic.* 28.5; cf. Plut. *Nic.* 27.2; Just. 4.5.10
27	413/12	[Nikias]	Thuc. 7.86.2, 4; Diod. 13.33.1; Plut. *Mor.* 169a, *Nic.* 28.4; Paus. 1.29.12
28	411/0	Simichos/ Strombichides[9]	*Hell. Oxy.* 7.2, 4; schol. Aeschin. 2.31
29	406/5	Archestratos	Lys. 21.8
30	405/4	[Philokles] (*AO* no. 2417)	Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.32; Diod. 13.106.7; Paus. 9.32.9
31	405/4	[Menandros][10]	
32	405/4	[Tydeus]	
33	405/4	[Kephisodotos] (*AO* no. 1598)	
34	390/89	Thrasyboulos of Steiria	Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.30; Nep. *Thras.* 4.3; Diod. 14.99.4
35	376/5	Kedon[11]	Diod. 15.34.5
36	357/6	Chabrias[12]	Dem. 20.81; Nep. *Chab.* 4; Diod. 16.7.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 6.2
37	338/7	...[6]...t--[13]	
38	323/2	Leosthenes, son of Leosthenes	Hyp. 6 *passim*; Diod. 18.13.5; Strab. 9.5.10; Just. 13.5.12; Paus. 1.25.5, 3.6.1; Suda s.v. *Leosthenes*

NOTES

[1] Kimon died in 451/0 during his campaign against Cyprus, but I have not included him in this list of war dead since it is not likely that his death resulted from wounds received in battle. Of our sources only Plutarch (*Cim.* 19.1) records the tradition that Kimon died from a battle injury, but he also tells us that according to most accounts Kimon died from sickness. Our other sources for Kimon's death either are noncommittal (Thuc. 1.112.4; Plut. *Comp. Cim. et Luc.* 2.5, *Per.* 10.8; Suda s.v. *Kimon*) or they likewise report that Kimon died of sickness (Diod. 12.4.6; Nep. *Cim.* 3.4; Aristod. *FGH* 104 F 13.1). One would expect them to have indicated that Kimon

died of a war injury if such were the case, or if the disease from which he ultimately died had been caused by a wound received in battle.

Develin, *AO* p. 68, suggests that the generals Kratinos, Lykourgos, and Lysistratos died in action in 476/5. The evidence for this is a scholion to Aeschines 2.31 which lists Athenian disasters at Ennea Hodoi. The scholiast does not say specifically that the generals died in battle, however, and I have therefore not included them among the war dead: τὰ δὲ ἀτυχήματα ἐγένοντο τάδε· τὸ πρῶτον μὲν Λυσιστράτου καὶ Λυκούργου καὶ Κρατίνου στρατευόντων ἐπ' Ἠϊόνα τὴν ἐπὶ Στρύμονι διεφθάρησαν ὑπὸ Θρᾳκῶν, εἰληφότες Ἠϊόνα, ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Φαίδωνος....

Pausanias (1.23.3-4) tells us that the general Dieitrephes, who led Thracian mercenaries through Mykalessos in 414/13 (Thuc. 7.29) and served again in Thrace in 411 (Thuc. 8.64.2), was portrayed as wounded (ὀιστοῖς βεβλημένος) in a statue erected near the entrance of the Acropolis. We do not know, however, whether Dieitrephes' wounds were fatal, nor whether he sustained them while general. Kirchner (*PA* 3755) doubts Pausanias' identification of the Dieitrephes portrayed in the statue with the general of Mykalessos. So also Connor (1971), p. 156 n. 45.

[2] Miltiades died after his return to Athens from a wound sustained during his Parian campaign.

[3] Sophanes' colleague Leagros may likewise have died at Drabescus, but we are not told as much by our sources.

[4] The name of some general is to be restored at *IG* i^3 1147.6, an Athenian casualty list of the tribe Erechtheis. On the restoration of "Phrynichos" see Daux (1975), p. 153.

[5] The name "--odotos" is inscribed on an Athenian casualty list in larger letters than the other names in the list. Bradeen (1964), p. 22, has suggested from the greater letter size that the man was a general. It is far from certain that he was.

[6] Thucydides (2.79.1) tells us that Xenophon and two other generals (whom he does not name) were in command at Spartolos. Diodorus names only Xenophon and Phanomachos as the generals in command (12.47.3); Plutarch names only Xenophon and Kalliades (*Nic.* 6.3). Merging these sources one could conclude that the three generals of the expedition were Xenophon, Phanomachos, and Kalliades. Some modern scholars have doubted the generalship of the last, however, arguing that Plutarch, in naming "Kalliades" as general, was referring mistakenly to the Kallias who was general in 432/1 (so Fornara [1971], p. 55 and cf. p. 32, *HCT* II, p. 203, and Beloch [1884], pp. 300-301; Krause [1914], pp. 35-36 n. 34, accepts Kalliades' *strategia*, as does Develin, *AO* p. 119). Thompson (1969), pp. 160-161, makes a strong (and to my mind correct) argument against rejecting

Plutarch's evidence: "Kallias" and "Kalliades" are both common names, and the coincidence of their occurrence is not significant; their similarity is not sufficient reason to believe that Plutarch was so confused that he "turned Kallias the victor at Poteidaia into Kalliades the loser at Spartolos." Hestiodoros has been earmarked by some as the third general at Spartolos in place of Kalliades (*Eisangelia*, p. 64 n. 52, and Kirchner *PA* 5207; Develin, *AO* p. 119, accepts all four generals in question as having been in command). The only apparent reason for this is that Hestiodoros had been associated with Xenophon and Phanomachos at Poteidaia during the previous winter (Thuc. 2.70.1). But Hestiodoros' association with these generals on one occasion does not imply his association with them on another. If we accept that he was general with Xenophon at Spartolos we are forced into one of the following positions: (1) we must reject the evidence of either Diodorus or Plutarch regarding the generalships of, respectively, Phanomachos or Kalliades, or (2) we must reject Thucydides' statement that Xenophon was one of only three generals on the expedition. I do not believe that an argument from Hestiodoros' previous association with Xenophon is sufficiently compelling to justify either course (cf. Thompson). I am inclined to believe, therefore, that the three generals who fought and died at Spartolos were Xenophon, Phanomachos, and Kalliades. (Although for the present purpose of counting corpses it is sufficient to conclude only that three Athenian generals died at Spartolos; it is not necessary to establish the identity of those generals.)

[7] According to [Andoc.] 4.13, Hipponikos died while serving as general at Delion in 424/3. No other source lists Hipponikos as general in this year, however, and it is possible that the author has confused Hipponikos with Hippokrates (as Develin, *AO* p. 133, and Davies, *APF* 7826 IX, suggest).

[8] I have bracketed the names of those generals who were executed by the enemy after capture. Plutarch (*Nic.* 28.5) records two traditions regarding the deaths of Demosthenes and Nikias: according to Timaeus, the two committed suicide in captivity after learning that they were going to be executed; according to Thucydides and Philistus, they were executed after capture. (For Philistus' account, cf. Paus. 1.29.12: Demosthenes *attempted* [ἐπιχερεῖν] to kill himself after capture.) Justin (4.5.10-11) tells us that Demosthenes eluded captivity by killing himself, but he says nothing of Nikias' fate except that he, unlike Demosthenes, was captured.

[9] Our sources disagree on the name of the general. For discussion of the problem see *AO* p. 163 and Thompson (1967), pp. 106-107. Whatever the name, some general is recorded as having died while on campaign and so is to be included as a fatality.

[10] Our sources tell us that all the Athenians captured at Aigospotami were executed except for the general Adeimantos (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.32; Plut. *Lys.* 13.1-2; cf. Plut. *Alc.* 37.4, *Lys.* 11.6). Philokles was certainly executed. Konon escaped capture altogether (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.29; Diod. 13.106.6; Plut. *Alc.* 37.4, *Lys.* 11.6). As for the rest, Menandros, Tydeus, and Kephisodotos, it is reasonable to assume that they either fell in the fighting or were executed after capture.

[11] Diodorus (15.34.5) informs us that Kedon was in command of the Athenians' left wing at Naxos (376/5), but he does not tell us what office Kedon held: ...τριήρεσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ λαιοῦ κέρατος, ὧν ἡγεῖτο Κήδων ὁ Ἀθηναῖος.... He is accepted as a general by Hansen (1989b), Krause (1914), and Beloch (1884). Develin (*AO*) lists him only as an officer.

[12] According to Diodorus, this was Chabrias' second trip to the grave: at 15.36.4 he mistakenly reports that Chabrias was assassinated after a battle near Abdera in 376/5.

Nepos (*Chab.* 4.1) reports that Chabrias' death in 357/6 occurred while he was serving in a private capacity (presumably as trierarch). Plutarch's account (*Phoc.* 6.2) may likewise suggest that he was trierarch. Demosthenes (20.81-82) does not mention Chabrias' position, but Diodorus (16.7.3) calls him a general. I follow *AO* p. 275, Hansen (1989b), p. 63, Krause (1914), pp. 19 and 54 n. 108, and Beloch (1884), pp. 298 and 320, in accepting Chabrias' generalship.

[13] The name of some general is to be restored in a fragment of an Athenian casualty list. See Wankel (1984), p. 49, and Bradeen (1964), pp. 55-58.

APPENDIX FIFTEEN

NOTE ON THE RETIREMENT OF ALKIBIADES TO THE CHERSONESE IN 407/6

Xenophon tells us that after the battle at Notion in 407/6 the Athenians were angry with Alkibiades and elected ten new generals. After the elections Alkibiades left Samos for the Chersonese. Konon then sailed to Samos to replace him and was himself replaced at Andros by Phanosthenes (*Hell.* 1.5.16-17). It is clear that Alkibiades left office before the end of the year. As noted above, Phanosthenes replaced Konon at Andros when Konon was sent to Samos to replace Alkibiades (*Hell.* 1.5.16-18), and we know that Phanosthenes was not a general in 406/5, since he is not among the ten generals of that year named by our sources (Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.16; Diod. 13.74.1). Therefore, if Phanosthenes was a general, as is likely,[1] he must have held office in 407/6. His replacement of Konon in that year implies that Alkibiades left office before the end of his term.[2] Alkibiades' premature departure from office does not imply that he was deposed, however. It is possible that after learning he had not been reelected to the *strategia* Alkibiades left Samos and renounced his generalship of his own accord, thereby anticipating whatever disciplinary measures might have awaited him. Given Alkibiades' history, it would hardly be surprising if his failure at the polls made him fear the worst. Once Alkibiades left Samos the Athenians—according to this recreation of events—were compelled to replace him with another general and consequently sent orders to Konon to sail from Andros: it should be noted that according to Xenophon's account Konon sailed to Samos only after Alkibiades' departure from the island.

[1] We cannot be certain that Phanosthenes was a general on this occasion, since no source says he was. (Pl. *Ion* 541d does not provide evidence for the date of Phanosthenes' generalships: καὶ Φανοσθένη τὸν Ἄνδριον καὶ Ἡρακλείδην τὸν Κλαζομένιον...ἡ πόλις...καὶ εἰς στρατηγίας καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἄγει....) Most modern scholars have accepted Phanosthenes as a general without reservation, and I would agree that it is likely that the Athenians were replacing their general at Andros with another general, but certainty is impossible. (Davies [1981], p. 162, Fornara [1971], p. 69, Krause [1914], p. 14, and Beloch [1884], pp. 294 and 312, accept Phanosthenes as a general without reservation. Jordan [1975], p. 122, and [1970], p. 232, makes him a navarch in 406/5, but this is because he is assuming, I think mistakenly, that Phanosthenes sailed to Andros in that year, when he could not have been a general. Develin, *AO* p. 174, includes Phanosthenes as a general with reservations, apparently influenced by Jordan.)

[2] The argument is made by Roberts (1982), pp. 223-224 n. 62.

Lysias at 21.7 tells us that the Athenians in some way "put an end to" (ἐπαύσατε) the office-holding of Alkibiades and his colleagues: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνους μὲν ὑμεῖς ἐπαύσατε τῆς ἀρχῆς, τοὺς δὲ μετὰ Θρασύλλου δέκα εἵλεσθε.... The verb παύω is used elsewhere to mean "depose,"[3] but it must be admitted that the term is not as clear-cut as we would like. Lysias could be referring here only to the dismissal of the board of generals as a whole at the end of 407/6.[4] I think this is likely for two reasons. First, Lysias appears to connect the removal of Alkibiades and his colleagues from office with the election of the new generals. There is no indication that a separate procedure is meant. Second, if Lysias is referring to deposition, the passage would be our only evidence that some of Alkibiades' colleagues were deposed after the battle at Notion, and it is not obvious to whom Lysias could be referring. Konon, Aristokrates, Thrasyboulos (of Steiria), and Adeimantos are known to have been associated with Alkibiades in his campaign of 407/6.[5] Of these Konon and Aristokrates were almost certainly not deposed, since both were reelected to the *strategia* for 406/5 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.16; Diod. 13.74.1). Nor is there evidence that either Adeimantos or Thrasyboulos was out of favor in Athens in the following year: Thrasyboulos served as a trierarch in 406/5 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.35; 1.7.5, 31), and Adeimantos was reelected to the *strategia* after the recall of the generals from Arginousai (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.1). It remains possible, of course, that other generals whom our sources do not name were deposed with Alkibiades.

In another passage Lysias reports that Alkibiades' exile to the Thracian Chersonese was self-imposed: καὶ οὕτω πολλὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἡμαρτηκέναι, ὥστε...οὐδέποτ' ἐλθὼν εὐθύνας ἐτόλμησε δοῦναι, ἀλλὰ φυγὴν αὑτοῦ καταγνοὺς καὶ Θρᾴκης καὶ πάσης πόλεως ἐβούλετο πολίτης γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς πατρίδος εἶναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ (14.38). Admittedly, the passage does not allow us to rule out the possibility that Alkibiades was deposed. He may have chosen to go into exile only after learning that the vote had gone against him. But if Alkibiades was deposed it is surprising that Lysias does not mention the fact in this passage in which he is attempting to blacken the general's reputation.

Cornelius Nepos reports that Alkibiades was deposed: *absenti* [Alkibiades] *magistratum abrogarent et alium in eius locum substituerent* (*Alc.* 7.3).

According to Diodorus, Alkibiades went into exile of his own accord in fear of Athenian reprisal: ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διανοούμενος ἐφοβεῖτο, μήποτε καιρὸν λαβόντες Ἀθηναῖοι τιμωρίαν ἐπιθῶσι περὶ πάντων

[3] In the case of Timotheos: Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.13. That Timotheos was deposed is confirmed in a fourth-century speech, [Dem.] 49.9.

[4] So Kagan (1987), p. 326 n. 6.

[5] For sources see *AO* p. 174.

ὧν εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐξήμαρτεν· αὐτὸς οὖν αὑτοῦ κατέγνω φυγήν (13.74.4). The passage suggests that the Athenians had not yet taken any action against the general.

At *Alc.* 36.4-5 Plutarch reports that Alkibiades left Samos when he learned that he had not been reelected to the *strategia*: οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι...ἑτέρους εἵλοντο στρατηγούς, ἐνδεικνύμενοι τὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὀργὴν καὶ κακόνιαν. ἃ δὴ πυνθανόμενος ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ δεδοικὼς ἀπῆλθεν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου παντάπασι.... The implication of the passage is that there was no deposition and that Alkibiades' departure from Samos was voluntary, although prompted by his fear of prosecution. This contradicts Plutarch's statement in his life of Lysander that Alkibiades was deposed by *apocheirotonia*: ...τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ὁ μὲν ἐν ἄστει δῆμος ὀργισθεὶς ἀπεχειροτόνησεν... (*Lys.* 5.2). The contradiction suggests that Plutarch had found conflicting or vague reports in his sources and was himself only guessing at the reasons for Alkibiades' withdrawal from Samos.

I am inclined to believe that Alkibiades was not deposed: Plutarch and Nepos provide evidence in favor of deposition, but both authors are late, and in reporting that Alkibiades was deposed Plutarch is contradicting a statement he makes elsewhere; our other sources make no mention of deposition and give accounts which are at least consistent with the interpretation that Alkibiades retired to the Chersonese in anticipation of punitive action but not because any measures had yet been taken against him. For bibliography on the question see Roberts (1982), pp. 223-224 n. 62.

APPENDIX SIXTEEN

NOTE ON PHILOKLES' GENERALSHIP

There is dispute about the identity of the office from which Philokles was deposed. The question is tied to a larger debate regarding the identity of Philokles himself. The man who is the subject of Dinarchus' third speech was general in 325/4 (*AO* no. 2422), when he enraged the Athenians by admitting Harpalos into the Peiraieus after having been ordered to prevent his entry ([Plut.] *Mor.* 846a; cf. Din. 3.1). Philokles was later tried for taking bribes in connection with the Harpalos affair (Din. 3, *passim*) and was found guilty and exiled (Dem. *Ep.* 3.31). He may have been recalled from exile: at *Ep.* 2.2, 16, and 21 Demosthenes claims that the Athenians were reconciled with all those who were involved in the Harpalos affair except himself.[1] This Philokles, whose patronymic and demotic are not known, may have been the same man as the Philokles of Eroiadai, son of Phormion, who was elected *kosmetes* in 324/3 and crowned at the end of that ephebic year (Metageitnion 323) for his service in office.[2] It has been supposed that the general and the *kosmetes* were the same man both because of the coincidence of their names and because the ἐπιμελεία τῶν ἐφήβων, the office from which the Philokles who was general in 325/4 was deposed (Din. 3.15), was thought to be the office of the *kosmetes*, the supervisor of the ephebes. But neither reason for the identification of the two is compelling: "Philokles" was a common Athenian name,[3] and the phrase ἐπιμελεία τῶν ἐφήβων could refer to a number of Athenian offices other than that of the *kosmetes*, including the *strategia*.[4] Moreover, the identification of Philokles the general with Philokles the *kosmetes* results in chronological difficulties: if there was only one Philokles, he must have begun his term as *kosmetes* in Boedromion 324 and been deposed from that office, tried, exiled, recalled from exile, and reinstated as *kosmetes*, all before Metageitnion 323. It is possible that all these events occurred in the space of one year, but not likely.[5] Given these difficulties and the lack of any compelling reason to

[1] Goldstein (1968), p. 65, takes this as evidence that Philokles was recalled; but Reinmuth (1971), pp. 74-75, argues that in these passages Demosthenes was generalizing for rhetorical effect and is not to be taken seriously.

[2] Reinmuth no. 15.

[3] Gomme (1933), p. 68.

[4] Worthington (1989), p. 81; Reinmuth (1971), pp. 68 and 73; Gomme (1933), p. 68 n. 1.

[5] For discussion see Reinmuth (1971), pp. 75-76.

believe that the general and the *kosmetes* were the same man, I am inclined to believe that they were not, and that Philokles the general was deposed by *apocheirotonia* from the *strategia*, perhaps toward the end of 325/4.[6]

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[6] So Worthington (1989), p. 81, but cf. Goldstein (1968), pp. 278-279. Bosworth (1988), pp. 293-294, believes there was only one Philokles and solves the chronological problems this poses by redating to 329/8 the inscription (Reinmuth no. 15) which informs us that Philokles of Eroiadai was crowned as *kosmetes*. This inscription has conventionally been dated to 324/3 because Dikaiogenes of Kydathenaion is attested in it as general of the Peiraieus (right side, col. I, ll. 4-6), and we know independently that Dikaiogenes was general, perhaps of the Peiraieus, in that year (*IG* ii^2 1631.380-381). Bosworth's proposed date is possible, but there is no positive support for it in our sources; moreover, it requires that a generalship for which there is no evidence be invented for Dikaiogenes in 329/8. For recent discussion and further bibliography on Philokles see Worthington (1992), pp. 315-316 and 328.

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